Clarifying the role of theory of mind areas during visual perspective taking: Issues of spontaneity and domain-specificity

Dynamic spatial representation of self and others' actions in the macaque frontal cortex

Modulation of neuronal firing rates by the spatial locations of physical objects is a widespread phenomenon in the brain. However, little is known about how neuronal responses to the actions of biological entities are spatially tuned and whether such spatially tuned responses are affected by social contexts. These issues are of key importance for understanding the neural basis of embodied social cognition, such as imitation and perspective-taking. Here, we show that spatial representation of actions can be dynamically changed depending on others' social relevance and agents of action. Monkeys performed a turn-taking choice task with a real monkey partner sitting face-to-face or a filmed partner in prerecorded videos. Three rectangular buttons (left, center, and right) were positioned in front of the subject and partner as their choice targets. We recorded from single neurons in two frontal nodes in the social brain, the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). When the partner was filmed rather than real, spatial preference for partner-actions was markedly diminished in MPFC, but not PMv, neurons. This social context-dependent modulation in the MPFC was also evident for self-actions. Strikingly, a subset of neurons in both areas switched their spatial preference between self-actions and partner-actions in a diametrically opposite manner. This observation suggests that these cortical areas are associated with coordinate transformation in ways consistent with an actor-centered perspective-taking coding scheme. The PMv may subserve such functions in context-independent manners, whereas the MPFC may do so primarily in social contexts.

Dissonant music engages early visual processing

The neuroscientific examination of music processing in audio-visual contexts offers a valuable framework to assess how auditory information influences the emotional encoding of visual information. Using fMRI during naturalistic film viewing, we investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the effect of music on valence inferences during mental state attribution. Thirty-eight participants watched the same short-film accompanied by systematically controlled consonant or dissonant music. Subjects were instructed to think about the main character's intentions. The results revealed that increasing levels of dissonance led to more negatively valenced inferences, displaying the profound emotional impact of musical dissonance. Crucially, at the neuroscientific level and despite music being the sole manipulation, dissonance evoked the response of the primary visual cortex (V1). Functional/effective connectivity analysis showed a stronger coupling between the auditory ventral stream (AVS) and V1 in response to tonal dissonance and demonstrated the modulation of early visual processing via top-down feedback inputs from the AVS to V1. These V1 signal changes indicate the influence of high-level contextual representations associated with tonal dissonance on early visual cortices, serving to facilitate the emotional interpretation of visual information. Our results highlight the significance of employing systematically controlled music, which can isolate emotional valence from the arousal dimension, to elucidate the brain's sound-to-meaning interface and its distributive crossmodal effects on early visual encoding during naturalistic film viewing.

Neural correlates involved in perspective-taking in early childhood

Learning to consider another person's perspective is pivotal in early social development. Still, little is known about the neural underpinnings involved in perspective-taking in early childhood. In this EEG study, we examined 4-year-old children's brain activity during a live, social interaction that involved perspective-taking. Children were asked to pass one of two toys to another person. To decide which toy to pass, they had to consider either their partner's perspective (perspective-taking) or visual features unrelated to their partner's perspective (control). We analyzed power changes in midfrontal and temporal-parietal EEG channels. The results indicated that children showed higher power around 7 Hz at right temporal-parietal channels for perspective-taking compared to control trials. This power difference was positively correlated with children's perspective-taking performance, specifically for trials in which they needed to pass the toy their partner could not see. A similar power difference at right temporal-parietal channels was seen when comparing perspective-taking trials where children's visual access mismatched rather than matched that of their partner. No differences were detected for midfrontal channels. In sum, we identified distinct neural activity as 4-year-olds considered another person's perspective in a live interaction; this activity converges with neural findings of adults' social processing network.

Mentalizing and self-other distinction in visual perspective taking: the analysis of temporal neural processing using high-density EEG

This high density EEG report dissects the neural processing in the visual perspective taking using four experimental comparisons (Arrow, Avatar and Self, Other). Early activation differences occurred between the Avatar and the Arrow condition in primary visual pathways concomitantly with alpha and beta phase locked responses predominant in the Avatar condition. In later time points, brain activation was stronger for the Avatar condition in paracentral lobule of frontal lobe. When taking the other's perspective, there was an increased recruitment of generators in the occipital and temporal lobes and later on in mentalizing and salience networks bilaterally before spreading to right frontal lobe subdivisions. Microstate analysis further supported late recruitment of the medial frontal gyrus and precentral lobule in this condition. Other perspective for the Avatar only showed a strong beta response located first in left occipito-temporal and right parietal areas, and later on in frontal lobes. Our EEG data support distinct brain processes for the Avatar condition with an increased recruitment of brain generators that progresses from primary visual areas to the anterior brain. Taking the other's perspective needs an early recruitment of neural processors in posterior areas involved in theory of mind with later involvement of additional frontal generators.

