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Parvizi-Wayne D, Severs L. When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2024; 24:660-680. [PMID: 38777988 PMCID: PMC11233343 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-024-01189-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/15/2024] [Indexed: 05/25/2024]
Abstract
Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self-which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference-and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.
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Affiliation(s)
- D Parvizi-Wayne
- Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, London, UK.
| | - L Severs
- Centre for the Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
- Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institute of Philosophy II, Bochum, Germany
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2
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Feldman MJ, Bliss-Moreau E, Lindquist KA. The neurobiology of interoception and affect. Trends Cogn Sci 2024; 28:643-661. [PMID: 38395706 PMCID: PMC11222051 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2023] [Revised: 01/25/2024] [Accepted: 01/26/2024] [Indexed: 02/25/2024]
Abstract
Scholars have argued for centuries that affective states involve interoception, or representations of the state of the body. Yet, we lack a mechanistic understanding of how signals from the body are transduced, transmitted, compressed, and integrated by the brains of humans to produce affective states. We suggest that to understand how the body contributes to affect, we first need to understand information flow through the nervous system's interoceptive pathways. We outline such a model and discuss how unique anatomical and physiological aspects of interoceptive pathways may give rise to the qualities of affective experiences in general and valence and arousal in particular. We conclude by considering implications and future directions for research on interoception, affect, emotions, and human mental experiences.
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Affiliation(s)
- M J Feldman
- Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA.
| | - E Bliss-Moreau
- Department of Psychology, University of California Davis, Davis, CA, USA; California National Primate Research Center, University of California Davis, Davis, CA, USA
| | - K A Lindquist
- Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA.
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3
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Varangot-Reille C, Pezzulo G, Thacker M. The fear-avoidance model as an embodied prediction of threat. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2024:10.3758/s13415-024-01199-4. [PMID: 38890209 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-024-01199-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/24/2024] [Indexed: 06/20/2024]
Abstract
The fear-avoidance model is a well-established framework in the understanding of persistent pain. It proposes a dichotomous path: either the context is interpreted as safe; there is no fear reaction and, therefore, the individual engages in active (positive) coping; or the context is interpreted as threatening, leading to a self-reinforcing vicious circle of fear and (negative) avoidance. We propose an embodied interpretation of this phenomenon employing the joint framework of predictive coding and active inference. The key idea is that multisensory integration of exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive sensory inputs can lead to dysfunctional experiences of threat in nonthreatening situations. Threat inference can promote fear responses, maladaptive strategies (i.e., avoidance) and self-provides evidence for threat in associated or future contexts, or both. Under this treatment, the prediction of nonrealized threat becomes self-evidencing and context-invariant, and hence self-perpetuating. Safety cues are unable to attenuate the interpretation of the negative context as the dominant inference of the context is threatful and gains more precision and becomes resistant over time. Our model provides an explanation for the emergence of a dysfunctional fear response in the clinical setting despite apparent safety based on modern concepts from theoretical (computational) neuroscience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Clovis Varangot-Reille
- MSc Statistics and Computer Science for Data Science, University Lumière Lyon 2, Bron, France.
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Mick Thacker
- Department of Physiotherapy, Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, Dublin, Ireland
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4
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Parvizi-Wayne D, Sandved-Smith L, Pitliya RJ, Limanowski J, Tufft MRA, Friston KJ. Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1354719. [PMID: 38887627 PMCID: PMC11182004 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354719] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2023] [Accepted: 04/26/2024] [Indexed: 06/20/2024] Open
Abstract
Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Darius Parvizi-Wayne
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Lars Sandved-Smith
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
| | - Riddhi J. Pitliya
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | - Jakub Limanowski
- Institute of Psychology, University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany
| | - Miles R. A. Tufft
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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5
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Albarracin M, Bouchard-Joly G, Sheikhbahaee Z, Miller M, Pitliya RJ, Poirier P. Feeling our place in the world: an active inference account of self-esteem. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae007. [PMID: 38562605 PMCID: PMC10984624 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2023] [Revised: 12/21/2023] [Accepted: 02/20/2024] [Indexed: 04/04/2024] Open
Abstract
Self-esteem, the evaluation of one's own worth or value, is a critical aspect of psychological well-being and mental health. In this paper, we propose an active inference account of self-esteem, casting it as a sociometer or an inferential capacity to interpret one's standing within a social group. This approach allows us to explore the interaction between an individual's self-perception and the expectations of their social environment.When there is a mismatch between these perceptions and expectations, the individual needs to adjust their actions or update their self-perception to better align with their current experiences. We also consider this hypothesis in relation with recent research on affective inference, suggesting that self-esteem enables the individual to track and respond to this discrepancy through affective states such as anxiety or positive affect. By acting as an inferential sociometer, self-esteem allows individuals to navigate and adapt to their social environment, ultimately impacting their psychological well-being and mental health.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mahault Albarracin
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
| | - Gabriel Bouchard-Joly
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
| | - Zahra Sheikhbahaee
- CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, University of Montreal, 5757, Av. Decelles bureau 500, Montreal, QC H3S 2C3, Canada
| | - Mark Miller
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melboume, Australia
- Psychology Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada
| | - Riddhi J Pitliya
- Department of Experimental Psychology Oxford University, Oxford OX1 2JD, United Kingdom
| | - Pierre Poirier
- Département d'Informatique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, Montreal H2L 2C4, QC, Canada
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Biddell H, Solms M, Slagter H, Laukkonen R. Arousal coherence, uncertainty, and well-being: an active inference account. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae011. [PMID: 38504827 PMCID: PMC10949961 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2023] [Revised: 02/14/2024] [Accepted: 02/26/2024] [Indexed: 03/21/2024] Open
Abstract
Here we build on recent findings which show that greater alignment between our subjective experiences (how we feel) and physiological states (measurable changes in our body) plays a pivotal role in the overall psychological well-being. Specifically, we propose that the alignment or 'coherence' between affective arousal (e.g. how excited we 'feel') and autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate or pupil dilation) may be key for maintaining up-to-date uncertainty representations in dynamic environments. Drawing on recent advances in interoceptive and affective inference, we also propose that arousal coherence reflects interoceptive integration, facilitates adaptive belief updating, and impacts our capacity to adapt to changes in uncertainty, with downstream consequences to well-being. We also highlight the role of meta-awareness of arousal, a third level of inference, which may permit conscious awareness, learning about, and intentional regulation of lower-order sources of arousal. Practices emphasizing meta-awareness of arousal (like meditation) may therefore elicit some of their known benefits via improved arousal coherence. We suggest that arousal coherence is also likely to be associated with markers of adaptive functioning (like emotional awareness and self-regulatory capacities) and discuss mind-body practices that may increase coherence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hannah Biddell
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Saint Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia
| | - Mark Solms
- Department of Psychology, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, Western Cape 7701, South Africa
| | - Heleen Slagter
- Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1081 HV, The Netherlands
- Institute for Brain and Behaviour, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 1081 HV, The Netherlands
| | - Ruben Laukkonen
- School of Psychology, Southern Cross University, Gold Coast, QLD 4225, Australia
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White B, Clark A, Miller M. Digital Being: social media and the predictive mind. Neurosci Conscious 2024; 2024:niae008. [PMID: 38504826 PMCID: PMC10949958 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/15/2023] [Revised: 12/27/2023] [Accepted: 02/22/2024] [Indexed: 03/21/2024] Open
Abstract
Social media is implicated today in an array of mental health concerns. While concerns around social media have become mainstream, little is known about the specific cognitive mechanisms underlying the correlations seen in these studies or why we find it so hard to stop engaging with these platforms when things obviously begin to deteriorate for us. New advances in computational neuroscience, however, are now poised to shed light on this matter. In this paper, we approach the phenomenon of social media addiction through the lens of the active inference framework. According to this framework, predictive agents like us use a 'generative model' of the world to predict our own incoming sense data and act to minimize any discrepancy between the prediction and incoming signal (prediction error). In order to live well and be able to act effectively to minimize prediction error, it is vital that agents like us have a generative model, which not only accurately reflects the regularities of our complex environment but is also flexible and dynamic and able to stay accurate in volatile and turbulent circumstances. In this paper, we propose that some social media platforms are a spectacularly effective way of warping an agent's generative model and of arresting the model's ability to flexibly track and adapt to changes in the environment. We go on to investigate cases of digital tech, which do not have these adverse effects and suggest-based on the active inference framework-some ways to understand why some forms of digital technology pose these risks, while others do not.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ben White
- School of Media, Arts and Humanities, University of Sussex, Arts A07, Brighton BN1 9RH, United Kingdom
| | - Andy Clark
- School of Media, Arts and Humanities, University of Sussex, Arts A07, Brighton BN1 9RH, United Kingdom
- Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Macquarie University Wallumattagal Campus Macquarie Park, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
| | - Mark Miller
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Wellington Rd, Clayton, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia
- Psychology Department, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, 4th Floor, Sidney Smith Hall, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada
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8
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Schiller D, Yu ANC, Alia-Klein N, Becker S, Cromwell HC, Dolcos F, Eslinger PJ, Frewen P, Kemp AH, Pace-Schott EF, Raber J, Silton RL, Stefanova E, Williams JHG, Abe N, Aghajani M, Albrecht F, Alexander R, Anders S, Aragón OR, Arias JA, Arzy S, Aue T, Baez S, Balconi M, Ballarini T, Bannister S, Banta MC, Barrett KC, Belzung C, Bensafi M, Booij L, Bookwala J, Boulanger-Bertolus J, Boutros SW, Bräscher AK, Bruno A, Busatto G, Bylsma LM, Caldwell-Harris C, Chan RCK, Cherbuin N, Chiarella J, Cipresso P, Critchley H, Croote DE, Demaree HA, Denson TF, Depue B, Derntl B, Dickson JM, Dolcos S, Drach-Zahavy A, Dubljević O, Eerola T, Ellingsen DM, Fairfield B, Ferdenzi C, Friedman BH, Fu CHY, Gatt JM, de Gelder B, Gendolla GHE, Gilam G, Goldblatt H, Gooding AEK, Gosseries O, Hamm AO, Hanson JL, Hendler T, Herbert C, Hofmann SG, Ibanez A, Joffily M, Jovanovic T, Kahrilas IJ, Kangas M, Katsumi Y, Kensinger E, Kirby LAJ, Koncz R, Koster EHW, Kozlowska K, Krach S, Kret ME, Krippl M, Kusi-Mensah K, Ladouceur CD, Laureys S, Lawrence A, Li CSR, Liddell BJ, Lidhar NK, Lowry CA, Magee K, Marin MF, Mariotti V, Martin LJ, Marusak HA, Mayer AV, Merner AR, Minnier J, Moll J, Morrison RG, Moore M, Mouly AM, Mueller SC, Mühlberger A, Murphy NA, Muscatello MRA, Musser ED, Newton TL, Noll-Hussong M, Norrholm SD, Northoff G, Nusslock R, Okon-Singer H, Olino TM, Ortner C, Owolabi M, Padulo C, Palermo R, Palumbo R, Palumbo S, Papadelis C, Pegna AJ, Pellegrini S, Peltonen K, Penninx BWJH, Pietrini P, Pinna G, Lobo RP, Polnaszek KL, Polyakova M, Rabinak C, Helene Richter S, Richter T, Riva G, Rizzo A, Robinson JL, Rosa P, Sachdev PS, Sato W, Schroeter ML, Schweizer S, Shiban Y, Siddharthan A, Siedlecka E, Smith RC, Soreq H, Spangler DP, Stern ER, Styliadis C, Sullivan GB, Swain JE, Urben S, Van den Stock J, Vander Kooij MA, van Overveld M, Van Rheenen TE, VanElzakker MB, Ventura-Bort C, Verona E, Volk T, Wang Y, Weingast LT, Weymar M, Williams C, Willis ML, Yamashita P, Zahn R, Zupan B, Lowe L. The Human Affectome. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 158:105450. [PMID: 37925091 PMCID: PMC11003721 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105450] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2022] [Revised: 10/26/2023] [Accepted: 10/27/2023] [Indexed: 11/06/2023]
Abstract
Over the last decades, theoretical perspectives in the interdisciplinary field of the affective sciences have proliferated rather than converged due to differing assumptions about what human affective phenomena are and how they work. These metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions, shaped by academic context and values, have dictated affective constructs and operationalizations. However, an assumption about the purpose of affective phenomena can guide us to a common set of metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. In this capstone paper, we home in on a nested teleological principle for human affective phenomena in order to synthesize metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. Under this framework, human affective phenomena can collectively be considered algorithms that either adjust based on the human comfort zone (affective concerns) or monitor those adaptive processes (affective features). This teleologically-grounded framework offers a principled agenda and launchpad for both organizing existing perspectives and generating new ones. Ultimately, we hope the Human Affectome brings us a step closer to not only an integrated understanding of human affective phenomena, but an integrated field for affective research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniela Schiller
- Department of Psychiatry, the Nash Family Department of Neuroscience, and the Friedman Brain Institute, at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, United States.
