Antibody response in individuals infected with avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses and detection of anti-H5 antibody among household and social contacts

Zoonotic Animal Influenza Virus and Potential Mixing Vessel Hosts

Influenza viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae with a negative-sense, single-stranded segmented RNA genome. They infect a wide range of animals, including humans. From 1918 to 2009, there were four influenza pandemics, which caused millions of casualties. Frequent spillover of animal influenza viruses to humans with or without intermediate hosts poses a serious zoonotic and pandemic threat. The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic overshadowed the high risk raised by animal influenza viruses, but highlighted the role of wildlife as a reservoir for pandemic viruses. In this review, we summarize the occurrence of animal influenza virus in humans and describe potential mixing vessel or intermediate hosts for zoonotic influenza viruses. While several animal influenza viruses possess a high zoonotic risk (e.g., avian and swine influenza viruses), others are of low to negligible zoonotic potential (e.g., equine, canine, bat and bovine influenza viruses). Transmission can occur directly from animals, particularly poultry and swine, to humans or through reassortant viruses in "mixing vessel" hosts. To date, there are less than 3000 confirmed human infections with avian-origin viruses and less than 7000 subclinical infections documented. Likewise, only a few hundreds of confirmed human cases caused by swine influenza viruses have been reported. Pigs are the historic mixing vessel host for the generation of zoonotic influenza viruses due to the expression of both avian-type and human-type receptors. Nevertheless, there are a number of hosts which carry both types of receptors and can act as a potential mixing vessel host. High vigilance is warranted to prevent the next pandemic caused by animal influenza viruses.

Household transmission of influenza A and B within a prospective cohort during the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 seasons

People living within the same household as someone ill with influenza are at increased risk of infection. Here, we use Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to partition the hazard of influenza illness within a cohort into the hazard from the community and the hazard from the household. During the 2013‐2014 influenza season, 49 (4.7%) of the 1044 people enrolled in a community surveillance cohort had an acute respiratory illness (ARI) attributable to influenza. During the 2014‐2015 influenza season, 50 (4.7%) of the 1063 people in the cohort had an ARI attributable to influenza. The secondary attack rate from a household member was 2.3% for influenza A (H1) during 2013‐2014, 5.3% for influenza B during 2013‐2014, and 7.6% for influenza A (H3) during 2014‐2015. Living in a household with a person ill with influenza increased the risk of an ARI attributable to influenza up to 350%, depending on the season and the influenza virus circulating within the household.

Serological evidence of human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus: a systematic review and meta-analysis

BACKGROUND

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus poses a global public health threat given severe and fatal zoonotic infections since 1997 and ongoing A(H5N1) virus circulation among poultry in several countries. A comprehensive assessment of the seroprevalence of A(H5N1) virus antibodies remains a gap and limits understanding of the true risk of A(H5N1) virus infection.

METHODS

We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of published serosurveys to assess the risk of subclinical and clinically mild A(H5N1) virus infections. We assessed A(H5N1) virus antibody titers and changes in titers among populations with variable exposures to different A(H5N1) viruses.

RESULTS

Across studies using the World Health Organization-recommended seropositive definition, the point estimates of the seroprevalence of A(H5N1) virus-specific antibodies were higher in poultry-exposed populations (range 0-0.6%) and persons exposed to both human A(H5N1) cases and infected birds (range 0.4-1.8%) than in close contacts of A(H5N1) cases or the general population (none to very low frequencies). Seroprevalence was higher in persons exposed to A(H5N1) clade 0 virus (1.9%, range 0.7-3.2%) than in participants exposed to other clades of A(H5N1) virus (range 0-0.5%) (p < 0.05). Seroprevalence was higher in poultry-exposed populations (range 0-1.9%) if such studies utilized antigenically similar A(H5N1) virus antigens in assays to A(H5N1) viruses circulating among poultry.

CONCLUSIONS

These low seroprevalences suggest that subclinical and clinically mild human A(H5N1) virus infections are uncommon. Standardized serological survey and laboratory methods are needed to fully understand the extent and risk of human A(H5N1) virus infections.

Seroprevalence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus infection among humans in mainland China: A systematic review and meta-analysis

Although the effective transmission of the H5N1 virus from humans to humans has yet to be further observed, humans are at increased risk of a pandemic caused by H5N1. In order to fully evaluate the seroprevalence and risk factor of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection among in mainland China, we performed a systematic review and meta-analysis. In this review, we searched literature on the seroprevalence of H5N1 infection among humans in mainland China from 1 January 1997 to 20 October 2018 in English and Chinese databases, including PubMed, Google scholar, Cochrane library, Clinical Trial, VIP, CNKI and WanFang database. We made a selection according to the title and the abstract of paper, and then, we excluded duplicated literature, and data incomplete literature according to the exclusion criteria we formulated. Finally, we extracted how many humans have H5N1 infection from the obtained studies to establish the seroprevalence of H5N1 infection among humans in mainland China. A total of 56 studies (including data of 35,159 humans) were compliant with our criteria. In China, the overall seroprevalence of H5N1 infection among humans was 2.45% (862/35,159), while the seroprevalence of H5N1 infection among humans from central China was 7.32% (213/2,911), higher than those in other regions of China. The seroprevalence of H5N1 infection was associated with test method, sampling time and demographic characteristics of humans. However, there was no significant difference in the effect of gender on the seroprevalence of H5N1 among humans in China. The purpose of this review was to better understand the real infection rate of H5N1 virus among humans and evaluate the potential risk factors for the zoonotic spread of H5N1 virus to humans. Sufficient epidemiological data are important to explore and understand the prevalent status of AIVs throughout the country and to disease control.

