Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception

Synthetic surprise as the foundation of the psychedelic experience

Psychedelic agents, such as LSD and psilocybin, induce marked alterations in consciousness via activation of the 5-HT2A receptor (5-HT2ARs). We hypothesize that psychedelics enforce a state of synthetic surprise through the biased activation of the 5-HTRs system. This idea is informed by recent insights into the role of 5-HT in signaling surprise. The effects on consciousness, explained by the cognitive penetrability of perception, can be described within the predictive coding framework where surprise corresponds to prediction error, the mismatch between predictions and actual sensory input. Crucially, the precision afforded to the prediction error determines its effect on priors, enabling a dynamic interaction between top-down expectations and incoming sensory data. By integrating recent findings on predictive coding circuitry and 5-HT2ARs transcriptomic data, we propose a biological implementation with emphasis on the role of inhibitory interneurons. Implications arise for the clinical use of psychedelics, which may rely primarily on their inherent capacity to induce surprise in order to disrupt maladaptive patterns.

How the brain controls decision making in a multisensory world

Sensory systems evolved to provide the organism with information about the environment to guide adaptive behaviour. Neuroscientists and psychologists have traditionally considered each sense independently, a legacy of Aristotle and a natural consequence of their distinct physical and anatomical bases. However, from the point of view of the organism, perception and sensorimotor behaviour are fundamentally multi-modal; after all, each modality provides complementary information about the same world. Classic studies revealed much about where and how sensory signals are combined to improve performance, but these tended to treat multisensory integration as a static, passive, bottom-up process. It has become increasingly clear how this approach falls short, ignoring the interplay between perception and action, the temporal dynamics of the decision process and the many ways by which the brain can exert top-down control of integration. The goal of this issue is to highlight recent advances on these higher order aspects of multisensory processing, which together constitute a mainstay of our understanding of complex, natural behaviour and its neural basis. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Self-Prioritization Reconsidered: Scrutinizing Three Claims

Such is the power of self-relevance, it has been argued that even arbitrary stimuli (e.g., shapes, lines, colors) with no prior personal connection are privileged during information processing following their association with the self (i.e., self-prioritization). This prioritization effect, moreover, is deemed to be stimulus driven (i.e., automatic), grounded in perception, and supported by specialized processing operations. Here, however, we scrutinize these claims and challenge this viewpoint. Although self-relevance unquestionably influences information processing, we contend that, at least at present, there is limited evidence to suggest that the prioritization of arbitrary self-related stimuli is compulsory, penetrates perception, and is underpinned by activity in a dedicated neural network. Rather, self-prioritization appears to be a task-dependent product of ordinary cognitive processes.

Hypnotic suggestions cognitively penetrate tactile perception through top-down modulation of semantic contents

Perception is subject to ongoing alterations by learning and top-down influences. Although abundant studies have shown modulation of perception by attention, motivation, content and context, there is an unresolved controversy whether these examples provide true evidence that perception is penetrable by cognition. Here we show that tactile perception assessed as spatial discrimination can be instantaneously and systematically altered merely by the semantic content during hypnotic suggestions. To study neurophysiological correlates, we recorded EEG and SEPs. We found that the suggestion "your index finger becomes bigger" led to improved tactile discrimination, while the suggestion "your index finger becomes smaller" led to impaired discrimination. A hypnosis without semantic suggestions had no effect but caused a reduction of phase-locking synchronization of the beta frequency band between medial frontal cortex and the finger representation in somatosensory cortex. Late SEP components (P80-N140 complex) implicated in attentional processes were altered by the semantic contents, but processing of afferent inputs in SI remained unaltered. These data provide evidence that the psychophysically observed modifiability of tactile perception by semantic contents is not simply due to altered perception-based judgments, but instead is a consequence of modified perceptual processes which change the perceptual experience.

Guns Are Not Faster to Enter Awareness After Seeing a Black Face: Absence of Race-Priming in a Gun/Tool Task During Continuous Flash Suppression

In the Weapon Identification Task (WIT), Black faces prime the identification of guns compared with tools. We measured race-induced changes in visual awareness of guns and tools using continuous flash suppression (CFS). Eighty-four participants, primed with Black or Asian faces, indicated the location of a gun or tool target that was temporarily rendered invisible through CFS, which provides a sensitive measure of effects on early visual processing. The same participants also completed a standard (non-CFS) WIT. We replicated the standard race-priming effect in the WIT. In the CFS task, Black and Asian primes did not affect the time guns and tools needed to enter awareness. Thus, race priming does not alter early visual processing but does change the identification of guns and tools. This confirms that race-priming originates from later post-perceptual memory- or response-related processing.

