A Game-Theoretic Model of Cholera with Optimal Personal Protection Strategies

A mathematical model of visceral leishmaniasis transmission and control: Impact of ITNs on VL prevention and elimination in the Indian subcontinent

Visceral Leishmaniasis (VL) is a deadly, vector-borne, parasitic, neglected tropical disease, particularly prevalent on the Indian subcontinent. Sleeping under the long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) was considered an effective VL prevention and control measures, until KalaNet, a large trial in Nepal and India, did not show enough supporting evidence. In this paper, we adapt a biologically accurate, yet relatively simple compartmental ordinary differential equations (ODE) model of VL transmission and explicitly model the use of ITNs and their role in VL prevention and elimination. We also include a game-theoretic analysis in order to determine an optimal use of ITNs from the individuals' perspective. In agreement with the previous more detailed and complex model, we show that the ITNs coverage amongst the susceptible population has to be unrealistically high (over 96%) in order for VL to be eliminated. However, we also show that if the whole population, including symptomatic and asymptomatic VL cases adopt about 90% ITN usage, then VL can be eliminated. Our model also suggests that ITN usage should be accompanied with other interventions such as vector control.

A dynamic game of lymphatic filariasis prevention by voluntary use of insecticide treated nets

Lymphatic filariasis (LF) has been targeted for elimination as a public health concern by 2030 with a goal to keep the prevalence of LF infections under the 1% threshold. While mass drug administration (MDA) is a primary strategy recommended by WHO, the use of insecticide treated nets (ITN) plays a crucial role as an alternative strategy when MDA cannot be used. In this paper, we use imitation dynamics to incorporate human behavior and voluntary use of ITN into the compartmental epidemiological model of LF transmission. We find the equilibrium states of the dynamics and the ITN usage as it depends on epidemiological parameters and the cost of ITNs. We investigate the conditions under which the voluntary use of ITNs can keep the LF prevalence under the 1% threshold. We found that when the cost of using the ITNs is about 105 smaller than the perceived cost of LF, then the voluntary use of ITNs will eliminate LF as a public health concern. Furthermore, when the ITNs are given away for free, our model predicts that over 80% of the population will use them which would eliminate LF completely in regions where Anopheles are the primary vectors.

Analysis of an environmental epidemic model based on voluntary vaccination policy

With the worsening of the environment and the increasing international trade, indirect transmission from exposure to contaminants in the surrounding environment has become an overlooked mode of transmission. This paper proposes a new game-theoretic model considering voluntary vaccination against imperfection and the unique integration of human-to-human and virus-to-human transmission routes. Based on the individual-based risk assessment update rule (IB-RA), the strategy-based risk assessment update rule (SB-RA), and the direct commitment update rule (DC), the different effects of individuals' behaviors on disease prevalence are analyzed. To find the effect of indirect transmission on epidemic transmission, we compare our model with the traditional SVIR model. Finally, it can be seen that indirect transmission mechanisms will aggravate the spread of epidemics.

Imperfect vaccine can yield multiple Nash equilibria in vaccination games

As infectious diseases continue to threaten communities across the globe, people are faced with a choice to vaccinate, or not. Many factors influence this decision, such as the cost of the disease, the chance of contracting the disease, the population vaccination coverage, and the efficacy of the vaccine. While the vaccination games in which individuals decide whether to vaccinate or not based on their own interests are gaining in popularity in recent years, the vaccine imperfection has been an overlooked aspect so far. In this paper we investigate the effects of an imperfect vaccine on the outcomes of a vaccination game. We use a simple SIR compartmental model for the underlying model of disease transmission. We model the vaccine imperfection by adding vaccination at birth and maintain a possibility for the vaccinated individual to become infected. We derive explicit conditions for the existence of different Nash equilibria, the solutions of the vaccination game. The outcomes of the game depend on the complex interplay between disease transmission dynamics (the basic reproduction number), the relative cost of the infection, and the vaccine efficacy. We show that for diseases with relatively low basic reproduction numbers (smaller than about 2.62), there is a little difference between outcomes for perfect or imperfect vaccines and thus the simpler models assuming perfect vaccines are good enough. However, when the basic reproduction number is above 2.62, then, unlike in the case of a perfect vaccine, there can be multiple equilibria. Moreover, unless there is a mandatory vaccination policy in place that would push the vaccination coverage above the value of unstable Nash equilibrium, the population could eventually slip to the "do not vaccinate" state. Thus, for diseases that have relatively high basic reproduction numbers, the potential for the vaccine not being perfect should be explicitly considered in the models.