Seeing in my way or your way: impact of intelligence, attention, and empathy on brain reactivity

Previous studies showed that neurotypical adults are able to engage in unconscious analyses of others' mental states in the context of automatic perspective taking and experience systematic difficulties when judging the conflicts between their own (Self) and another's (Other) perspective. Several functional MRI (fMRI) studies reported widespread activation of mentalizing, salience, and executive networks when adopting the Other compared to Self perspective. This study aims to explore whether cognitive and emotional parameters impact on brain reactivity in dot perspective task (dPT). We provide here an fMRI analysis based on individual z-scores in eighty-two healthy adults who underwent the Samson's dPT after detailed assessment of fluid intelligence, attention, levels of alexithymia and social cognition abilities. Univariate regression models were used to explore the association between brain activation patterns and psychological variables. There was a strong positive association between Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and fMRI z-scores in Self perspective. When the Other perspective is taken, Continuous Performance Test (CPT)-II parameters were negatively associated with fMRI z-scores. Individuals with higher Toronto Alexithymia scale (TAS) score and lower scores in mini-Social cognition and Emotional Assessment (SEA) displayed significantly higher egocentric interference-related fMRI z-scores. Our data demonstrate that brain activation when focusing on our own perspective depends on the levels of fluid intelligence. Decreased attentional recruitment and decreased inhibitory control affects the brain efforts to adopt the Other perspective. Egocentric interference-associated brain fMRI activation was less marked in cases with better empathy abilities but the opposite was true for persons who experience increased difficulties in the recognition of emotions.

Patterns of multiple brain network activation in dot perspective task

In this functional MRI (fMRI) study on 82 healthy adults using the dot perspective task, inconsistency of perspectives was associated with a significant increase of the mean reaction time and number of errors both in Self and Other conditions. Unlike the Arrow (non-mentalizing), the Avatar (mentalizing) paradigm was characterized by the recruitment of parts of the mentalizing and salience networks. These data provide experimental evidence supporting the fMRI distinction between mentalizing and non-mentalizing stimuli. A widespread activation of classical theory of mind (ToM) areas but also of salience network and decision making areas was observed in the Other compared to Self-conditions. Compared to Self-Consistent, Self-Inconsistent trials were related to increased activation in the lateral occipital cortex, right supramarginal and angular gyrus as well as inferior, superior and middle frontal gyri. Compared to the Other-Consistent, Other-Inconsistent trials yielded strong activation in the lateral occipital cortex, precuneus and superior parietal lobule, middle and superior precentral gyri and left frontal pole. These findings reveal that altercentric interference relies on areas involved in self-other distinction, self-updating and central executive functions. In contrast, egocentric interference needs the activation of the mirror neuron system and deductive reasoning, much less related to pure ToM abilities.

Heterogeneity of social cognition between visual perspective-taking and theory of mind in the temporo-parietal junction

Visual perspective taking (VPT), particularly level 2 VPT (VPT2), which allows an individual to understand that the same object can be seen differently by others, is related to the theory of mind (ToM), because both functions require a decoupled representation from oneself. Although previous neuroimaging studies have shown that VPT and ToM activate the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), it is unclear whether common neural substrates are involved in VPT and ToM. To clarify this point, we directly compared the TPJ activation patterns of individual participants performing VPT2 and ToM tasks using functional magnetic resonance imaging and within-subjects design. A whole-brain analysis revealed that VPT2 and ToM activated overlapping areas in the posterior part of the TPJ. In addition, we found that both the peak coordinates and activated regions for ToM were located significantly more anteriorly and dorsally within the bilateral TPJ than those measured during the VPT2 task. We further confirmed that these activity areas were spatially distinct from the nearby extrastriate body area (EBA), visual motion area (MT+), and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) using independent localizer scans. Our findings revealed that VPT2 and ToM have gradient representations, indicating the functional heterogeneity of social cognition within the TPJ.

Human but not robotic gaze facilitates action prediction

Do people ascribe intentions to humanoid robots as they would to humans or non-human-like animated objects? In six experiments, we compared people’s ability to extract non-mentalistic (i.e., where an agent is looking) and mentalistic (i.e., what an agent is looking at; what an agent is going to do) information from gaze and directional cues performed by humans, human-like robots, and a non-human-like object. People were faster to infer the mental content of human agents compared to robotic agents. Furthermore, although the absence of differences in control conditions rules out the use of non-mentalizing strategies, the human-like appearance of non-human agents may engage mentalizing processes to solve the task. Overall, results suggest that human-like robotic actions may be processed differently from humans’ and objects’ behavior. These findings inform our understanding of the relevance of an object’s physical features in triggering mentalizing abilities and its relevance for human–robot interaction.

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People differently ascribe mental content to human-like and non-human-like agents

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A human-like shape may automatically engage mentalizing processes

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Human actions are interpreted faster than non-human actions

Psychopathic traits modulate functional connectivity during pain perception and perspective-taking in female inmates

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PCL-R scores are associated with altered functional connectivity in female inmates.

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PCL-R Factor 1 and Factor 2 subscores predicted opposite shifts in connectivity.

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Functional connectivity in the salience network is altered during pain perception.

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Connectivity in the social cognition network is altered during perspective-taking.

