How ideological migration geographically segregates groups

A post-Brexit intergroup contact intervention reduces affective polarization between Leavers and Remainers short-term

With mounting evidence of the harmful societal consequences of affective polarization, it is crucial to find ways of addressing it. Employing a randomized controlled trial, this study tested the effectiveness of an intervention based on theories of intergroup contact and interpersonal communication in reducing affective polarization in the context of Brexit. Participants were 120 UK self-identified Leavers and Remainers. Sixty Leaver-Remainer dyads were randomized to engage in either a facilitated intergroup interaction or a control interaction, which was equivalent in structure and tone but was unrelated to Brexit identities. Different aspects of affective polarization were assessed one month prior, immediately after, and one month after the intervention. Results indicate that the intervention increased warmth toward the outgroup, reduced unfavourable attributions of the sources of outgroup positions, and increased willingness to compromise, but only short-term. There were no statistically significant longer-term effects of the intervention. Evidence of selective attrition further suggests that those with more extreme baseline opinions were more likely to drop out. Our findings highlight the challenges of designing effective interventions that engender enduring attitude change in polarized contexts and of engaging those with extreme political views. This study can provide a useful framework for future research.

Misplaced Divides? Discussing Political Disagreement With Strangers Can Be Unexpectedly Positive

Differences of opinion between people are common in everyday life, but discussing those differences openly in conversation may be unnecessarily rare. We report three experiments (N = 1,264 U.S.-based adults) demonstrating that people's interest in discussing important but potentially divisive topics is guided by their expectations about how positively the conversation will unfold, leaving them more interested in having a conversation with someone who agrees versus disagrees with them. People's expectations about their conversations, however, were systematically miscalibrated such that people underestimated how positive these conversations would be-especially in cases of disagreement. Miscalibrated expectations stemmed from underestimating the degree of common ground that would emerge in conversation and from failing to appreciate the power of social forces in conversation that create social connection. Misunderstanding the outcomes of conversation could lead people to avoid discussing disagreements more often, creating a misplaced barrier to learning, social connection, free inquiry, and free expression.

Moral foundations and HPV vaccine acceptance in the United States: State, parental, and individual factors

RATIONALE

Appeals to intuitive morality may present a novel approach to addressing vaccine hesitancy.

OBJECTIVE

To better understand the relationship between morality and vaccination by employing Moral Foundations Theory to studies surrounding the HPV vaccination at multiple different levels of decision making.

METHOD

We employed three different study modalities which examined moralities link to vaccination by employing Moral Foundations Theory. A state-wide ecological study aimed to understand population level trends. Two randomized control interventional studies were then created to understand the effects of Moral Foundations Theory based interventions on both parents of children and individual decision makers.

RESULTS

We demonstrated a negative association at the state level between the purity moral foundations and HPV vaccination rates (β = -.75, SE 0.23; p < .01) and a positive association between loyalty and HPV vaccination rates (β = 0.62 SE 0.24; p < .05). The parental study built upon this by demonstrating negative association between higher moral purity scores and attitudes towards the HPV vaccine and intention to vaccinate their children (β = -0.27 SE 0.07; p < .001). Our final study demonstrated a Moral Foundations Theory based intervention was associated with an increase in the odds of indicating an intention to receive the HPV vaccination (adjusted Odds Ratio (aOR) 2.59, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) 1.62-4.14). This equates to a 20% increase in the predicted probability of the intention to receive an HPV vaccine (39% CI (36%-42%) vs 60% CI (57%-63%).

CONCLUSIONS

Together, these studies demonstrate that moral foundations, specifically the purity foundation, appear to have a strong and consistent relationship with HPV vaccination. They also demonstrate the how moral values-based interventions may serve as a novel approach to increase HPV vaccine uptake with potential to be employed to target vaccine hesitancy more broadly.

Political Person-Culture Match and Longevity: The Partisanship-Mortality Link Depends on the Cultural Context

Recent studies demonstrate that Republicans live longer than Democrats. We examined whether these longevity benefits are universal or culturally varying. Following a person-culture match perspective, we hypothesized that Republicans' longevity benefits occur in Republican, but not in Democratic, states. To test this argument, we conducted two studies among U.S. adults. In preregistered Study 1, we used large survey data (extended U.S. General Social Survey; N = 42,855). In confirmatory Study 2, we analyzed obituaries/biographies of deceased U.S. political partisans (novel data web-scraped from an online cemetery; N = 9,177). Both studies supported the person-culture match perspective with substantial effect sizes. In Republican contexts, up to 50.1% of all Republicans but only 36.3% of all Democrats reached an age of 80 years. In Democratic contexts, there was no such longevity gap. Robustness tests showed that this effect generalizes to political ideology and holds across spatial levels but is limited to persons with strong political convictions.

Partner choice and cooperation in social dilemmas can increase resource inequality

Cooperation is more likely when individuals can choose their interaction partner. However, partner choice may be detrimental in unequal societies, in which individuals differ in available resources and productivity, and thus in their attractiveness as interaction partners. Here we experimentally examine this conjecture in a repeated public goods game. Individuals (n = 336), participating in groups of eight participants, are assigned a high or low endowment and a high or low productivity factor (the value that their cooperation generates), creating four unique participant types. On each round, individuals are either assigned a partner (assigned partner condition) or paired based on their self-indicated preference for a partner type (partner choice condition). Results show that under partner choice, individuals who were assigned a high endowment and high productivity almost exclusively interact with each other, forcing other individuals into less valuable pairs. Consequently, pre-existing resource differences between individuals increase. These findings show how partner choice in social dilemmas can amplify resource inequality.