| | - Alessandra N C Yu
- Nash Family Department of Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10029, United States.
| | - Nelly Alia-Klein
- Department of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, United States
| | - Susanne Becker
- Department of Cognitive and Clinical Neuroscience, Central Institute of Mental Health, Medical Faculty Mannheim, Heidelberg University, J5, 68159 Mannheim, Germany; Integrative Spinal Research Group, Department of Chiropractic Medicine, University Hospital Balgrist, University of Zurich, Balgrist Campus, Lengghalde 5, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland
| | - Howard C Cromwell
- J.P. Scott Center for Neuroscience, Mind and Behavior, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, United States
| | - Florin Dolcos
- Beckman Institute for Advanced Science & Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States
| | - Paul J Eslinger
- Departments of Neurology, Neural & Behavioral Science, Radiology, and Public Health Sciences, Penn State Hershey Medical Center and College of Medicine, Hershey, PA, United States
| | - Paul Frewen
- Departments of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
| | - Andrew H Kemp
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, Health & Life Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom
| | - Edward F Pace-Schott
- Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts General Hospital, Department of Psychiatry, Boston, MA, United States; Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Jacob Raber
- Department of Behavioral Neuroscience, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR 97239, United States; Departments of Neurology, Radiation Medicine, Psychiatry, and Division of Neuroscience, ONPRC, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR, United States
| | - Rebecca L Silton
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Elka Stefanova
- Faculty of Medicine, University of Belgrade, Serbia; Neurology Clinic, Clinical Center of Serbia, Serbia
| | - Justin H G Williams
- Griffith University, Gold Coast Campus, 1 Parklands Dr, Southport, QLD 4215, Australia
| | - Nobuhito Abe
- Institute for the Future of Human Society, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, Japan
| | - Moji Aghajani
- Institute of Education & Child Studies, Section Forensic Family & Youth Care, Leiden University, the Netherlands; Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC, Location VUMC, GGZ InGeest Research & Innovation, Amsterdam Neuroscience, the Netherlands
| | - Franziska Albrecht
- Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany; Clinic for Cognitive Neurology, University Hospital Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany; Division of Physiotherapy, Department of Neurobiology, Care Sciences and Society, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden; Karolinska University Hospital, Women's Health and Allied Health Professionals Theme, Medical unit Occupational Therapy & Physiotherapy, Stockholm, Sweden
| | - Rebecca Alexander
- Neuroscience Research Australia, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia; Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
| | - Silke Anders
- Department of Neurology, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany; Center of Brain, Behavior and Metabolism, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Oriana R Aragón
- Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Ave, New Haven, CT, United States; Cincinnati University, Marketing Department, 2906 Woodside Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0145, United States
| | - Juan A Arias
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, Health & Life Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom; Department of Statistics, Mathematical Analysis, and Operational Research, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Spain; The Galician Center for Mathematical Research and Technology (CITMAga), 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
| | - Shahar Arzy
- Department of Medical Neurobiology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Tatjana Aue
- Institute of Psychology, University of Bern, Fabrikstr. 8, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
| | | | - Michela Balconi
- International Research Center for Cognitive Applied Neuroscience, Catholic University of Milan, Milan, Italy
| | - Tommaso Ballarini
- Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Scott Bannister
- Durham University, Palace Green, DH1 RL3 Durham, United Kingdom
| | | | - Karen Caplovitz Barrett
- Department of Human Development & Family Studies, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, United States; Department of Community & Behavioral Health, Colorado School of Public Health, Denver, CO, United States
| | | | - Moustafa Bensafi
- Research Center in Neurosciences of Lyon, CNRS UMR5292, INSERM U1028, Claude Bernard University Lyon 1, Lyon, Centre Hospitalier Le Vinatier, 95 bd Pinel, 69675 Bron Cedex, France
| | - Linda Booij
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada; CHU Sainte-Justine, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Jamila Bookwala
- Department of Psychology, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, United States
| | - Julie Boulanger-Bertolus
- Department of Anesthesiology and Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, United States
| | - Sydney Weber Boutros
- Department of Behavioral Neuroscience, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR 97239, United States
| | - Anne-Kathrin Bräscher
- Department of Clinical Psychology, Psychotherapy and Experimental Psychopathology, University of Mainz, Wallstr. 3, 55122 Mainz, Germany; Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Orangeburg, NY, United States
| | - Antonio Bruno
- Department of Biomedical, Dental Sciences and Morpho-Functional Imaging - University of Messina, Italy
| | - Geraldo Busatto
- Laboratory of Psychiatric Neuroimaging (LIM-21), Departamento e Instituto de Psiquiatria, Hospital das Clinicas HCFMUSP, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil
| | - Lauren M Bylsma
- Departments of Psychiatry and Psychology; and the Center for Neural Basis of Cognition, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | | | - Raymond C K Chan
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Nicolas Cherbuin
- Centre for Research on Ageing, Health, and Wellbeing, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
| | - Julian Chiarella
- Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada; CHU Sainte-Justine, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Pietro Cipresso
- Applied Technology for Neuro-Psychology Lab., Istituto Auxologico Italiano (IRCCS), Milan, Italy; Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Hugo Critchley
- Psychiatry, Department of Neuroscience, Brighton and Sussex Medical School (BSMS), University of Sussex, Sussex, United Kingdom
| | - Denise E Croote
- Departments of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai and Friedman Brain Institute, New York, NY 10029, United States; Hospital Universitário Gaffrée e Guinle, Universidade do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Heath A Demaree
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
| | - Thomas F Denson
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Brendan Depue
- Departments of Psychological and Brain Sciences and Anatomical Sciences and Neurobiology, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, United States
| | - Birgit Derntl
- Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Tübingen Center for Mental Health, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
| | - Joanne M Dickson
- Edith Cowan University, Psychology Discipline, School of Arts and Humanities, 270 Joondalup Dr, Joondalup, WA 6027, Australia
| | - Sanda Dolcos
- Beckman Institute for Advanced Science & Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States
| | - Anat Drach-Zahavy
- The Faculty of Health and Welfare Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Olga Dubljević
- Neurology Clinic, Clinical Center of Serbia, Serbia; Institute for Biological Research "Siniša Stanković", National Institute of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia
| | - Tuomas Eerola
- Durham University, Palace Green, DH1 RL3 Durham, United Kingdom
| | - Dan-Mikael Ellingsen
- Department of Diagnostic Physics, Division of Radiology and Nuclear Medicine, Oslo University Hospital, Oslo, Norway
| | - Beth Fairfield
- Department of Humanistic Studies, University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy; UniCamillus, International Medical University, Rome, Italy
| | - Camille Ferdenzi
- Research Center in Neurosciences of Lyon, CNRS UMR5292, INSERM U1028, Claude Bernard University Lyon 1, Lyon, Centre Hospitalier Le Vinatier, 95 bd Pinel, 69675 Bron Cedex, France
| | - Bruce H Friedman
- Department of Psychology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, United States
| | - Cynthia H Y Fu
- School of Psychology, University of East London, United Kingdom; Centre for Affective Disorders, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, United Kingdom
| | - Justine M Gatt
- Neuroscience Research Australia, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Beatrice de Gelder
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
| | - Guido H E Gendolla
- Geneva Motivation Lab, University of Geneva, FPSE, Section of Psychology, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
| | - Gadi Gilam
- The Institute of Biomedical and Oral Research, Faculty of Dental Medicine, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel; Systems Neuroscience and Pain Laboratory, Stanford University School of Medicine, CA, United States
| | - Hadass Goldblatt
- Department of Nursing, Faculty of Social Welfare & Health Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | | | - Olivia Gosseries
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness & Centre du Cerveau2, University and University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
| | - Alfons O Hamm
- Department of Biological and Clinical Psychology/Psychotherapy, University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany
| | - Jamie L Hanson
- Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15206, United States
| | - Talma Hendler
- Tel Aviv Center for Brain Function, Wohl Institute for Advanced Imaging, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, Tel Aviv, Israel; School of Psychological Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Cornelia Herbert
- Department of Applied Emotion and Motivation Psychology, Institute of Psychology and Education, Ulm University, Ulm, Germany
| | - Stefan G Hofmann
- Department of Clinical Psychology, Philipps University Marburg, Germany
| | - Agustin Ibanez
- Universidad de San Andres, Buenos Aires, Argentina; National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina; Latin American Brain Health Institute (BrainLat), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile; Global Brain Health Institute (GBHI), University of California San Francisco (UCSF), United States and Trinity Collegue Dublin (TCD), Ireland
| | - Mateus Joffily
- Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), 93 Chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Écully, France
| | - Tanja Jovanovic
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavaioral Neurosciences, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - Ian J Kahrilas
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Maria Kangas
- Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
| | - Yuta Katsumi
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States; Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Charlestown, MA, USA
| | - Elizabeth Kensinger
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Lauren A J Kirby
- Department of Psychology and Counseling, University of Texas at Tyler, Tyler, TX, United States
| | - Rebecca Koncz
- Centre for Healthy Brain Ageing, Discipline of Psychiatry and Mental Health, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia; Specialty of Psychiatry, The University of Sydney, Concord, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Ernst H W Koster
- Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | | | - Sören Krach
- Social Neuroscience Lab, Translational Psychiatry Unit, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Mariska E Kret