New numerical dynamics of the fractional monkeypox virus model transmission pertaining to nonsingular kernels

Monkeypox (MPX) is a zoonotic illness that is analogous to smallpox. Monkeypox infections have moved across the forests of Central Africa, where they were first discovered, to other parts of the world. It is transmitted by the monkeypox virus, which is a member of the Poxviridae species and belongs to the Orthopoxvirus genus. In this article, the monkeypox virus is investigated using a deterministic mathematical framework within the Atangana-Baleanu fractional derivative that depends on the generalized Mittag-Leffler (GML) kernel. The system's equilibrium conditions are investigated and examined for robustness. The global stability of the endemic equilibrium is addressed using Jacobian matrix techniques and the Routh-Hurwitz threshold. Furthermore, we also identify a criterion wherein the system's disease-free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. Also, we employ a new approach by combining the two-step Lagrange polynomial and the fundamental concept of fractional calculus. The numerical simulations for multiple fractional orders reveal that as the fractional order reduces from 1, the virus's transmission declines. The analysis results show that the proposed strategy is successful at reducing the number of occurrences in multiple groups. It is evident that the findings suggest that isolating affected people from the general community can assist in limiting the transmission of pathogens.

Voluntary vaccination may not stop monkeypox outbreak: A game-theoretic model

Monkeypox (MPX) is a viral zoonotic disease that was endemic to Central and West Africa. However, during the first half of 2022, MPX spread to almost 60 countries all over the world. Smallpox vaccines are about 85% effective in preventing MPX infections. Our objective is to determine whether the vaccines should be mandated or whether voluntary use of the vaccine could be enough to stop the MPX outbreak. We incorporate a standard SVEIR compartmental model of MPX transmission into a game-theoretical framework. We study a vaccination game in which individuals decide whether or not to vaccinate by assessing their benefits and costs. We solve the game for Nash equilibria, i.e., the vaccination rates the individuals would likely adopt without any outside intervention. We show that, without vaccination, MPX can become endemic in previously non-endemic regions, including the United States. We also show that to "not vaccinate" is often an optimal solution from the individual's perspective. Moreover, we demonstrate that, for some parameter values, there are multiple equilibria of the vaccination game, and they exhibit a backward bifurcation. Thus, without centrally mandated minimal vaccination rates, the population could easily revert to no vaccination scenario.

A game-theoretic model of rabies in domestic dogs with multiple voluntary preventive measures

Game theory is now routinely applied to quantitatively model the decision making of individuals presented with various voluntary actions that can prevent a given disease. Most models consider only a single preventive strategy and the case where multiple preventative actions are available is severely understudied. In our paper, we consider a very simple SI compartmental model of rabies in the domestic dog population. We study two choices of the dog owners: to vaccinate their dogs or to restrict the movements of unvaccinated dogs. We analyze the relatively rich patterns of Nash equilibria (NE). We show that there is always at least one NE at which the owners utilize only one form of prevention. However, there can be up to three different NEs at the same time: two NEs at which the owners use exclusively only the vaccination or movement restriction, and the third NE when the owners use both forms of prevention simultaneously. However, we also show that, unlike the first two types of NEs, the third kind of NE is not convergent stable.

A game-theoretic model of lymphatic filariasis prevention

Lymphatic filariasis (LF) is a mosquito-borne parasitic neglected tropical disease. In 2000, WHO launched the Global Programme to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis (GPELF) as a public health problem. In 2020, new goals for 2030 were set which includes a reduction to 0 of the total population requiring Mass Drug Administrations (MDA), a primary tool of GPELF. We develop a mathematical model to study what can happen at the end of MDA. We use a game-theoretic approach to assess the voluntary use of insect repellents in the prevention of the spread of LF through vector bites. Our results show that when individuals use what they perceive as optimal levels of protection, the LF incidence rates will become high. This is in striking difference to other vector-borne NTDs such as Chagas or zika. We conclude that the voluntary use of the protection alone will not be enough to keep LF eliminated as a public health problem and a more coordinated effort will be needed at the end of MDA.

Game-Theoretical Model of the Voluntary Use of Insect Repellents to Prevent Zika Fever

Zika fever is an emerging mosquito-borne disease. While it often causes no or only mild symptoms that are similar to dengue fever, Zika virus can spread from a pregnant woman to her baby and cause severe birth defects. There is no specific treatment or vaccine, but the disease can be mitigated by using several control strategies, generally focusing on the reduction in mosquitoes or mosquito bites. In this paper, we model Zika virus transmission and incorporate a game-theoretical approach to study a repeated population game of DEET usage to prevent insect bites. We show that the optimal use effectively leads to disease elimination. This result is robust and not significantly dependent on the cost of the insect repellents.