The ability to share and understand the distress of others is critical for successful social interactions and is a fundamental building block of morality. Psychopathy is a personality disorder that includes lack of empathy and concern for others. In the present study, functional MRI was used to examine neural responses and functional connectivity associated with empathy and affective perspective-taking in female inmates (N = 109) with various levels of psychopathic traits, as measured with Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). Participants viewed hands and feet in painful or non-painful situations while adopting a first person or third person perspective. All participants demonstrated robust neural responses in anterior insula (aINS), anterior cingulate (ACC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and supplementary motor area (SMA) when viewing pain, both during imagine-self and imagine-other blocks. Psychopathy shifted the functional connectivity seeded in core nodes of the salience and social cognition networks. Perceiving stimuli depicting somatic pain led to decreased functional coupling from right temporoparietal junction to superior temporal sulcus, which correlated with scores on PCL-R Factor 1 (Affective/Interpersonal). In contrast, connectivity from right insula to precuneus increased with Factor 2 (Lifestyle/Antisocial) scores. When adopting a third-person perspective, psychopathic traits modulated connectivity from the social cognition network, but not the salience network, with Factor 1 scores associated with increased connectivity to sensorimotor cortex and temporal pole, while Factor 2 scores were associated with decreased connectivity with ACC/SMA and inferior frontal gyrus. Overall, these results demonstrate that psychopathic traits in incarcerated females are associated with atypical functional connectivity within the salience network during pain-empathy processing and within the social cognition network during affective perspective-taking.

Individual Differences in Indirect Speech Act Processing Found Outside the Language Network

Face-to-face communication requires skills that go beyond core language abilities. In dialogue, we routinely make inferences beyond the literal meaning of utterances and distinguish between different speech acts based on, e.g., contextual cues. It is, however, not known whether such communicative skills potentially overlap with core language skills or other capacities, such as theory of mind (ToM). In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study we investigate these questions by capitalizing on individual variation in pragmatic skills in the general population. Based on behavioral data from 199 participants, we selected participants with higher vs. lower pragmatic skills for the fMRI study (N = 57). In the scanner, participants listened to dialogues including a direct or an indirect target utterance. The paradigm allowed participants at the whole group level to (passively) distinguish indirect from direct speech acts, as evidenced by a robust activity difference between these speech acts in an extended language network including ToM areas. Individual differences in pragmatic skills modulated activation in two additional regions outside the core language regions (one cluster in the left lateral parietal cortex and intraparietal sulcus and one in the precuneus). The behavioral results indicate segregation of pragmatic skill from core language and ToM. In conclusion, contextualized and multimodal communication requires a set of interrelated pragmatic processes that are neurocognitively segregated: (1) from core language and (2) partly from ToM.

Gender Differences in Theory of Mind, Empathic Understanding, and Moral Reasoning in an Offending and a Matched Non-Offending Population

Previous research suggests that a lack of pro-social skills is characteristic of an offending personality. Two hundred male and female offenders and matched controls completed measures to assess: Theory of Mind, empathic understanding, and moral reasoning. Significant differences between the offenders and the control group, as well as between the male and female participants, were detected in theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning with offenders scoring lower than the control group, and with males scoring lower than females on most tests. The ability to assess Theory of Mind, empathic understanding, and moral reasoning, and subsequently to identify reduced ability, is not only useful for researchers but will also allow practitioners to tailor existing (or develop new) interventions specific to the needs of individuals. This could be particularly useful in terms of recidivism when applied to those involved in anti-social or offending behavior.

The self-consistency effect seen on the Dot Perspective Task is a product of domain-general attention cueing, not automatic perspective taking

It has been proposed that humans automatically compute the visual perspective of others. Evidence for this view comes from the Dot Perspective Task. In this task, participants view a room in which a human actor is depicted, looking either leftwards or rightwards. Dots can appear on either the left wall of the room, the right wall, or both. At the start of each trial, participants are shown a number. Their speeded task is to decide whether the number of dots visible matches the number shown. On consistent trials the participant and the actor can see the same number of dots. On inconsistent trials, the participant and the actor can see a different number of dots. Participants respond faster on consistent trials than on inconsistent trials. This self-consistency effect is cited as evidence that participants compute the visual perspective of others automatically, even when it impedes their task performance. According to a rival interpretation, however, this effect is a product of attention cueing: slower responding on inconsistent trials simply reflects the fact that participants' attention is directed away from some or all of the to-be-counted dots. The present study sought to test these rival accounts. We find that desk fans, a class of inanimate object known to cue attention, also produce the self-consistency effect. Moreover, people who are more susceptible to the effect induced by fans tend to be more susceptible to the effect induced by human actors. These findings suggest that the self-consistency effect is a product of attention cueing.

Try to see it my way - Examining the relationship between visual perspective taking and theory of mind in frontotemporal dementia

The behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is characterised by pronounced alterations in social functioning, including the understanding of others' thoughts and feelings via theory of mind. The emergence of such impairments in other social disorders such as autism and schizophrenia is suggested to reflect an inability to imagine the other person's visual perspective of the world. To our knowledge, relationships between visual perspective taking and theory of mind have not previously been explored in bvFTD. Here, we sought to examine the capacity for visual perspective taking and theory of mind in bvFTD, and to establish their inter-relationships and underlying neural correlates. Fifteen bvFTD patients and 15 healthy Controls completed a comprehensive battery of perspective taking measures, comprising Level 1 ('what') and Level 2 ('how') visual perspective taking tasks, a cartoon task capturing theory of mind, and a questionnaire assessing subjective perspective taking in daily life. Compared with Controls, bvFTD patients displayed significant impairments across all perspective taking measures. These perspective taking impairments, however, were not correlated with one another in bvFTD. Region-of-interest voxel-based morphometry analyses suggested distinct neural correlates for visual perspective taking (inferior frontal gyrus) versus theory of mind (medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus), which appeared to partially overlap with those implicated in subjective perspective taking (inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus, temporoparietal junction). Despite pervasive impairments in all aspects of perspective taking in bvFTD, these did not appear to relate to one another at the behavioural or neural level in our study. Future large-scale studies manipulating discrete aspects of the tasks will help to clarify the neurocognitive mechanisms of, and relationships between, visual perspective taking and theory of mind in bvFTD, along with their real-world implications.