M2SR, a novel live influenza vaccine, protects mice and ferrets against highly pathogenic avian influenza

The emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses has heightened global concern about the threat posed by pandemic influenza. To address the need for a highly effective universal influenza vaccine, we developed a novel M2-deficient single replication (M2SR) influenza vaccine virus and previously reported that it provided strong heterosubtypic protection against seasonal influenza viruses in mice. In the current study, we assessed M2SR induced protection against H5N1 influenza in mice and ferrets. Mice were intranasally inoculated with M2SR viruses containing the HA and NA from A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (M2SR H5N1) or A/California/07/2009 (M2SR H1N1). All M2SR vaccinated mice survived lethal challenge with influenza A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1), whereas 40% of mice vaccinated with recombinant H5 HA and none of the naïve controls survived. M2SR H5N1 provided sterile immunity, whereas low levels of virus were detected in the lungs of some M2SR H1N1 vaccinated mice. In contrast, recombinant H5 HA vaccinated mice and naïve controls showed systemic infection. M2SR H5N1 induced strong serum and mucosal antibody responses (IgG and IgA classes) against H5 HA, with high hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) titers. In contrast, while M2SR H1N1 elicited cross-reactive antibodies recognizing the H5 HA2 stalk region or the neuraminidase, no HAI activity against H5N1 virus was detected after M2SR H1N1 immunization. Both M2SR H5N1 and H1N1 also protected ferrets against lethal challenge with A/Vietnam/1203/2004. A prime-boost regimen provided optimal protection with no virus detected in the respiratory tract or brain after challenge. As in the mouse model, only the M2SR H5N1 vaccine induced HAI antibodies against the challenge virus in ferrets, while the M2SR H1N1 was able to provide protection without the induction of HAI antibodies. In summary, effective protection against highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus was provided by both homologous H5N1 M2SR and heterologous H1N1 M2SR demonstrating the cross-protective attributes of the M2SR platform.

Sensitization with vaccinia virus encoding H5N1 hemagglutinin restores immune potential against H5N1 influenza virus

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1 HPAI) virus causes elevated mortality compared with seasonal influenza viruses like H1N1 pandemic influenza (H1N1 pdm) virus. We identified a mechanism associated with the severe symptoms seen with H5N1 HPAI virus infection. H5N1 HPAI virus infection induced a decrease of dendritic cell number in the splenic extrafollicular T-cell zone and impaired formation of the outer layers of B-cell follicles, resulting in insufficient levels of antibody production after infection. However, in animals vaccinated with a live recombinant vaccinia virus expressing the H5 hemagglutinin, infection with H5N1 HPAI virus induced parafollicular dendritic cell accumulation and efficient antibody production. These results indicate that a recombinant vaccinia encoding H5 hemagglutinin gene does not impair dendritic cell recruitment and can be a useful vaccine candidate.

Serological Evidence of Human Infection with Avian Influenza A H7virus in Egyptian Poultry Growers

Avian influenza viruses circulate widely in birds, with occasional human infections. Poultry-exposed individuals are considered to be at high risk of infection with avian influenza viruses due to frequent exposure to poultry. Some avian H7 viruses have occasionally been found to infect humans. Seroprevalence of neutralizing antibodies against influenza A/H7N7 virus among poultry-exposed and unexposed individuals in Egypt were assessed during a three-years prospective cohort study. The seroprevalence of antibodies (titer, ≥80) among exposed individuals was 0%, 1.9%, and 2.1% annually while the seroprevalence among the control group remained 0% as measured by virus microneutralization assay. We then confirmed our results using western blot and immunofluorescence assays. Although human infection with H7 in Egypt has not been reported yet, our results suggested that Egyptian poultry growers are exposed to avian H7 viruses. These findings highlight the need for surveillance in the people exposed to poultry to monitor the risk of zoonotic transmission of avian influenza viruses.

Risks to healthcare workers with emerging diseases: lessons from MERS-CoV, Ebola, SARS, and avian flu

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Several viral diseases have emerged and impacted healthcare systems worldwide. Healthcare personnels (HCPs) are at high risk of acquiring some emerging infections while caring for patients. We provide a review of risk factors, evidence of infection in HCPs, and prevention strategies with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, Ebola virus disease (Ebola), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and avian influenza.

RECENT FINDINGS

HCP-related infections with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, Ebola, and SARS have been reported among 1-27%, 2.5-12%, and 11-57% of total cases, respectively. The case fatality rate of Ebola in HCPs has been reported up to 73%. The WHO guidelines for the global surveillance of SARS were developed in 2004 and used as a template for other emerging diseases preparedness. Risks to HCPs with emerging diseases are related to inappropriate and insufficient infection control measures during an initial encounter, at the beginning of outbreak and with an overwhelming number of patient cases. To date, there are no reports of avian influenza transmission to HCPs from affected cases.

SUMMARY

Early and rapid detection of suspected infected patients with communicable diseases along with appropriate infection control practice, education, national and global preparedness guidelines would help to prevent disease transmission to HCPs.

Controlling highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks: An epidemiological and economic model analysis

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) can cause large losses for the poultry sector and for animal disease controlling authorities, as well as risks for animal and human welfare. In the current simulation approach epidemiological and economic models are combined to compare different strategies to control highly pathogenic avian influenza in Dutch poultry flocks. Evaluated control strategies are the minimum EU strategy (i.e., culling of infected flocks, transport regulations, tracing and screening of contact flocks, establishment of protection and surveillance zones), and additional control strategies comprising pre-emptive culling of all susceptible poultry flocks in an area around infected flocks (1 km, 3 km and 10 km) and emergency vaccination of all flocks except broilers around infected flocks (3 km). Simulation results indicate that the EU strategy is not sufficient to eradicate an epidemic in high density poultry areas. From an epidemiological point of view, this strategy is the least effective, while pre-emptive culling in 10 km radius is the most effective of the studied strategies. But these two strategies incur the highest costs due to long duration (EU strategy) and large-scale culling (pre-emptive culling in 10 km radius). Other analysed pre-emptive culling strategies (i.e., in 1 km and 3 km radius) are more effective than the analysed emergency vaccination strategy (in 3 km radius) in terms of duration and size of the epidemics, despite the assumed optimistic vaccination capacity of 20 farms per day. However, the total costs of these strategies differ only marginally. Extending the capacity for culling substantially reduces the duration, size and costs of the epidemic. This study demonstrates the strength of combining epidemiological and economic model analysis to gain insight in a range of consequences and thus to serve as a decision support tool in the control of HPAI epidemics.

