Is there a G factor for metacognition? Correlations in retrospective metacognitive sensitivity across tasks

Are subjective language complaints in memory clinic patients informative?

To diagnose mild cognitive impairment, it is crucial to understand whether subjective cognitive complaints reflect objective cognitive deficits. This question has mostly been investigated in the memory domain, with mixed results. Our study was one of the first to address it for language. Participants were 55-to-93-year-old memory clinic patients (n = 163). They filled in a questionnaire about subjective language and memory complaints and performed two language tasks (naming-by-definition and sentence comprehension). Greater language complaints were associated with two language measures, thus showing a moderate value in predicting language performance. Greater relative severity of language versus memory complaints was a better predictor, associated with three language performance measures. Surprisingly, greater memory complaints were associated with better naming, probably due to anosognosia in further disease progression or personality-related factors. Our findings highlight the importance of relative complaint severity across domains and, clinically, call for developing self-assessment questionnaires asking specific questions about multiple cognitive functions.

Why metacognition matters in politically contested domains

Emerging evidence highlights the importance of metacognition - the capacity for insight into the reliability and fallibility of our own knowledge and thought - in politically contested domains. The present synthesis elucidates why metacognition matters in politically charged contexts and its potential impact on how individuals form beliefs, process evidence, and make decisions.

How Do You Know If You Were Mind Wandering? Dissociating Explicit Memories of Off Task Thought From Subjective Feelings of Inattention

Mind wandering is a common experience in which your attention drifts away from the task at hand and toward task-unrelated thoughts. To measure mind wandering we typically use experience sampling and retrospective self-reports, which require participants to make metacognitive judgments about their immediately preceding attentional states. In the current study, we aimed to better understand how people come to make such judgments by introducing a novel distinction between explicit memories of off task thought and subjective feelings of inattention. Across two preregistered experiments, we found that participants often indicated they were "off task" and yet had no memory of the content of their thoughts-though, they were less common than remembered experiences. Critically, remembered experiences of mind wandering and subjective feelings of inattention differed in their behavioral correlates. In Experiment 1, we found that only the frequency of remembered mind wandering varied with task demands. In contrast, only subjective feelings of inattention were associated with poor performance (Experiments 1 and 2) and individual differences in executive functioning (Experiment 2). These results suggest that the phenomenology of mind wandering may differ depending on how the experiences are brought about (e.g., executive functioning errors versus excess attentional resources), and provide preliminary evidence of the importance of measuring subjective feelings of inattention when assessing mind wandering.

The structure of metacognition in middle childhood: Evidence for a unitary metacognition-for-memory factor

It has been debated whether children's metacognitive monitoring and control processes rely on a general resource or whether metacognitive processes are task specific. Moreover, findings about the extent to which metacognitive processes are related to first-order task performance are mixed. The current study aimed to uncover the relationships among children's monitoring (discrimination between correct and incorrect responses), control (accurate withdrawal of wrong answers), and performance across three memory-based learning tasks: Kanji learning, text comprehension, and secret code learning. All tasks consisted of a study phase, a test phase, monitoring (confidence judgments), and control (maintaining/withdrawing responses). Participants were 325 children (151 second graders [Mage = 8.12 years] and 174 fourth graders [Mage = 10.20 years]). Confirmatory factor analyses showed that a model in which monitoring and control loaded on a joint factor and performance on a separate factor provided the best fit to the data. Fourth graders had better monitoring and control accuracy than second graders. However, the factor structure of metacognition was similar for both age groups, contradictory to the assumption that metacognition generalizes across tasks as children grow older. After accounting for task-specific processes, monitoring and control skills for language-based memory tasks appear to be generalizable in middle childhood. In sum, children's monitoring and control for three separate memory tasks appear to reflect a unitary metacognition-for-memory factor related to, but distinguishable from, performance.

Metacognitive evaluation of postdecisional perceptual representations

Perceptual confidence is thought to arise from metacognitive processes that evaluate the underlying perceptual decision evidence. We investigated whether metacognitive access to perceptual evidence is constrained by the hierarchical organization of visual cortex, where high-level representations tend to be more readily available for explicit scrutiny. We found that the ability of human observers to evaluate their confidence did depend on whether they performed a high-level or low-level task on the same stimuli, but was also affected by manipulations that occurred long after the perceptual decision. Confidence in low-level perceptual decisions degraded with more time between the decision and the response cue, especially when backward masking was present. Confidence in high-level tasks was immune to backward masking and benefitted from additional time. These results can be explained by a model assuming confidence heavily relies on postdecisional internal representations of visual stimuli that degrade over time, where high-level representations are more persistent.

The future of metacognition research: Balancing construct breadth with measurement rigor

Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one's capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition - such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.