Visual perspective-taking in complex natural scenes

Studies of visual perspective-taking have shown that adults can rapidly and accurately compute their own and other peoples’ viewpoints, but they experience difficulties when the two perspectives are inconsistent. We tested whether these egocentric (i.e., interference from one’s own perspective) and altercentric biases (i.e., interference from another person’s perspective) persist in ecologically valid complex environments. Participants (N = 150) completed a dot-probe visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in natural scenes containing real people, first only according to their own perspective and then judging both their own and another person’s perspective. Results showed that the other person’s perspective did not disrupt self perspective-taking judgements when the other perspective was not explicitly prompted. In contrast, egocentric and altercentric biases were found when participants were prompted to switch between self and other perspectives. These findings suggest that altercentric visual perspective-taking can be activated spontaneously in complex real-world contexts, but is subject to both top-down and bottom-up influences, including explicit prompts or salient visual stimuli.

Beyond avatars and arrows: Testing the mentalising and submentalising hypotheses with a novel entity paradigm

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In this study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalising” processes. Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalising processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g., arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze–following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalising interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct.

Brain mechanisms of visuospatial perspective-taking in relation to object mental rotation and the theory of mind

Visuospatial perspective-taking (VPT) is a process of imagining what can be seen and how a scene looks from a location and orientation in space that differs from one's own. It comprises two levels that are underpinned by distinct neurocognitive processes. Level-2 VPT is often studied in relation to two other cognitive phenomena, object mental rotation (oMR) and theory of mind (ToM). With the aim to describe the broad picture of neurocognitive processes underlying level-2 VPT, here we give an overview of the recent behavioral and neuroscientific findings of level-2 VPT. We discuss its relation to level-1 VPT, which is also referred to as perspective-tracking, and the neighboring topics, oMR and ToM. Neuroscientific research shows that level-2 VPT is a diverse cognitive process, encompassing functionally distinct neural circuits. It shares brain substrates with oMR, especially those parietal brain areas that are specialized in spatial reasoning. However, compared to oMR, level-2 VPT involves additional activations in brain structures that are typically involved in ToM tasks and deal with self/other distinctions. In addition, level-2 VPT has been suggested to engage brain areas coding for internal representations of the body. Thus, the neurocognitive model underpinning level-2 VPT can be understood as a combination of visuospatial processing with social cognition and body schema representations.

Exploring neurophysiological markers of visual perspective taking: Methodological considerations

RATIONALE

For visual perspective taking (VPT) using the avatar task, examinations of neural processes using event related potentials (ERP) indicate a distinction between an early posterior perspective calculation process (P3) and a later frontal process (LFSW) managing perspective conflict. While it is unknown if these neural processes are affected in clinical populations, it is unclear if the avatar task can be applied to this group, due to the long duration and sensitivity to data loss. Thus, we performed a methodological study of the avatar task, testing the feasibility of a shortened experimental paradigm.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate whether previously reported behavioural and ERP effects in the avatar task can also be seen if analysing all trials (matching/non-matching) jointly, and whether they remain robust if only a subset of the data is analysed.

METHOD

Healthy individuals (n = 20) completed the avatar task with ERP measurement. ERP components (P3, LFSW) and behavioural data were investigated by A) comparing use of only matching trials (n = 384) versus all trials (n = 768), and B) examining if reduced duration of assessment, by analysing only a subset of the data, impacts ERP findings.

RESULTS

We observed minimal differences when analysing data from only matching trial types compared to all trial types. Further, ERP amplitudes and latency findings were replicated when analysing only a subset of the data.

CONCLUSIONS

The duration of the avatar task can be reduced to avoid long testing times, thus making it better suited for use in clinical populations.

The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study

Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, contra a standard attitude taken by philosophers. Instead, observed differences in P3b amplitude indicate that knowledge attribution doesn't recruit the strong self-perspective inhibition characteristic of belief attribution. However, both belief and knowledge attribution were observed to display a late slow wave widely associated with mental state attribution, indicating that knowledge attribution also shares in more general processing of others' mental states. These results provide a new perspective both on how we think about knowledge attribution, as well as Theory of Mind processes generally.

Stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impacts conflict resolution in Level-1 visual perspective taking

Theory of mind is the ability to understand others' beliefs, mental states, and knowledge. Perspective-taking is a key part of this capacity, and while previous research has suggested that calculating another's perspective is relatively straightforward, executive function is required to resolve the conflict between the self and that other perspective. Previous studies have shown that theory of mind is selectively impaired by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). However, it has been hitherto unclear as to which specific aspect of perspective-taking is impacted. The current study administered rTMS (N = 31 adult participants) to the DLPFC (active condition) and vertex (control condition) in a within-subjects design. Participants completed a L1 VPT task after each stimulation session, and focus (relative performance on self-perspective trials compared with other perspective trials) and conflict indices (relative ability to resolve competing self/other perspectives) were calculated. Results showed that stimulation of the DLPFC selectively impaired the conflict index, suggesting that the DLPFC may be causally related with the resolution of conflict between self and other perspectives, and that self-other interference may rely on domain-general processes.