Safety, potential efficacy, and pharmacokinetics of specific polyclonal immunoglobulin F(ab')₂ fragments against avian influenza A (H5N1) in healthy volunteers: a single-centre, randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled, phase 1 study

BACKGROUND

Human infection with the avian influenza A H5N1 virus results in disease with a high fatality rate, against which antiviral treatments have limited efficacy. We aimed to investigate the safety, pharmacokinetics, and therapeutic potential of specific polyclonal immunoglobulin equine F(ab')₂ fragments raised against influenza A/Vietnam/1194/2004 virus (H5N1 subtype) in healthy volunteers.

METHODS

We did a randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled, single-centre phase 1 study. In stage 1 (one infusion) and stage 2 (five infusions) of the trial, we randomly assigned healthy male volunteers to receive once-daily intravenous infusions of 0·85 U/kg body weight of F(ab')₂ or once-daily saline placebo. Randomisation was done centrally, with one block of four patients and one block for substitutes (three actives, one placebo) in stage 1, and two blocks of six patients (five actives and one placebo) and the same block for substitutes in stage 2. The primary objective was assessment of the clinical and laboratory safety of F(ab')₂, which was monitored for 22 days in the group that received one dose (assessments on days 0-2, 4, 8, 15, and 22) and 33 days in the group that received five doses (days 0-6, 8, 10, 12, 19, 26, and 33). A final post-study safety assessment was done at 120 days. We also assessed pharmacokinetic outcomes, and assayed haemagglutination and seroneutralisation activity. Analysis was done according to intention-to-treat. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT02295813.

FINDINGS

We enrolled 16 healthy Asian men between Sept 28 and Dec 28, 2012, and randomly assigned 13 to one or five doses of F(ab')₂ and three to placebo. F(ab')₂ was well tolerated, and no deaths or serious adverse events occurred. Three patients had mild adverse events (one each of blepharospasm, sinusitis, and pyrexia). The pyrexia (38°C) was regarded as probably related to the infusion, and resolved after 37 min. Our laboratory assessments of blood and urine samples and physical examinations of heart rate, electrocardiogram readings, and weight showed no clinically significant safety issues. Mean peak plasma concentrations were 19·3 μg/mL (SD 3·5) with the one dose schedule and 23·0 μg/mL (4·5) with the five-dose schedule. F(ab')₂ were still detectable in plasma on average up to 5 days after five doses. Haemagglutination inhibition was only increased after the third dose, but in-vitro seroneutralisation activity was transiently increased after each of the five doses to concentrations regarded as clinically beneficial in infected patients.

INTERPRETATION

F(ab')₂ showed good safety, tolerability, and therapeutic potential for managing of H5N1 exposed patients.

FUNDING

Fab'entech.

Avian influenza: recent epidemiology, travel-related risk, and management

H5N1 influenza continues to smolder in Southeast Asia over the past 5 years, but the emergence of H7N9 in China in 2012 raised concerns for a new avian influenza threat. In contrast with H5N1 with over 650 confirmed cases over 11 years, H7N9 has infected over 450 persons within 2 years. The case fatality rate for H7N9 (35 %) is lower than for H5N1 (60 %) or H10N8 (67 %) but is comparable to that for the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS CoV), another emerging zoonosis with travel-associated importations. Exposure to poultry and fomites are considered the likely sources of infection for H7N9, H5N1, and H10N8, with limited human-to-human transmission in close contacts. Most cases have occurred in local populations of affected countries, and travel-related risk can be mitigated by avoiding exposure. Vaccines, antivirals, and other therapeutics remain in development stage or of modest benefit for dangerous infections carrying high morbidity and mortality.

Human antibody responses to avian influenza A(H7N9) virus, 2013

Understanding host antibody response is crucial for predicting disease severity and for vaccine development. We investigated antibody responses against influenza A(H7N9) virus in 48 serum samples from 21 patients, including paired samples from 15 patients. IgG against subtype H7 and neutralizing antibodies (NAbs) were not detected in acute-phase samples, but ELISA geometric mean titers increased in convalescent-phase samples; NAb titers were 20–80 (geometric mean titer 40). Avidity to IgG against subtype H7 was significantly lower than that against H1 and H3. IgG against H3 was boosted after infection with influenza A(H7N9) virus, and its level in acute-phase samples correlated with that against H7 in convalescent-phase samples. A correlation was also found between hemagglutinin inhibition and NAb titers and between hemagglutinin inhibition and IgG titers against H7. Because of the relatively weak protective antibody response to influenza A(H7N9), multiple vaccinations might be needed to achieve protective immunity.

Characterizing wild bird contact and seropositivity to highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in Alaskan residents

BACKGROUND

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI) H5N1 viruses have infected poultry and wild birds on three continents with more than 600 reported human cases (59% mortality) since 2003. Wild aquatic birds are the natural reservoir for avian influenza A viruses, and migratory birds have been documented with HPAI H5N1 virus infection. Since 2005, clade 2.2 HPAI H5N1 viruses have spread from Asia to many countries.

OBJECTIVES

We conducted a cross-sectional seroepidemiological survey in Anchorage and western Alaska to identify possible behaviors associated with migratory bird exposure and measure seropositivity to HPAI H5N1.

METHODS

We enrolled rural subsistence bird hunters and their families, urban sport hunters, wildlife biologists, and a comparison group without bird contact. We interviewed participants regarding their exposures to wild birds and collected blood to perform serologic testing for antibodies against a clade 2.2 HPAI H5N1 virus strain.

RESULTS

Hunters and wildlife biologists reported exposures to wild migratory birds that may confer risk of infection with avian influenza A viruses, although none of the 916 participants had evidence of seropositivity to HPAI H5N1.