- Leiden University, Cognitive Psychology, Pieter de la Court, Waassenaarseweg 52, Leiden 2333 AK, the Netherlands
| | - Martin Krippl
- Faculty of Natural Sciences, Department of Psychology, Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Universitätsplatz 2, Magdeburg, Germany
| | - Kwabena Kusi-Mensah
- Department of Psychiatry, Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital, P. O. Box 1934, Kumasi, Ghana; Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, Darwin College, Silver Street, CB3 9EU Cambridge, United Kingdom; Behavioural Sciences Department, School of Medicine and Dentistry, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana
| | - Cecile D Ladouceur
- Departments of Psychiatry and Psychology and the Center for Neural Basis of Cognition (CNBC), University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | - Steven Laureys
- Coma Science Group, GIGA Consciousness & Centre du Cerveau2, University and University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
| | - Alistair Lawrence
- Scotland's Rural College, King's Buildings, Edinburgh, Scotland; The Roslin Institute, University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush, Scotland
| | - Chiang-Shan R Li
- Connecticut Mental Health Centre, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States
| | - Belinda J Liddell
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Randwick, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Navdeep K Lidhar
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada
| | - Christopher A Lowry
- Department of Integrative Physiology and Center for Neuroscience, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States
| | - Kelsey Magee
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
| | - Marie-France Marin
- Department of Psychology, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Canada; Research Center, Institut universitaire en santé mentale de Montréal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Veronica Mariotti
- Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
| | - Loren J Martin
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada
| | - Hilary A Marusak
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavaioral Neurosciences, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States; Merrill Palmer Skillman Institute for Child and Family Development, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - Annalina V Mayer
- Social Neuroscience Lab, Translational Psychiatry Unit, University of Lübeck, Lübeck, Germany
| | - Amanda R Merner
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States
| | - Jessica Minnier
- School of Public Health, Oregon Health & Science University, Portland, OR, United States
| | - Jorge Moll
- Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroinformatics Unit, D'Or Institute for Research and Education, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Robert G Morrison
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Matthew Moore
- Beckman Institute for Advanced Science & Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, United States; War Related Illness and Injury Study Center (WRIISC), Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Anne-Marie Mouly
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Center, CNRS-UMR 5292, INSERM U1028, Universite Lyon, Lyon, France
| | - Sven C Mueller
- Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
| | - Andreas Mühlberger
- Department of Psychology (Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy), University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Nora A Murphy
- Department of Psychology, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, United States
| | | | - Erica D Musser
- Center for Children and Families, Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States
| | - Tamara L Newton
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, United States
| | - Michael Noll-Hussong
- Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, TU Muenchen, Langerstrasse 3, D-81675 Muenchen, Germany
| | - Seth Davin Norrholm
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavaioral Neurosciences, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - Georg Northoff
- Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics Research Unit, University of Ottawa Institute of Mental Health Research, Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre, Canada
| | - Robin Nusslock
- Department of Psychology and Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, United States
| | - Hadas Okon-Singer
- School of Psychological Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Thomas M Olino
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, 1701N. 13th St, Philadelphia, PA, United States
| | - Catherine Ortner
- Thompson Rivers University, Department of Psychology, 805 TRU Way, Kamloops, BC, Canada
| | - Mayowa Owolabi
- Department of Medicine and Center for Genomic and Precision Medicine, College of Medicine, University of Ibadan; University College Hospital, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria; Blossom Specialist Medical Center Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria
| | - Caterina Padulo
- Department of Psychological, Health and Territorial Sciences, University of Chieti, Chieti, Italy
| | - Romina Palermo
- School of Psychological Science, University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia
| | - Rocco Palumbo
- Department of Psychological, Health and Territorial Sciences, University of Chieti, Chieti, Italy
| | - Sara Palumbo
- Department of Surgical, Medical and Molecular Pathology and of Critical Care, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
| | - Christos Papadelis
- Jane and John Justin Neuroscience Center, Cook Children's Health Care System, Fort Worth, TX, United States; Department of Bioengineering, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, United States
| | - Alan J Pegna
- School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Saint Lucia, Queensland, Australia
| | - Silvia Pellegrini
- Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
| | - Kirsi Peltonen
- Research Centre for Child Psychiatry, University of Turku, Turku, Finland; INVEST Research Flagship, University of Turku, Turku, Finland
| | - Brenda W J H Penninx
- Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC, Location VUMC, GGZ InGeest Research & Innovation, Amsterdam Neuroscience, the Netherlands
| | | | - Graziano Pinna
- The Psychiatric Institute, Department of Psychiatry, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Rosario Pintos Lobo
- Center for Children and Families, Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States
| | - Kelly L Polnaszek
- Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, United States
| | - Maryna Polyakova
- Neurology Department, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Christine Rabinak
- Department of Pharmacy Practice, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, United States
| | - S Helene Richter
- Department of Behavioural Biology, University of Münster, Badestraße 13, Münster, Germany
| | - Thalia Richter
- School of Psychological Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
| | - Giuseppe Riva
- Applied Technology for Neuro-Psychology Lab., Istituto Auxologico Italiano (IRCCS), Milan, Italy; Humane Technology Lab., Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy
| | - Amelia Rizzo
- Department of Biomedical, Dental Sciences and Morpho-Functional Imaging - University of Messina, Italy
| | | | - Pedro Rosa
- Laboratory of Psychiatric Neuroimaging (LIM-21), Departamento e Instituto de Psiquiatria, Hospital das Clinicas HCFMUSP, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil
| | - Perminder S Sachdev
- Centre for Healthy Brain Ageing, Discipline of Psychiatry and Mental Health, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia; Neuropsychiatric Institute, The Prince of Wales Hospital, Sydney, Australia
| | - Wataru Sato
- Psychological Process Research Team, Guardian Robot Project, RIKEN, 2-2-2 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto, Japan
| | - Matthias L Schroeter
- Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany; Clinic for Cognitive Neurology, University Hospital Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Susanne Schweizer
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
| | - Youssef Shiban
- Department of Psychology (Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy), University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany; Department of Psychology (Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy Research), PFH - Private University of Applied Sciences, Gottingen, Germany
| | - Advaith Siddharthan
- Knowledge Media Institute, The Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, United Kingdom
| | - Ewa Siedlecka
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Robert C Smith
- Departments of Medicine and Psychiatry, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, United States
| | - Hermona Soreq
- Department of Biological Chemistry, Edmond and Lily Safra Center of Brain Science and The Institute of Life Sciences, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Derek P Spangler
- Department of Biobehavioral Health, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, United States
| | - Emily R Stern
- Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, Orangeburg, NY, United States; New York University School of Medicine, New York, NY, United States
| | - Charis Styliadis
- Neuroscience of Cognition and Affection group, Lab of Medical Physics and Digital Innovation, School of Medicine, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
| | | | - James E Swain
- Departments of Psychiatry & Behavioral Health, Psychology, Obstetrics, Gynecology & Reproductive Medicine, and Program in Public Health, Renaissance School of Medicine at Stony Brook University, New York, United States
| | - Sébastien Urben
- Division of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV) and University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - Jan Van den Stock
- Neuropsychiatry, Department of Neurosciences, Leuven Brain Institute, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Michael A Vander Kooij
- Translational Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Universitatsmedizin der Johannes Guttenberg University Medical Center, Mainz, Germany
| | | | - Tamsyn E Van Rheenen
- University of Melbourne, Melbourne Neuropsychiatry Centre, Department of Psychiatry, 161 Barry Street, Carlton, VIC, Australia
| | - Michael B VanElzakker
- Division of Neurotherapeutics, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, United States
| | - Carlos Ventura-Bort
- Department of Biological Psychology and Affective Science, Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
| | - Edelyn Verona
- Department of Psychology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States
| | - Tyler Volk
- Professor Emeritus of Biology and Environmental Studies, New York University, New York, NY, United States
| | - Yi Wang
- Neuropsychology and Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, CAS Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Leah T Weingast
- Department of Social Work and Human Services and the Department of Psychological Sciences, Center for Young Adult Addiction and Recovery, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, United States
| | - Mathias Weymar
- Department of Biological Psychology and Affective Science, Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany; Faculty of Health Sciences Brandenburg, University of Potsdam, Germany
| | - Claire Williams
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, Health & Life Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom; Elysium Neurological Services, Elysium Healthcare, The Avalon Centre, United Kingdom
| | - Megan L Willis
- School of Behavioural and Health Sciences, Australian Catholic University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Paula Yamashita
- Department of Integrative Physiology and Center for Neuroscience, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States
| | - Roland Zahn
- Centre for Affective Disorders, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, United Kingdom
| | - Barbra Zupan
- Central Queensland University, School of Health, Medical and Applied Sciences, Bruce Highway, Rockhampton, QLD, Australia
| | - Leroy Lowe
- Neuroqualia (NGO), Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada.
