1
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Granato G, Baldassarre G. Bridging flexible goal-directed cognition and consciousness: The Goal-Aligning Representation Internal Manipulation theory. Neural Netw 2024; 176:106292. [PMID: 38657422 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2024.106292] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/27/2023] [Revised: 03/27/2024] [Accepted: 04/05/2024] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Goal-directed manipulation of internal representations is a key element of human flexible behaviour, while consciousness is commonly associated with higher-order cognition and human flexibility. Current perspectives have only partially linked these processes, thus preventing a clear understanding of how they jointly generate flexible cognition and behaviour. Moreover, these limitations prevent an effective exploitation of this knowledge for technological scopes. We propose a new theoretical perspective that extends our 'three-component theory of flexible cognition' toward higher-order cognition and consciousness, based on the systematic integration of key concepts from Cognitive Neuroscience and AI/Robotics. The theory proposes that the function of conscious processes is to support the alignment of representations with multi-level goals. This higher alignment leads to more flexible and effective behaviours. We analyse here our previous model of goal-directed flexible cognition (validated with more than 20 human populations) as a starting GARIM-inspired model. By bridging the main theories of consciousness and goal-directed behaviour, the theory has relevant implications for scientific and technological fields. In particular, it contributes to developing new experimental tasks and interpreting clinical evidence. Finally, it indicates directions for improving machine learning and robotics systems and for informing real-world applications (e.g., in digital-twin healthcare and roboethics).
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Affiliation(s)
- Giovanni Granato
- Laboratory of Embodied Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, Rome, Italy.
| | - Gianluca Baldassarre
- Laboratory of Embodied Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, Rome, Italy.
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2
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Kanai R, Fujisawa I. Toward a universal theory of consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae022. [PMID: 38826771 PMCID: PMC11141593 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2023] [Revised: 05/08/2024] [Accepted: 05/15/2024] [Indexed: 06/04/2024] Open
Abstract
While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of "Universality" as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryota Kanai
- President Office, Araya, Inc., Sanpo Sakuma Building, 1-11 Kanda Sakuma-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0025, Japan
| | - Ippei Fujisawa
- President Office, Araya, Inc., Sanpo Sakuma Building, 1-11 Kanda Sakuma-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0025, Japan
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3
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Ludwig D, Khalidi MA. Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response (ASMR) and the Functions of Consciousness. Cogn Sci 2024; 48:e13453. [PMID: 38742274 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13453] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/19/2023] [Revised: 03/16/2024] [Accepted: 04/29/2024] [Indexed: 05/16/2024]
Abstract
"Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response" (ASMR) refers to a sensory-emotional experience that was first explicitly identified and named within the past two decades in online discussion boards. Since then, there has been mounting psychological and neural evidence of a clustering of properties common to the phenomenon of ASMR, including convergence on the set of stimuli that trigger the experience, the properties of the experience itself, and its downstream effects. Moreover, psychological instruments have begun to be developed and employed in an attempt to measure it. Based on this empirical work, we make the case that despite its nonscientific origins, ASMR is a good candidate for being a real kind in the cognitive sciences. The phenomenon appears to have a robust causal profile and may also have an adaptive evolutionary history. We also argue that a more thorough understanding of the distinctive type of phenomenal experience involved in an ASMR episode can shed light on the functions of consciousness, and ultimately undermine certain "cognitive" theories of consciousness. We conclude that ASMR should be the subject of more extensive scientific investigation, particularly since it may also have the potential for therapeutic applications.