Exploring quantitative measures in metacognition of emotion

Metacognition of emotion (meta-emotion) refers to the ability to evaluate and identify one's emotional feelings. No previous study has defined and measured this construct through objective and quantitative procedures. We established a reliable method to measure meta-emotion. With a two-interval forced-choice procedure, participants selected which of two pictures elicited stronger positive emotion; via the Law of Comparative Judgment, their responses were used to compute individual psychological distances for the emotional responses triggered by the pictures. Then, participants were asked to judge whether a pre-exposed picture induced a stronger positive emotion than the median of that elicited by the whole picture set, followed by a confidence rating. By utilizing each individual's psychological distance, the correctness of a participant's emotional experience was quantified by d', and meta-emotion was quantified using meta-d', M-ratio, and M-diff as indices of metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency based on Signal-Detection Theory. Test-retest reliabilities, validated by Spearman correlation, were observed in meta-d', M-ratio, and marginally with M-diff, suggesting the stability of meta-emotion in the current design. This study unveils a validated procedure to quantify meta-emotion, extendable for assessing metacognition of other subjective feelings. Nevertheless, caution is warranted in interpretation, as the measured processes may be influenced by non-metacognitive factors.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Unskilled, underperforming, or unaware? Testing three accounts of individual differences in metacognitive monitoring

Many studies show that competence (e.g., skill, expertise, natural ability) influences individuals' capabilities of monitoring their item-level performance. However, debate persists about how best to explain these individual differences in metacognition. The competence-based account ascribes differences in monitoring to individuals' objective ability level, arguing that the same skills necessary to perform a task are required to effectively monitor performance. The performance-based account attributes differences in monitoring to changes in overall task performance - no individual differences in competence required. Finally, the metacognitive awareness account proposes that alignment between an individuals' self-assessed and objective ability leads to differences in monitoring. In this study, 603 participants completed a self-assessment of face recognition ability, a lineup identification task, and an objective assessment of face recognition ability. We manipulated the number of encoding repetitions and delay between encoding and test to produce varying levels of task performance across objective face recognition ability. Following each lineup decision, participants provided both a numeric confidence rating and a written expression of verbal confidence. We transformed verbal confidence into a quantitative value using machine learning techniques. When matched on overall identification accuracy, objectively stronger face recognizers used numeric and verbal confidence that a) better discriminates between correct and filler lineup identifications than weaker recognizers, and b) shows better calibration to accuracy. Participants with greater self-assessed ability used higher levels of confidence, irrespective of trial accuracy. These results support the competence-based account.

Common computations for metacognition and meta-metacognition

Recent evidence shows that people have the meta-metacognitive ability to evaluate their metacognitive judgments of confidence. However, it is unclear whether meta-metacognitive judgments are made by a different system and rely on a separate set of computations compared to metacognitive judgments. To address this question, we asked participants (N = 36) to perform a perceptual decision-making task and provide (i) an object-level, Type-1 response about the identity of the stimulus; (ii) a metacognitive, Type-2 response (low/high) regarding their confidence in their Type-1 decision; and (iii) a meta-metacognitive, Type-3 response (low/high) regarding the quality of their Type-2 rating. We found strong evidence for the existence of Type-3, meta-metacognitive ability. In a separate condition, participants performed an identical task with only a Type-1 response followed by a Type-2 response given on a 4-point scale. We found that the two conditions produced equivalent results such that the combination of binary Type-2 and binary Type-3 responses acts similar to a 4-point Type-2 response. Critically, while Type-2 evaluations were subject to metacognitive noise, Type-3 judgments were made at no additional cost. These results suggest that it is unlikely that there is a distinction between Type-2 and Type-3 systems (metacognition and meta-metacognition) in perceptual decision-making and, instead, a single system can be flexibly adapted to produce both Type-2 and Type-3 evaluations recursively.

Retrospective judgments of confidence in a complex span task

Although the study of metamemory monitoring originated in predictions for simple span tasks, the study of metacognition for working memory (WM) has been somewhat neglected in comparison with long-term memory. We aimed to fill this gap by exploring the ability to self-assess WM operations. Thirty-four participants performed 16 series of complex span tasks and rated their confidence in a verbal recall paradigm. We manipulated the cognitive load based on the TBRS model in order to analyze the role of attentional resources on both WM and metacognitive evaluations. As expected, we found that recall is affected by cognitive load and we found standard serial position effects. Interestingly, metacognitive evaluations followed the same pattern, and measures of metacognitive sensitivity suggest that participants are able to make item-by-item retrospective judgments reflective of their performance. We discuss how these results contribute to our understanding of metacognitive access to newly-formed WM contents.

Episodic and semantic feeling-of-knowing in aging: a systematic review and meta-analysis

A complex pattern of preservation and deterioration in metacognition in aging is found, especially regarding predicting future memory retrieval (i.e., feeling-of-knowing, FOK). While semantic FOK (sFOK) is preserved with age, studies on episodic tasks (eFOK) produce equivocal findings. We present a meta-analysis of 20 studies on eFOK and sFOK, analyzing the difference in metacognitive sensitivity between 922 younger and 966 older adults, taking into account the difference in memory performance. The sFOK studies yielded no overall age effect (8 effects, g = -0.10 [-0.29, 0.10]). However, we found a reliable age-group difference on eFOK (22 effects, g = 0.53 [0.28, 0.78]), which was moderated when considering recognition performance. Moreover, using aggregated data of 134 young and 235 older adults from published and unpublished studies from our lab, we investigated memory performance as an explanation of the eFOK deficit. We show that older adults are less metacognitively sensitive than younger adults for eFOKs which is, at least partly, due to the age-related memory decline. We highlight two non-exclusive explanations: a recollection deficit at play in the first and second order tasks, and a confound between first order performance and the measure used to assess metacognitive sensitivity.