Visual processing deficits in patients with schizophrenia spectrum and bipolar disorders and associations with psychotic symptoms, and intellectual abilities

Objective

Low-level sensory disruption is hypothesized as a precursor to clinical and cognitive symptoms in severe mental disorders. We compared visual discrimination performance in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder or bipolar disorder with healthy controls, and investigated associations with clinical symptoms and IQ.

Methods

Patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder (n = 32), bipolar disorder (n = 55) and healthy controls (n = 152) completed a computerized visual discrimination task. Participants responded whether the latter of two consecutive grids had higher or lower spatial frequency, and discrimination thresholds were estimated using an adaptive maximum likelihood procedure. Case-control differences in threshold were assessed using linear regression, F-test and post-hoc pair-wise comparisons. Linear models were used to test for associations between visual discrimination threshold and psychotic symptoms derived from the PANSS and IQ assessed using the Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary subtests from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI).

Results

Robust regression revealed a significant main effect of diagnosis on discrimination threshold (robust F = 6.76, p = .001). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that patients with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder (mean = 14%, SD = 0.08) had higher thresholds compared to healthy controls (mean = 10.8%, SD = 0.07, β = 0.35, t = 3.4, p = .002), as did patients with bipolar disorder (12.23%, SD = 0.07, β = 0.21, t = 2.42, p = .04). There was no significant difference between bipolar disorder and schizophrenia (β = -0.14, t = -1.2, p = .45). Linear models revealed negative associations between IQ and threshold across all participants when controlling for diagnostic group (β = -0.3, t = -3.43, p = .0007). This association was found within healthy controls (t = -3.72, p = .0003) and patients with bipolar disorder (t = -2.53, p = .015), and no significant group by IQ interaction on threshold (F = 0.044, p = .97). There were no significant associations between PANSS domain scores and discrimination threshold.

Conclusion

Patients with schizophrenia spectrum or bipolar disorders exhibited higher visual discrimination thresholds than healthy controls, supporting early visual deficits among patients with severe mental illness. Discrimination threshold was negatively associated with IQ among healthy controls and bipolar disorder patients. These findings elucidate perception-related disease mechanisms in severe mental illness, which warrants replication in independent samples.

Seeing What You Believe or Believing What You See? Belief Biases Correlation Estimation

When an analyst or scientist has a belief about how the world works, their thinking can be biased in favor of that belief. Therefore, one bedrock principle of science is to minimize that bias by testing the predictions of one's belief against objective data. But interpreting visualized data is a complex perceptual and cognitive process. Through two crowdsourced experiments, we demonstrate that supposedly objective assessments of the strength of a correlational relationship can be influenced by how strongly a viewer believes in the existence of that relationship. Participants viewed scatterplots depicting a relationship between meaningful variable pairs (e.g., number of environmental regulations and air quality) and estimated their correlations. They also estimated the correlation of the same scatterplots labeled instead with generic 'X' and 'Y' axes. In a separate section, they also reported how strongly they believed there to be a correlation between the meaningful variable pairs. Participants estimated correlations more accurately when they viewed scatterplots labeled with generic axes compared to scatterplots labeled with meaningful variable pairs. Furthermore, when viewers believed that two variables should have a strong relationship, they overestimated correlations between those variables by an r-value of about 0.1. When they believed that the variables should be unrelated, they underestimated the correlations by an r-value of about 0.1. While data visualizations are typically thought to present objective truths to the viewer, these results suggest that existing personal beliefs can bias even objective statistical values people extract from data.

Do psychedelics change beliefs?

Renewed interest in psychedelics has reignited the debate about whether and how they change human beliefs. In both the clinical and social-cognitive domains, psychedelic consumption may be accompanied by profound, and sometimes lasting, belief changes. We review these changes and their possible underlying mechanisms. Rather than inducing de novo beliefs, we argue psychedelics may instead change the impact of affect and of others' suggestions on how beliefs are imputed. Critically, we find that baseline beliefs (in the possible effects of psychedelics, for example) might color the acute effects of psychedelics as well as longer-term changes. If we are to harness the apparent potential of psychedelics in the clinic and for human flourishing more generally, these possibilities must be addressed empirically.

Information in Explaining Cognition: How to Evaluate It?