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4
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Witkowski O, Schwitzgebel E. The Ethics of Life as It Could Be: Do We Have Moral Obligations to Artificial Life? ARTIFICIAL LIFE 2024; 30:193-215. [PMID: 38656414 DOI: 10.1162/artl_a_00436] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
The field of Artificial Life studies the nature of the living state by modeling and synthesizing living systems. Such systems, under certain conditions, may come to deserve moral consideration similar to that given to nonhuman vertebrates or even human beings. The fact that these systems are nonhuman and evolve in a potentially radically different substrate should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to their potentially having rights, if they are sufficiently sophisticated in other respects. Nor should the fact that they owe their existence to us be seen as reducing their status as targets of moral concern. On the contrary, creators of Artificial Life may have special obligations to their creations, resembling those of an owner to their pet or a parent to their child. For a field that aims to create artificial life-forms with increasing levels of sophistication, it is crucial to consider the possible ethical implications of our activities, with an eye toward assessing potential moral obligations for which we should be prepared. If Artificial Life is larger than life, then the ethics of artificial beings should be larger than human ethics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Olaf Witkowski
- Cross Compass Ltd. Cross Labs University of Tokyo College of Arts and Sciences.
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5
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Bayne T, Seth AK, Massimini M, Shepherd J, Cleeremans A, Fleming SM, Malach R, Mattingley JB, Menon DK, Owen AM, Peters MAK, Razi A, Mudrik L. Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond. Trends Cogn Sci 2024; 28:454-466. [PMID: 38485576 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2023] [Revised: 01/24/2024] [Accepted: 01/26/2024] [Indexed: 05/12/2024]
Abstract
Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tim Bayne
- Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada.
| | - Anil K Seth
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science and School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
| | - Marcello Massimini
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; Department of Biomedical and Clinical Science, University of Milan, Milan, Italy; IRCCS Fondazione Don Gnocchi
| | - Joshua Shepherd
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Belleterra, Spain; ICREA, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; Center for Research in Cognition and Neuroscience, ULB Institute of Neuroscience, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Stephen M Fleming
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
| | - Rafael Malach
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; The Department of Brain Sciences, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
| | - Jason B Mattingley
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; Queensland Brain Institute and School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - David K Menon
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Adrian M Owen
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada
| | - Megan A K Peters
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
| | - Adeel Razi
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
| | - Liad Mudrik
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Brain, Mind, and Consciousness Program, Toronto, ON, Canada; School of Psychological Sciences and Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
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6
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Baetu TM. Extrapolating animal consciousness. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2024; 104:150-159. [PMID: 38520882 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.03.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2023] [Revised: 03/01/2024] [Accepted: 03/04/2024] [Indexed: 03/25/2024]
Abstract
I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, technologies and medical applications developed by extrapolating and aggregating findings from multiple models. Crucially important, this methodology does not require a commitment to any particular theory or construct of consciousness, thus avoiding theory-biased reinterpretations of empirical findings rampant in the literature.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tudor M Baetu
- Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Département de philosophie et des arts, 3351, boul. des Forges, Trois-Rivières, Québec, G8Z 4M3, Canada.
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7
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Thomsen AM, Borrie WT, Miller KK, Cardilini APA. Listen to Us: Perceptions of Animal Voice and Agency. Animals (Basel) 2023; 13:3271. [PMID: 37893995 PMCID: PMC10603673 DOI: 10.3390/ani13203271] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/11/2023] [Revised: 09/12/2023] [Accepted: 10/17/2023] [Indexed: 10/29/2023] Open
Abstract
In many contexts, the interests of nonhuman animals (hereafter "animals") are often overlooked or considered to be a lower priority than those of humans. While strong arguments exist for taking animal moral claims seriously, these largely go unheard due to dominant anthropocentric attitudes and beliefs. This study aimed to explore how animal interests might be best represented in the human world. We conducted interviews to investigate people's perceptions of what it means to speak for other animals and who can reliably represent animal interests. Using Grounded Theory analytical methods, we identified one major theme: "Animal voice", and its subthemes: "Animals do/do not have a voice", "Human language constructs realities and paradigms", and "Let animals speak". Our findings illustrate how human language constructs contribute to shaping the realities of animals by contextually defining them as voiceless. This has serious implications for animals, society, and the environment. Drawing parallels with the relevant literature, our results reflect calls for the social and political recognition of animal voice as fundamental to animal representation. We recommend future research to focus on developing ethical and compassionate approaches to understanding animal subjective experiences to empower and amplify animal voices.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anja M. Thomsen
- School of Life and Environmental Sciences, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia; (W.T.B.); (K.K.M.); (A.P.A.C.)
| | - William T. Borrie
- School of Life and Environmental Sciences, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia; (W.T.B.); (K.K.M.); (A.P.A.C.)