Evidence for a metacognitive awareness of autobiographical memory organisation

Models of autobiographical memory (AM) recall posit some form of control process, but the extent to which we can reflect on this form of retrieval is under-researched. Here we propose a method for measuring such metacognitive awareness in AM. Since the verification of personal facts is difficult, we based our design on AM organisation. AMs are proposed to be organised into a coherent life story, that is, a subjective chronology reflecting the goals of the individual over time. We investigated the metacognitive awareness of this coherence. Eighty-three participants generated AMs and made two judgements of order for pairs of memories and gave a confidence rating. We found that participants were indeed able to distinguish pairs of memories that were coherent with their life story chronology from pairs which were not. We also found a significant effect of response time and task difficulty on confidence, suggesting that judgement of order fluency was determinant for metacognitive evaluation. This suggests common properties between metacognitive abilities related to autobiographical memory and those related to other forms of memory.

Modality independent or modality specific? Common computations underlie confidence judgements in visual and auditory decisions

The mechanisms that enable humans to evaluate their confidence across a range of different decisions remain poorly understood. To bridge this gap in understanding, we used computational modelling to investigate the processes that underlie confidence judgements for perceptual decisions and the extent to which these computations are the same in the visual and auditory modalities. Participants completed two versions of a categorisation task with visual or auditory stimuli and made confidence judgements about their category decisions. In each modality, we varied both evidence strength, (i.e., the strength of the evidence for a particular category) and sensory uncertainty (i.e., the intensity of the sensory signal). We evaluated several classes of computational models which formalise the mapping of evidence strength and sensory uncertainty to confidence in different ways: 1) unscaled evidence strength models, 2) scaled evidence strength models, and 3) Bayesian models. Our model comparison results showed that across tasks and modalities, participants take evidence strength and sensory uncertainty into account in a way that is consistent with the scaled evidence strength class. Notably, the Bayesian class provided a relatively poor account of the data across modalities, particularly in the more complex categorisation task. Our findings suggest that a common process is used for evaluating confidence in perceptual decisions across domains, but that the parameter settings governing the process are tuned differently in each modality. Overall, our results highlight the impact of sensory uncertainty on confidence and the unity of metacognitive processing across sensory modalities.

Common computations in automatic cue combination and metacognitive confidence reports

Appropriate perceptual decision making necessitates the accurate estimation and use of sensory uncertainty. Such estimation has been studied in the context of both low-level multisensory cue combination and metacognitive estimation of confidence, but it remains unclear whether the same computations underlie both sets of uncertainty estimation. We created visual stimuli with low vs. high overall motion energy, such that the high-energy stimuli led to higher confidence but lower accuracy in a visual-only task. Importantly, we tested the impact of the low- and high-energy visual stimuli on auditory motion perception in a separate task. Despite being irrelevant to the auditory task, both visual stimuli impacted auditory judgments presumably via automatic low-level mechanisms. Critically, we found that the high-energy visual stimuli influenced the auditory judgments more strongly than the low-energy visual stimuli. This effect was in line with the confidence but contrary to the accuracy differences between the high- and low-energy stimuli in the visual-only task. These effects were captured by a simple computational model that assumes common computational principles underlying both confidence reports and multisensory cue combination. Our results reveal a deep link between automatic sensory processing and metacognitive confidence reports, and suggest that vastly different stages of perceptual decision making rely on common computational principles.

Age-related decreases in global metacognition are independent of local metacognition and task performance

Metacognition refers to a capacity to reflect on and control other cognitive processes, commonly quantified as the extent to which confidence tracks objective performance. There is conflicting evidence about how "local" metacognition (monitoring of individual judgments) and "global" metacognition (estimates of self-performance) change across the lifespan. Additionally, the degree to which metacognition generalises across cognitive domains may itself change with age due to increased experience with one's own abilities. Using a gamified suite of performance-controlled memory and visual perception tasks, we measured local and global metacognition in an age-stratified sample of 304 healthy volunteers (18-83 years; N = 50 in each of 6 age groups). We calculated both local and global metrics of metacognition and quantified how and whether domain-generality changes with age. First-order task performance was stable across the age range. People's global self-performance estimates and local metacognitive bias decreased with age, indicating overall lower confidence in performance. In contrast, local metacognitive efficiency was spared in older age and remained correlated across the two cognitive domains. A stability of local metacognition indicates distinct mechanisms contributing to local and global metacognition. Our study reveals how local and global metacognition change across the lifespan and provide a benchmark against which disease-related changes in metacognition can be compared.