If graffiti changed anything, it would be illegal. The influence of political graffiti on the perception of neighborhoods and intergroup attitudes

In a series of three studies (total N = 956), we examined how political graffiti, which serves as a representation of prevailing social norms, influences the evaluation of social cohesion and neighborhood inhabitants depending on the individuals political orientation. In line with our hypothesis, results of Study 1 (N = 199) indicated that individuals tended to express more positive evaluations of the social cohesion within a neighborhood when the political graffiti aligns with their own political orientation. Conversely, when confronted with counter-attitudinal political graffiti, participants reported lower evaluations of social cohesion. In Study 2, a sensitive scale to assess social cohesion was developed. Study 3 (N = 550) investigated the dose-response relationship of right-wing political graffiti and replicated the results from Study 1. Consistent with our hypotheses, even a minimal presence of right-wing graffiti exerted a significant impact on participants' evaluations of the neighborhood and interacted with the participants political orientation. Taken together, our studies shed light on the crucial role of the individuals' own political orientation for the evaluation of neighborhoods and their inhabitants. Furthermore, we offer insights into how these perceptions may influence intergroup attitudes toward foreigners living in Germany. The implications of our findings are highly relevant to ongoing discussions surrounding social norms within neighborhoods. By highlighting the significance of political graffiti as a representation of social norms, our research contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play in evaluating neighborhoods and their social fabric.

Ideological prejudice is stronger in ideological extremists (vs. moderates)

The agency–beliefs–communion (ABC) model and worldview conflict research show that people rate groups as more moral and likable if they rate their ideology as more similar to the ideology of the self. This paper refers to this effect as ideological prejudice. There is a debate whether ideology moderates the effect size of ideological prejudice. Through three observational studies ( NS1 = 700, NS2 = 974, NS3 = 633), this paper contributes to this debate in three ways. First and primarily, the paper shows that ideological prejudice is stronger in conservatives and progressives compared to people with more moderate ideological beliefs. Second, stronger ideological prejudice in ideological extremists (vs. moderates) holds when controlling for stronger ingroup favoritism in ideological extremists (vs. moderates). And third, the paper suggests that higher importance of own ideology in ideological extremists (vs. moderates) may explain why ideological prejudice is stronger in ideological extremists (vs. moderates). These findings develop a part of the ABC model of stereotypes, contribute to worldview conflict research, and help to explain why ideological polarization is divisive.

The changing association between political ideology and closed-mindedness: Left and right have become more alike

Evidence suggests that politically right-leaning individuals are more likely to be closed-minded. Whether this association is inherent or subject to change has been the subject of debate, yet has not been formally tested. Through a meta-analysis, we find evidence of a changing association between conservatism and facets of closed-mindedness in the U.S. and international context using 341 unique samples, over 200,000 participants, and 920 estimates over 71 years. In the U.S., data ranging from 1948 to 2019 revealed a linear decline in the association between social conservatism (SC) and closed-mindedness, though economic conservatism (EC) did not vary in its association with closed-mindedness over time. Internationally across 18 countries, excluding the U.S., we observed a curvilinear decline in the association between SC and closed-mindedness over that same time, but no change in ECs association. We also tested variation over time for attitudinal measures of conservatism ranging between 1987 to 2018. In the U.S., we observed a linear increase in the association between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and closed-mindedness, with a similar linear increase in the association between social dominance orientation (SDO) and closed-mindedness. Internationally, there was a curvilinear increase in the association between RWA and closed-mindedness, but no change in the association with SDO. We discuss the changes to the political landscape that might explain our findings.

Space-Focused Stereotypes About People Living With HIV/AIDS and the Effects on Community-Approaching Willingness

Targeting people living with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), this research examined the prevalence of space-focused stereotypes and their underlying mechanism on behavioral inclinations. Study 1 adopted the explicit nomination and implicit Go/No-Go association tests to explore the existence of space-focused stereotypes of people living with HIV/AIDS. The results demonstrated that space-focused stereotypes were only manifested explicitly with characteristics such as messy, dirty, and gloomy. Study 2 demonstrated a more negative evaluation and community-approaching willingness for communities that include people living with HIV/AIDS than those without HIV/AIDS. Additionally, space-focused stereotypes were found to have an indirect influence on community-approaching willingness; the influence was mediated by both emotional (threat perception) and cognitive factors (community evaluation). These results indicate the deviation of explicit and implicit space-focused stereotypes. More importantly, it revealed that space-focused stereotypes decreased community evaluation and influenced behavioral inclination. This research suggested the existence of space-focused stereotypes on another stigmatized social group. Characteristics of space (e.g., geographical segregation) might be the key to forming space-focused stereotypes.