Two systems for thinking about others' thoughts in the developing brain

The ability to reason about other people’s thoughts and beliefs characterizes the complex social interaction among humans. This ability, called Theory of Mind (ToM), has long been argued to develop around 4 y when children start explicitly reasoning about others' beliefs. However, when tested nonverbally, infants already show action expectations congruent with others’ beliefs before the age of 2 y. Do these behaviors reflect different systems for understanding others’ minds—an early and a later developing one—or when does ToM develop? We show that these abilities are supported by the maturation of independent brain networks, suggesting different systems for explicit verbal ToM and early nonverbal action expectations.

Human social interaction crucially relies on the ability to infer what other people think. Referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM), this ability has long been argued to emerge around 4 y of age when children start passing traditional verbal ToM tasks. This developmental dogma has recently been questioned by nonverbal ToM tasks passed by infants younger than 2 y of age. How do young children solve these tests, and what is their relation to the later-developing verbal ToM reasoning? Are there two different systems for nonverbal and verbal ToM, and when is the developmental onset of mature adult ToM? To address these questions, we related markers of cortical brain structure (i.e., cortical thickness and surface area) of 3- and 4-y-old children to their performance in novel nonverbal and traditional verbal TM tasks. We showed that verbal ToM reasoning was supported by cortical surface area and thickness of the precuneus and temporoparietal junction, classically involved in ToM in adults. Nonverbal ToM reasoning, in contrast, was supported by the cortical structure of a distinct and independent neural network including the supramarginal gyrus also involved in emotional and visual perspective taking, action observation, and social attention or encoding biases. This neural dissociation suggests two systems for reasoning about others’ minds—mature verbal ToM that emerges around 4 y of age, whereas nonverbal ToM tasks rely on different earlier-developing possibly social-cognitive processes.

Lack of implicit visual perspective taking in adult males with autism spectrum disorders

BACKGROUND

Some theorists have suggested that the ability of visual perspective-taking (VPT) constitutes a rudimentary process of social cognition, and as such, the ability of VPT in people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has been the focus of intensive research.

AIM

The present study investigated whether adult males with ASD show signs of implicit VPT in first-level VPT tasks, in which participants were required to judge whether a target object can be seen from another's perspective, even when they are not explicitly required to take another's perspective.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

We examined whether the information from another's visual perspective interferes with visual processing from the participant's own perspective ("altercentric interference") using the reaction time as the main performance indicator in adult males with or without ASD. Eye movement patterns during VPT were analyzed for some participants.

OUTCOMES AND RESULTS

The results revealed signs of altercentric interference in neurotypical adults, but not in adult males with ASD.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The results indicate the possibility that people with ASD may rely on a different strategy than neurotypical adults in completing a first-level VPT task.

Neural signatures of promotion versus prevention goal priming: fMRI evidence for distinct cognitive-motivational systems

Regulatory focus theory (RFT) postulates two cognitive-motivational systems for personal goal pursuit: the promotion system, which is associated with ideal goals (an individual's hopes, dreams, and aspirations), and the prevention system, which is associated with ought goals (an individual's duties, responsibilities, and obligations). The two systems have been studied extensively in behavioral research with reference to differences between promotion and prevention goal pursuit as well as the consequences of perceived attainment versus nonattainment within each system. However, no study has examined the neural correlates of each combination of goal domain and goal attainment status. We used a rapid masked idiographic goal priming paradigm and functional magnetic resonance imaging to present individually selected promotion and prevention goals, which participants had reported previously that they were close to attaining ("match") or far from attaining ("mismatch"). Across the four priming conditions, significant activations were observed in bilateral insula (Brodmann area (BA) 13) and visual association cortex (BA 18/19). Promotion priming discriminantly engaged left prefrontal cortex (BA 9), whereas prevention priming discriminantly engaged right prefrontal cortex (BA 8/9). Activation in response to promotion goal priming was also correlated with an individual difference measure of perceived success in promotion goal attainment. Our findings extend the construct validity of RFT by showing that the two systems postulated by RFT, under conditions of both attainment and nonattainment, have shared and distinct neural correlates that interface logically with established network models of self-regulatory cognition.

Reduced spontaneous perspective taking in schizophrenia

Judgments about another person's visual perspective are impaired when the self-perspective is inconsistent with the other-perspective. This is a robust finding in healthy samples as well as in schizophrenia (SZ). Studies show evidence for the existence of a reverse effect, where an inconsistent other-perspective impairs the self-perspective. Such spontaneous perspective taking processes are not yet explored in SZ. In the current fMRI experiment, 24 healthy and 24 schizophrenic participants performed a visual perspective taking task in the scanner. Either a social or a non-social stimulus was presented and their visual perspectives were consistent or inconsistent with the self-perspective of the participant. We replicated previous findings showing that healthy participants show increased reaction times when the human avatar's perspective is inconsistent to the self-perspective. Patients with SZ, however, did not show this effect, neither in the social nor in the non-social condition. BOLD responses revealed similar patterns in occipital areas and group differences were identified in the middle occipital gyrus. These findings suggest that patients with SZ are less likely to spontaneously compute the visual perspectives of others.