Cross-modal metacognition: Visual and tactile confidence share a common scale

Humans can judge the quality of their perceptual decisions-an ability known as perceptual confidence. Previous work suggested that confidence can be evaluated on an abstract scale that can be sensory modality-independent or even domain-general. However, evidence is still scarce on whether confidence judgments can be directly made across visual and tactile decisions. Here, we investigated in a sample of 56 adults whether visual and tactile confidence share a common scale by measuring visual contrast and vibrotactile discrimination thresholds in a confidence-forced choice paradigm. Confidence judgments were made about the correctness of the perceptual decision between two trials involving either the same or different modalities. To estimate confidence efficiency, we compared discrimination thresholds obtained from all trials to those from trials judged to be relatively more confident. We found evidence for metaperception because higher confidence was associated with better perceptual performance in both modalities. Importantly, participants were able to judge their confidence across modalities without any costs in metaperceptual sensitivity and only minor changes in response times compared to unimodal confidence judgments. In addition, we were able to predict cross-modal confidence well from unimodal judgments. In conclusion, our findings show that perceptual confidence is computed on an abstract scale and that it can assess the quality of our decisions across sensory modalities.

A shared brain system forming confidence judgment across cognitive domains

Confidence is typically defined as a subjective judgment about whether a decision is right. Decisions are based on sources of information that come from various cognitive domains and are processed in different brain systems. An unsettled question is whether the brain computes confidence in a similar manner whatever the domain or in a manner that would be idiosyncratic to each domain. To address this issue, human participants performed two tasks probing confidence in decisions made about the same material (history and geography statements), but based on different cognitive processes: semantic memory for deciding whether the statement was true or false, and duration perception for deciding whether the statement display was long or short. At the behavioral level, we found that the same factors (difficulty, accuracy, response time, and confidence in the preceding decision) predicted confidence judgments in both tasks. At the neural level, we observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging that confidence judgments in both tasks were associated to activity in the same brain regions: positively in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and negatively in a prefronto-parietal network. Together, these findings suggest the existence of a shared brain system that generates confidence judgments in a similar manner across cognitive domains.

Dynamics of task-based confidence in schizophrenia using seasonal decomposition approach

Objective

Introspective Accuracy (IA) is a metacognitive construct that refers to alignment of self-generated accuracy judgments, confidence, and objective information regarding performance. IA not only refers to accuracy and confidence during tasks, but also predicts functional outcomes. The consistency and magnitude of IA deficits suggest a sustained disconnect between self-assessments and actual performance. The cognitive origins of IA are unclear and are not simply due to poor performance. We tried to capture task and diagnosis-related differences through examining confidence as a timeseries.

Method

This relatively large sample (N = 171; Bipolar = 71, Schizophrenia = 100) study used item by item confidence judgments for tasks including the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) and the Emotion Recognition task (ER-40). Using a seasonal decomposition approach and AutoRegressive, Integrative and Moving Averages (ARIMA) time-series analyses we tested for the presence of randomness and perseveration.

Results

For the WCST, comparisons across participants with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder found similar trends and residuals, thus excluding perseverative or random responding. However, seasonal components were weaker in participants with schizophrenia, reflecting a reduced impact of feedback on confidence. In contrast, for the ER40, which does not require identification of a sustained construct, seasonal, trend, and residual analyses were highly comparable.

Conclusion

Seasonal analysis revealed that confidence judgments in participants with schizophrenia on tasks requiring responses to feedback reflected diminished incorporation of external information, not random or preservative responding. These analyses highlight how time series analyses can specify potential faulty processes for future intervention.

Assessing Metacognitive Regulation during Problem Solving: A Comparison of Three Measures

Metacognition is hypothesized to play a central role in problem solving and self-regulated learning. Various measures have been developed to assess metacognitive regulation, including survey items in questionnaires, verbal protocols, and metacognitive judgments. However, few studies have examined whether these measures assess the same metacognitive skills or are related to the same learning outcomes. To explore these questions, we investigated the relations between three metacognitive regulation measures given at various points during a learning activity and subsequent test. Verbal protocols were collected during the learning activity, questionnaire responses were collected after the learning tasks but before the test, and judgments of knowing (JOKs) were collected during the test. We found that the number of evaluation statements as measured via verbal protocols was positively associated with students' responses on the control/debugging and evaluation components of the questionnaire. There were also two other positive trends. However, the number of monitoring statements was negatively associated with students' responses on the monitoring component of the questionnaire and their JOKs on the later test. Each measure was also related to some aspect of performance, but the particular metacognitive skill, the direction of the effect, and the type of learning outcome differed across the measures. These results highlight the heterogeneity of outcomes across the measures, with each having different affordances and constraints for use in research and educational practice.