CONCLUSIONS

We characterized wild bird contact among Alaskans and behaviors that may influence risk of infection with avian influenza A viruses. Such knowledge can inform surveillance and risk communication surrounding HPAI H5N1 and other influenza viruses in a population with exposure to wild birds at a crossroads of intercontinental migratory flyways.

Disease severity is associated with differential gene expression at the early and late phases of infection in nonhuman primates infected with different H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses

Occasional transmission of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses to humans causes severe pneumonia with high mortality. To better understand the mechanisms via which H5N1 viruses induce severe disease in humans, we infected cynomolgus macaques with six different H5N1 strains isolated from human patients and compared their pathogenicity and the global host responses to the virus infection. Although all H5N1 viruses replicated in the respiratory tract, there was substantial heterogeneity in their replicative ability and in the disease severity induced, which ranged from asymptomatic to fatal. A comparison of global gene expression between severe and mild disease cases indicated that interferon-induced upregulation of genes related to innate immunity, apoptosis, and antigen processing/presentation in the early phase of infection was limited in severe disease cases, although interferon expression was upregulated in both severe and mild cases. Furthermore, coexpression analysis of microarray data, which reveals the dynamics of host responses during the infection, demonstrated that the limited expression of these genes early in infection led to a failure to suppress virus replication and to the hyperinduction of genes related to immunity, inflammation, coagulation, and homeostasis in the late phase of infection, resulting in a more severe disease. Our data suggest that the attenuated interferon-induced activation of innate immunity, apoptosis, and antigen presentation in the early phase of H5N1 virus infection leads to subsequent severe disease outcome.

IMPORTANCE

Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses sometimes transmit to humans and cause severe pneumonia with ca. 60% lethality. The continued circulation of these viruses poses a pandemic threat; however, their pathogenesis in mammals is not fully understood. We, therefore, investigated the pathogenicity of six H5N1 viruses and compared the host responses of cynomolgus macaques to the virus infection. We identified differences in the viral replicative ability of and in disease severity caused by these H5N1 viruses. A comparison of global host responses between severe and mild disease cases identified the limited upregulation of interferon-stimulated genes early in infection in severe cases. The dynamics of the host responses indicated that the limited response early in infection failed to suppress virus replication and led to hyperinduction of pathological condition-related genes late in infection. These findings provide insight into the pathogenesis of H5N1 viruses in mammals.

Brief literature review for the WHO global influenza research agenda--highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 risk in humans

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses remain a significant health threat to humans given the continued rare occurrence of human cases with a high case fatality rate. This brief literature review summarizes available evidence of risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans and updates a recent systematic review published in early 2011. Several epidemiologic studies have been published to evaluate the risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans, including contact with poultry and poultry products and non-poultry-related contact such as from H5N1-contaminated water. While most H5N1 cases are attributed to exposure to sick poultry, it is unclear how many may be due to human-to-human transmission. The collective results of published literature suggest that transmission risk of H5N1 from poultry to humans may be highest among individuals who may have been in contact with the highest potential concentrations of virus shed by poultry. This suggests that there may be a threshold of virus concentration needed for effective transmission and that circulating H5N1 strains have not yet mutated to transmit readily from either poultry to human or from human to human. However, the mode of potential transmission can be quite varied throughout different countries and by study with exposures ranging from visiting a wet market, preparing infected poultry for consumption, to swimming or bathing in ponds frequented by poultry. Several important data gaps remain in the understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 in humans and limit our ability to interpret the results of the available H5N1 seroepidemiologic studies.

Specific polyclonal F(ab')2 neutralize a large panel of highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses (H5N1) and control infection in mice

AIM

There is still no specific therapy for infection with the highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (HPAI) H5N1, which caused 39 human cases with a 64% fatality rate in 2013.

MATERIALS & METHODS

We prepared highly purified specific equine polyclonal immunoglobulin fragments (F(ab')2) against H5N1 and tested them for efficacy in vitro and with different administration schedules in H5N1-challenged BALB/c mice.

RESULTS

in vitro, F(ab')2 neutralized 21 different H5N1 strains from different areas, representative of 11 different clades and sub-clades and 9 years of evolution of the virus. In vivo mouse experiments identified that the most efficient administration protocol consists of five consecutive daily injections after infection; 10 mg/kg giving a 60% increase in survival.

CONCLUSION

These data demonstrate the ability of anti-H5N1 F(ab')2 to markedly reduce the mortality and morbidity associated with infection of mice with HPAI H5N1 virus, and their potential for human therapy.

Long-term booster schedules with AS03A-adjuvanted heterologous H5N1 vaccines induces rapid and broad immune responses in Asian adults

BACKGROUND

The pandemic potential of avian influenza A/H5N1 should not be overlooked, and the continued development of vaccines against these highly pathogenic viruses is a public health priority.

METHODS

This open-label extension booster study followed a Phase III study of 1206 adults who had received two 3.75 μg doses of primary AS03A-adjuvanted or non-adjuvanted H5N1 split-virus vaccine (A/Vietnam/1194/2004; clade 1) (NCT00449670). The aim of the extension study was to evaluate different timings for heterologous AS03A-adjuvanted booster vaccination (A/Indonesia/5/2005; clade 2.1) given at Month 6, 12, or 36 post-primary vaccination. Immunogenicity was assessed 21 days after each booster vaccination and the persistence of immune responses against the primary vaccine strain (A/Vietnam) and the booster strain (A/Indonesia) was evaluated up to Month 48 post-primary vaccination. Reactogenicity and safety were also assessed.

RESULTS

After booster vaccination given at Month 6, HI antibody responses to primary vaccine, and booster vaccine strains were markedly higher with one dose of AS03A-H5N1 booster vaccine in the AS03A-adjuvanted primary vaccine group compared with two doses of booster vaccine in the non-adjuvanted primary vaccine group. HI antibody responses were robust against the primary and booster vaccine strains 21 days after boosting at Month 12 or 36. At Month 48, in subjects boosted at Month 6, 12, or 36, HI antibody titers of ≥1:40 against the booster strain persisted in 39.2%, 61.2%, and 95.6% of subjects, respectively. Neutralizing antibody responses and cell-mediated immune responses also showed that AS03A-H5N1 heterologous booster vaccination elicited robust immune responses within 21 days of boosting at Month 6, 12, or 36 post-primary vaccination. The booster vaccine was well tolerated, and no safety concerns were raised.