- PAN Works, Marlborough, MA 01752, USA
| | - Kelly K. Miller
- School of Life and Environmental Sciences, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia; (W.T.B.); (K.K.M.); (A.P.A.C.)
| | - Adam P. A. Cardilini
- School of Life and Environmental Sciences, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia; (W.T.B.); (K.K.M.); (A.P.A.C.)
- PAN Works, Marlborough, MA 01752, USA
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8
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Paßler M. The exclusionary approach to consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad022. [PMID: 37810758 PMCID: PMC10553408 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2023] [Revised: 08/25/2023] [Accepted: 09/13/2023] [Indexed: 10/10/2023] Open
Abstract
The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marlo Paßler
- Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Luisenstraße 56, Berlin 10117, Germany
- RTG 2386 “Extrospection”, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Luisenstraße 56, Berlin 10117, Germany
- Institute of Philosophy, Otto-von-Guericke University, Zschokkestr. 32, Magdeburg, Sachsen-Anhalt 39104, Germany
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9
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Frohlich J, Crone JS, Mediano PAM, Toker D, Bor D. Editorial: Dissociations between neural activity and conscious state: a key to understanding consciousness. Front Hum Neurosci 2023; 17:1256168. [PMID: 37600551 PMCID: PMC10433896 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2023.1256168] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2023] [Accepted: 07/20/2023] [Indexed: 08/22/2023] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Joel Frohlich
- Institute for Neuromodulation and Neurotechnology, University Hospital and University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, United States
| | - Julia S. Crone
- Vienna Cognitive Science Hub, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
| | - Pedro A. M. Mediano
- Department of Computing, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
| | - Daniel Toker
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | - Daniel Bor
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
- Department of Psychology, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom
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10
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Schoeller F. Primary states of consciousness: A review of historical and contemporary developments. Conscious Cogn 2023; 113:103536. [PMID: 37321024 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103536] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/21/2022] [Revised: 06/01/2023] [Accepted: 06/02/2023] [Indexed: 06/17/2023]
Abstract
Primary states of consciousness are conceived as phylogenetically older states of consciousness as compared to secondary states governed by sociocultural inhibition. The historical development of the concept in psychiatry and neurobiology is reviewed, along with its relationship to theories of consciousness. We suggest that primary states of consciousness are characterized by a temporary breakdown of self-control accompanied by a merging of action, communication, and emotion (ACE fusion), ordinarily segregated in human adults. We examine the neurobiologic basis of this model, including its relation to the phenomenon of neural dedifferentiation, the loss of modularity during altered states of consciousness, and increased corticostriatal connectivity. By shedding light on the importance of primary states of consciousness, this article provides a novel perspective on the role of consciousness as a mechanism of differentiation and control. We discuss potential differentiators underlying a gradient from primary to secondary state of consciousness, suggesting changes in thalamocortical interactions and arousal function. We also propose a set of testable, neurobiologically plausible working hypotheses to account for their distinct phenomenological and neural signatures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Felix Schoeller
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, United States; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States.
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11
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Paoli M, Macri C, Giurfa M. A cognitive account of trace conditioning in insects. CURRENT OPINION IN INSECT SCIENCE 2023; 57:101034. [PMID: 37044245 DOI: 10.1016/j.cois.2023.101034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/17/2023] [Revised: 04/03/2023] [Accepted: 04/05/2023] [Indexed: 05/07/2023]
Abstract
Trace conditioning is a form of Pavlovian learning in which the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US) are separated by a temporal gap. Insects learn trace associations of variable nature (appetitive, aversive) and involving CSs of different sensory modalities (olfactory, visual). The accessibility of the insect neural system in behaving animals allowed identifying neural processes driving trace conditioning: the existence of prolonged neural responses to the CS after stimulus offset and the anticipation of US responses during the free-stimulus gap. Specific brain structures, such as the mushroom bodies seem to be allocated to this learning form. Here, we posit that a further component facilitating trace conditioning in insects relates to neuromodulatory mechanisms underlying enhanced attention. We thus propose a model based on different types of mushroom-body neurons, which provides a cognitive account of trace conditioning in insects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco Paoli
- Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale, Centre de Biologie Intégrative (CBI), University of Toulouse, CNRS, UPS, 31062 Toulouse cedex 9, France
| | - Catherine Macri
- Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale, Centre de Biologie Intégrative (CBI), University of Toulouse, CNRS, UPS, 31062 Toulouse cedex 9, France
| | - Martin Giurfa
- Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale, Centre de Biologie Intégrative (CBI), University of Toulouse, CNRS, UPS, 31062 Toulouse cedex 9, France; Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Paris, France.