Metacognitive Domains Are Not Aligned along a Dimension of Internal-External Information Source

It is still debated whether metacognition, or the ability to monitor our own mental states, relies on processes that are “domain-general” (a single set of processes can account for the monitoring of any mental process) or “domain-specific” (metacognition is accomplished by a collection of multiple monitoring modules, one for each cognitive domain). It has been speculated that two broad categories of metacognitive processes may exist: those that monitor primarily externally generated versus those that monitor primarily internally generated information. To test this proposed division, we measured metacognitive performance (using m-ratio, a signal detection theoretical measure) in four tasks that could be ranked along an internal-external axis of the source of information, namely memory, motor, visuomotor, and visual tasks. We found correlations between m-ratios in visuomotor and motor tasks, but no correlations between m-ratios in visual and visuomotor tasks, or between motor and memory tasks. While we found no correlation in metacognitive ability between visual and memory tasks, and a positive correlation between visuomotor and motor tasks, we found no evidence for a correlation between motor and memory tasks. This pattern of correlations does not support the grouping of domains based on whether the source of information is primarily internal or external. We suggest that other groupings could be more reflective of the nature of metacognition and discuss the need to consider other non-domain task-features when using correlations as a way to test the underlying shared processes between domains.

Learning with certainty in childhood

Learners use certainty to guide learning. They maintain existing beliefs when certain, but seek further information when they feel uninformed. Here, we review developmental evidence that this metacognitive strategy does not require reportable processing. Uncertainty prompts nonverbal human infants and nonhuman animals to engage in strategies like seeking help, searching for additional information, or opting out. Certainty directs children's attention and active learning strategies and provides a common metric for comparing and integrating conflicting beliefs across people. We conclude that certainty is a continuous, domain-general signal of belief quality even early in life.

Dynamic influences on static measures of metacognition

Humans differ in their capability to judge choice accuracy via confidence judgments. Popular signal detection theoretic measures of metacognition, such as M-ratio, do not consider the dynamics of decision making. This can be problematic if response caution is shifted to alter the tradeoff between speed and accuracy. Such shifts could induce unaccounted-for sources of variation in the assessment of metacognition. Instead, evidence accumulation frameworks consider decision making, including the computation of confidence, as a dynamic process unfolding over time. Using simulations, we show a relation between response caution and M-ratio. We then show the same pattern in human participants explicitly instructed to focus on speed or accuracy. Finally, this association between M-ratio and response caution is also present across four datasets without any reference towards speed. In contrast, when data are analyzed with a dynamic measure of metacognition, v-ratio, there is no effect of speed-accuracy tradeoff.

Metacognitive Ability and the Precision of Confidence

In prior research, signal detection theory (SDT) has been widely utilized to assess metacognitive ability. However, the SDT metacognitive model requires the use of a two-alternative forced-choice task, while confidence must also be measured discretely. In our model, participants' cognitive ability and their confidence in the cognitive task were used to estimate their metacognitive abilities. Therefore, in this study, a metacognitive model that can be applied to various cognitive tasks was developed. This model implements the item response theory (IRT) and Q-learning models to estimate cognitive ability; participants' metacognitive ability is defined as the discrepancy between their confidence in their cognitive ability and their actual cognitive ability. The entire procedure was divided into two experiments. In experiment 1, two different cognitive tasks were used to estimate metacognitive ability and to examine overall discriminative and convergent validity. Notably, the parameters representing metacognitive ability did not correlate with cognitive ability but were positively correlated between the two tasks. In experiment 2, we performed a similar analysis using a different task to test the replicability of experiment 1. The results for experiment 2 were replicated for discriminative and convergent validity, albeit with weak results. Our metacognitive model exhibited high interpretability and versatility.

Age-related differences in visual confidence are driven by individual differences in cognitive control capacities

Visual perception is not only shaped by sensitivity but also by confidence, i.e., the ability to estimate the accuracy of a visual decision. Younger observers have been reported to have access to a reliable measure of their own uncertainty when making visual decisions. This metacognitive ability might be challenged during ageing due to increasing sensory noise and decreasing cognitive control resources. We investigated age effects on visual confidence using a visual contrast discrimination task and a confidence forced-choice paradigm. Younger adults (19-38 years) showed significantly lower discrimination thresholds than older adults (60-78 years). To focus on confidence sensitivity above and beyond differences in discrimination performance, we estimated confidence efficiency that reflects the ability to distinguish good from bad perceptual decisions. Confidence efficiency was estimated by comparing thresholds obtained from all trials and trials that were judged with relatively higher confidence, respectively. In both age groups, high confidence judgments were associated with better visual performance, but confidence efficiency was reduced in older adults. However, we observed substantial variability across all participants. Controlling for age group, confidence effciency was closely linked to individual differences in cognitive control capacities. Our findings provide evidence for age-related differences in confidence efficiency that present a specific challenge to perceptual performance in old age. We propose that these differences are driven by cognitive control capacities, supporting their crucial role for metacognitive efficiency.