Secret of the Masters: Young Chess Players Show Advanced Visual Perspective Taking

Playing chess requires perspective taking in order to consistently infer the opponent's next moves. The present study examined whether long-term chess players are more advanced in visual perspective taking tasks than their counterparts without chess training during laboratory visual perspective taking tasks. Visual perspective taking performance was assessed among 11- to 12-year-old experienced chess players (n = 15) and their counterparts without chess training (n = 15) using a dot perspective task. Participants judged their own and the avatar's visual perspective that were either consistent with each other or not. The results indicated that the chess players out-performed the non-chess players (Experiment 1), yet this advantage disappeared when the task required less executive functioning (Experiment 2). Additionally, unlike the non-chess players whose performance improved in Experiment 2 when the executive function (EF) demand was reduced, the chess players did not show better perspective taking under such condition. These findings suggested that long-term chess experience might be associated with children's more efficient perspective taking of other people's viewpoints without exhausting their cognitive resources.

Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence

Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective. Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective (Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between (Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioral (Experiments 1–3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by experimental context.

Action effect consistency and body ownership in the avatar-Simon task

Putting oneself in the shoes of a digital alter ego becomes an increasingly relevant part of our everyday experience. In modern day psychology, these interactions can be examined within the frameworks of visual perspective taking and body ownership. Both target similar questions: What does it take, to become one with the avatar? When do we show the same behavior and make the same experiences, as if we were in its place? In this study, we want to address the role of action effect consistency for these concepts. We manipulated the participants’ sense of agency over a task-irrelevant avatar in a Simon task by providing either corresponding or random action effects. These effects could be either embodied and therefore linked to the avatar (Experiment 1) or independent of it (Experiment 2). We used stimulus-response compatibility effects from the avatar’s point of view as a measure for spontaneous visual perspective taking and a questionnaire to measure the perceived body ownership of the avatar. The results showed that corresponding action effects lead to increased spontaneous perspective taking of the avatar, regardless of whether the effect was linked to the avatar or not. Though the avatar compatibility effects were overall more pronounced in the embodied action effect condition. However, significant differences in perceived body ownership were only observed if the effects were linked to the avatar. The results might prove useful to further our understanding of subjective and objective measurements of interactions with avatars.

Increasing the Difference in Decision Making for Oneself and for Others by Stimulating the Right Temporoparietal Junction

The right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) has been thought to be associated with the difference in self-other decision making. In the present study, using noninvasive transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), we examined whether stimulating the rTPJ could modulate the self-other decision-making difference. We found that after receiving anodal stimulation of the rTPJ, participants were more likely to choose a high-value item for others than for themselves in the situations where the win probability of the high-value item was equal to or greater than that of a low-value item, indicating that elevating the cortical excitability of the rTPJ might increase the self-other decision-making difference in certain decision contexts. Our results suggest that decision making for others depends on neural activity in the rTPJ and regulation of the excitability of the rTPJ can influence the self-other decision-making difference.

The social neuroscience of mentalizing: challenges and recommendations

Our ability to understand and think about the mental states of other people is referred to as 'mentalizing' or 'theory of mind'. It features prominently in all social behavior, is essential for maintaining relationships, and shows pronounced individual differences. Here we review new approaches to study the underlying psychological mechanisms and discuss how they could best be investigated using modern tools from social neuroscience. We list key desiderata for the field, such as validity, specificity, and reproducibility, and link them to specific recommendations for the future. We also discuss new computational modeling approaches, and the application to psychopathology.

An objective neural signature of rapid perspective taking

The frequency-tagging approach has generally been confined to study low-level sensory processes and always found related activation over the occipital region. Here for the first time, we investigated with it, high-level socio-cognitive functions, i.e. the processing of what other people are looking at which is referred to as level 1 visual perspective taking (VPT). Sixteen participants were presented with visual scenes alternating at 2.5 Hz which were depicting a person and an object in a room, while recording electrophysiological brain activity. The person orientation and object position changed at every stimulus but the person in the room always faced the object, except on every fifth stimulus. We found responses in the electroencephalography (EEG) spectrum exactly at the frequency corresponding to the presentation of the scenes where the person could not see the object, i.e. 0.5 Hz. While the 2.5 Hz stimulation rate response focused on typical medial occipital sites, the specific 0.5 Hz response was found mainly over a centro-parietal region. Besides a robust group effect, these responses were significant and quantifiable for most individual participants. Overall, these observations reveal a clear measure of level 1-VPT representation, highlighting the potential of EEG frequency-tagging to capture high-level socio-cognitive functions in the brain.

Modulation of behavioral and brain responses to visual perspective taking by social rejection: Evidence from electrophysiology

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is crucial for reasoning about other people's mental states. To explore the modulation of behavioral and neural responses to visual perspective taking by social rejection, we firstly manipulated rejection using get-acquainted oral communication and a two-person visual perspective task, then explored how the experience of social rejection affected the behavioral and neural responses during the follow-up classical one-person visual perspective task. The subjective rating and behavior results showed that social rejection increased individuals' negative affect level and feelings of need-threat, decreased self-regulation and impulsive control. The event-related potentials (ERP) and standardized low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) results mainly showed that the increased parietal late slow wave (LSW) showed greater activities in SPL and rTPJ after social rejection. Moreover, compared with making judgments from self-perspective, making judgments from other-perspective yielded later TP450 and greater late frontal wave (LFW). In addition, the left LFW of socially rejected group showed more positive amplitude for other-inconsistent condition than that for other-consistent condition. These results suggested that social rejection might decrease impulsive control behaviorally, as well as increase neural processing of perspective taking, including visual-spatial perspective taking (indexed by the LSW), calculating of the self and other perspectives (indexed by the TP450), and processing of others' visual perspectives (indexed by the LFW). Our findings provide powerful evidence on neural mechanism underlying how social rejection modulates visual perspective taking, and support the model of social monitoring system, in that socially rejected individuals motivate to attend more carefully to social cues, such as other people's perspective.