Optimal Voluntary Vaccination of Adults and Adolescents Can Help Eradicate Hepatitis B in China

Hepatitis B (HBV) is one of the most common infectious diseases, with a worldwide annual incidence of over 250 million people. About one-third of the cases are in China. While China made significant efforts to implement a nationwide HBV vaccination program for newborns, a significant number of susceptible adults and teens remain. In this paper, we analyze a game-theoretical model of HBV dynamics that incorporates government-provided vaccination at birth coupled with voluntary vaccinations of susceptible adults and teens. We show that the optimal voluntary vaccination brings the disease incidence to very low levels. This result is robust and, in particular, due to a high HBV treatment cost, essentially independent from the vaccine cost.

Mathematical modelling of the use of insecticide-treated nets for elimination of visceral leishmaniasis in Bihar, India

Visceral leishmaniasis (VL) is a deadly neglected tropical disease caused by a parasite Leishmania donovani and spread by female sand flies Phlebotomus argentipes. There is conflicting evidence regarding the role of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) on the prevention of VL. Numerous studies demonstrated the effectiveness of ITNs. However, KalaNet, a large trial in Nepal and India did not support those findings. The purpose of this paper is to gain insight into the situation by mathematical modelling. We expand a mathematical model of VL transmission based on the KalaNet trial and incorporate the use of ITNs explicitly into the model. One of the major contributions of this work is that we calibrate the model based on the available epidemiological data, generally independent of the KalaNet trial. We validate the model on data collected during the KalaNet trial. We conclude that in order to eliminate VL, the ITN usage would have to stay above 96%. This is higher than the 91% ITNs use at the end of the trial which may explain why the trial did not show a positive effect from ITNs. At the same time, our model indicates that asymptomatic individuals play a crucial role in VL transmission.

A dynamic optimal control model for COVID-19 and cholera co-infection in Yemen

In this work, we propose a new dynamic mathematical model framework governed by a system of differential equations that integrates both COVID-19 and cholera outbreaks. The estimations of the model parameters are based on the outbreaks of COVID-19 and cholera in Yemen from January 1, 2020 to May 30, 2020. Moreover, we present an optimal control model for minimizing both the number of infected people and the cost associated with each control. Four preventive measures are to be taken to control the outbreaks: social distancing, lockdown, the number of tests, and the number of chlorine water tablets (CWTs). Under the current conditions and resources available in Yemen, various policies are simulated to evaluate the optimal policy. The results obtained confirm that the policy of providing resources for the distribution of CWTs, providing sufficient resources for testing with an average social distancing, and quarantining of infected individuals has significant effects on flattening the epidemic curves.

Optimal voluntary and mandatory insect repellent usage and emigration strategies to control the chikungunya outbreak on Reunion Island

In 2005, a chikungunya virus outbreak devastated the tropical island of Reunion, infecting a third of the total population. Motivated by the Reunion Island case study, we investigate the theoretic potential for two intervention measures under both voluntary and mandatory protocols to control a vector-borne disease when there is risk of the disease becoming endemic. The first measure uses insect repellent to prevent mosquito bites, while the second involves emigrating to the neighboring Mauritius Island to avoid infection. There is a threshold on the cost of using repellent above which both voluntary and mandatory regimes find it optimal to forgo usage. Below that threshold, mandatory usage protocols will eradicate the disease; however, voluntary adoption leaves the disease at a small endemic level. Emigrating from the island to avoid infection results in a tragedy-of-the-commons effect: while being potentially beneficial to specific susceptible individuals, the remaining islanders paradoxically face a higher risk of infection. Mandated relocation of susceptible individuals away from the epidemic is viable only if the cost of this relocation is several magnitudes lower than the cost of infection. Since this assumption is unlikely to hold for chikungunya, it is optimal to discourage such emigration for the benefit of the entire population. An underlying assumption about the conservation of human-vector encounter rates in mosquito biting behavior informs our conclusions and may warrant additional experimental verification.

A voluntary use of insecticide treated nets can stop the vector transmission of Chagas disease

One of the stated goals of the London Declaration on Neglected Tropical Diseases is the interruption of domiciliary transmissions of Chagas disease in the region of the Americas. We used a game-theoretic approach to assess the voluntary use of insecticide treated nets (ITNs) in the prevention of the spread of infection through vector bites. Our results show that individuals behave rationally and weigh the risks of insect bites against the cost of the ITNs. The optimal voluntary use of ITNs results in predicted incidence rates that closely track the real incidence rates in Latin America. This means that ITNs are effective and could be used to control the spread of the disease by relying on individual decisions rather than centralized policies. Our model shows that to completely eradicate the vector transmission through the voluntary individual use of ITNs, the cost of ITNs should be as low as possible.