Metacognition in functional cognitive disorder

Functional cognitive disorder is common but underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. Metacognition, an individual's ability to reflect on and monitor cognitive processes, is likely to be relevant. Local metacognition refers to an ability to estimate confidence in cognitive performance on a moment-to-moment basis, whereas global metacognition refers to long-run self-evaluations of overall performance. Using a novel protocol comprising task-based measures and hierarchical Bayesian modelling, we compared local and global metacognitive performance in individuals with functional cognitive disorder. Eighteen participants with functional cognitive disorder (mean age = 49.2 years, 10 males) were recruited to this cross-sectional study. Participants completed computerized tasks that enabled local metacognitive efficiency for perception and memory to be measured using the hierarchical meta-d' model within a signal detection theory framework. Participants also completed the Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire measuring global metacognition, and questionnaires measuring anxiety and depression. Estimates of local metacognitive efficiency were compared with those estimated from two control groups who had undergone comparable metacognitive tasks. Global metacognition scores were compared with the existing normative data. A hierarchical regression model was used to evaluate associations between global metacognition, depression and anxiety and local metacognitive efficiency, whilst simple linear regressions were used to evaluate whether affective symptomatology and local metacognitive confidence were associated with global metacognition. Participants with functional cognitive disorder had intact local metacognition for perception and memory when compared with controls, with the 95% highest density intervals for metacognitive efficiency overlapping with the two control groups in both cognitive domains. Functional cognitive disorder participants had significantly lower global metacognition scores compared with normative data; Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire-Ability subscale (t = 6.54, P < 0.0001) and Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire-Satisfaction subscale (t = 5.04, P < 0.0001). Mood scores, global metacognitive measures and metacognitive bias were not significantly associated with local metacognitive efficiency. Local metacognitive bias [β = -0.20 (SE = 0.09), q = 0.01] and higher depression scores as measured by the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 [β = -1.40 (SE = 2.56), q = 0.01] were associated with the lower global metacognition scores. We show that local metacognition is intact, whilst global metacognition is impaired, in functional cognitive disorder, suggesting a decoupling between the two metacognitive processes. In a Bayesian model, an aberrant prior (impaired global metacognition), may override bottom-up sensory input (intact local metacognition), giving rise to the subjective experience of abnormal cognitive processing. Future work should further investigate the interplay between local and global metacognition in functional cognitive disorder.

The heart rate discrimination task: a psychophysical method to estimate the accuracy and precision of interoceptive beliefs

Interoception - the physiological sense of our inner bodies - has risen to the forefront of psychological and psychiatric research. Much of this research utilizes tasks that attempt to measure the ability to accurately detect cardiac signals. Unfortunately, these approaches are confounded by well-known issues limiting their validity and interpretation. At the core of this controversy is the role of subjective beliefs about the heart rate in confounding measures of interoceptive accuracy. Here, we recast these beliefs as an important part of the causal machinery of interoception, and offer a novel psychophysical "heart rate discrimination" method to estimate their accuracy and precision. By applying this task in 223 healthy participants, we demonstrate that cardiac interoceptive beliefs are more biased, less precise, and are associated with poorer metacognitive insight relative to an exteroceptive control condition. Our task, provided as an open-source python package, offers a robust approach to quantifying cardiac beliefs.

Visual metacognition: Measures, models, and neural correlates

Visual metacognition is the ability to evaluate one's performance on visual perceptual tasks. The field of visual metacognition unites the long tradition of visual psychophysics with the younger field of metacognition research. This article traces the historical roots of the field and reviews progress in the areas of (a) constructing appropriate measures of metacognitive ability, (b) developing computational models, and (c) revealing the neural correlates of visual metacognition. First, I review the most popular measures of metacognitive ability with an emphasis on their psychophysical properties. Second, I examine the empirical targets for modeling, the dominant modeling frameworks and the assumed computations underlying visual metacognition. Third, I explore the progress on understanding the neural correlates of visual metacognition by focusing on anatomical and functional studies, as well as causal manipulations. What emerges is a picture of substantial progress on constructing measures, developing models, and revealing the neural correlates of metacognition, but very little integration between these three areas of inquiry. I then explore the deep, intrinsic links between the three areas of research and argue that continued progress requires the recognition and exploitation of these links. Throughout, I discuss the implications of progress in visual metacognition for other areas of metacognition research, and pinpoint specific advancements that could be adopted by researchers working in other subfields of metacognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Child witness expressions of certainty are informative

Children are frequently witnesses of crime. In the witness literature and legal systems, children are often deemed to have unreliable memories. Yet, in the basic developmental literature, young children can monitor their memory. To address these contradictory conclusions, we reanalyzed the confidence-accuracy relationship in basic and applied research. Confidence provided considerable information about memory accuracy, from at least age 8, but possibly younger. We also conducted an experiment where children in young (4-6 years), middle (7-9 years), and late (10-17 years) childhood (N = 2,205) watched a person in a video and then identified that person from a police lineup. Children provided a confidence rating (an explicit judgment) and used an interactive lineup-in which the lineup faces can be rotated-and we analyzed children's viewing behavior (an implicit measure of metacognition). A strong confidence-accuracy relationship was observed from age 10 and an emerging relationship from age 7. A constant likelihood ratio signal-detection model can be used to understand these findings. Moreover, in all ages, interactive viewing behavior differed in children who made correct versus incorrect suspect identifications. Our research reconciles the apparent divide between applied and basic research findings and suggests that the fundamental architecture of metacognition that has previously been evidenced in basic list-learning paradigms also underlies performance on complex applied tasks. Contrary to what is believed by legal practitioners, but similar to what has been found in the basic literature, identifications made by children can be reliable when appropriate metacognitive measures are used to estimate accuracy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A Bayesian inference model for metamemory