A Novel Biomarker of Compensatory Recruitment of Face Emotional Imagery Networks in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Imagery of facial expressions in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is likely impaired but has been very difficult to capture at a neurophysiological level. We developed an approach that allowed to directly link observation of emotional expressions and imagery in ASD, and to derive biomarkers that are able to classify abnormal imagery in ASD. To provide a handle between perception and action imagery cycles it is important to use visual stimuli exploring the dynamical nature of emotion representation. We conducted a case-control study providing a link between both visualization and mental imagery of dynamic facial expressions and investigated source responses to pure face-expression contrasts. We were able to replicate the same highly group discriminative neural signatures during action observation (dynamical face expressions) and imagery, in the precuneus. Larger activation in regions involved in imagery for the ASD group suggests that this effect is compensatory. We conducted a machine learning procedure to automatically identify these group differences, based on the EEG activity during mental imagery of facial expressions. We compared two classifiers and achieved an accuracy of 81% using 15 features (both linear and non-linear) of the signal from theta, high-beta and gamma bands extracted from right-parietal locations (matching the precuneus region), further confirming the findings regarding standard statistical analysis. This robust classification of signals resulting from imagery of dynamical expressions in ASD is surprising because it far and significantly exceeds the good classification already achieved with observation of neutral face expressions (74%). This novel neural correlate of emotional imagery in autism could potentially serve as a clinical interventional target for studies designed to improve facial expression recognition, or at least as an intervention biomarker.

Dissociable Roles Within the Social Brain for Self–Other Processing: A HD-tDCS Study

Theories of right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) function in social cognition include self–other distinction, self-inhibition, or embodied rotation, whereas the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is associated with integrating social information. However, no study has provided causal evidence for dissociable roles of the rTPJ and dmPFC in social cognition. A total of 52 healthy young adults were stratified to receive either dmPFC or rTPJ anodal high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) in a sham-controlled, double-blinded, repeated measures design. Self–other processing was assessed across implicit and explicit level 1 (line-of-sight) and level 2 (mental rotation) visual perspective taking (VPT) tasks, and self–other effects on memory. DmPFC stimulation selectively increased the influence of the allocentric perspective during egocentric perspective taking, indexed by an increase in congruency effect across explicit VPT tasks. Moreover, dmPFC stimulation removed the self-reference effect in episodic memory by increasing the recognition of other and decreasing the recognition of self-encoded words. Stimulation of the rTPJ resulted in improved inhibition of the egocentric-perspective during level 2 VPT only, indexed by a reduction of the congruency effect when taking the allocentric perspective. This research supports theories suggesting that the rTPJ facilitates embodied mental rotation of the self into an alternate perspective, whereas the dmPFC integrates social information relevant to self-directed processes.

Measuring visual perspective taking in the brain with avatars and arrows: Which question are we asking?

There is an ongoing debate about the involvement of Theory of Mind (ToM) processes in Visual Perspective Taking (VPT). In an fMRI study (Schurz et al., 2015), we borrowed the positive features from a novel VPT task - which is widely used in behavioral research - to study previously overlooked experimental factors in neuroimaging studies. However, as Catmur et al. (2016) rightly argue in a comment on our work, our data do not speak strongly to questions discussed in the original behavioral studies, in particular the issue of implicit mentalizing. We appreciate the clarification of these interpretational limitations of our study, but would like to point out the differences between questions emerging from behavioral and neuroimaging research on VPT. Different from what Catmur et al. (2016) discuss, our study was not intended as a test of implicit mentalizing. In fact, the terms "automatic" and "implicit mentalizing" were never mentioned in our manuscript. Our study addressed a methodological gap between ToM and VPT research, which we identified in two previous meta-analyses on the topics (Schurz et al., 2013, 2014). With this difference in mind we show that the critical points levelled by Catmur et al. (2016) cease to apply.

Causal evidence for task-specific involvement of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in human social cognition

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is a key hub of the 'social brain', but little is known about specific processes supported by this region. Using focal high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) and a social cognitive battery with differing demands on self-other processing, we demonstrate specific involvement of the dmPFC in tasks placing high demands on self-other processing. Specifically, excitatory (anodal) HD-tDCS enhanced the integration of external information into the self for explicit higher-order socio-cognitive tasks across cognitive domains; i.e. visual perspective taking (VPT) and episodic memory. These effects were task specific, as no stimulation effects were found for attributing mental states from the eyes or implicit VPT. Inhibitory (cathodal) HD-tDCS had weaker effects in the opposite direction towards reduced integration of external information into the self. We thus demonstrate for the first time a specific and causal role of the dmPFC in integrating higher-order information from others/external source into that of the self across cognitive domains.