CONCLUSIONS

In Asian adults primed with two doses of AS03A-adjuvanted H5N1 pandemic influenza vaccine, strong cross-clade anamnestic antibody responses were observed after one dose of AS03A-H5N1 heterologous booster vaccine given at Month 6, 12, or 36 after priming, suggesting that AS03A-adjuvanted H5N1 vaccines may provide highly flexible prime-boost schedules. Although immunogenicity decreased with time, vaccinated populations could potentially be protected for up to three years after vaccination, which is likely to far exceed the peak of the a pandemic.

Are we ready for pandemic influenza H5N1?

Influenza is an important annual respiratory pathogen with the potential to cause infrequent pandemics with devastating consequences. The establishment of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 as an endemic virus within duck and poultry populations in Asia increases the possibility of adaptation to humans and the threat of an emerging pandemic. Vaccines are the mainstay of prophylaxis against influenza, but there are technical and safety issues that must be overcome in the development of vaccines in order to combat avian influenza. Pandemic preparedness plans have been developed by national and international authorities but may be compromised by a lack of readily available interventions.

A detailed epidemiological and clinical description of 6 human cases of avian-origin influenza A (H7N9) virus infection in Shanghai

BACKGROUND

The world's first reported patient infected with avian influenza H7N9 was treated at the Fifth People's Hospital of Shanghai. Shortly thereafter, several other cases emerged in the local area. Here, we describe the detailed epidemiological and clinical data of 6 cases of avian influenza H7N9.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

We analyzed the epidemiologic and clinical data from clustered patients infected with H7N9 in the Minhang District of Shanghai during a 2-week period. Of the 6 patients, 2 were from a single family. In addition, 3 patients had a history of contact with poultry; however, all 6 patients lived in the proximity of 2 food markets where the H7N9 virus was detected in chickens and pigeons. The main symptoms were fever, cough, and hemoptysis. At onset, a decreased lymphocyte count and elevated creatine kinase, lactate dehydrogenase, procalcitonin, and C-reactive protein levels were observed. As the disease progressed, most patients developed dyspnea and hypoxemia. Imaging studies revealed lung consolidation and multiple ground-glass opacities in the early stage, rapidly extending bilaterally. All patients were treated with oseltamivir tablets beginning on days 3-8 after onset. The main complications were as follows: acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS; 83.3%), secondary bacterial infection (66.7%), pleural effusion (50%), left ventricular failure (33.3%), neuropsychiatric symptoms (33.3%), and rhabdomyolysis (16.7%). Of the 6 patients, 4 died of ARDS, with 2 patients recovering from the infection.

CONCLUSIONS

An outbreak of H7N9 infection occurred in the Minhang District of Shanghai that easily progressed to acute respiratory distress syndrome. Two cases showed family aggregation, which led us to identify the H7N9 virus and indicated that human transmission may be involved in the spread of this infection.

Comparative serological assays for the study of h5 and h7 avian influenza viruses

The nature of influenza virus to randomly mutate and evolve into new types is an important challenge in the control of influenza infection. It is necessary to monitor virus evolution for a better understanding of the pandemic risk posed by certain variants as evidenced by the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses. This has been clearly recognized in Egypt following the notification of the first HPAI H5N1 outbreak. The continuous circulation of the virus and the mass vaccination programme undertaken in poultry have resulted in a progressive genetic evolution and a significant antigenic drift near the major antigenic sites. In order to establish if vaccination is sufficient to provide significant intra- and interclade cross-protection, lentiviral pseudotypes derived from H5N1 HPAI viruses (A/Vietnam/1194/04, A/chicken/Egypt-1709-01/2007) and an antigenic drift variant (A/chicken/Egypt-1709-06-2008) were constructed and used in pseudotype-based neutralization assays (pp-NT). pp-NT data obtained was confirmed and correlated with HI and MN assays. A panel of pseudotypes belonging to influenza Groups 1 and 2, with a combination of reporter systems, was also employed for testing avian sera in order to support further application of pp-NT as an alternative valid assay that can improve avian vaccination efficacy testing, vaccine virus selection, and the reliability of reference sera.

Monitoring of influenza viruses in Western Siberia in 2008-2012

Western Siberia is of great importance in ecology and epidemiology of influenza. This territory is nesting area for great amount of bird species. Territorial relations of Western Siberian birds that are established during seasonal migration are extremely wide since this region is an intersection point of bird migration flows wintering in different regions of the world: Europe, Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, Hindustan, and South East Asia. Reassortant influenza viruses that can cause outbreak among population may emerge in Western Siberia with high probability. Thus, it is extremely important to carry out widespread study of circulated viruses, their molecular biological properties, phylogenetic links in this region, as well as herd immunity to influenza virus serotypes with epidemic potential.

Seroprevalence of antibodies to highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus among close contacts exposed to H5N1 cases, China, 2005-2008

To assess the extent of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A (H5N1) virus transmission, we conducted sero-epidemiologic studies among close contacts exposed to H5N1 cases in mainland China during 2005-2008. Blood specimens were collected from 87 household members and 332 social contacts of 23 H5N1 index cases for HPAI H5N1 serological testing by modified horse red-blood-cell hemagglutinin inhibition and microneutralization assays. All participants were interviewed with a standardized questionnaire to collect information about the use of personal protective equipment, illness symptoms, exposure to an H5N1 case during the infectious period, and poultry exposures. Two (2.3%) household contacts tested positive for HPAI H5N1 virus antibody, and all social contacts tested negative. Both seropositive cases had prolonged, unprotected, close contact with a different H5N1 index case, including days of bed-care or sleeping together during the index case's infectious period, and did not develop any illness. None of the 419 close contacts used appropriate personal protective equipment including 17% who reported providing bedside care or having physical contact with an H5N1 case for at least 12 hours. Our findings suggest that HPAI H5N1 viruses that circulated among poultry in mainland China from 2005-2008 were not easily transmitted to close contacts of H5N1 cases.