The dual-basis theory of metamemory suggests that people evaluate their memory performance based on both processing experience during the memory process and their prior beliefs about overall memory ability. However, few studies have proposed a formal computational model to quantitatively characterize how processing experience and prior beliefs are integrated during metamemory monitoring. Here, we introduce a Bayesian inference model for metamemory (BIM) which provides a theoretical and computational framework for the metamemory monitoring process. BIM assumes that when people evaluate their memory performance, they integrate processing experience and prior beliefs via Bayesian inference. We show that BIM can be fitted to recall or recognition tasks with confidence ratings on either a continuous or discrete scale. Results from data simulation indicate that BIM can successfully recover a majority of generative parameter values, and demonstrate a systematic relationship between parameters in BIM and previous computational models of metacognition such as the stochastic detection and retrieval model (SDRM) and the meta-d' model. We also show examples of fitting BIM to empirical data sets from several experiments, which suggest that the predictions of BIM are consistent with previous studies on metamemory. In addition, when compared with SDRM, BIM could more parsimoniously account for the data of judgments of learning (JOLs) and memory performance from recall tasks. Finally, we discuss an extension of BIM which accounts for belief updating, and conclude with a discussion of how BIM may benefit metamemory research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Separable neural signatures of confidence during perceptual decisions

Perceptual confidence is an evaluation of the validity of perceptual decisions. While there is behavioural evidence that confidence evaluation differs from perceptual decision-making, disentangling these two processes remains a challenge at the neural level. Here, we examined the electrical brain activity of human participants in a protracted perceptual decision-making task where observers tend to commit to perceptual decisions early whilst continuing to monitor sensory evidence for evaluating confidence. Premature decision commitments were revealed by patterns of spectral power overlying motor cortex, followed by an attenuation of the neural representation of perceptual decision evidence. A distinct neural representation was associated with the computation of confidence, with sources localised in the superior parietal and orbitofrontal cortices. In agreement with a dissociation between perception and confidence, these neural resources were recruited even after observers committed to their perceptual decisions, and thus delineate an integral neural circuit for evaluating perceptual decision confidence.

I know better! Emerging metacognition allows adolescents to ignore false advice

Adolescents aspire for independence. Successful independence means knowing when to rely on one's own knowledge and when to listen to others. A critical prerequisite thus is a well-developed metacognitive ability to accurately assess the quality of one's own knowledge. Little is known about whether the strive to become an independent decision maker in adolescence is underpinned by the necessary metacognitive skills. Here, we demonstrate that metacognition matures from childhood to adolescence (N = 107) and that this process coincides with greater independent decision-making. We show that adolescents, in contrast to children, take on others' advice less often, but only when the advice is misleading. Finally, we demonstrate that adolescents' reduced reliance on others' advice is explained by their increased metacognitive skills, suggesting that a developing ability to introspect may support independent decision-making in adolescence.

Functional Cognitive Disorders (FCD): How Is Metacognition Involved?

Functional cognitive disorders (FCD) have become a subject of increasing clinical interest in recent years, in part because of their high prevalence amongst patients attending dedicated memory clinics. Empirical understanding of FCD based on observational studies is growing, suggesting a relationship to other functional neurological disorders (FND) based on shared phenomenology. However, understanding of FCD at the theoretical level has been lacking. One suggestion has been that FCD are disorders of metacognition, most usually of metamemory. In this article, a brief overview of these constructs is presented along with existing evidence for their impairment in FCD. Previous adaptations of theoretical models of FND to accommodate FCD are reviewed. A novel application to FCD of Nelson and Narens’ monitoring and control model of metamemory is then attempted, positing an improper setting of the monitoring function, with examples of ecological relevance. Formulation of FCD in light of a metacognitive model of anosognosia is also considered. Although lacking mechanistic and neuroanatomical sophistication, this metacognitive formulation of FCD may give pointers for future hypothesis-driven research and a pragmatic basis for management strategies.

Multitasking costs on metacognition in a triple-task paradigm

Multitasking situations, such as using one's phone while driving, are increasingly common in everyday life. Experimental psychology has long documented the costs of multitasking on task performance; however, little is known of the effects it has on the metacognitive processes that monitor such performance. The present study is a step toward filling this void by combining psychophysical procedures with complex multitasking. We devised a multimodal paradigm in which participants performed a sensorimotor tracking task, a visual discrimination task, and an auditory 2-back working memory task, either separately or concurrently, while also evaluating their task performance every ~15 s. Our main finding is that multitasking decreased participants' awareness of their performance (metacognitive sensitivity) for all three tasks. Importantly, this result was independent of the multitasking cost on task performance, and could not be attributed to confidence leak, psychological refractory period, or recency effects on self-evaluations. We discuss the implications of this finding for both metacognition and multitasking research.