High endemic levels of typhoid fever in rural areas of Ghana may stem from optimal voluntary vaccination behaviour

Typhoid fever has long established itself endemically in rural Ghana despite the availability of cheap and effective vaccines. We used a game-theoretic model to investigate whether the low vaccination coverage in Ghana could be attributed to rational human behaviour. We adopted a version of an epidemiological model of typhoid fever dynamics, which accounted not only for chronic life-long carriers but also for a short-cycle transmission in the immediate environment and a long-cycle transmission via contamination of the water supply. We calibrated the model parameters based on the known incidence data. We found that unless the (perceived) cost of vaccination is negligible, the individually optimal population vaccination rate falls significantly short of the societally optimal population vaccination rate needed to reach herd immunity. We expressed both the herd immunity and the optimal equilibrium vaccination rates in terms of only a few observable parameters such as the incidence rate, demographics, vaccine waning rate and the perceived cost of vaccination relative to the cost of infection. This allowed us not to rely on other uncertain epidemiological model parameters and, in particular, to bypass uncertainties about the role of the carriers in the transmission.

Optimal strategies for vaccination and social distancing in a game-theoretic epidemiologic model

For various infectious diseases, vaccination has become a major intervention strategy. However, the importance of social distancing has recently been highlighted during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In the absence of vaccination, or when vaccine efficacy is poor, social distancing may help to curb the spread of new virus strains. However, both vaccination and social distancing are associated with various costs. It is critical to consider these costs in addition to the benefits of these strategies when determining the optimal rates of application of control strategies. We developed a game-theoretic epidemiological model that considers vaccination and social distancing under the assumption that individuals pursue the maximization of payoffs. By using this model, we identified the individually optimal strategy based on the Nash strategy when both strategies are available and when only one strategy is available. Furthermore, we determined the relative costs of control strategies at which individuals preferentially adopt vaccination over social distancing (or vice versa).

A game-theoretic model of Monkeypox to assess vaccination strategies

Monkeypox (MPX) is a zoonotic disease similar to smallpox. Its fatality rate is about 11% and it is endemic to the Central and West African countries. In this paper, we analyze a compartmental model of MPX dynamics. Our goal is to see whether MPX can be controlled and eradicated by voluntary vaccinations. We show that there are three equilibria—disease free, fully endemic and previously neglected semi-endemic (with disease existing only among humans). The existence of semi-endemic equilibrium has severe implications should the MPX virus mutate to increased viral fitness in humans. We find that MPX is controllable and can be eradicated in a semi-endemic equilibrium by vaccination. However, in a fully endemic equilibrium, MPX cannot be eradicated by vaccination alone.

Game-Theoretical Model of Retroactive Hepatitis B Vaccination in China

Hepatitis B (HepB) is one of the most common infectious diseases affecting over two billion people worldwide. About one third of all HepB cases are in China. In recent years, China made significant efforts to implement a nationwide HepB vaccination program and reduced the number of unvaccinated infants from 30 to 10%. However, many individuals still remain unprotected, particularly those born before 2003. Consequently, a catch-up retroactive vaccination is an important and potentially cost-effective way to reduce HepB prevalence. In this paper, we analyze a game theoretical model of HepB dynamics that incorporates government-provided vaccination at birth coupled with voluntary retroactive vaccinations. Given the uncertainty about the long-term efficacy of the HepB vaccinations, we study several scenarios. When the waning rate is relatively high, we show that this retroactive vaccination should be a necessary component of any HepB eradication effort. When the vaccine offers long-lasting protection, the voluntary retroactive vaccination brings the disease incidence to sufficiently low levels. Also, we find that the optimal vaccination rates are almost independent of the vaccination coverage at birth. Moreover, it is in an individual's self-interest to vaccinate (and potentially re-vaccinate) at a rate just slightly above the vaccine waning rate.

A game-theoretical analysis of poliomyelitis vaccination

Poliomyelitis is a worldwide disease that has nearly been eradicated thanks to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Nevertheless, the disease is currently still endemic in three countries. In this paper, we incorporate the vaccination in a two age-class model of polio dynamics. Our main objective is to see whether mandatory vaccination policy is needed or if polio could be almost eradicated by a voluntary vaccination. We perform game theoretical analysis and compare the herd immunity vaccination levels with the Nash equilibrium vaccination levels. We show that the gap between two vaccination levels is too large. We conclude that the mandatory vaccination policy is therefore needed to achieve a complete eradication.