Person Memory Mechanism Underlying Approach and Avoidance Judgments of Social Targets

People display approach and avoidance tendencies toward social targets. Although much research has studied the factors that affect decisions to approach or avoid targets, less work has investigated whether cognitive factors, such as episodic memory (e.g., details remembered about others from previous encounters) contribute to such judgments. Across two experiments, participants formed positive or negative impressions of targets based on their picture, a trait-implying behavior (Experiments 1 & 2), and their political ideology (conservative or liberal; Experiment 2). Memory and approach/avoidance decisions for targets were then measured. Results showed remembering negative impressions about targets increased avoidance responses, whereas remembering positive impressions increased approach responses. Strikingly, falsely remembering negative impressions for novel social targets (not seen before) also induced avoidance. Results suggest remembering negative information about targets, whether correctly or falsely, strongly influences future social judgments. Overall, these data support an episodic memory mechanism underlying subsequent approach/avoidance judgments, which is a rich area for future research.

Are Regional Differences in Psychological Characteristics and Their Correlates Robust? Applying Spatial-Analysis Techniques to Examine Regional Variation in Personality

There is growing evidence that psychological characteristics are spatially clustered across geographic regions and that regionally aggregated psychological characteristics are related to important outcomes. However, much of the evidence comes from research that relied on methods that are theoretically ill-suited for working with spatial data. The validity and generalizability of this work are thus unclear. Here we address two main challenges of working with spatial data (i.e., modifiable areal unit problem and spatial dependencies) and evaluate data-analysis techniques designed to tackle those challenges. To illustrate these issues, we investigate the robustness of regional Big Five personality differences and their correlates within the United States (Study 1; N = 3,387,303) and Germany (Study 2; N = 110,029). First, we display regional personality differences using a spatial smoothing approach. Second, we account for the modifiable areal unit problem by examining the correlates of regional personality scores across multiple spatial levels. Third, we account for spatial dependencies using spatial regression models. Our results suggest that regional psychological differences are robust and can reliably be studied across countries and spatial levels. The results also show that ignoring the methodological challenges of spatial data can have serious consequences for research concerned with regional psychological differences.

Ideological Extremism Among Syrian Refugees Is Negatively Related to Intentions to Migrate to the West

The conflict in Syria created a dire humanitarian situation, as nations around the world struggled with how best to deal with the more than 6.6 million Syrian refugees who fled their homes to escape aggression. Resistance to granting refugee status to individuals often originates in the belief that the influx of refugees endangers national security because of the presumably extremist religious and political beliefs that refugees hold. The present research surveyed Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq (N = 1,000). The results revealed that the majority of surveyed refugees did not intend to migrate to the West and would rather return to their home country. More importantly, refugees most interested in moving to Western countries were the least likely to subscribe to Islamist extremism or to harbor negative sentiment toward the West. Theoretical and practical implications for addressing the current refugee crisis are discussed.

Mask Wearing as Cultural Behavior: An Investigation Across 45 U.S. States During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Although masks (face coverings) are a prime tool in fighting airborne pathogens, during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States the use of masks encountered resistance based on existing patterns of cultural division. We argue that mask wearing must be understood basis on existing cultural frames assessed at both the individual level and the state level. We relied on prominent frameworks in cultural psychology: individualism-collectivism as well as independent and interdependent self-construals, the tightness-looseness framework, U.S. honor cultures, and political orientation as predictors. Using multilevel modeling, in a sample of 633 respondents from 45 U.S. states we investigated mask-wearing behavior, masks' perceived utility, implications for well-being, and the social meaning attributed to masks. Conservatism was linked to lower mask wearing, and consistently unfavorable perceptions of mask wearing. Collective interdependence predicted favorable perceptions of masks, as did state-level differences in collectivism; both constructs were linked with viewing mask wearing to be normative. Independent self-construal predicted a greater intent to wear masks, even though masks were also evaluated less favorably. Mediation analyses revealed that a single mediator, the perceived utility of mask wearing, was implicated in translating the effects of different cultural predictors into behavior. Additional findings highlighted that in tightener (vs. looser) states masks wearing was conceived of as a civic duty, whereas in U.S. honor states mask were seen as spoiling one's public image. Our discussion focuses on the cultural and political context of mask wearing, argues that different communities in the U.S. respond to its symbolic and social meaning, and suggest strategies to increase mask wearing among those who are otherwise reluctant to do so.

On the Varieties of Diversity: Ideological Variations in Attitudes Toward, and Understandings of Diversity

Three studies explore the possibility that attitudes toward "diversity" are multidimensional rather than unidimensional and that ideological differences in diversity attitudes vary as a function of diversity subtype. Study 1 (n = 1,001) revealed that the factor structure of attitudes toward 23 diverse community features was bidimensional. Factors involving demographic and viewpoint diversity emerged. Conservatives reported more positive attitudes toward viewpoint diversity, and liberals more positive attitudes toward demographic diversity. Study 2 (n = 1,012) replicated Study 1 findings, and extended Study 1 results by showing attitudes toward the general concept of diversity predicted attitudes toward demographic diversity but not viewpoint diversity. In Study 3, 386 participants rated how relevant a set of features was to their prototypical understanding of diversity. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) revealed people discriminate between viewpoint, demographic, and consumer diversity. Conservatives perceived viewpoint features as more relevant to "diversity," whereas liberals perceived demographic features as more relevant.