The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories posit. A systematic identification of these features can reveal the explanatory role that information plays in specific neurocognitive theories, and can, therefore, be both theoretically and practically important. These features can be used, in turn, as desiderata against which candidate theories of information may be evaluated. After discussing some characteristics of explanation in cognitive science and their implications for “information”, three notions are briefly introduced: natural, sensory, and endogenous information. Subsequently, six desiderata are identified and defended based on cognitive scientific practices. The global workspace theory of consciousness is then used as a specific case study that arguably posits either five or six corresponding features of information.

A Review of EEG and fMRI Measuring Aesthetic Processing in Visual User Experience Research

In human-computer interaction, the visual interaction of user experience (UX) and user interface (UI) plays an important role in enriching the quality of daily life. The purpose of our study analyzes the use of brain-computer interface (BCI), wearable technology, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to explore the aesthetic processing of visual neural response to UI and UX designs. Specifically, this review aims to understand neuroaesthetic processing knowledge, aesthetic appreciation models, and the ways in which visual brain studies can improve the quality of current and future UI and UX designs. Recent research has found that subjective evaluations of aesthetic appreciation produce different results for objective evaluations of brain research analysis. We applied SWOT analysis and examined the advantages and disadvantages of both evaluation methods. Furthermore, we conducted a traditional literature review on topics pertaining to the use of aesthetic processing knowledge in the visual interaction field in terms of art therapy, information visualization, website or mobile applications, and other interactive platforms. Our main research findings from current studies have helped and motivated researchers and designers to use convincing scientific knowledge of brain event-related potential, electroencephalography, and fMRI to understand aesthetic judgment. The key trend finds that many designers, artists, and engineers use artistic BCI technology in the visual interaction experience. Herein, the scientific methods applied in the aesthetic appreciation to human-computer interface are summarized, and the influence of the latest wearable brain technology on visual interaction design is discussed. Furthermore, current possible research entry points for aesthetics, usability, and creativity in UI and UX designs are explicated. The study results have implications for the visual user experience research domain as well as for interaction industries, which produce interactive projects to improve people's daily lives.

Attention allocation on mobile app interfaces when human interacts with them

With the popularity of smartphones and the pervasion of mobile apps, people spend more and more time to interact with a diversity of apps on their smartphones, especially for young population. This raises a question: how people allocate attention to interfaces of apps during using them. To address this question, we, in this study, designed an experiment with two sessions (i.e., Session1: browsing original interfaces; Session 2: browsing interfaces after removal of colors and background) integrating with an eyetracking system. Attention fixation durations were recorded by an eye-tracker while participants browsed app interfaces. The whole screen of smartphone was divided into four even regions to explore fixation durations. The results revealed that participants gave significantly longer total fixation duration on the bottom left region compared to other regions in the session (1) Longer total fixation duration on the bottom was preserved, but there is no significant difference between left side and right side in the session2. Similar to the finding of total fixation duration, first fixation duration is also predominantly paid on the bottom area of the interface. Moreover, the skill in the use of mobile phone was quantified by assessing familiarity and accuracy of phone operation and was investigated in the association with the fixation durations. We found that first fixation duration of the bottom left region is significantly negatively correlated with the smartphone operation level in the session 1, but there is no significant correlation between them in the session (2) According to the results of ratio exploration, the ratio of the first fixation duration to the total fixation duration is not significantly different between areas of interest for both sessions. The findings of this study provide insights into the attention allocation during browsing app interfaces and are of implications on the design of app interfaces and advertisements as layout can be optimized according to the attention allocation to maximally deliver information.

Bayes, predictive processing, and the cognitive architecture of motor control

Despite their popularity, relatively scant attention has been paid to the upshot of Bayesian and predictive processing models of cognition for views of overall cognitive architecture. Many of these models are hierarchical; they posit generative models at multiple distinct "levels," whose job is to predict the consequences of sensory input at lower levels. I articulate one possible position that could be implied by these models, namely, that there is a continuous hierarchy of perception, cognition, and action control comprising levels of generative models. I argue that this view is not entailed by a general Bayesian/predictive processing outlook. Bayesian approaches are compatible with distinct formats of mental representation. Focusing on Bayesian approaches to motor control, I argue that the junctures between different types of mental representation are places where the transitivity of hierarchical prediction may be broken, and I consider the upshot of this conclusion for broader discussions of cognitive architecture.

V1 as an egocentric cognitive map

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1's laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.