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12
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Barrett M, Fischer B. Challenges in farmed insect welfare: Beyond the question of sentience. Anim Welf 2023; 32:e4. [PMID: 38487436 PMCID: PMC10936363 DOI: 10.1017/awf.2022.5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2022] [Revised: 08/08/2022] [Accepted: 08/19/2022] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
Abstract
The global Insects as Food and Feed (IAFF) industry currently farms over a trillion individual insects a year and is growing rapidly. Intensive animal production systems are known to cause a range of negative affective states in livestock; given the potential scale of the IAFF industry, it is urgent to consider the welfare of the industry's insect livestock. The majority of the literature on farmed insect welfare has focused on: (i) establishing that insect welfare ought to be of concern; or (ii) extending vertebrate welfare frameworks to insects. However, there are many overlooked challenges to studying insect welfare and applying that knowledge in IAFF industry contexts. Here, we briefly review five of these challenges. We end with practical recommendations for the future study of insect welfare.
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Affiliation(s)
- Meghan Barrett
- Department of Biology, California State University Dominguez Hills, Carson, CA90747, USA
| | - Bob Fischer
- Department of Philosophy, Texas State University, 601 University Dr, San Marcos, TX78666, USA
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13
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Zher-Wen, Yu R. Unconscious integration: Current evidence for integrative processing under subliminal conditions. Br J Psychol 2023; 114:430-456. [PMID: 36689339 DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12631] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/20/2022] [Accepted: 01/05/2023] [Indexed: 01/24/2023]
Abstract
Integrative processing is traditionally believed to be dependent on consciousness. While earlier studies within the last decade reported many types of integration under subliminal conditions (i.e. without perceptual awareness), these findings are widely challenged recently. This review evaluates the current evidence for 10 types of subliminal integration that are widely studied: arithmetic processing, object-context integration, multi-word processing, same-different processing, multisensory integration and 5 different types of associative learning. Potential methodological issues concerning awareness measures are also taken into account. It is concluded that while there is currently no reliable evidence for subliminal integration, this does not necessarily refute 'unconscious' integration defined through non-subliminal (e.g. implicit) approaches.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zher-Wen
- Department of Management, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China.,Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Singapore City, Singapore
| | - Rongjun Yu
- Department of Management, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
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14
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Barrett M, Fischer B, Buchmann S. Informing policy and practice on insect pollinator declines: Tensions between conservation and animal welfare. Front Ecol Evol 2023. [DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2022.1071251] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/07/2023] Open
Abstract
Climate change, agricultural intensification, and other anthropogenic ecosystem challenges have caused declines in the diversity and abundance of insect pollinators. In response to these declines, entomologists have called for greater attention to insect pollinator conservation. Conservation primarily aims to protect groups of non-human animals—populations or species—with only secondary concern for the welfare of individual animals. While conservation and animal welfare goals are sometimes aligned, they often are not. And because animal welfare comes second, it tends to be sacrificed when in tension with conversation priorities. Consider, for example, lethal sampling to monitor many pollinator populations. Growing evidence suggests that the welfare of individual insect pollinators may be morally significant, particularly in the Hymenoptera and Diptera. Considering insect welfare in conservation practices and policies presents many challenges as, in the face of rapid, anthropogenic change, it may be impossible to avoid harming individual animals while promoting diverse populations. We suggest some practical, implementable strategies that can allow for more robust integration of animal welfare goals into insect pollinator conservation. By following these strategies, entomologists may be able to find policies and practices that promote the health of ecosystems and the individual animals within them.