Personal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts

Both liberals and conservatives believe that using facts in political discussions helps to foster mutual respect, but 15 studies-across multiple methodologies and issues-show that these beliefs are mistaken. Political opponents respect moral beliefs more when they are supported by personal experiences, not facts. The respect-inducing power of personal experiences is revealed by survey studies across various political topics, a field study of conversations about guns, an analysis of YouTube comments from abortion opinion videos, and an archival analysis of 137 interview transcripts from Fox News and CNN. The personal experiences most likely to encourage respect from opponents are issue-relevant and involve harm. Mediation analyses reveal that these harm-related personal experiences increase respect by increasing perceptions of rationality: everyone can appreciate that avoiding harm is rational, even in people who hold different beliefs about guns, taxes, immigration, and the environment. Studies show that people believe in the truth of both facts and personal experiences in nonmoral disagreement; however, in moral disagreements, subjective experiences seem truer (i.e., are doubted less) than objective facts. These results provide a concrete demonstration of how to bridge moral divides while also revealing how our intuitions can lead us astray. Stretching back to the Enlightenment, philosophers and scientists have privileged objective facts over experiences in the pursuit of truth. However, furnishing perceptions of truth within moral disagreements is better accomplished by sharing subjective experiences, not by providing facts.

Geographic distribution of prejudice toward African Americans: Applying the two-dimensional model

Using the two-dimensional model of prejudice as a theoretical framework, we examined the geographic distribution of prejudice toward African Americans in the United States (N = 10,522). We found the East South Central, West South Central, and South Atlantic regions were associated with modern racism, principled conservatism characterized the Mountain region, aversive racism was prevalent in the East North Central region, and finally, low in prejudice was found in the Pacific, West North Central, Mid Atlantic, and New England regions. Additional analyses on political conservatism, social conservatism, and egalitarianism generally supported the distinctions between prejudice types made by the two-dimensional model. We believe mapping regional prejudice may have implications for testing theoretical differences between distinct types of prejudice as well as for implementing prejudice reduction strategies.

Psychological Factors Influencing Pro-environmental Behavior in Developing Countries: Evidence From Colombian and Nicaraguan Students

Identifying the determinants of human behavior is useful to adjust interventions and lead the civil society toward a stronger commitment to climate change (CC) mitigation and adaptation objectives, achieving greater support for successfully implementing environmental policies. Existing research has largely focused on case studies of pro-environmental behaviors (PEBs) in developed economies but there is very little evidence for developing countries. This study provides estimations of the effect of internal factors, such as sociodemographic variables, and four psychological dimensions (CC knowledge, environmental attitudes, self-efficacy, and trust in sources of environmental information) on PEBs. Data were obtained through a survey applied with future decision makers – university students – from Colombia (n = 4,769) and Nicaragua (n = 2,354). Indices were generated for PEBs and the psychological dimensions using z-scores and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Partial correlations were evaluated through the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. Our results suggest that, in order to reach the planned emission reduction targets, policy approaches should more strongly focus on educating and motivating citizens and prepare them for contributing to the environmental cause, as well as provide individual solutions to combat CC, rather than providing only information on its causes and consequences.

Elections have Consequences: Partisan Politics may be Literally Killing Us

BACKGROUND

Presidential campaigns and election outcomes have significant health implications for voters and communities. The theoretical underpinning of this relationship is multifaceted, but a new and growing field of empirical literature strongly suggests communities that voted for the losing presidential candidate may experience decreased physical and mental health under the leadership of the winning candidate.

OBJECTIVE

Our objective was to estimate the relationship between mortality rates and community support for the losing presidential candidate (partisan loss).

METHODS

Mortality data compiled by the US Centers for Disease Control and election results at the county level were used across a suite of county-year fixed-effects models to estimate the effect of election outcomes on mortality rates for the years 1999-2017.

RESULTS

Mortality rates were positively associated with partisan loss. Results suggest mortality rates increase by as much as 3% in extremely partisan counties following presidential election losses.

CONCLUSIONS

We suggest two mechanisms-social disintegration and/or partisan theory-by which mortality rates are likely to increase for counties that voted for the losing presidential candidate.

Partisan differences in physical distancing are linked to health outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic

Numerous polls suggest that COVID-19 is a profoundly partisan issue in the United States. Using the geotracking data of 15 million smartphones per day, we found that US counties that voted for Donald Trump (Republican) over Hillary Clinton (Democrat) in the 2016 presidential election exhibited 14% less physical distancing between March and May 2020. Partisanship was more strongly associated with physical distancing than numerous other factors, including counties' COVID-19 cases, population density, median income, and racial and age demographics. Contrary to our predictions, the observed partisan gap strengthened over time and remained when stay-at-home orders were active. Additionally, county-level consumption of conservative media (Fox News) was related to reduced physical distancing. Finally, the observed partisan differences in distancing were associated with subsequently higher COVID-19 infection and fatality growth rates in pro-Trump counties. Taken together, these data suggest that US citizens' responses to COVID-19 are subject to a deep-and consequential-partisan divide.