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Sladky R, Kargl D, Haubensak W, Lamm C. An active inference perspective for the amygdala complex. Trends Cogn Sci 2024; 28:223-236. [PMID: 38103984 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2023.11.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/30/2023] [Revised: 11/14/2023] [Accepted: 11/16/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023]
Abstract
The amygdala is a heterogeneous network of subcortical nuclei with central importance in cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Various experimental designs in human psychology and animal model research have mapped multiple conceptual frameworks (e.g., valence/salience and decision making) to ever more refined amygdala circuitry. However, these predominantly bottom up-driven accounts often rely on interpretations tailored to a specific phenomenon, thus preventing comprehensive and integrative theories. We argue here that an active inference model of amygdala function could unify these fractionated approaches into an overarching framework for clearer empirical predictions and mechanistic interpretations. This framework embeds top-down predictive models, informed by prior knowledge and belief updating, within a dynamical system distributed across amygdala circuits in which self-regulation is implemented by continuously tracking environmental and homeostatic demands.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ronald Sladky
- Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience Unit, Department of Cognition, Emotion, and Methods in Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Liebiggasse 5, 1010 Vienna, Austria; Vienna Cognitive Science Hub, University of Vienna, 1010 Vienna, Austria.
| | - Dominic Kargl
- Department of Neuronal Cell Biology, Center for Brain Research, Medical University of Vienna, Spitalgasse 4, 1090 Vienna, Austria
| | - Wulf Haubensak
- Department of Neuronal Cell Biology, Center for Brain Research, Medical University of Vienna, Spitalgasse 4, 1090 Vienna, Austria; Research Institute of Molecular Pathology (IMP), Vienna Biocenter (VBC), Campus Vienna Biocenter 1, 1030 Vienna, Austria
| | - Claus Lamm
- Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience Unit, Department of Cognition, Emotion, and Methods in Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Liebiggasse 5, 1010 Vienna, Austria; Vienna Cognitive Science Hub, University of Vienna, 1010 Vienna, Austria
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10
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Bamford JS, Vigl J, Hämäläinen M, Saarikallio SH. Love songs and serenades: a theoretical review of music and romantic relationships. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1302548. [PMID: 38420176 PMCID: PMC10899422 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1302548] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2023] [Accepted: 01/23/2024] [Indexed: 03/02/2024] Open
Abstract
In this theoretical review, we examine how the roles of music in mate choice and social bonding are expressed in romantic relationships. Darwin's Descent of Man originally proposed the idea that musicality might have evolved as a sexually selected trait. This proposition, coupled with the portrayal of popular musicians as sex symbols and the prevalence of love-themed lyrics in music, suggests a possible link between music and attraction. However, recent scientific exploration of the evolutionary functions of music has predominantly focused on theories of social bonding and group signaling, with limited research addressing the sexual selection hypothesis. We identify two distinct types of music-making for these different functions: music for attraction, which would be virtuosic in nature to display physical and cognitive fitness to potential mates; and music for connection, which would facilitate synchrony between partners and likely engage the same reward mechanisms seen in the general synchrony-bonding effect, enhancing perceived interpersonal intimacy as a facet of love. Linking these two musical functions to social psychological theories of relationship development and the components of love, we present a model that outlines the potential roles of music in romantic relationships, from initial attraction to ongoing relationship maintenance. In addition to synthesizing the existing literature, our model serves as a roadmap for empirical research aimed at rigorously investigating the possible functions of music for romantic relationships.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joshua S Bamford
- Centre of Excellence in Music, Mind, Body and Brain, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
- Institute of Human Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Julia Vigl
- Centre of Excellence in Music, Mind, Body and Brain, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
- Department of Psychology, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria
| | - Matias Hämäläinen
- Centre of Excellence in Music, Mind, Body and Brain, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
| | - Suvi Helinä Saarikallio
- Centre of Excellence in Music, Mind, Body and Brain, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
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Krupnik V, Danilova N. To be or not to be: The active inference of suicide. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 157:105531. [PMID: 38176631 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105531] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/12/2023] [Revised: 12/27/2023] [Accepted: 12/29/2023] [Indexed: 01/06/2024]
Abstract
Suicide presents an apparent paradox as a behavior whose motivation is not obvious since its outcome is non-existence and cannot be experienced. To address this paradox, we propose to frame suicide in the integrated theory of stress and active inference. We present an active inference-based cognitive model of suicide as a type of stress response hanging in cognitive balance between predicting self-preservation and self-destruction. In it, self-efficacy emerges as a meta-cognitive regulator that can bias the model toward either survival or suicide. The model suggests conditions under which cognitive homeostasis can override physiological homeostasis in motivating self-destruction. We also present a model proto-suicidal behavior, programmed cell death (apoptosis), in active inference terms to illustrate how an active inference model of self-destruction can be embodied in molecular mechanisms and to offer a hypothesis on another puzzle of suicide: why only humans among brain-endowed animals are known to practice it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Valery Krupnik
- Department of Mental Health, Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton, Camp Pendleton, CA, USA.
| | - Nadia Danilova
- Department of Cell Biology, UCLA (retired), Los Angeles, CA, USA
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12
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Miller M, White B, Scrivner C. Surfing uncertainty with screams: predictive processing, error dynamics and horror films. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20220425. [PMID: 38104602 PMCID: PMC10725765 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0425] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2023] [Accepted: 10/08/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Despite tremendous efforts in psychology, neuroscience and media and cultural studies, it is still something of a mystery why humans are attracted to fictional content that is horrifying, disgusting or otherwise aversive. While the psychological benefits of horror films, stories, video games, etc. has recently been demonstrated empirically, current theories emphasizing the negative and positive consequences of this engagement often contradict one another. Here, we suggest the predictive processing framework may provide a unifying account of horror content engagement that provides clear and testable hypotheses, and explains why a 'sweet spot' of fear and fun exists in horror entertainment. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Miller
- Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5R 0A3
| | - Ben White
- School of Media, Arts and Humanities, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9RH, UK
| | - Coltan Scrivner
- Recreational Fear Lab, Aarhus University, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark
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Fernández Velasco P, Loev S. Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2024:17456916231221976. [PMID: 38285929 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231221976] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/31/2024]
Abstract
Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Slawa Loev
- Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
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Omigie D, Mencke I. A model of time-varying music engagement. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20220421. [PMID: 38104598 PMCID: PMC10725767 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0421] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/11/2023] [Accepted: 11/13/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
The current paper offers a model of time-varying music engagement, defined as changes in curiosity, attention and positive valence, as music unfolds over time. First, we present research (including new data) showing that listeners tend to allocate attention to music in a manner that is guided by both features of the music and listeners' individual differences. Next, we review relevant predictive processing literature before using this body of work to inform our model. In brief, we propose that music engagement, over the course of an extended listening episode, may constitute several cycles of curiosity, attention and positive valence that are interspersed with moments of mind-wandering. Further, we suggest that refocusing on music after an episode of mind-wandering can be due to triggers in the music or, conversely, mental action that occurs when the listener realizes they are mind-wandering. Finally, we argue that factors that modulate both overall levels of music engagement and how it changes over time include music complexity, listener background and the listening context. Our paper highlights how music can be used to provide insights into the temporal dynamics of attention and into how curiosity might emerge in everyday contexts. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diana Omigie
- Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths University of London, London, SE14 6NW, UK
| | - Iris Mencke
- Music Perception and Processing Lab, Department of Medical Physics and Acoustics, University of Oldenburg, 26129 Oldenberg, Germany
- Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg—Institute for Advanced Studies, 27753 Delmenhorst, Germany
- Department of Music, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt/Main 60322, Germany
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15
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Van de Cruys S, Frascaroli J, Friston K. Order and change in art: towards an active inference account of aesthetic experience. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20220411. [PMID: 38104600 PMCID: PMC10725768 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0411] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/29/2023] [Accepted: 10/31/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters-at the expense of affective aspects-and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)-at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Karl Friston
- The Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
- VERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, 900016, CA, USA
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Frascaroli J, Leder H, Brattico E, Van de Cruys S. Aesthetics and predictive processing: grounds and prospects of a fruitful encounter. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20220410. [PMID: 38104599 PMCID: PMC10725766 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0410] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2023] [Accepted: 12/01/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
In the last few years, a remarkable convergence of interests and results has emerged between scholars interested in the arts and aesthetics from a variety of perspectives and cognitive scientists studying the mind and brain within the predictive processing (PP) framework. This convergence has so far proven fruitful for both sides: while PP is increasingly adopted as a framework for understanding aesthetic phenomena, the arts and aesthetics, examined under the lens of PP, are starting to be seen as important windows into our mental functioning. The result is a vast and fast-growing research programme that promises to deliver important insights into our aesthetic encounters as well as a wide range of psychological phenomena of general interest. Here, we present this developing research programme, describing its grounds and highlighting its prospects. We start by clarifying how the study of the arts and aesthetics encounters the PP picture of mental functioning (§1). We then go on to outline the prospects of this encounter for the fields involved: philosophy and history of art (§2), psychology of aesthetics and neuroaesthetics (§3) and psychology and neuroscience more generally (§4). The upshot is an ambitious but well-defined framework within which aesthetics and cognitive science can partner up to illuminate crucial aspects of the human mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Helmut Leder
- Faculty of Psychology and Cognitive Science Research Hub, University of Vienna, 1010 Vienna, Austria
| | - Elvira Brattico
- Center for Music in the Brain, Department of Clinical Medicine, Aarhus University, and Royal Academy of Music Aarhus/Aalborg, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark
- Department of Education, Psychology, Communication, University of Bari Aldo Moro, 70121 Bari, Italy
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17
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Drew A, Soto-Faraco S. Perceptual oddities: assessing the relationship between film editing and prediction processes. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20220426. [PMID: 38104604 PMCID: PMC10725757 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2022.0426] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2023] [Accepted: 10/16/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