Linguistic labels cue biological motion perception and misperception

Linguistic labels exert a particularly strong top-down influence on perception. The potency of this influence has been ascribed to their ability to evoke category-diagnostic features of concepts. In doing this, they facilitate the formation of a perceptual template concordant with those features, effectively biasing perceptual activation towards the labelled category. In this study, we employ a cueing paradigm with moving, point-light stimuli across three experiments, in order to examine how the number of biological motion features (form and kinematics) encoded in lexical cues modulates the efficacy of lexical top-down influence on perception. We find that the magnitude of lexical influence on biological motion perception rises as a function of the number of biological motion-relevant features carried by both cue and target. When lexical cues encode multiple biological motion features, this influence is robust enough to mislead participants into reporting erroneous percepts, even when a masking level yielding high performance is used.

Age biases the judgment rather than the perception of an ambiguous figure

Older participants who are briefly presented with the ‘my wife/mother-in-law’ ambiguous figure estimate its age to be higher than young participants do. This finding is thought to be the result of a subconscious social group bias that influences participants’ perception of the figure. Because people are better able to recognize similarly aged individuals, young participants are expected to perceive the ambiguous figure as a young woman, while older participants are more likely to recognize an older lady. We replicate the difference in age estimates, but find no relationship between participants’ age and their perception of the ambiguous figure. This leads us to conclude that the positive relationship between participants’ age and their age estimates of the ambiguous ‘my wife/mother-in-law’ figure is better explained by the own-age anchor effect, which holds that people use their own age as a yard stick to judge the age of the figure, regardless of whether the young woman or the older lady is perceived. Our results disqualify the original finding as an example of cognitive penetrability: the participants’ age biases their judgment of the ambiguous figure, not its perception.

Penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana: Evidencia empírica en humanos

Con base en un trasfondo teórico sobre las concepciones modulares de la mente de Fodor (2001) y Pinker (2005), el objetivo del presente texto es analizar cualitativemente la solidez de la evidencia experimental de una muestra de artículos publicados entre 2002 y 2017 que apoyan la tesis de la penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana. El estudio se justifica por las implicaciones que pueden tener los resultados de estas investigaciones para las diferentes concepciones sobre arquitectura mental en funciones perceptuales, procesamiento de la información intra e intermodular e isomorfismo entre arquitectura mental y cerebral. La metodología que se utilizó para realizar este estudio implicó establecimiento de la tesis y de los criterios de inclusión de los artículos a revisar, selección final de los artículos más representativos sobre las subáreas seleccionadas, análisis de la calidad metodológica y de los resultados de éstos, identificación de aportes específicos de cada estudio a la tesis planteada e interpretación y síntesis de los hallazgos. De 26 artículos revisados sobre el tema, se reportan y analizan 7, que se consideran representativos de 4 subáreas: penetrabilidad de expectativas, de percepción del color, de rasgos faciales y de reconocimiento de objetos. Se concluye que hay amplia y sólida evidencia convergente (perceptual y neurofisiológica) a favor de los fenómenos penetrativos en la visión temprana, lo cual apoyaría indirectamente la hipótesis de permeabilidad de los módulos mentales de Pinker. Se formulan recomendaciones sobre aspectos por investigar y variables a controlar en experimentos sobre este tema.

The impact of team preferences on soccer offside judgments in laypersons: a quasi-experimental study

The present study uses a quasi-experimental design to investigate the impact of team preferences on the accuracy of offside judgments. In Experiments 1 and 2, supporters of two German soccer clubs (i.e., Borussia Dortmund and FC Schalke 04) judged offsides in artificial scenes from a match between the clubs. We expected that supporters of both clubs would less frequently report the offside position of a forward from the preferred team. The results of Experiment 1 partly confirmed the predictions. Both groups reported the offside position of a yellow forward less frequently than that of a blue forward, and this effect was much larger for supporters of Borussia Dortmund than for supporters of Schalke 04. The difference between groups could be attributed to team preferences. The weaker effect of team preference in supporters of Schalke 04 was attributed to an unexpected perceptual effect that increased the accuracy of offside judgments for blue forwards in both groups. Experiments 2 and 3 showed the presumed effect of team preferences and the perceptual effect, respectively, in isolation. In summary, the results of our experiments provide evidence for (a) an effect of team preferences and (b) an effect of shirt–background contrast on offside judgments in soccer.