Partisan differences in physical distancing are linked to health outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic

Numerous polls suggest that COVID-19 is a profoundly partisan issue in the United States. Using the geotracking data of 15 million smartphones per day, we found that US counties that voted for Donald Trump (Republican) over Hillary Clinton (Democrat) in the 2016 presidential election exhibited 14% less physical distancing between March and May 2020. Partisanship was more strongly associated with physical distancing than numerous other factors, including counties' COVID-19 cases, population density, median income, and racial and age demographics. Contrary to our predictions, the observed partisan gap strengthened over time and remained when stay-at-home orders were active. Additionally, county-level consumption of conservative media (Fox News) was related to reduced physical distancing. Finally, the observed partisan differences in distancing were associated with subsequently higher COVID-19 infection and fatality growth rates in pro-Trump counties. Taken together, these data suggest that US citizens' responses to COVID-19 are subject to a deep-and consequential-partisan divide.

Are politically diverse Thanksgiving dinners shorter than politically uniform ones?

Americans on the political left and right are engaged in a Culture War with one another, one that is often characterized by mutual fear, antipathy, and avoidance. Are there safe havens from the socially straining effects of this Culture War, times and places where Americans of different political stripes gather and put aside their political differences? Previous research (Chen & Rohla, 2018) implied that there might not be insofar as even intimate family gatherings seem to be subject to Culture War tensions. They found that politically diverse Thanksgiving Dinners were 35-70 minutes shorter than politically uniform ones, representing a 14-27% reduction in overall dinner duration. Noting analytical and methodological limitations in the prior analysis, we conducted two pre-registered studies to test whether diverse dinners are shorter than uniform ones and to attempt to conceptually replicate and extend this prior analysis. Individual analyses yielded mixed results, with null models generally supported but effect estimates generally overlapping with those of Chen and Rohla (2018). A mega-analysis found that, when controlling for various covariates, politically diverse dinners were 24 minutes shorter than politically uniform ones, 95% confidence interval = [9, 39], representing a 6% decrease in the total dinner time [2%-10%]. This final result successfully replicates Chen and Rohla (2018) both in terms of effect overlap and direct-and-significance criteria while nonetheless favoring the conclusion that politics is not straining family ties as much as previously thought.

The Well-Being Benefits of Person-Culture Match Are Contingent on Basic Personality Traits

People enjoy well-being benefits if their personal characteristics match those of their culture. This person-culture match effect is integral to many psychological theories and-as a driver of migration-carries much societal relevance. But do people differ in the degree to which person-culture match confers well-being benefits? In the first-ever empirical test of that question, we examined whether the person-culture match effect is moderated by basic personality traits-the Big Two and Big Five. We relied on self-reports from 2,672,820 people across 102 countries and informant reports from 850,877 people across 61 countries. Communion, agreeableness, and neuroticism exacerbated the person-culture match effect, whereas agency, openness, extraversion, and conscientiousness diminished it. People who possessed low levels of communion coupled with high levels of agency evidenced no well-being benefits from person-culture match, and people who possessed low levels of agreeableness and neuroticism coupled with high levels of openness, extraversion, and conscientiousness even evidenced well-being costs. Those results have implications for theories building on the person-culture match effect, illuminate the mechanisms driving that effect, and help explain failures to replicate it.

Censoring political opposition online: Who does it and why

As ordinary citizens increasingly moderate online forums, blogs, and their own social media feeds, a new type of censoring has emerged wherein people selectively remove opposing political viewpoints from online contexts. In three studies of behavior on putative online forums, supporters of a political cause (e.g., abortion or gun rights) preferentially censored comments that opposed their cause. The tendency to selectively censor cause-incongruent online content was amplified among people whose cause-related beliefs were deeply rooted in or “fused with” their identities. Moreover, six additional identity-related measures also amplified the selective censoring effect. Finally, selective censoring emerged even when opposing comments were inoffensive and courteous. We suggest that because online censorship enacted by moderators can skew online content consumed by millions of users, it can systematically disrupt democratic dialogue and subvert social harmony.

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We use a novel experimental paradigm to study censorship in online environments.

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People selectively censor online content that challenges their political beliefs.

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People block online authors of posts they disagree with.

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When beliefs are rooted in identity, selective censoring is amplified.

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Selective censoring occurred even for comments without offensive language.