Immune responses to infection with H5N1 influenza virus

Influenza A H5N1 viruses remain a substantial threat to global public health. In particular, the expanding genetic diversity of H5N1 viruses and the associated risk for human adaptation underscore the importance of better understanding host immune responses that may protect against disease or infection. Although much emphasis has been placed on investigating early virus-host interactions and the induction of innate immune responses, little is known of the consequent adaptive immune response to H5N1 virus infection. In this review, we describe the H5N1 virus-specific and cross-reactive antibody and T cell responses in humans and animal models. Data from limited studies suggest that although initially robust, there is substantial waning of the serum antibody responses in survivors of H5N1 virus infection. Characterization of monoclonal antibodies generated from memory B cells of survivors of H5N1 virus infection has provided an understanding of the fine specificity of the human antibody response to H5N1 virus infection and identified strategies for immunotherapy. Human T cell responses induced by infection with seasonal influenza viruses are directed to relatively conserved internal proteins and cross-react with the H5N1 subtype. A role for T cell-based heterosubtypic immunity against H5N1 viruses is suggested in animal studies. Further studies on adaptive immune responses to H5N1 virus infection in both humans and animals are needed to inform the design of optimal immunological treatment and prevention modalities.

Assessment of serosurveys for H5N1

BACKGROUND

It has been suggested that the true case-fatality rate of human H5N1 influenza infection is appreciably less than the figure of approximately 60% that is based on official World Health Organization (WHO)-confirmed case reports because asymptomatic cases may have been missed. A number of seroepidemiologic studies have been conducted in an attempt to identify such missed cases.

METHODS

We conducted a comprehensive literature review of all English-language H5N1 human serology surveys with detailed attention to laboratory methodology used (including whether investigators used criteria set by the WHO to define positive cases), laboratory controls used, and the clades/genotypes involved.

RESULTS

Twenty-nine studies were included in the analysis. Few reported using unexposed control groups and one-third did not apply WHO criteria. Of studies that used WHO criteria, only 4 found any seropositive results to clades/genotypes of H5N1 that are currently circulating. No studies reported seropositive results to the clade 2/genotype Z viruses that have spread throughout Eurasia and Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

This review suggests that the frequency of positive H5 serology results is likely to be low; therefore, it is essential that future studies adhere to WHO criteria and include unexposed controls in their laboratory assays to limit the likelihood of false-positive results.

Engineering H5N1 avian influenza viruses to study human adaptation

Two studies of H5N1 avian influenza viruses that had been genetically engineered to render them transmissible between ferrets have proved highly controversial. Divergent opinions exist about the importance of these studies of influenza transmission and about potential 'dual use' research implications. No consensus has developed yet about how to balance these concerns. After not recommending immediate full publication of earlier, less complete versions of the studies, the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity subsequently recommended full publication of more complete manuscripts; however, controversy about this and similar research remains.

Seroevidence for H5N1 influenza infections in humans: meta-analysis

The prevalence of avian H5N1 influenza A infections in humans has not been definitively determined. Cases of H5N1 infection in humans confirmed by the World Health Organization (WHO) are fewer than 600 in number, with an overall case fatality rate of >50%. We hypothesize that the stringent criteria for confirmation of a human case of H5N1 by WHO do not account for a majority of infections but rather the select few hospitalized cases that are more likely to be severe and result in poor clinical outcome. Meta-analysis shows that 1 to 2% of more than 12,500 study participants from 20 studies had seroevidence for prior H5N1 infection.

Is H5N1 really highly lethal?

Medicine for Policymakers is a Journal column that provides decision makers with brief explanations of the meaning and implications for biosecurity of clinical issues. The articles describe, for a nonmedical audience, hospital practices, medical challenges, healthcare delivery issues, and other topics of current interest. Readers may submit ideas to the column's editor, Amesh A. Adalja, MD, through the Journal's editorial office at jfox@upmc-biosecurity.org .

Mammalian-transmissible H5N1 influenza: facts and perspective

Two recently submitted (but as yet unpublished) studies describe success in creating mutant isolates of H5N1 influenza A virus that can be transmitted via the respiratory route between ferrets; concern has been raised regarding human-to-human transmissibility of these or similar laboratory-generated influenza viruses. Furthermore, the potential release of methods used in these studies has engendered a great deal of controversy around publishing potential dual-use data and also has served as a catalyst for debates around the true case-fatality rate of H5N1 influenza and the capability of influenza vaccines and antivirals to impact any future unintentional or intentional release of H5N1 virus. In this report, we review available seroepidemiology data for H5N1 infection and discuss how case-finding strategies may influence the overall case-fatality rate reported by the WHO. We also provide information supporting the position that if an H5N1 influenza pandemic occurred, available medical countermeasures would have limited impact on the associated morbidity and mortality.

Profiling of humoral immune responses to influenza viruses by using protein microarray

The emergence of pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 influenza showed the importance of rapid assessment of the degree of immunity in the population, the rate of asymptomatic infection, the spread of infection in households, effects of control measures, and ability of candidate vaccines to produce a response in different age groups. A limitation lies in the available assay repertoire: reference standard methods for measuring antibodies to influenza virus are haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays and virus neutralization tests. Both assays are difficult to standardize and may be too specific to assess possible partial humoral immunity from previous exposures. Here, we describe the use of antigen-microarrays to measure antibodies to HA1 antigens from seven recent and historical seasonal H1, H2 and H3 influenza viruses, the A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic influenza virus, and three avian influenza viruses. We assessed antibody profiles in 18 adult patients infected with A(H1N1) 2009 influenza virus during the recent pandemic, and 21 children sampled before and after the pandemic, against background reactivity observed in 122 persons sampled in 2008, a season dominated by seasonal A(H1N1) influenza virus. We show that subtype-specific and variant-specific antibody responses can be measured, confirming serological responses measured by HI. Comparison of profiles from persons with similar HI response showed that the magnitude and broadness of response to individual influenza subtype antigens differs greatly between individuals. Clinical and vaccination studies, but also exposure studies, should take these findings into consideration, as they may indicate some level of humoral immunity not measured by HI assays.