During film viewing, humans parse sequences of individual shots into larger narrative structures, often weaving transitions at edit points into an apparently seamless and continuous flow. Editing helps filmmakers manipulate visual transitions to induce feelings of fluency/disfluency, tension/relief, curiosity, expectation and several emotional responses. We propose that the perceptual dynamics induced by film editing can be captured by a predictive processing (PP) framework. We hypothesise that visual discontinuities at edit points produce discrepancies between anticipated and actual sensory input, leading to prediction error. Further, we propose that the magnitude of prediction error depends on the predictability of each shot within the narrative flow, and lay out an account based on conflict monitoring. We test this hypothesis in two empirical studies measuring electroencephalography (EEG) during passive viewing of film excerpts, as well as behavioural responses during an active edit detection task. We report the neural and behavioural modulations at editing boundaries across three levels of narrative depth, showing greater modulations for edits spanning less predictable, deeper narrative transitions. Overall, our contribution lays the groundwork for understanding film editing from a PP perspective. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectivess'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alice Drew
- Multisensory Research Group, Centre for Brain and Cognition, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain
| | - Salvador Soto-Faraco
- Multisensory Research Group, Centre for Brain and Cognition, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain
- Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), 08010 Barcelona, Spain
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18
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Yoo J, Jasko K, Winkielman P. Fluency, prediction and motivation: how processing dynamics, expectations and epistemic goals shape aesthetic judgements. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2024; 379:20230326. [PMID: 38104614 PMCID: PMC10725759 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2023.0326] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2023] [Accepted: 11/21/2023] [Indexed: 12/19/2023] Open
Abstract
What psychological mechanisms underlie aesthetic judgements? An influential account known as the Hedonic Marking of Fluency, later developed into a Processing Fluency Theory of Aesthetic Pleasure, posits that ease of processing elicits positive feelings and thus enhances stimulus evaluations. However, the theory faces empirical and conceptual challenges. In this paper, we extend it by integrating insights from predictive processing frameworks (PPF) and the epistemic motivation model (EMM). We propose four extensions. First, fluency of a stimulus depends on perceivers' expectations-their internal model of the world. Second, perceivers also form expectations about fluency itself and thus can experience surprising fluency. These expectations can come from the individual's history, their current task and their environment. Third, perceivers can value fluency but also disfluency, reflecting their non-directional epistemic goals. Fourth, perceivers also have directional epistemic goals, preferring specific conclusions or belief content. Consequently, affective reactions depend on whether the stimulus satisfies those goals. These directional epistemic goals may override concerns about fluency or change the value of fluency associated with specific content. We review supporting evidence and introduce novel predictions. By integrating insights from PPF and EMM, our framework can better capture established fluency effects and highlights their limitations and extensions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jenny Yoo
- Department of Psychology, University of California, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0109, USA
| | - Katarzyna Jasko
- Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology, Ingardena 6, 30-060 Krakow, Poland
| | - Piotr Winkielman
- Department of Psychology, University of California, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0109, USA
- SWPS University, Chodakowska 19/31, 03-815 Warsaw, Poland
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19
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Krupnik V. I like therefore I can, and I can therefore I like: the role of self-efficacy and affect in active inference of allostasis. Front Neural Circuits 2024; 18:1283372. [PMID: 38322807 PMCID: PMC10839114 DOI: 10.3389/fncir.2024.1283372] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2023] [Accepted: 01/02/2024] [Indexed: 02/08/2024] Open
Abstract
Active inference (AIF) is a theory of the behavior of information-processing open dynamic systems. It describes them as generative models (GM) generating inferences on the causes of sensory input they receive from their environment. Based on these inferences, GMs generate predictions about sensory input. The discrepancy between a prediction and the actual input results in prediction error. GMs then execute action policies predicted to minimize the prediction error. The free-energy principle provides a rationale for AIF by stipulating that information-processing open systems must constantly minimize their free energy (through suppressing the cumulative prediction error) to avoid decay. The theory of homeostasis and allostasis has a similar logic. Homeostatic set points are expectations of living organisms. Discrepancies between set points and actual states generate stress. For optimal functioning, organisms avoid stress by preserving homeostasis. Theories of AIF and homeostasis have recently converged, with AIF providing a formal account for homeo- and allostasis. In this paper, we present bacterial chemotaxis as molecular AIF, where mutual constraints by extero- and interoception play an essential role in controlling bacterial behavior supporting homeostasis. Extending this insight to the brain, we propose a conceptual model of the brain homeostatic GM, in which we suggest partition of the brain GM into cognitive and physiological homeostatic GMs. We outline their mutual regulation as well as their integration based on the free-energy principle. From this analysis, affect and self-efficacy emerge as the main regulators of the cognitive homeostatic GM. We suggest fatigue and depression as target neurocognitive phenomena for studying the neural mechanisms of such regulation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Valery Krupnik
- Department of Mental Health, Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton, Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, CA, United States
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20
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Novicky F, Parr T, Friston K, Mirza MB, Sajid N. Bistable perception, precision and neuromodulation. Cereb Cortex 2024; 34:bhad401. [PMID: 37950879 PMCID: PMC10793076 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhad401] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2022] [Revised: 10/04/2023] [Accepted: 10/05/2023] [Indexed: 11/13/2023] Open
Abstract
Bistable perception follows from observing a static, ambiguous, (visual) stimulus with two possible interpretations. Here, we present an active (Bayesian) inference account of bistable perception and posit that perceptual transitions between different interpretations (i.e. inferences) of the same stimulus ensue from specific eye movements that shift the focus to a different visual feature. Formally, these inferences are a consequence of precision control that determines how confident beliefs are and change the frequency with which one can perceive-and alternate between-two distinct percepts. We hypothesized that there are multiple, but distinct, ways in which precision modulation can interact to give rise to a similar frequency of bistable perception. We validated this using numerical simulations of the Necker cube paradigm and demonstrate the multiple routes that underwrite the frequency of perceptual alternation. Our results provide an (enactive) computational account of the intricate precision balance underwriting bistable perception. Importantly, these precision parameters can be considered the computational homologs of particular neurotransmitters-i.e. acetylcholine, noradrenaline, dopamine-that have been previously implicated in controlling bistable perception, providing a computational link between the neurochemistry and perception.
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Affiliation(s)
- Filip Novicky
- Department of Neurophysics, Radboud University, Heyendaalseweg 135, 6525 AJ, Nijmegen, Netherlands
- Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Universiteitssingel 406229 ER, Maastricht, Netherlands
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, 12 Queen Square London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, 12 Queen Square London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
| | - Muammer Berk Mirza
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Pl, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
| | - Noor Sajid
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, 12 Queen Square London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
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Beals K, Torregrossa LJ, Smith R, Lane RD, Sheffield JM. Impaired emotional awareness is associated with childhood maltreatment exposure and positive symptoms in schizophrenia. Front Psychiatry 2024; 14:1325617. [PMID: 38283891 PMCID: PMC10811959 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1325617] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2023] [Accepted: 12/14/2023] [Indexed: 01/30/2024] Open
Abstract
Objectives Evidence suggests that emotional awareness-the ability to identify and label emotions-may be impaired in schizophrenia and related to positive symptom severity. Exposure to childhood maltreatment is a risk factor for both low emotional awareness and positive symptoms. Methods The current investigation examines associations between a performance-based measure of emotional awareness, positive symptom severity, and childhood maltreatment exposure in 44 individuals with a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder and 48 healthy comparison participants using the electronic Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (eLEAS), Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ). Results Patients demonstrated significant deficits in emotional awareness overall, which was true for both self and others. In patients, lower emotional awareness was significantly associated with more severe positive symptoms. Emotional awareness was significantly impaired in patients with schizophrenia with self-reported maltreatment exposure, relative to other groups. Severity of maltreatment was not significantly associated with emotional awareness or positive symptoms when looking continuously, and there was no significant indirect effect. Conclusion These data suggest that emotional awareness impairments observed in schizophrenia may be exacerbated by exposure to childhood maltreatment, possibly putting individuals at greater risk for experiencing positive symptoms of psychosis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kendall Beals
- Sheffield Lab, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, TN, United States
- Social Cognition and Recovery in Schizophrenia Lab, Department of Psychology, The University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS, United States
| | - Lénie J. Torregrossa
- Sheffield Lab, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, TN, United States
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Richard David Lane
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States
| | - Julia M. Sheffield
- Sheffield Lab, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, TN, United States
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22
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Schoeller F, Horowitz AH, Jain A, Maes P, Reggente N, Christov-Moore L, Pezzulo G, Barca L, Allen M, Salomon R, Miller M, Di Lernia D, Riva G, Tsakiris M, Chalah MA, Klein A, Zhang B, Garcia T, Pollack U, Trousselard M, Verdonk C, Dumas G, Adrien V, Friston K. Interoceptive technologies for psychiatric interventions: From diagnosis to clinical applications. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 156:105478. [PMID: 38007168 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105478] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/26/2023] [Revised: 11/16/2023] [Accepted: 11/19/2023] [Indexed: 11/27/2023]
Abstract
Interoception-the perception of internal bodily signals-has emerged as an area of interest due to its implications in emotion and the prevalence of dysfunctional interoceptive processes across psychopathological conditions. Despite the importance of interoception in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry, its experimental manipulation remains technically challenging. This is due to the invasive nature of existing methods, the limitation of self-report and unimodal measures of interoception, and the absence of standardized approaches across disparate fields. This article integrates diverse research efforts from psychology, physiology, psychiatry, and engineering to address this oversight. Following a general introduction to the neurophysiology of interoception as hierarchical predictive processing, we review the existing paradigms for manipulating interoception (e.g., interoceptive modulation), their underlying mechanisms (e.g., interoceptive conditioning), and clinical applications (e.g., interoceptive exposure). We suggest a classification for interoceptive technologies and discuss their potential for diagnosing and treating mental health disorders. Despite promising results, considerable work is still needed to develop standardized, validated measures of interoceptive function across domains and before these technologies can translate safely and effectively to clinical settings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Felix Schoeller
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA; Department Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel.