Toward a Developmental Science of Politics

In this monograph, we argue for the establishment of a developmental science of politics that describes, explains, and predicts the formation and change of individuals' political knowledge, attitudes, and behavior beginning in childhood and continuing across the life course. Reflecting our goal of contributing both theoretical conceptualizations and empirical data, we have organized the monograph into two broad sections. In the first section, we outline theoretical contributions that the study of politics may make to developmental science and provide practical reasons that empirical research in the domain of politics is important (e.g., for identifying ways to improve civics education and for encouraging higher voting rates among young adults). We also review major historical approaches to the study of political development and provide an integrative theoretical framework to ground future work. Drawing on Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems model as an organizing scheme and emphasizing social justice issues, we describe how factors rooted in cultural contexts, families, and children themselves are likely to shape political development. In the second section of the monograph, we argue for the importance and utility of studying major political events, such as presidential elections, and introduce the major themes, rationales, and hypotheses for a study of U.S. children's views of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In addition, we apply a social-justice lens to political thought and participation, addressing the role of gender/sex and race/ethnicity in children's political development broadly, and in their knowledge and views of the 2016 U.S. presidential election specifically. In interviews conducted within the month before and after the election, we examined two overarching categories of children's political attitudes: (a) knowledge, preferences, and expectations about the 2016 election, and (b) knowledge and attitudes concerning gender/sex and politics, particularly relevant for the 2016 election given Hillary Clinton's role as the first female major-party candidate for the presidency. Participants were 187 children (101 girls) between 5 and 11 years of age (M = 8.42 years, SD = 1.45 years). They were recruited from schools and youth organizations in five counties in four U.S. states (Kansas, Kentucky, Texas, and Washington) with varying voting patterns (e.g., Trump voters ranged from 27% to 71% of county voters). The sample was not a nationally representative one, but was racially diverse (35 African American, 50 Latinx, 81 White, and 21 multiracial, Asian American, Middle Eastern, or Native American children). In addition to several child characteristics (e.g., age, social dominance orientation [SDO]), we assessed several family and community characteristics (e.g., child-reported parental interest in the election and government-reported county-level voting patterns, respectively) hypothesized to predict outcome variables. Although our findings are shaped by the nature of our sample (e.g., our participants were less likely to support Trump than children in larger, nationwide samples were), they offer preliminary insights into children's political development. Overall, children in our sample were interested in and knowledgeable about the presidential election (e.g., a large majority identified the candidates correctly and reported some knowledge about their personal qualities or policy positions). They reported more information about Donald Trump's than Hillary Clinton's policies, largely accounted for by the substantial percentage of children (41%) who referred to Trump's immigration policies (e.g., building a wall between the United States and Mexico). Overall, children reported as many negative as positive personal qualities of the candidates, with negative qualities being reported more often for Trump than for Clinton (56% and 18% of children, respectively). Most children (88%) supported Clinton over Trump, a preference that did not vary by participants' gender/sex or race/ethnicity. In their responses to an open-ended inquiry about their reactions to Trump's win, 63% of children reported negative and 18% reported positive emotions. Latinx children reacted more negatively to the election outcome than did White children. Girls' and boys' emotional responses to the election outcome did not differ. Children's personal interest in serving as U.S. president did not vary across gender/sex or racial/ethnic groups (overall, 42% were interested). Clinton's loss of the election did not appear to depress (or pique) girls' interest in becoming U.S. president. With respect to the role of gender/sex in politics, many children (35%) were ignorant about women's absence from the U.S. presidency. Only a single child was able to name a historical individual who worked for women's civil rights or suffrage. Child characteristics predicted some outcome variables. For example, as expected, older children showed greater knowledge about the candidates than did younger children. Family and community characteristics also predicted some outcome variables. For example, as expected, participants were more likely to support Trump if they perceived that their parents supported him and if Trump received a greater percentage of votes in the children's county of residence. Our data suggest that civic education should be expanded and reformed. In addition to addressing societal problems requiring political solutions, civics lessons should include the histories of social groups' political participation, including information about gender discrimination and the women's suffrage movement in U.S. political history. Providing children with environments that are rich in information related to the purpose and value of politics, and with opportunities and encouragement for political thought and action, is potentially beneficial for youth and their nations.

Polarization in America: two possible futures

The rise of polarization over the past 25 years has many Americans worried about the state of politics. This worry is understandable: up to a point, polarization can help democracies, but when it becomes too vast, such that entire swaths of the population refuse to consider each other's views, this thwarts democratic methods for solving societal problems. Given widespread polarization in America, what lies ahead? We describe two possible futures, each based on different sets of theory and evidence. On one hand, polarization may be on a self-reinforcing upward trajectory fueled by misperception and avoidance; on the other hand it may have recently reached the apex of its pendulum swing. We conclude that it is too early to know which future we are approaching, but that our ability to address misperceptions may be one key factor.

Ideological Conflict and Prejudice: An Adversarial Collaboration Examining Correlates and Ideological (A)Symmetries

In an adversarial collaboration, we examined associations among factors that could link ideological conflict—perceiving that members of a group do not share one’s ideology—to prejudice and affiliation interest. We also examined whether these factors would possess similar (“symmetrical”) or different (“asymmetrical”) associative strength among liberals and conservatives. Across three samples (666 undergraduate students, 347 Mechanical Turk workers), ideological conflict was associated with perceived dissimilarity on political and nonpolitical topics, as well as negative emotions. Perceived political and nonpolitical dissimilarity were also associated with negative emotions, prejudice, and lower affiliative intentions among both liberals and conservatives. Importantly, however, perceived political dissimilarity was associated with negative emotions, prejudice, and lower affiliative intentions more strongly among liberals. Some inconsistent evidence also suggested that perceived nonpolitical dissimilarity was associated with prejudice and lower affiliative intentions more strongly among conservatives. These findings document nuance in relationships that could link ideological conflict to prejudice.