The modes of evolutionary emergence of primal and late pandemic influenza virus strains from viral reservoir in animals: an interdisciplinary analysis

Based on a wealth of recent findings, in conjunction with earliest chronologies pertaining to evolutionary emergences of ancestral RNA viruses, ducks, Influenzavirus A (assumingly within ducks), and hominids, as well as to the initial domestication of mallard duck (Anas platyrhynchos), jungle fowl (Gallus gallus), wild turkey (Meleagris gallopavo), wild boar (Sus scrofa), and wild horse (Equus ferus), presumed genesis modes of primordial pandemic influenza strains have multidisciplinarily been configured. The virological fundamentality of domestication and farming of those various avian and mammalian species has thereby been demonstrated and broadly elucidated, within distinctive coevolutionary paradigms. The mentioned viral genesis modes were then analyzed, compatibly with common denominators and flexibility that mark the geographic profile of the last 18 pandemic strains, which reputedly emerged since 1510, the antigenic profile of the last 10 pandemic strains since 1847, and the genomic profile of the last 5 pandemic strains since 1918, until present. Related ecophylogenetic and biogeographic aspects have been enlightened, alongside with the crucial role of spatial virus gene dissemination by avian hosts. A fairly coherent picture of primary and late evolutionary and genomic courses of pandemic strains has thus been attained, tentatively. Specific patterns underlying complexes prone to generate past and future pandemic strains from viral reservoir in animals are consequentially derived.

Identification of H5N1-specific T-cell responses in a high-risk cohort in vietnam indicates the existence of potential asymptomatic infections

BACKGROUND

Most reported human H5N1 viral infections have been severe and were detected after hospital admission. A case ascertainment bias may therefore exist, with mild cases or asymptomatic infections going undetected. We sought evidence of mild or asymptomatic H5N1 infection by examining H5N1-specific T-cell and antibody responses in a high-risk cohort in Vietnam.

METHODS

Peripheral blood mononuclear cells were tested using interferon-γ enzyme-linked immunospot T assays measuring the response to peptides of influenza H5, H3, and H1 hemagglutinin (HA), N1 and N2 neuraminidase, and the internal proteins of H3N2. Horse erythrocyte hemagglutination inhibition assay was performed to detect antibodies against H5N1.

RESULTS

Twenty-four of 747 individuals demonstrated H5-specific T-cell responses but little or no cross-reactivity with H3 or H1 HA peptides. H5N1 peptide-specific T-cell lines that did not cross-react with H1 or H3 influenza virus HA peptides were generated. Four individuals also had antibodies against H5N1.

CONCLUSIONS

This is the first report of ex vivo H5 HA-specific T-cell responses in a healthy but H5N1-exposed population. Our results indicate that the presence of H5N1-specific T cells could be an additional diagnostic tool for asymptomatic H5N1 infection.

Human infection with avian influenza virus, Pakistan, 2007

Human infection with avian influenza (H5N1) virus raises concern for the possibility of a pandemic. We report 20 cases, which ranged from asymptomatic to fatal, in Pakistan in 2007. These cases indicate human-to-human-to-human transmission of this virus, and the number of cases may be higher than realized.

Human infection with avian influenza virus, Pakistan, 2007

Human infection with avian influenza (H5N1) virus raises concern for the possibility of a pandemic. We report 20 cases, which ranged from asymptomatic to fatal, in Pakistan in 2007. These cases indicate human-to-human-to-human transmission of this virus, and the number of cases may be higher than realized.

H3N2 influenza infection elicits more cross-reactive and less clonally expanded anti-hemagglutinin antibodies than influenza vaccination

Background

During the recent H1N1 influenza pandemic, excess morbidity and mortality was seen in young but not older adults suggesting that prior infection with influenza strains may have protected older subjects. In contrast, a history of recent seasonal trivalent vaccine in younger adults was not associated with protection.

Methods and Findings

To study hemagglutinin (HA) antibody responses in influenza immunization and infection, we have studied the day 7 plasma cell repertoires of subjects immunized with seasonal trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (TIV) and compared them to the plasma cell repertoires of subjects experimentally infected (EI) with influenza H3N2 A/Wisconsin/67/2005. The majority of circulating plasma cells after TIV produced influenza-specific antibodies, while most plasma cells after EI produced antibodies that did not react with influenza HA. While anti-HA antibodies from TIV subjects were primarily reactive with single or few HA strains, anti-HA antibodies from EI subjects were isolated that reacted with multiple HA strains. Plasma cell-derived anti-HA antibodies from TIV subjects showed more evidence of clonal expansion compared with antibodies from EI subjects. From an H3N2-infected subject, we isolated a 4-member clonal lineage of broadly cross-reactive antibodies that bound to multiple HA subtypes and neutralized both H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. This broad reactivity was not detected in post-infection plasma suggesting this broadly reactive clonal lineage was not immunodominant in this subject.

Conclusion

The presence of broadly reactive subdominant antibody responses in some EI subjects suggests that improved vaccine designs that make broadly reactive antibody responses immunodominant could protect against novel influenza strains.