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15
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Ludwig D. The functions of consciousness in visual processing. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niac018. [PMID: 36628118 PMCID: PMC9825248 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/01/2022] [Revised: 10/24/2022] [Accepted: 12/06/2022] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dylan Ludwig
- Department of Philosophy, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
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16
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Dung L. Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 2022; 28:51. [PMID: 36305975 PMCID: PMC9616780 DOI: 10.1007/s11948-022-00408-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2021] [Accepted: 09/24/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
According to a common view, sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral status. In other words, whether a being has intrinsic moral relevance is determined by its capacity for conscious experience. The epistemic objection derives from our profound uncertainty about sentience. According to this objection, we cannot use sentience as a criterion to ascribe moral status in practice because we won't know in the foreseeable future which animals and AI systems are sentient while ethical questions regarding the possession of moral status are urgent. Therefore, we need to formulate an alternative criterion. I argue that the epistemic objection is dissolved once one clearly distinguishes between the question what determines moral status and what criterion should be employed in practice to ascribe moral status. Epistemic concerns are irrelevant to the former question and-I will argue-criteria of moral status have inescapably to be based on sentience, if one concedes that sentience determines moral status. It follows that doubts about our epistemic access to sentience cannot be used to motivate an alternative criterion of moral status. If sentience turns out to be unknowable, then moral status is unknowable. However, I briefly advocate against such strong pessimism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonard Dung
- Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, 44801, Bochum, Germany.
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17
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Dung L. Assessing tests of animal consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2022; 105:103410. [PMID: 36115312 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103410] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2022] [Revised: 08/10/2022] [Accepted: 08/25/2022] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
Abstract
Which animals have conscious experiences? Many different, diverse and unrelated behaviors and cognitive capacities have been proposed as tests of the presence of consciousness in an animal. It is unclear which of these tests, if any, are valid. To remedy this problem, I develop a list consisting of eight desiderata which can be used to assess putative tests of animal consciousness. These desiderata are based either on detailed analogies between consciousness-linked human behavior and non-human behavior, on theories of consciousness or on methods from human consciousness science. If a test or set of tests satisfies more of these desiderata, passing it provides stronger evidence of consciousness. Moreover, one can design future tests of animal consciousness with the intention of satisfying these desiderata to ensure their evidential strength.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonard Dung
- Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, 44801 Bochum, Germany.
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18
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Birch J, Crump A. The lights and shadows of consciousness. Curr Biol 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2022.06.055] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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19
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Giurfa M, Macri C. Neuroscience: Mechanisms for bridging stimuli in Pavlovian trace conditioning in flies. Curr Biol 2022; 32:R532-R535. [PMID: 35671730 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2022.04.059] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
A recent study revealed neural mechanisms underlying visual trace conditioning in flies. To associate visual stimuli with heat punishment, the activity of visual- and heat-processing circuits was extended into the gap between them. Distractors delivered during the gap disrupted learning, raising the question of the cognitive processes at play.
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Affiliation(s)
- Martin Giurfa
- Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale, Centre de Biologie Intégrative (CBI), University of Toulouse, CNRS, UPS, 31062 Toulouse cedex 9, France; Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Paris, France.
| | - Catherine Macri
- Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale, Centre de Biologie Intégrative (CBI), University of Toulouse, CNRS, UPS, 31062 Toulouse cedex 9, France
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20
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Abstract
Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.