How Ambient Cues Facilitate Political Segregation

People increasingly self-segregate into politically homogeneous communities. How they do this remains unclear. We propose that people use ambient cues correlated with political values to infer whether they would like to live in those communities. We test this hypothesis in five studies. In Studies 1 ( n = 3,543) and 2 ( n = 5,609), participants rated community cues; liberals and conservatives’ preferences differed. In Studies 3a ( n = 1,643) and 3b ( n = 1,840), participants read about communities with liberal or conservative cues. Even without explicit information about the communities’ politics, participants preferred communities with politically congenial cues. In Study 4 ( n = 282), participants preferred politically congenial communities and wanted to leave politically uncongenial communities. In Study 5 ( n = 370), people selectively navigated their communities in a politically congenial way. These studies suggest that peoples’ perceptions of communities can be shaped by subtle, not necessarily political, cues that may facilitate growing political segregation.

Political orientation, political environment, and health behaviors in the United States

Political orientation (Republican/Democrat and conservative/liberal) and political environment (geo-spatial political party affiliated voting patterns) are both associated with various health outcomes, including mortality. Modern disease etiology in the U.S. suggests that many of our health outcomes derive from behaviors and lifestyle choices. Thus, we examine the associations of political orientation and political environment with health behaviors. We used the Annenberg National Health Communication Survey (ANHCS) data, which is a nationally representative U.S. survey fielded continuously from 2005 through 2012. The health behaviors studied include health information search, flu vaccination, excessive alcohol consumption, tobacco consumption, exercise, and dietary patterns. Democrats/liberals had higher odds of cigarette smoking and excessive drinking compared to Republicans/conservatives. Whereas, Republicans/conservatives ate fewer servings and fewer varieties of fruit and vegetables; ate more high fat and processed foods; and engaged in less in-depth health information searches compared to Democrats/liberals. Also, conservatives had lower odds of exercise participation than liberals; whereas Republicans had lower odds of flu vaccination. Greater Republican vote share in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections at the state and/or county levels was associated with higher odds of flu vaccination and smoking cigarettes and lower odds of avoiding fat/calories, avoiding fast/processed food, eating a variety of fruits and vegetables, and eating more servings of fruit. We use the distinct cognitive-motivational styles attributed to political orientation in discussing the findings. Health communication strategies could leverage these relationships to produce tailored and targeted messages as well as to develop and advocate for policy.

Seeing beyond political affiliations: The mediating role of perceived moral foundations on the partisan similarity-liking effect

Decades of research have demonstrated that we like people who are more similar to us. The present research tested a potential mechanism for this similarity-liking effect in the domain of politics: the stereotype that people's political orientation reflects their morals. People believe that Democrats are more likely to endorse individualizing morals like fairness and Republicans are more likely to endorse binding morals like obedience to authority. Prior to the 2016 election, American participants (N = 314) viewed an ostensible Facebook profile that shared an article endorsing conservative ideals (pro-Trump or pro-Republican), or liberal ideals (pro-Clinton or pro-Democrat). Participants rated the favorability of the profile-owner, and completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire for the profile-owner and themselves. As predicted, participants liked the profile-owner more when they shared political beliefs, and used political stereotypes to infer the moral foundations of the profile-owner. Additionally, the perceived moral foundation endorsement of the profile owner differentially mediated the relationship between the ideology and evaluations of the profile owner based on the party affiliation of the participant: perceived individualizing foundations mediated the relationship for Democratic participants and perceived binding foundations mediated the relationship for Republican participants. In other words, people liked their in-group members more because they thought that the profile-owner endorsed a specific type of morals. In Study 2 (N = 486), we ruled out the potential explanation that any political stereotype can account for the similarity-liking effect, replicating the results of Study 1 even when controlling for perceptions of other personality differences. Taken together, these studies highlight that there may be something unique about the perceived type of morality of political in-group and out-group members that may be contributing to the similarity-liking effect in politics.

Toward an Integrative Framework for Studying Human Evaluation: Attitudes Toward Objects and Attributes

Evaluation is central to human experience, and multiple literatures have studied it. This article pulls from research on attitudes, human and nonhuman mating preferences, consumer behavior, and beyond to build a more comprehensive framework for studying evaluation. First, we distinguish between evaluations of objects (persons, places, things) and evaluations of attributes (dimensions, traits, characteristics). Then, we further distinguish between summarized attribute preferences (a valenced response to a direction on a dimension, such as liking sweetness in desserts) and functional attribute preferences (a valenced response to increasing levels of a dimension in a set of targets, such as the extent to which sweetness predicts liking for desserts). We situate these constructs with respect to existing distinctions in the attitude literature (e.g., specific/general, indirect/direct). Finally, new models address how people translate functional into summarized preferences, as well as how attribute preferences affect (a) subsequent evaluations of objects and (b) situation selection.

The effect of partisanship and political advertising on close family ties

Research on growing American political polarization and antipathy primarily studies public institutions and political processes, ignoring private effects, including strained family ties. Using anonymized smartphone-location data and precinct-level voting, we show that Thanksgiving dinners attended by residents from opposing-party precincts were 30 to 50 minutes shorter than same-party dinners. This decline from a mean of 257 minutes survives extensive spatial and demographic controls. Reductions in the duration of Thanksgiving dinner in 2016 tripled for travelers from media markets with heavy political advertising-an effect not observed in 2015-implying a relationship to election-related behavior. Effects appear asymmetric: Although fewer Democratic-precinct residents traveled in 2016 than in 2015, Republican-precinct residents shortened their Thanksgiving dinners by more minutes in response to political differences. Nationwide, 34 million hours of cross-partisan Thanksgiving dinner discourse were lost in 2016 owing to partisan effects.