H5N1-SeroDetect EIA and rapid test: a novel differential diagnostic assay for serodiagnosis of H5N1 infections and surveillance

Continuing evolution of highly pathogenic (HP) H5N1 influenza viruses in wild birds with transmission to domestic poultry and humans poses a pandemic threat. There is an urgent need for a simple and rapid serological diagnostic assay which can differentiate between antibodies to seasonal and H5N1 strains and that could provide surveillance tools not dependent on virus isolation and nucleic acid technologies. Here we describe the establishment of H5N1 SeroDetect enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and rapid test assays based on three peptides in HA2 (488-516), PB1-F2 (2-75), and M2e (2-24) that are highly conserved within H5N1 strains. These peptides were identified by antibody repertoire analyses of H5N1 influenza survivors in Vietnam using whole-genome-fragment phage display libraries (GFPDLs). To date, both platforms have demonstrated high levels of sensitivity and specificity in detecting H5N1 infections (clade 1 and clade 2.3.4) in Vietnamese patients as early as 7 days and up to several years postinfection. H5N1 virus-uninfected individuals in Vietnam and the United States, including subjects vaccinated with seasonal influenza vaccines or with confirmed seasonal virus infections, did not react in the H5N1-SeroDetect assays. Moreover, sera from individuals vaccinated with H5N1 subunit vaccine with moderate anti-H5N1 neutralizing antibody titers did not react positively in the H5N1-SeroDetect ELISA or rapid test assays. The simple H5N1-SeroDetect ELISA and rapid tests could provide an important tool for large-scale surveillance for potential exposure to HP H5N1 strains in both humans and birds.

H5N1 virus-like particle vaccine elicits cross-reactive neutralizing antibodies that preferentially bind to the oligomeric form of influenza virus hemagglutinin in humans

Transmission of pathogenic avian influenza viruses (AIV) from wild birds to domestic poultry and humans is continuing in multiple countries around the world. In preparation for a potential AIV pandemic, multiple vaccine candidates are under development. In the case of H5N1 AIV, a clear shift in transmission from clade 1 to clade 2 viruses occurred in recent years. The virus-like particle (VLP) represents an economical approach to pandemic vaccine development. In the current study, we evaluated the humoral immune response in humans vaccinated with H5N1 A/Indonesia/05/2005 (clade 2.1) VLP vaccine manufactured in Sf9 insect cells. The VLPs were comprised of the influenza virus hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and matrix 1 (M1) proteins. In an FDA-approved phase I/II human clinical study, two doses of H5N1 VLPs at 15, 45, or 90 μg HA/dose resulted in seroconversion and production of functional antibodies. Moreover, cross-reactivity against other clade 2 subtypes was demonstrated using virus neutralization assays. H5N1 whole-genome fragment phage display libraries (GFPDL) were used to elucidate the antibody epitope repertoire in postvaccination human sera. Diverse epitopes in HA1/HA2 and NA were recognized by postvaccination sera from the two high-dose groups, including large segments spanning the HA1 receptor binding domain. Importantly, the vaccine elicited sera that preferentially bound to an oligomeric form of recombinant HA1 compared with monomeric HA1. The oligomeric/monomeric HA1 binding ratios of the sera correlated with the virus neutralizing titers. Additionally, the two high-dose VLP vaccine groups generated NA-inhibiting antibodies that were associated with binding to a C-terminal epitope close to the sialic acid binding site. These findings represent the first report describing the quality of the antibody responses in humans following AIV VLP immunization and support further development of such vaccines against emerging influenza virus strains.

Ode to oseltamivir and amantadine?

Influenza A and B viruses are the two major types of influenza viruses that cause human epidemic disease. Influenza A viruses are further categorized into subtypes based on two surface antigens: hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N). Influenza B viruses are not categorized into subtypes (1). Influenza A viruses are found in many animal species, including humans, ducks, chickens, pigs, whales, horses and seals, whereas influenza B viruses circulate only among humans. The H antigen contains common and strain-specific antigens, demonstrates antigenic variation, and acts as a site of attachment of the virus to host cells to initiate infection (1). The N antigen contains subtype-specific antigens and also demonstrates antigenic variation between subtypes. It is a surface glycoprotein possessing enzymatic activity essential for viral replication in both influenza A and B viruses. The N antigen allows the release of newly produced virions from infected host cells, prevents the formation of viral aggregates after release from the host cells, and prevents viral inactivation by respiratory mucous (2,3). It is thought that this enzyme may also promote viral penetration into respiratory epithelial cells and may contribute to the pathogenicity of the virus by promoting production of proinflammatory cytokines such as interleukin-1 and tumour necrosis factor from macrophages (4-6).

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1): pathways of exposure at the animal-human interface, a systematic review

BACKGROUND

The threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses to humans remains significant, given the continued occurrence of sporadic human cases (499 human cases in 15 countries) with a high case fatality rate (approximately 60%), the endemicity in poultry populations in several countries, and the potential for reassortment with the newly emerging 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain. Therefore, we review risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

Several epidemiologic studies have evaluated the risk factors associated with increased risk of H5N1 infection among humans who were exposed to H5N1 viruses. Our review shows that most H5N1 cases are attributed to exposure to sick poultry. Most cases are sporadic, while occasional limited human-to-human transmission occurs. The most commonly identified factors associated with H5N1 virus infection included exposure through contact with infected blood or bodily fluids of infected poultry via food preparation practices; touching and caring for infected poultry; [corrected] exposure to H5N1 via swimming or bathing in potentially virus laden ponds; and exposure to H5N1 at live bird markets.

CONCLUSIONS

Research has demonstrated that despite frequent and widespread contact with poultry, transmission of the H5N1 virus from poultry to humans is rare. Available research has identified several risk factors that may be associated with infection including close direct contact with poultry and transmission via the environment. However, several important data gaps remain that limit our understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 in humans. Although infection in humans with H5N1 remains rare, human cases continue to be reported and H5N1 is now considered endemic among poultry in parts of Asia and in Egypt, providing opportunities for additional human infections and for the acquisition of virus mutations that may lead to more efficient spread among humans and other mammalian species. Collaboration between human and animal health sectors for surveillance, case investigation, virus sharing, and risk assessment is essential to monitor for potential changes in circulating H5N1 viruses and in the epidemiology of H5N1 in order to provide the best possible chance for effective mitigation of the impact of H5N1 in both poultry and humans.

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions or organizations with which they are affiliated.