| | - Adam Haar Horowitz
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; Center for Sleep and Cognition, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Harvard Medical School, USA
| | - Abhinandan Jain
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
| | - Pattie Maes
- Fluid Interfaces Group, Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
| | - Nicco Reggente
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | | | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Laura Barca
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Micah Allen
- Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark; Cambridge Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, UK
| | - Roy Salomon
- Department Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel
| | - Mark Miller
- Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience, Hokkaido University, Japan
| | - Daniele Di Lernia
- Department of Psychology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy; Applied Technology for Neuro- Psychology Laboratory, IRCCS Istituto Auxologico Italiano, Milan, Italy
| | - Giuseppe Riva
- Department of Psychology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy; Applied Technology for Neuro- Psychology Laboratory, IRCCS Istituto Auxologico Italiano, Milan, Italy
| | - Manos Tsakiris
- The Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, University of London, UK; Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK; Department of Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
| | - Moussa A Chalah
- EA 4391, Excitabilité Nerveuse et Thérapeutique, Université Paris-Est Créteil, Créteil, France; Service de Physiologie - Explorations Fonctionnelles, Hôpital Henri Mondor, Créteil, France
| | - Arno Klein
- Child Mind Institute, New York City, USA
| | - Ben Zhang
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Teresa Garcia
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Ursula Pollack
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Marion Trousselard
- Institut de Recherche Biomédicale des Armées, Place Général Valérie André, 91220 Brétigny-sur-Orge, France
| | - Charles Verdonk
- Institut de Recherche Biomédicale des Armées, Place Général Valérie André, 91220 Brétigny-sur-Orge, France
| | | | - Vladimir Adrien
- Infrastructure for Clinical Research in Neurosciences (iCRIN) Psychiatry, Paris Brain Institute, Paris, France; Department of Psychiatry, Hôpital Saint-Antoine, AP-HP, Sorbonne Université, 75012 Paris, France
| | - Karl Friston
- Queen Sq, Institute of Neurology, UCL, London WC1N 3AR, UK
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23
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Kiverstein J, Miller M. Special Issue: Experiencing Well-BeingPlayfulness and the meaningful life: an active inference perspective. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad024. [PMID: 38028727 PMCID: PMC10656941 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2023] [Revised: 10/04/2023] [Accepted: 11/06/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Our paper takes as its starting point the recent proposal, at the core of this special issue, to use the active inference framework (AIF) to computationally model what it is for a person to live a meaningful life. In broad brushstrokes, the AIF takes experiences of human flourishing to be the result of predictions and uncertainty estimations along many dimensions at multiple levels of neurobiological organization. Our aim in this paper is to explain how AIF models predict that uncertainty can sometimes, under the right conditions, be conducive to the experiences of flourishing. Our focus is on playfulness, because playful individuals have learned a high-level prior that in certain safe contexts, uncertainty and error should be tolerated and explored. They have expanded the phenotypic bound on the amount of surprise they are prepared to tolerate in their lives. The positive embracing of uncertainty has a number of positive knock-on effects for the kind of lives playful individuals are able to lead. First, a playful individual attends to the world in a way that is open and expansive, a mode of attending that is effortless and therefore conducive to being in the present. This openness to the present moment allows for deep engagement and participation in experience that can furnish a renewed appreciation for life. Second, playful individuals will actively seek out spaces at the edge of their own abilities and will therefore be more likely to grow and develop in their skills and relationships in ways that contribute to their living a good life. Finally, playful agents seek out situations in which they can monitor, observe, and learn from their own affective responses to uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty becomes something familiar to them that they not only learn to tolerate but also enjoy positively exploring, in ways that provide them opportunities to grow. For these three reasons, we will argue that playfulness and openness to experiences of uncertainty and the unknown may be important ingredients in human flourishing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julian Kiverstein
- Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam University Medical Research, Meibergdreef 9, Amsterdam South East 1105AZ, The Netherlands
| | - Mark Miller
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, 29 Ancora Imparo Wy, Clayton VIC 3168, Melbourne, Australia
- Psychology Department, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, 4th Floor, Sidney Smith Hall, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada
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24
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Sprevak M, Smith R. An Introduction to Predictive Processing Models of Perception and Decision-Making. Top Cogn Sci 2023. [PMID: 37899002 DOI: 10.1111/tops.12704] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2023] [Revised: 08/30/2023] [Accepted: 10/06/2023] [Indexed: 10/31/2023]
Abstract
The predictive processing framework includes a broad set of ideas, which might be articulated and developed in a variety of ways, concerning how the brain may leverage predictive models when implementing perception, cognition, decision-making, and motor control. This article provides an up-to-date introduction to the two most influential theories within this framework: predictive coding and active inference. The first half of the paper (Sections 2-5) reviews the evolution of predictive coding, from early ideas about efficient coding in the visual system to a more general model encompassing perception, cognition, and motor control. The theory is characterized in terms of the claims it makes at Marr's computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels of description, and the conceptual and mathematical connections between predictive coding, Bayesian inference, and variational free energy (a quantity jointly evaluating model accuracy and complexity) are explored. The second half of the paper (Sections 6-8) turns to recent theories of active inference. Like predictive coding, active inference models assume that perceptual and learning processes minimize variational free energy as a means of approximating Bayesian inference in a biologically plausible manner. However, these models focus primarily on planning and decision-making processes that predictive coding models were not developed to address. Under active inference, an agent evaluates potential plans (action sequences) based on their expected free energy (a quantity that combines anticipated reward and information gain). The agent is assumed to represent the world as a partially observable Markov decision process with discrete time and discrete states. Current research applications of active inference models are described, including a range of simulation work, as well as studies fitting models to empirical data. The paper concludes by considering future research directions that will be important for further development of both models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Sprevak
- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma
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25
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Brouillet D, Friston K. Relative fluency (unfelt vs felt) in active inference. Conscious Cogn 2023; 115:103579. [PMID: 37776599 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103579] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2023] [Revised: 09/07/2023] [Accepted: 09/16/2023] [Indexed: 10/02/2023]
Abstract
For a growing number of researchers, it is now accepted that the brain is a predictive organ that predicts the content of the sensorium and crucially the precision of-or confidence in-its own predictions. In order to predict the precision of its predictions, the brain has to infer the reliability of its own beliefs. This means that our brains have to recognise the precision of their predictions or, at least, their accuracy. In this paper, we argue that fluency is product of this recognition process. In short, to recognise fluency is to infer that we have a precise 'grip' on the unfolding processes that generate our sensations. More specifically, we propose that it is changes in fluency - from unfelt to felt - that are both recognised and realised when updating predictions about precision. Unfelt fluency orients attention to unpredicted sensations, while felt fluency supervenes on-and contextualises-unfelt fluency; thereby rendering certain attentional processes, phenomenologically opaque. As such, fluency underwrites the precision we place in our predictions and therefore acts upon our perceptual inferences. Hence, the causes of conscious subjective inference have unconscious perceptual precursors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Denis Brouillet
- University Paul Valéry-Montpellier-France, EPSYLON, France; University Paris Nanterre, LICAE, France.
| | - Karl Friston
- Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College, London, United Kingdom; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, London, United Kingdom
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26
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Corcoran AW, Perrykkad K, Feuerriegel D, Robinson JE. Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2023:17456916231185343. [PMID: 37694720 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231185343] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/12/2023]
Abstract
Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew W Corcoran
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
| | - Kelsey Perrykkad
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
| | | | - Jonathan E Robinson
- Cognition and Philosophy Laboratory, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University
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27
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Christov-Moore L, Reggente N, Vaccaro A, Schoeller F, Pluimer B, Douglas PK, Iacoboni M, Man K, Damasio A, Kaplan JT. Preventing antisocial robots: A pathway to artificial empathy. Sci Robot 2023; 8:eabq3658. [PMID: 37436969 DOI: 10.1126/scirobotics.abq3658] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/14/2023]
Abstract
Given the accelerating powers of artificial intelligence (AI), we must equip artificial agents and robots with empathy to prevent harmful and irreversible decisions. Current approaches to artificial empathy focus on its cognitive or performative processes, overlooking affect, and thus promote sociopathic behaviors. Artificially vulnerable, fully empathic AI is necessary to prevent sociopathic robots and protect human welfare.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonardo Christov-Moore
- Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
- Ahmanson-Lovelace Brain Mapping Center, Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, Brain Research Institute, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
- Consciousness Center of Oaxaca, Oaxaca, Mexico
| | - Nicco Reggente
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
| | - Anthony Vaccaro
- Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
| | - Felix Schoeller
- Institute for Advanced Consciousness Studies, Santa Monica, CA, USA
- Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
- Gonda Multidisciplinary Brain Centre, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
| | - Brock Pluimer
- Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
| | - Pamela K Douglas
- Institute for Simulation and Training, Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA
- Department of Psychiatry & Biobehavioral Sciences, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA
| | - Marco Iacoboni
- Ahmanson-Lovelace Brain Mapping Center, Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, Brain Research Institute, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA
| | - Kingson Man
- Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
| | - Antonio Damasio
- Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
| | - Jonas T Kaplan
- Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
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Hipólito I, Mago J, Rosas FE, Carhart-Harris R. Pattern breaking: a complex systems approach to psychedelic medicine. Neurosci Conscious 2023; 2023:niad017. [PMID: 37424966 PMCID: PMC10325487 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/13/2022] [Revised: 05/19/2023] [Accepted: 06/08/2023] [Indexed: 07/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Recent research has demonstrated the potential of psychedelic therapy for mental health care. However, the psychological experience underlying its therapeutic effects remains poorly understood. This paper proposes a framework that suggests psychedelics act as destabilizers, both psychologically and neurophysiologically. Drawing on the 'entropic brain' hypothesis and the 'RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics' model, this paper focuses on the richness of psychological experience. Through a complex systems theory perspective, we suggest that psychedelics destabilize fixed points or attractors, breaking reinforced patterns of thinking and behaving. Our approach explains how psychedelic-induced increases in brain entropy destabilize neurophysiological set points and lead to new conceptualizations of psychedelic psychotherapy. These insights have important implications for risk mitigation and treatment optimization in psychedelic medicine, both during the peak psychedelic experience and during the subacute period of potential recovery.