Advances and Open Questions in the Science of Subjective Well-Being

Subjective well-being (SWB) is an extremely active area of research with about 170,000 articles and books published on the topic in the past 15 years. Methodological and theoretical advances have been notable in this period of time, with the increasing use of longitudinal and experimental designs allowing for a greater understanding of the predictors and outcomes that relate to SWB, along with the process that underlie these associations. In addition, theories about these processes have become more intricate, as findings reveal that many associations with SWB depend on people's culture and values and the context in which they live. This review provides an overview of many major areas of research, including the measurement of SWB, the demographic and personality-based predictors of SWB, and process-oriented accounts of individual differences in SWB. In addition, because a major new focus in recent years has been the development of national accounts of subjective well-being, we also review attempts to use SWB measures to guide policy decisions.

How Moral Perceptions Influence Intergroup Tolerance: Evidence From Lebanon, Morocco, and the United States

Intergroup boundaries are often associated with differences in moral codes. How does the perception of similarity and dissimilarity in moral worldviews influence tolerant relationships between members of different groups? We theorized that the relationship between perceived moral similarity and intergroup tolerance is domain specific. Specifically, because people treat autonomy values (e.g., caring for others, being fair) as denoting universal rights and obligations, but binding values (e.g., purity) as denoting rights and obligations that apply preferentially for their own group, perceived similarity on autonomy values should be more relevant than perceived similarity on binding values to intergroup tolerance. Here, we describe correlational and experimental evidence to support these predictions from studies carried out in Lebanon (with sectarian groups), in Morocco (with ethnic groups), and in the United States (with ideological groups). Implications for understanding intergroup relations and theories of morality are discussed.

Regional Cultures and the Psychological Geography of Switzerland: Person-Environment-Fit in Personality Predicts Subjective Wellbeing

The present study extended traditional nation-based research on person-culture-fit to the regional level. First, we examined the geographical distribution of Big Five personality traits in Switzerland. Across the 26 Swiss cantons, unique patterns were observed for all traits. For Extraversion and Neuroticism clear language divides emerged between the French- and Italian-speaking South-West vs. the German-speaking North-East. Second, multilevel modeling demonstrated that person-environment-fit in Big Five, composed of elevation (i.e., mean differences between individual profile and cantonal profile), scatter (differences in mean variances) and shape (Pearson correlations between individual and cantonal profiles across all traits; Furr, 2008, 2010), predicted the development of subjective wellbeing (i.e., life satisfaction, satisfaction with personal relationships, positive affect, negative affect) over a period of 4 years. Unexpectedly, while the effects of shape were in line with the person-environment-fit hypothesis (better fit predicted higher subjective wellbeing), the effects of scatter showed the opposite pattern, while null findings were observed for elevation. Across a series of robustness checks, the patterns for shape and elevation were consistently replicated. While that was mostly the case for scatter as well, the effects of scatter appeared to be somewhat less robust and more sensitive to the specific way fit was modeled when predicting certain outcomes (negative affect, positive affect). Distinguishing between supplementary and complementary fit may help to reconcile these findings and future research should explore whether and if so under which conditions these concepts may be applicable to the respective facets of person-culture-fit.

Political opposites do not attract: The effects of ideological dissimilarity on impression formation

Past research shows that people like others who are similar to themselves, and that political partisans tend to dislike those with opposing viewpoints. Two studies examined how initial person impressions changed after discovering that the target held similar or dissimilar political beliefs. Using potential mates as targets, we found that participants liked targets less, were less romantically interested in targets, and rated targets as less attractive after discovering political dissimilarity with them. Further, they became more uncomfortable with targets after discovering ideological dissimilarity. Theoretical implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.

The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief

Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untrustworthy news poses a serious problem for healthy democratic functioning. We articulate why and how identification with political parties - known as partisanship - can bias information processing in the human brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-based model of belief for understanding the influence of partisanship on these cognitive processes. This framework helps to explain why people place party loyalty over policy, and even over truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de-biasing information processing to help to create a shared reality across partisan divides.

Segregation and belief polarization as boundary conditions for when fusion leads to self-sacrifice

Physical enclavement, away from out-group members, may determine when identify fusion leads to self-sacrifice. When people surround themselves with ideologically similar others, their attitudes may polarize and become moralized, leading to more violence and hostility toward people who do not share those attitudes. We discuss how this segregation may increase the amount of political violence in typically nonviolent systems.

Worldview Conflict in Daily Life

Building on laboratory- and survey-based research probing the psychology of ideology and the experience of worldview conflict, we examined the association between worldview conflict and emotional reactions, psychological well-being, humanity esteem, and political ideology in everyday life using experience sampling. In three combined samples (total N = 328), experiencing disagreement compared to agreement was associated with experiencing more other-condemning emotions, less well-being, and less humanity esteem. There were no clear associations between experiencing disagreement and experiencing self-conscious emotions, positive emotions, and mental stress. None of the relationships were moderated by political ideology. These results both replicate and challenge findings from laboratory- and survey-based research, and we discuss possible reasons for the discrepancies. Experience sampling methods can help researchers get a glimpse into everyday worldview conflict.