Implicit Mentalising during Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking Indicated by Dissociation with Attention Orienting

Experiments demonstrating level-1 visual perspective-taking have been interpreted as providing important evidence for 'implicit mentalising'-the ability to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner. However, this interpretation has been contested by a rival 'submentalising' account that proposes that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for attentional orienting. Here, we aim to discriminate between these competing accounts by examining whether a gaze aversion manipulation expected to enhance attention orienting would have similar effects on both perspective-taking and attention orienting tasks. Gaze aversion was operationalised by manipulating head position relative to torso of the avatar figures employed in two experiments (gaze-averted vs. gaze-maintained). Experiment 1 used a Posner cueing task to establish that gaze aversion enhanced attention orienting cued by these avatars. Using the avatar task, Experiment 2 revealed level-1 visual perspective-taking effects of equivalent magnitude for gaze-averted and gaze-maintained conditions. These results indicate that gaze aversion moderated attention orienting but not perspective-taking. This dissociation in performance favours implicit mentalising by casting doubt on the submentalising account. It further constrains theorising by implying that attention orienting is not integral to the system permitting the relatively automatic tracking of mental states.

Neural Correlates of a Perspective-taking Task Using in a Realistic Three-dimmensional Environment Based Task: A Pilot Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

Objective

Perspective-taking ability is an essential spatial faculty that is of much interest in both health and neuropsychiatric disorders. There is limited data on the neural correlates of perspective taking in the context of a realistic three-dimensional environment. We report the results of a pilot study exploring the same in eight healthy volunteers.

Methods

Subjects underwent two runs of an experiment in a 3 Tesla magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) involving alternate blocks of a first-person perspective based allocentric object location memory task (OLMT), a third-person perspective based egocentric visual perspective taking task (VPRT), and a table task (TT) that served as a control. Difference in blood oxygen level dependant response during task performance was analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software, version 12. Activations were considered significant if they survived family-wise error correction at the cluster level using a height threshold of p＜0.001, uncorrected at the voxel level.

Results

A significant difference in accuracy and reaction time based on task type was found. Subjects had significantly lower accuracy in VPRT compared to TT. Accuracy in the two active tasks was not significantly different. Subjects took significantly longer in the VPRT in comparison to TT. Reaction time in the two active tasks was not significantly different. Functional MRI revealed significantly higher activation in the bilateral visual cortex and left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) in VPRT compared to OLMT.

Conclusion

The results underscore the importance of TPJ in egocentric manipulation in healthy controls in the context of reality-based spatial tasks.

Do implicit and explicit belief processing share neural substrates?

Humans rely on their ability to infer another person's mental state to understand and predict others' behavior ("theory of mind," ToM). Multiple lines of research suggest that not only are humans able to consciously process another person's belief state, but also are able to do so implicitly. Here we explored how general implicit belief states are represented in the brain, compared to those substrates involved in explicit ToM processes. Previous work on this topic has yielded conflicting results, and thus, the extent to which the implicit and explicit ToM systems draw on common neural bases is unclear. Participants were presented with "Sally-Anne" type movies in which a protagonist was falsely led to believe a ball was in one location, only for a puppet to later move it to another location in their absence (false-belief condition). In other movies, the protagonist had their back turned the entire time the puppet moved the ball between the two locations, meaning that they had no opportunity to develop any pre-existing beliefs about the scenario (no-belief condition). Using a group of independently localized explicit ToM brain regions, we found greater activity for false-belief trials, relative to no-belief trials, in the right temporoparietal junction, right superior temporal sulcus, precuneus, and left middle prefrontal gyrus. These findings extend upon previous work on the neural bases of implicit ToM by showing substantial overlap between this system and the explicit ToM system, suggesting that both abilities might recruit a common set of mentalizing processes/functional brain regions. Hum Brain Mapp 38:4760-4772, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Current evidence for automatic Theory of Mind processing in adults

Theory of Mind (ToM) is thought to play a key role in social information processing as it refers to the ability of individuals to represent the mental states of others (e.g., intentions, desires, beliefs). A provocative hypothesis has been put forward which espouses the existence of two ToM systems: one that is implicit and involves the automatic analysis of the belief states of others and another that is not automatic and is involved in explicitly reasoning about others' mental states. Recently, Phillips et al. (2015) have suggested that there is limited evidence for automatic ToM processing, after identifying a confound in a previous high-profile paper supporting the existence of this cognitive operation in infants and adults (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010). Here, we take a broader view of the literature and find, contrary to the conclusions of Phillips et al., that there is a substantial body of literature which demonstrates that adult humans are able to engage in unconscious and unintentional, and thus automatic, analyses of others' mental states. However, whether this ability is best described under a one, two or multiple systems ToM account remains to be determined.

The rTPJ's overarching cognitive function in networks for attention and theory of mind

Cortical networks underpinning attentional control and mentalizing converge at the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). It is debated whether the rTPJ is fractionated in neighboring, but separate functional modules underpinning attentional control and mentalizing, or whether one overarching cognitive mechanism explains the rTPJ's role in both domains. Addressing this question, we combined attentional control and mentalizing in a factorial design within one task. We added a social context condition, in which another individual's mental states became apparently task-relevant, to a spatial cueing paradigm. This allowed for assessing cue validity- and context-dependent functional activity and effective connectivity of the rTPJ within corresponding cortical networks. We found two discriminable rTPJ subregions, an anterior and a posterior one. Yet, we did not observe a sharp functional dissociation between these two, as both regions responded to attention cueing and social context manipulation. The results suggest that the rTPJ is part of both the ventral attention and the ToM network and that its function is defined by context-dependent coupling with the respective network. We argue that the rTPJ as a functional unit underpins an overarching cognitive mechanism in attentional control and mentalizing and discuss how the present results help to further specify this mechanism.