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21
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Browning H, Birch J. Animal sentience. PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 2022; 17:e12822. [PMID: 35859762 PMCID: PMC9285591 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2020] [Revised: 10/01/2021] [Accepted: 02/14/2022] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
Abstract
'Sentience' sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Heather Browning
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social ScienceLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK
| | - Jonathan Birch
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social ScienceLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK
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22
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Droege P, Schwob N, Weiss DJ. Fishnition: Developing Models From Cognition Toward Consciousness. Front Vet Sci 2021; 8:785256. [PMID: 34977218 PMCID: PMC8714737 DOI: 10.3389/fvets.2021.785256] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2021] [Accepted: 11/24/2021] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
A challenge to developing a model for testing animal consciousness is the pull of opposite intuitions. On one extreme, the anthropocentric view holds that consciousness is a highly sophisticated capacity involving self-reflection and conceptual categorization that is almost certainly exclusive to humans. At the opposite extreme, an anthropomorphic view attributes consciousness broadly to any behavior that involves sensory responsiveness. Yet human experience and observation of diverse species suggest that the most plausible case is that consciousness functions between these poles. In exploring the middle ground, we discuss the pros and cons of "high level" approaches such as the dual systems approach. According to this model, System 1 can be thought of as unconscious; processing is fast, automatic, associative, heuristic, parallel, contextual, and likely to be conserved across species. Consciousness is associated with System 2 processing that is slow, effortful, rule-based, serial, abstract, and exclusively human. An advantage of this model is the clear contrast between heuristic and decision-based responses, but it fails to include contextual decision-making in novel conditions which falls in between these two categories. We also review a "low level" model involving trace conditioning, which is a trained response to the first of two paired stimuli separated by an interval. This model highlights the role of consciousness in maintaining a stimulus representation over a temporal span, though it overlooks the importance of attention in subserving and also disrupting trace conditioning in humans. Through a critical analysis of these two extremes, we will develop the case for flexible behavioral response to the stimulus environment as the best model for demonstrating animal consciousness. We discuss a methodology for gauging flexibility across a wide variety of species and offer a case study in spatial navigation to illustrate our proposal. Flexibility serves the evolutionary function of enabling the complex evaluation of changing conditions, where motivation is the basis for goal valuation, and attention selects task-relevant stimuli to aid decision-making processes. We situate this evolutionary function within the Temporal Representation Theory of consciousness, which proposes that consciousness represents the present moment in order to facilitate flexible action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paula Droege
- Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States
| | - Natalie Schwob
- Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States
| | - Daniel J. Weiss
- Department of Psychology and Program in Linguistics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States
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23
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Birch J. The hatching of consciousness. HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIFE SCIENCES 2021; 43:121. [PMID: 34807317 PMCID: PMC8608763 DOI: 10.1007/s40656-021-00472-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2021] [Accepted: 10/13/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
Peter Godfrey-Smith's Metazoa and Joseph LeDoux's The Deep History of Ourselves present radically different big pictures regarding the nature, evolution and distribution of consciousness in animals. In this essay review, I discuss the motivations behind these big pictures and try to steer a course between them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jonathan Birch
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK.
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24
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Abstract
In a new study, Ben-Haim et al. use subliminal stimuli to separate conscious and unconscious perception in macaques. A programme of this type, using a range of cognitive tasks, is a promising way to look for conscious perception in more controversial cases.
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25
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Mallatt J. A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2021; 23:650. [PMID: 34067413 PMCID: PMC8224652 DOI: 10.3390/e23060650] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2021] [Revised: 05/14/2021] [Accepted: 05/18/2021] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
Abstract
This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT's strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative "experience-first" approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body ("hard") problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jon Mallatt
- The University of Washington WWAMI Medical Education Program at The University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844, USA
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26
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Overgaard M. Insect Consciousness. Front Behav Neurosci 2021; 15:653041. [PMID: 34093146 PMCID: PMC8175961 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2021.653041] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/13/2021] [Accepted: 04/23/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
The question of consciousness in other species, not least species very physically different from humans such as insects, is highly challenging for a number of reasons. One reason is that we do not have any available empirical method to answer the question. Another reason is that current theories of consciousness disagree about the relation between physical structure and consciousness, i.e., whether consciousness requires specific, say, neural structures or whether consciousness can be realized in different ways. This article sets out to analyze if and how there could be an empirical and/or a theoretical approach to the topic on the basis of current consciousness research in humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Morten Overgaard
- Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
- Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
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27
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Birch J, Browning H. Neural Organoids and the Precautionary Principle. THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS : AJOB 2021; 21:56-58. [PMID: 33373578 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2020.1845858] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
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