A neurodynamic model of the interaction between color perception and color memory

The memory color effect and Spanish castle illusion have been taken as evidence of the cognitive penetrability of vision. In the same manner, the successful decoding of color-related brain signals in functional neuroimaging studies suggests the retrieval of memory colors associated with a perceived gray object. Here, we offer an alternative account of these findings based on the design principles of adaptive resonance theory (ART). In ART, conscious perception is a consequence of a resonant state. Resonance emerges in a recurrent cortical circuit when a bottom-up spatial pattern agrees with the top-down expectation. When they do not agree, a special control mechanism is activated that resets the network and clears off erroneous expectation, thus allowing the bottom-up activity to always dominate in perception. We developed a color ART circuit and evaluated its behavior in computer simulations. The model helps to explain how traces of erroneous expectations about incoming color are eventually removed from the color perception, although their transient effect may be visible in behavioral responses or in brain imaging. Our results suggest that the color ART circuit, as a predictive computational system, is almost never penetrable, because it is equipped with computational mechanisms designed to constrain the impact of the top-down predictions on ongoing perceptual processing.

Parental Perception of Changes in Basic Life Needs of Children with Disabilities after Six Months of Therapeutic Horseback Riding: A Qualitative Study

Therapeutic horseback riding (THR) has a positive effect on the physical, cognitive, and psychosocial functioning of children with disabilities. Parents’ reports of the effects of THR on their children support professionals in individualizing the THR program. With this qualitative study, we aimed to explore parents’ perceptions of changes in the basic life needs of their children with disabilities after six months of THR lessons and to survey parents’ explanations for the causes of these changes. The study involved parents of 13 children with disabilities who were enrolled in a six-month THR program. Parents continuously monitored their children and wrote a report on possible changes in their child’s needs according to Virginia Henderson’s need theory. Qualitative content analysis of parents’ reports indicated only positive changes in 11 children. Most codes were identified in categories “relationships and communication with other people” and “movement and posturing”. Other categories identified codes such as easier breathing, a better quality of sleep, better appetite, better elimination of stool and urine, more independence in clothing and maintaining personal hygiene, and greater interest in play and learning. Parents’ reports are further supported by the assessments of professionals. Most parents think THR is responsible for the noticeable improvements in their children’s quality of life.

Expectation Causes Misperception of the Attitude Indicator in Nonpilots: A Fixed-Base Simulator Experiment

Previous studies show that pilots sometimes make roll reversal errors (RREs) when responding to the aircraft bank angle shown on the attitude indicator (AI). This is suggestive of a perceptual ambiguity in the AI. In the current study, we investigated whether expectation contributes to such misperception. Twenty nonpilots performed tasks in a fixed-base flight simulator. Their expectation about the bank angle was manipulated with a flying task using outside view only. When flying at a bank angle, the outside view disappeared, a moving-horizon type AI was shown, and participants had to roll the wings level, trusting the AI. The AI often matched the previously flown turn. However, in some runs, it showed an opposite bank direction (Opposite condition), which was hypothesized to facilitate a misperception. In some other runs, it showed level flight (Level condition), which should not facilitate this. In a second session, participants rolled wings level without preceding flying task (Baseline condition). Participants made 11.2 times more RREs in the Opposite condition (75% error rate) compared to Baseline condition (6.7%), and 2.5 times more compared to the Level condition (30%). This indicates that RREs were in many cases caused by expectation-induced misperception of the AI bank angle.

The Effect of Confidence Rating on a Primary Visual Task

The current study explored the influence of confidence rating on visual acuity. We used brief exposures of the Landolt gap discrimination task, probing the primary visual ability to detect contrast. During 200 practice trials, participants in the Confidence Rating group rated their response-confidence in each trial. A second (Time Delay) group received a short break at the end of each trial, equivalent to the average rating response time of the Confidence Rating group. The third (Standard Task) group performed the Landolt gap task in its original form. During practice, the Confidence Rating group developed an efficient monitoring ability indicated by a significant correlation between accuracy and confidence rating and a moderate calibration index score. Following practice, all groups performed 400 identical test trials of the standard Landolt gap task. In the test trials, the Confidence Rating group responded more accurately than the control groups, though it did not differ from them in response time for correct answers. Remarkably, the Confidence Rating group was significantly slower when making errors, compared the control groups. An interaction in learning efficiency occurred: the Confidence Rating group significantly improved its reaction times after the initial practice, as compared to both control groups. The findings demonstrate an effect of confidence rating on the formation of processing and response strategies, which granted participants significant benefits in later performance.