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Affiliation(s)
- Inês Hipólito
- Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin 10117, Germany
- Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, New South Wales 2109, Australia
| | - Jonas Mago
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
- Integrative Program in Neuroscience, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec QC H3A, Canada
| | - Fernando E Rosas
- Department of Brain Sciences, Centre for Psychedelic Research, Imperial College London, London SW7 2BX, United Kingdom
- Centre for Complexity Science, Imperial College London, London SW7 2BX, United Kingdom
- Data Science Institute, Imperial College London, London SW7 2BX, United Kingdom
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, United Kingdom
- Centre for Eudaimonia and Human Flourishing, University of Oxford, Oxford OX3 9BX, United Kingdom
| | - Robin Carhart-Harris
- Department of Brain Sciences, Centre for Psychedelic Research, Imperial College London, London SW7 2BX, United Kingdom
- Psychedelics Division, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA 92521, United States
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29
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Sharp PB, Fradkin I, Eldar E. Hierarchical inference as a source of human biases. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2023; 23:476-490. [PMID: 35725986 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-022-01020-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/06/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
The finding that human decision-making is systematically biased continues to have an immense impact on both research and policymaking. Prevailing views ascribe biases to limited computational resources, which require humans to resort to less costly resource-rational heuristics. Here, we propose that many biases in fact arise due to a computationally costly way of coping with uncertainty-namely, hierarchical inference-which by nature incorporates information that can seem irrelevant. We show how, in uncertain situations, Bayesian inference may avail of the environment's hierarchical structure to reduce uncertainty at the cost of introducing bias. We illustrate how this account can explain a range of familiar biases, focusing in detail on the halo effect and on the neglect of base rates. In each case, we show how a hierarchical-inference account takes the characterization of a bias beyond phenomenological description by revealing the computations and assumptions it might reflect. Furthermore, we highlight new predictions entailed by our account concerning factors that could mitigate or exacerbate bias, some of which have already garnered empirical support. We conclude that a hierarchical inference account may inform scientists and policy makers with a richer understanding of the adaptive and maladaptive aspects of human decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul B Sharp
- Department of Psychology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9190501, Jerusalem, Israel
- Department of Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9190501, Jerusalem, Israel
| | - Isaac Fradkin
- Max Planck University College London Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, London, WC1B 5EH, UK
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Eran Eldar
- Department of Psychology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9190501, Jerusalem, Israel.
- Department of Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9190501, Jerusalem, Israel.
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D’Amelio A, Patania S, Buršić S, Cuculo V, Boccignone G. Inferring Causal Factors of Core Affect Dynamics on Social Participation through the Lens of the Observer. SENSORS (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 23:2885. [PMID: 36991595 PMCID: PMC10051943 DOI: 10.3390/s23062885] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/09/2023] [Revised: 02/28/2023] [Accepted: 03/01/2023] [Indexed: 06/19/2023]
Abstract
A core endeavour in current affective computing and social signal processing research is the construction of datasets embedding suitable ground truths to foster machine learning methods. This practice brings up hitherto overlooked intricacies. In this paper, we consider causal factors potentially arising when human raters evaluate the affect fluctuations of subjects involved in dyadic interactions and subsequently categorise them in terms of social participation traits. To gauge such factors, we propose an emulator as a statistical approximation of the human rater, and we first discuss the motivations and the rationale behind the approach.The emulator is laid down in the next section as a phenomenological model where the core affect stochastic dynamics as perceived by the rater are captured through an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process; its parameters are then exploited to infer potential causal effects in the attribution of social traits. Following that, by resorting to a publicly available dataset, the adequacy of the model is evaluated in terms of both human raters' emulation and machine learning predictive capabilities. We then present the results, which are followed by a general discussion concerning findings and their implications, together with advantages and potential applications of the approach.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alessandro D’Amelio
- PHuSe Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Milano Statale, Via Celoria 18, 20133 Milan, Italy
| | - Sabrina Patania
- PHuSe Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Milano Statale, Via Celoria 18, 20133 Milan, Italy
| | - Sathya Buršić
- PHuSe Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Milano Statale, Via Celoria 18, 20133 Milan, Italy
- Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milan, Italy
| | - Vittorio Cuculo
- PHuSe Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Milano Statale, Via Celoria 18, 20133 Milan, Italy
| | - Giuseppe Boccignone
- PHuSe Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Milano Statale, Via Celoria 18, 20133 Milan, Italy
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31
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Kastel N, Hesp C, Ridderinkhof KR, Friston KJ. Small steps for mankind: Modeling the emergence of cumulative culture from joint active inference communication. Front Neurorobot 2023; 16:944986. [PMID: 36699948 PMCID: PMC9868743 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.944986] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/16/2022] [Accepted: 11/30/2022] [Indexed: 01/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche.
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Affiliation(s)
- Natalie Kastel
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Precision Psychiatry and Social Physiology Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry, CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, Université de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada,*Correspondence: Natalie Kastel
| | - Casper Hesp
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom,Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - K. Richard Ridderinkhof
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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32
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Miller M, Albarracin M, Pitliya RJ, Kiefer A, Mago J, Gorman C, Friston KJ, Ramstead MJD. Resilience and active inference. Front Psychol 2022; 13:1059117. [PMID: 36619023 PMCID: PMC9815108 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1059117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2022] [Accepted: 11/28/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
In this article, we aim to conceptualize and formalize the construct of resilience using the tools of active inference, a new physics-based modeling approach apt for the description and analysis of complex adaptive systems. We intend this as a first step toward a computational model of resilient systems. We begin by offering a conceptual analysis of resilience, to clarify its meaning, as established in the literature. We examine an orthogonal, threefold distinction between meanings of the word "resilience": (i) inertia, or the ability to resist change (ii) elasticity, or the ability to bounce back from a perturbation, and (iii) plasticity, or the ability to flexibly expand the repertoire of adaptive states. We then situate all three senses of resilience within active inference. We map resilience as inertia onto high precision beliefs, resilience as elasticity onto relaxation back to characteristic (i.e., attracting) states, and resilience as plasticity onto functional redundancy and structural degeneracy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Miller
- Center for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Mahault Albarracin
- VERSES Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Department of Computing, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada
| | - Riddhi J. Pitliya
- VERSES Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
| | - Alex Kiefer
- VERSES Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Jonas Mago
- Integrated Program in Neuroscience, Department of Neuroscience, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Claire Gorman
- MIT Senseable City Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States
| | - Karl J. Friston
- VERSES Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Maxwell J. D. Ramstead
- VERSES Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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33
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Albarracin M, Pitliya RJ. Situated models and the modeler: A comment on "The Markov blanket trick: On the scope of the free energy principle and active inference" by Raja, Valluri, Baggs, Chemero and Anderson. Phys Life Rev 2022; 43:4-6. [PMID: 35930909 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2022.07.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2022] [Accepted: 07/19/2022] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Mahault Albarracin
- Université du Québec a Montréal, Faculté des arts et des sciences - Département d'informatique et de recherche opérationnelle, 3150 Jean Brillant St, Montreal, H3T 1N8, Quebec, Canada; VERSES, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
| | - Riddhi J Pitliya
- VERSES, Los Angeles, CA, USA; Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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34
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Structure learning enhances concept formation in synthetic Active Inference agents. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0277199. [PMID: 36374909 PMCID: PMC9662737 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0277199] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/27/2021] [Accepted: 10/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans display astonishing skill in learning about the environment in which they operate. They assimilate a rich set of affordances and interrelations among different elements in particular contexts, and form flexible abstractions (i.e., concepts) that can be generalised and leveraged with ease. To capture these abilities, we present a deep hierarchical Active Inference model of goal-directed behaviour, and the accompanying belief update schemes implied by maximising model evidence. Using simulations, we elucidate the potential mechanisms that underlie and influence concept learning in a spatial foraging task. We show that the representations formed–as a result of foraging–reflect environmental structure in a way that is enhanced and nuanced by Bayesian model reduction, a special case of structure learning that typifies learning in the absence of new evidence. Synthetic agents learn associations and form concepts about environmental context and configuration as a result of inferential, parametric learning, and structure learning processes–three processes that can produce a diversity of beliefs and belief structures. Furthermore, the ensuing representations reflect symmetries for environments with identical configurations.
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35
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Yanagisawa H, Wu X, Ueda K, Kato T. Free energy model of emotional valence in dual-process perceptions. Neural Netw 2022; 157:422-436. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2022.10.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/10/2022] [Revised: 10/21/2022] [Accepted: 10/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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36
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Dodig-Crnkovic G. Cognition as Morphological/Morphogenetic Embodied Computation In Vivo. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2022; 24:e24111576. [PMID: 36359666 PMCID: PMC9689251 DOI: 10.3390/e24111576] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2022] [Revised: 10/25/2022] [Accepted: 10/26/2022] [Indexed: 05/25/2023]
Abstract
Cognition, historically considered uniquely human capacity, has been recently found to be the ability of all living organisms, from single cells and up. This study approaches cognition from an info-computational stance, in which structures in nature are seen as information, and processes (information dynamics) are seen as computation, from the perspective of a cognizing agent. Cognition is understood as a network of concurrent morphological/morphogenetic computations unfolding as a result of self-assembly, self-organization, and autopoiesis of physical, chemical, and biological agents. The present-day human-centric view of cognition still prevailing in major encyclopedias has a variety of open problems. This article considers recent research about morphological computation, morphogenesis, agency, basal cognition, extended evolutionary synthesis, free energy principle, cognition as Bayesian learning, active inference, and related topics, offering new theoretical and practical perspectives on problems inherent to the old computationalist cognitive models which were based on abstract symbol processing, and unaware of actual physical constraints and affordances of the embodiment of cognizing agents. A better understanding of cognition is centrally important for future artificial intelligence, robotics, medicine, and related fields.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
- Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, 41296 Gothenburg, Sweden;
- Division of Computer Science and Software Engineering, School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University, 722 20 Västerås, Sweden
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37
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Déli É, Peters JF, Kisvárday Z. How the Brain Becomes the Mind: Can Thermodynamics Explain the Emergence and Nature of Emotions? ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2022; 24:1498. [PMID: 37420518 DOI: 10.3390/e24101498] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/27/2022] [Revised: 10/07/2022] [Accepted: 10/11/2022] [Indexed: 07/09/2023]
Abstract
The neural systems' electric activities are fundamental for the phenomenology of consciousness. Sensory perception triggers an information/energy exchange with the environment, but the brain's recurrent activations maintain a resting state with constant parameters. Therefore, perception forms a closed thermodynamic cycle. In physics, the Carnot engine is an ideal thermodynamic cycle that converts heat from a hot reservoir into work, or inversely, requires work to transfer heat from a low- to a high-temperature reservoir (the reversed Carnot cycle). We analyze the high entropy brain by the endothermic reversed Carnot cycle. Its irreversible activations provide temporal directionality for future orientation. A flexible transfer between neural states inspires openness and creativity. In contrast, the low entropy resting state parallels reversible activations, which impose past focus via repetitive thinking, remorse, and regret. The exothermic Carnot cycle degrades mental energy. Therefore, the brain's energy/information balance formulates motivation, sensed as position or negative emotions. Our work provides an analytical perspective of positive and negative emotions and spontaneous behavior from the free energy principle. Furthermore, electrical activities, thoughts, and beliefs lend themselves to a temporal organization, an orthogonal condition to physical systems. Here, we suggest that an experimental validation of the thermodynamic origin of emotions might inspire better treatment options for mental diseases.