Is there more to metamemory? An argument for two specialized monitoring abilities

Metamemory is the process of monitoring and controlling one's beliefs, knowledge, and mental processes of memory. One fundamental question is whether the monitoring component of this theory should be considered as only one ability or an umbrella of more specialized abilities. In the current study, we aimed to understand the structure of metamemory monitoring by testing unitary versus specialized measurement models of metamemory. Monitoring accuracy and mean ratings from four common monitoring judgments across different stimulus presentation pairs were calculated to create latent factors for each judgment using structural equation modeling. Our results suggest that although each of the monitoring judgments was correlated with one another, monitoring may be composed of two distinct abilities: one occurring during initial presentation and one occurring at retrieval. These results can help explain prior behavioral and brain dissociations between predictions at encoding and retrieval in terms of experimental and material manipulations. We caution against the conceptualization and use of metamemory monitoring as a unitary construct.

Metric error monitoring: Another generalized mechanism for magnitude representations?

Error monitoring refers to the ability to monitor one's own task performance without explicit feedback. This ability is studied typically in two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigms. Recent research showed that humans can also keep track of the magnitude and direction of errors in different magnitude domains (e.g., numerosity, duration, length). Based on the evidence that suggests a shared mechanism for magnitude representations, we aimed to investigate whether metric error monitoring ability is commonly governed across different magnitude domains. Participants reproduced/estimated temporal, numerical, and spatial magnitudes after which they rated their confidence regarding first order task performance and judged the direction of their reproduction/estimation errors. Participants were also tested in a 2AFC perceptual decision task and provided confidence ratings regarding their decisions. Results showed that variability in reproductions/estimations and metric error monitoring ability, as measured by combining confidence and error direction judgements, were positively related across temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Metacognitive sensitivity in these metric domains was also positively associated with each other but not with metacognitive sensitivity in the 2AFC perceptual decision task. In conclusion, the current findings point at a general metric error monitoring ability that is shared across different metric domains with limited generalizability to perceptual decision-making.

Evidence for Age-Equivalent and Task-Dissociative Metacognition in the Memory Domain

Research suggests that metacognitive monitoring ability does not decline with age. For example, judgments-of-learning (JOL) accuracy is roughly equivalent between younger and older adults. But few studies have asked whether younger and older adults' metacognitive ability varies across different types of memory processes (e.g., for items vs. pairs). The current study tested the relationship between memory and post-decision confidence ratings at the trial level on item (individual words) and associative (word pairs) memory recognition tests. As predicted, younger and older adults had similar metacognitive efficiency, when using meta-d'/d', a measure derived from Signal Detection Theory, despite a significant age effect favoring younger adults on memory performance. This result is consistent with previous work showing age-equivalent metacognitive efficiency in the memory domain. We also found that metacognitive efficiency was higher for associative memory than for item memory across age groups, even though associative and item recognition memory (d') were statistically equivalent. Higher accuracy on post-test decision confidence ratings for associative recognition relative to item recognition on resolution accuracy itself (meta-d') and when corrected for performance differences (meta-d'/d') are novel findings. Implications for associative metacognition are discussed.

Emotional metacognition: stimulus valence modulates cardiac arousal and metamemory

Emotion alters how we feel, see, and experience the world. In the domain of memory, the emotional valence and arousal of memorised stimuli can modulate both the acuity and content of episodic recall. However, no experiment has investigated whether arousal and valence also influence metacognition for memory (i.e. the process of self-monitoring memories). In a pre-registered study, we applied a novel psychophysiological design together with computational models of metacognition to assess the influence of stimulus valence and arousal on the sensitivity, bias, and efficiency of metamemory. To estimate the role of physiological arousal in mediating these effects, we recorded cardiac measures through pulse oximetry. We found that negative valence substantially decreased both memory performance and subjective confidence, in particular for low arousal words. Simultaneously, we found that emotional valence modulated both heart rate and heart-rate variability (HRV) during recognition memory. Exploratory trial-level analyses further revealed that subjective confidence was encoded in instantaneous heart-rate fluctuations and that this relationship was also modulated by emotional valence. Our results demonstrate that recognition memory and metacognition are influenced by the emotional valence of encoded items and that this correlation is in part related to cardiac activity.

Sources of Metacognitive Inefficiency

Confidence judgments are typically less informative about one's accuracy than they could be; a phenomenon we call metacognitive inefficiency. We review the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency and classify them into four categories based on whether the corruption is due to: (i) systematic or nonsystematic influences, and (ii) the input to or the computation of the metacognitive system. Critically, the existence of different sources of metacognitive inefficiency provides an alternative explanation for behavioral findings typically interpreted as evidence for domain-specific (and against domain-general) metacognitive systems. We argue that, contrary to the dominant assumption in the field, metacognitive failures are not monolithic and suggest that understanding the sources of metacognitive inefficiency should be a primary goal of the science of metacognition.