Dissociating Sensory and Cognitive Biases in Human Perceptual Decision-Making: A Re-evaluation of Evidence From Reference Repulsion

Our perception of the world is governed by a combination of bottom-up sensory and top-down cognitive processes. This often begs the question whether a perceptual phenomenon originates from sensory or cognitive processes in the brain. For instance, reference repulsion, a compelling visual illusion in which the subjective estimates about the direction of a motion stimulus are biased away from a reference boundary, is previously thought to be originated at the sensory level. Recent studies, however, suggest that the misperception is not sensory in nature but rather reflects post-perceptual cognitive biases. Here I challenge the post-perceptual interpretations on both empirical and conceptual grounds. I argue that these new findings are not incompatible with the sensory account and can be more parsimoniously explained as reflecting the consequences of motion representations in different reference frames. Finally, I will propose one concrete experiment with testable predictions to shed more insights on the sensory vs. cognitive nature of this visual illusion.

The cognitive penetrability of perception: A blocked debate and a tentative solution

Despite the extensive body of psychological findings suggesting that cognition influences perception, the debate between defenders and detractors of the cognitive penetrability of perception persists. While detractors demand more strictness in psychological experiments, proponents consider that empirical studies show that cognitive penetrability occurs. These considerations have led some theorists to propose that the debate has reached a dead end. The issue about where perception ends and cognition begins is, I argue, one of the reasons why the debate is cornered. Another reason is the inability of psychological studies to present uncontroversial interpretations of the results obtained. To dive into other kinds of empirical sources is, therefore, required to clarify the debate. In this paper, I explain where the debate is blocked, and suggest that neuroscientific evidence together with the predictive coding account, might decant the discussion on the side of the penetrability thesis.

Preliminary Evidence of a Missing Self Bias in Face Perception for Individuals with Dissociative Identity Disorder

Failing to recognize one's mirror image can signal an abnormality in one's sense of self. In dissociative identity disorder (DID), individuals often report that their mirror image can feel unfamiliar or distorted. They also experience some of their own thoughts, emotions, and bodily sensations as if they are nonautobiographical and sometimes as if instead, they belong to someone else. To assess these experiences, we designed a novel backwards masking paradigm in which participants were covertly shown their own face, masked by a stranger's face. Participants rated feelings of familiarity associated with the strangers' faces. 21 control participants without trauma-generated dissociation rated masks, which were covertly preceded by their own face, as more familiar compared to masks preceded by a stranger's face. In contrast, across two samples, 28 individuals with DID and similar clinical presentations (DSM-IV Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise Specified type 1) did not show increased familiarity ratings to their own masked face. However, their familiarity ratings interacted with self-reported identity state integration. Individuals with higher levels of identity state integration had response patterns similar to control participants. These data provide empirical evidence of aberrant self-referential processing in DID/DDNOS and suggest this is restored with identity state integration.

Perceptual learning

Perceptual learning involves long-term changes to perception due to practice or experience. While perceptual learning has been studied for over a century in philosophy and psychology, research into the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying perceptual learning remains an area of ongoing development. This review explores what perceptual learning is and how it occurs, with a focus on areas of controversy. It then turns to several current debates. First, it explores the debate as to whether such learning involves genuine perceptual change at all, rather than a change in action, attention, or decision-making. Second, it questions the role that higher-cognitive mechanisms, like attention, might play in perceptual learning. Does perceptual learning require attention, or can it occur through mere exposure in the absence of attention? Third, it examines a debate about what perceptual learning means for the perception-cognition divide. Does it blur the divide or preserve it? This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Psychology > Learning.

Tweaking the concepts of perception and cognition

One approach to the issue of a joint in nature between perception and cognition is to investigate whether the concepts of perception and cognition can be tweaked to avoid direct, content-specific effects of cognition on perception.

Getting a grasp on action-specific scaling: A response to Witt (2017)

Can higher level cognition directly influence visual spatial perception? Many recent studies have claimed so, on the basis that manipulating cognitive factors (e.g., morality, emotion, action capacity) seems to directly affect perception. However, Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016) argued that such studies often fall prey to at least one of six pitfalls. They further argued that if an effect could be accounted for by any of these pitfalls, it is not a true demonstration of a top-down influence of cognition on perception. In response to Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016), Witt (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(4), 999–1021, 2017) discussed four action-specific scaling effects which, she argued, withstand all six pitfalls and thus demonstrate true perceptual changes caused by differences in action capacity. Her third case study was the influence of apparent grasping capacity on perceived object size. In this article, we provide new interpretations of previous findings and assess recent data which suggest that this effect is not, in fact, perceptual. Instead, we believe that many earlier studies showing this effect are subject to one or more of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016). We substantiate our claims with recent empirical evidence from our laboratory which suggests that neither actual nor perceived grasping capacity directly influence perceived object size. We conclude that studies manipulating grasping capacity do not provide evidence for the action-specific account because variation in this factor does not directly influence size perception.

Cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion.

Self-prioritization and perceptual matching: The effects of temporal construal

Recent research has revealed that self-referential processing enhances perceptual judgments - the so-called self-prioritization effect. The extent and origin of this effect remains unknown, however. Noting the multifaceted nature of the self, here we hypothesized that temporal influences on self-construal (i.e., past/future-self continuity) may serve as an important determinant of stimulus prioritization. Specifically, as representations of the self increase in abstraction as a function of temporal distance (i.e., distance from now), self-prioritization may only emerge when stimuli are associated with the current self. The results of three experiments supported this prediction. Self-relevance only enhanced performance in a standard perceptual-matching task when stimuli (i.e., geometric shapes) were connected with the current self; representations of the self in the future (Expts. 1 & 2) and past (Expt. 3) failed to facilitate decision making. To identify the processes underlying task performance, data were interrogated using a hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) approach. Results of these analyses revealed that self-prioritization was underpinned by a stimulus bias (i.e., rate of information uptake). Collectively, these findings elucidate when and how self-relevance influences decisional processing.

Neonatal Imitation: Theory, Experimental Design, and Significance for the Field of Social Cognition

Neonatal imitation has rich implications for neuroscience, developmental psychology, and social cognition, but there is little consensus about this phenomenon. The primary empirical question, whether or not neonatal imitation exists, is not settled. Is it possible to give a balanced evaluation of the theories and methodologies at stake so as to facilitate real progress with respect to the primary empirical question? In this paper, we address this question. We present the operational definition of differential imitation and discuss why it is important to keep it in mind. The operational definition indicates that neonatal imitation may not look like prototypical imitation and sets non-obvious requirements on what can count as evidence for imitation. We also examine the principal explanations for the extant findings and argue that two theories, the arousal hypothesis and the Association by Similarity Theory, which interprets neonatal imitation as differential induction of spontaneous behavior through similarity, offer better explanations than the others. With respect to methodology, we investigate what experimental design can best provide evidence for imitation, focusing on how differential induction may be maximized and detected. Finally, we discuss the significance of neonatal imitation for the field of social cognition. Specifically, we propose links with theories of social interaction and direct social perception. Overall, our goals are to help clarify the complex theoretical issues at stake and suggest fruitful guidelines for empirical research.

Pre-cueing, the Epistemic Role of Early Vision, and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision

I have argued (Raftopoulos, 2009, 2014) that early vision is not directly affected by cognition since its processes do not draw on cognition as an informational resource; early vision processes do not operate over cognitive contents, which is the essence of the claim that perception is cognitively penetrated; early vision is cognitively impenetrable. Recently it has been argued that there are cognitive effects that affect early vision, such as the various pre-cueing effects guided by cognitively driven attention, which suggests that early vision is cognitively penetrated. In addition, since the signatures of these effects are found in early vision it seems that early vision is directly affected by cognition since its processes seem to use cognitive information. I defend the cognitive impenetrability of early vision in three steps. First, I discuss the problems the cognitively penetrability of perception causes for the epistemic role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. Second, I argue that whether a set of perceptual processes is cognitively penetrated hinges on whether there are cognitive effects that undermine the justificatory role of these processes in grounding empirical beliefs, and I examine the epistemic role of early vision. I argue, third, that the cognitive effects that act through pre-cueing do not undermine this role and, thus, do not render early vision cognitively penetrable. In addition, they do not entail that early vision uses cognitive information.

Constructing emotion through simulation

Evidence increasingly suggests that simulations implement patterns of prior experience to construct one's current experience, whether that experience is oriented in the past, in the here and now, or in the future. Simulation is the mechanism by which the brain capitalizes on prior learning to efficiently navigate the situation at hand. This review examines the latest developments in theory and empirical research that address simulation during emotional phenomena. Integration of evidence across multiple literatures suggests that simulation accounts provide a unifying framework across many different emotional phenomena and highlights the importance of investigating dynamics, complexity, and variation in emotional experiences moving forward.

The iterative nature of person construal: Evidence from event-related potentials

Recently, a dynamic-interactive model of person construal (DI model) has been proposed, whereby the social categories a person represents are determined on the basis of an iterative integration of bottom-up and top-down influences. The current study sought to test this model by leveraging the high temporal resolution of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) as 65 participants viewed male faces that varied by race (White vs Black), fixating either between the eyes or on the forehead. Within face presentations, the effect of fixation, meant to vary bottom-up visual input, initially was large but decreased across early latency neural responses identified by a principal components analysis (PCA). In contrast, the effect of race, reflecting a combination of top-down and bottom-up factors, initially was small but increased across early latency principal components. These patterns support the DI model prediction that bottom-up and top-down processes are iteratively integrated to arrive at a stable construal within 230 ms. Additionally, exploratory multilevel modeling of single trial ERP responses representing a component linked to outgroup categorization (the P2) suggests change in effects of the manipulations over the course of the experiment. Implications of the findings for the DI model are considered.

Are You Smiling, or Have I Seen You Before? Familiarity Makes Faces Look Happier

It is clear that unreinforced repetition (familiarization) influences affective responses to social stimuli, but its effects on the perception of facial emotion are unknown. Reporting the results of two experiments, we show for the first time that repeated exposure enhances the perceived happiness of facial expressions. In Experiment 1, using a paradigm in which subjects' responses were orthogonal to happiness in order to avoid response biases, we found that faces of individuals who had previously been shown were deemed happier than novel faces. In Experiment 2, we replicated this effect with a rapid "happy or angry" categorization task. Using psychometric function fitting, we found that for subjects to classify a face as happy, they needed less actual happiness to be present in the face if the target was familiar than if it was novel. Critically, our results suggest that familiar faces appear happier than novel faces because familiarity selectively enhances the impact of positive stimulus features.

Assessing the Role of the 'Unity Assumption' on Multisensory Integration: A Review

There has been longstanding interest from both experimental psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists in the potential modulatory role of various top-down factors on multisensory integration/perception in humans. One such top-down influence, often referred to in the literature as the 'unity assumption,' is thought to occur in those situations in which an observer considers that various of the unisensory stimuli that they have been presented with belong to one and the same object or event (Welch and Warren, 1980). Here, we review the possible factors that may lead to the emergence of the unity assumption. We then critically evaluate the evidence concerning the consequences of the unity assumption from studies of the spatial and temporal ventriloquism effects, from the McGurk effect, and from the Colavita visual dominance paradigm. The research that has been published to date using these tasks provides support for the claim that the unity assumption influences multisensory perception under at least a subset of experimental conditions. We then consider whether the notion has been superseded in recent years by the introduction of priors in Bayesian causal inference models of human multisensory perception. We suggest that the prior of common cause (that is, the prior concerning whether multisensory signals originate from the same source or not) offers the most useful way to quantify the unity assumption as a continuous cognitive variable.

Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments from Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation

The main thesis of this paper is that two prevailing theories about cognitive penetration are too extreme, namely, the view that cognitive penetration is pervasive and the view that there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between cognition and perception, which precludes any type of cognitive penetration. These opposite views have clear merits and empirical support. To eliminate this puzzling situation, we present an alternative theoretical approach that incorporates the merits of these views into a broader and more nuanced explanatory framework. A key argument we present in favor of this framework concerns the evolution of intentionality and perceptual capacities. An implication of this argument is that cases of cognitive penetration must have evolved more recently and that this is compatible with the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual stages of processing information. A theoretical approach that explains why this should be the case is the consciousness and attention dissociation framework. The paper discusses why concepts, particularly issues concerning concept acquisition, play an important role in the interaction between perception and cognition.

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder

It is argued that during ongoing visual perception, the brain is generating top-down predictions to facilitate, guide and constrain the processing of incoming sensory input. Here we demonstrate that these predictions are drawn from a diverse range of cognitive processes, in order to generate the richest and most informative prediction signals. This is consistent with a central role for cognitive penetrability in visual perception. We review behavioural and mechanistic evidence that indicate a wide spectrum of domains-including object recognition, contextual associations, cognitive biases and affective state-that can directly influence visual perception. We combine these insights from the healthy brain with novel observations from neuropsychiatric disorders involving visual hallucinations, which highlight the consequences of imbalance between top-down signals and incoming sensory information. Together, these lines of evidence converge to indicate that predictive penetration, be it cognitive, social or emotional, should be considered a fundamental framework that supports visual perception.