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Affiliation(s)
- Éva Déli
- Department of Anatomy, Histology, and Embryology, University of Debrecen, 4032 Debrecen, Hungary
| | - James F Peters
- Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2, Canada
- Department of Mathematics, Adiyaman University, Adiyaman 02040, Turkey
| | - Zoltán Kisvárday
- Department of Anatomy, Histology, and Embryology, University of Debrecen, 4032 Debrecen, Hungary
- ELKH Neuroscience Research Group, University of Debrecen, 4032 Debrecen, Hungary
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38
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The seductive allure of cargo cult computationalism. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e185. [PMID: 36172778 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22000279] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Bruineberg and colleagues report a striking confusion, in which the formal Bayesian notion of a "Markov blanket" has been frequently misunderstood and misapplied to phenomena of mind and life. I argue that misappropriation of formal concepts is pervasive in the "predictive processing" literature, and echo Richard Feynman in suggesting how we might resist the allure of cargo cult computationalism.
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39
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Allen M, Levy A, Parr T, Friston KJ. In the Body’s Eye: The computational anatomy of interoceptive inference. PLoS Comput Biol 2022; 18:e1010490. [PMID: 36099315 PMCID: PMC9506608 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010490] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2021] [Revised: 09/23/2022] [Accepted: 08/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated ‘interoceptive lesions’ blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction. Understanding interactions between the brain and the body has become a topic of increased interest in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. A particular question here concerns how visceral, homeostatic rhythms such as the heart beat influence sensory, affective, and cognitive processing. To better understand these and other oscillatory brain-body interactions, we here introduce a novel computational model of interoceptive inference in which a synthetic agent’s perceptual beliefs are coupled to the rhythm of the heart. Our model both helps to explain emerging empirical data indicating that perceptual inference depends upon beat-to-beat heart rhythms, and can be used to better quantify intra- and inter-individual differences in heart-brain coupling. Using proof-of-principle simulations, we demonstrate how future empirical works could utilize our model to better understand and stratify disorders of interoception and brain-body interaction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Micah Allen
- Centre of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Denmark
- Cambridge Psychiatry, Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Andrew Levy
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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40
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McGovern HT, De Foe A, Biddell H, Leptourgos P, Corlett P, Bandara K, Hutchinson BT. Learned uncertainty: The free energy principle in anxiety. Front Psychol 2022; 13:943785. [PMID: 36248528 PMCID: PMC9559819 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943785] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2022] [Accepted: 07/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Generalized anxiety disorder is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders and often manifests as persistent and difficult to control apprehension. Despite its prevalence, there is no integrative, formal model of how anxiety and anxiety disorders arise. Here, we offer a perspective derived from the free energy principle; one that shares similarities with established constructs such as learned helplessness. Our account is simple: anxiety can be formalized as learned uncertainty. A biological system, having had persistent uncertainty in its past, will expect uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether uncertainty truly persists. Despite our account’s intuitive simplicity—which can be illustrated with the mere flip of a coin—it is grounded within the free energy principle and hence situates the formation of anxiety within a broader explanatory framework of biological self-organization and self-evidencing. We conclude that, through conceptualizing anxiety within a framework of working generative models, our perspective might afford novel approaches in the clinical treatment of anxiety and its key symptoms.
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Affiliation(s)
- H. T. McGovern
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Alexander De Foe
- School of Educational Psychology and Counselling, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Hannah Biddell
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
| | - Pantelis Leptourgos
- Department of Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
| | - Philip Corlett
- Department of Psychiatry, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
| | - Kavindu Bandara
- School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Brendan T. Hutchinson
- Research School of Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
- *Correspondence: Brendan T. Hutchinson,
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41
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Majumdar G, Yazin F, Banerjee A, Roy D. Emotion dynamics as hierarchical Bayesian inference in time. Cereb Cortex 2022; 33:3750-3772. [PMID: 36030379 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhac305] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2022] [Revised: 07/06/2022] [Accepted: 07/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
What fundamental property of our environment would be most valuable and optimal in characterizing the emotional dynamics we experience in daily life? Empirical work has shown that an accurate estimation of uncertainty is necessary for our optimal perception, learning, and decision-making. However, the role of this uncertainty in governing our affective dynamics remains unexplored. Using Bayesian encoding, decoding and computational modeling, on a large-scale neuroimaging and behavioral data on a passive movie-watching task, we showed that emotions naturally arise due to ongoing uncertainty estimations about future outcomes in a hierarchical neural architecture. Several prefrontal subregions hierarchically encoded a lower-dimensional signal that highly correlated with the evolving uncertainty. Crucially, the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) tracked the temporal fluctuations of this uncertainty and was predictive of the participants' predisposition to anxiety. Furthermore, we observed a distinct functional double-dissociation within OFC with increased connectivity between medial OFC and DMN, while with that of lOFC and FPN in response to the evolving affect. Finally, we uncovered a temporally predictive code updating an individual's beliefs spontaneously with fluctuating outcome uncertainty in the lOFC. A biologically relevant and computationally crucial parameter in the theories of brain function, we propose uncertainty to be central to the definition of complex emotions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gargi Majumdar
- Cognitive Brain Dynamics Lab, National Brain Research Centre, NH 8, Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana 122052, India
| | - Fahd Yazin
- Cognitive Brain Dynamics Lab, National Brain Research Centre, NH 8, Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana 122052, India
| | - Arpan Banerjee
- Cognitive Brain Dynamics Lab, National Brain Research Centre, NH 8, Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana 122052, India
| | - Dipanjan Roy
- Cognitive Brain Dynamics Lab, National Brain Research Centre, NH 8, Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana 122052, India.,Centre for Brain Science and Applications, School of AIDE, IIT Jodhpur, NH 62, Surpura Bypass Rd, Karwar, Rajasthan 342030, India
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42
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Deane G. Machines That Feel and Think: The Role of Affective Feelings and Mental Action in (Artificial) General Intelligence. ARTIFICIAL LIFE 2022; 28:289-309. [PMID: 35881678 DOI: 10.1162/artl_a_00368] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
What role do affective feelings (feelings/emotions/moods) play in adaptive behaviour? What are the implications of this for understanding and developing artificial general intelligence? Leading theoretical models of brain function are beginning to shed light on these questions. While artificial agents have excelled within narrowly circumscribed and specialised domains, domain-general intelligence has remained an elusive goal in artificial intelligence research. By contrast, humans and nonhuman animals are characterised by a capacity for flexible behaviour and general intelligence. In this article I argue that computational models of mental phenomena in predictive processing theories of the brain are starting to reveal the mechanisms underpinning domain-general intelligence in biological agents, and can inform the understanding and development of artificial general intelligence. I focus particularly on approaches to computational phenomenology in the active inference framework. Specifically, I argue that computational mechanisms of affective feelings in active inference-affective self-modelling-are revealing of how biological agents are able to achieve flexible behavioural repertoires and general intelligence. I argue that (i) affective self-modelling functions to "tune" organisms to the most tractable goals in the environmental context; and (ii) affective and agentic self-modelling is central to the capacity to perform mental actions in goal-directed imagination and creative cognition. I use this account as a basis to argue that general intelligence of the level and kind found in biological agents will likely require machines to be implemented with analogues of affective self-modelling.
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Affiliation(s)
- George Deane
- University of Edinburgh, School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences.
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43
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Deterding S, Andersen MM, Kiverstein J, Miller M. Mastering uncertainty: A predictive processing account of enjoying uncertain success in video game play. Front Psychol 2022; 13:924953. [PMID: 35959012 PMCID: PMC9363017 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.924953] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/20/2022] [Accepted: 06/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Why do we seek out and enjoy uncertain success in playing games? Game designers and researchers suggest that games whose challenges match player skills afford engaging experiences of achievement, competence, or effectance—of doing well. Yet, current models struggle to explain why such balanced challenges best afford these experiences and do not straightforwardly account for the appeal of high- and low-challenge game genres like Idle and Soulslike games. In this article, we show that Predictive Processing (PP) provides a coherent formal cognitive framework which can explain the fun in tackling game challenges with uncertain success as the dynamic process of reducing uncertainty surprisingly efficiently. In gameplay as elsewhere, people enjoy doing better than expected, which can track learning progress. In different forms, balanced, Idle, and Soulslike games alike afford regular accelerations of uncertainty reduction. We argue that this model also aligns with a popular practitioner model, Raph Koster’s Theory of Fun for Game Design, and can unify currently differentially modelled gameplay motives around competence and curiosity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Deterding
- Dyson School of Design Engineering, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
- Digital Creativity Labs, University of York, York, United Kingdom
- *Correspondence: Sebastian Deterding,
| | - Marc Malmdorf Andersen
- Interacting Minds Centre, School of Culture and Society, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
| | - Julian Kiverstein
- Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam University Medical Centre, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Mark Miller
- Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
- Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
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Sarasso P, Francesetti G, Roubal J, Gecele M, Ronga I, Neppi-Modona M, Sacco K. Beauty and Uncertainty as Transformative Factors: A Free Energy Principle Account of Aesthetic Diagnosis and Intervention in Gestalt Psychotherapy. Front Hum Neurosci 2022; 16:906188. [PMID: 35911596 PMCID: PMC9325967 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.906188] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2022] [Accepted: 06/09/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Drawing from field theory, Gestalt therapy conceives psychological suffering and psychotherapy as two intentional field phenomena, where unprocessed and chaotic experiences seek the opportunity to emerge and be assimilated through the contact between the patient and the therapist (i.e., the intentionality of contacting). This therapeutic approach is based on the therapist’s aesthetic experience of his/her embodied presence in the flow of the healing process because (1) the perception of beauty can provide the therapist with feedback on the assimilation of unprocessed experiences; (2) the therapist’s attentional focus on intrinsic aesthetic diagnostic criteria can facilitate the modification of rigid psychopathological fields by supporting the openness to novel experiences. The aim of the present manuscript is to review recent evidence from psychophysiology, neuroaesthetic research, and neurocomputational models of cognition, such as the free energy principle (FEP), which support the notion of the therapeutic potential of aesthetic sensibility in Gestalt psychotherapy. Drawing from neuroimaging data, psychophysiology and recent neurocognitive accounts of aesthetic perception, we propose a novel interpretation of the sense of beauty as a self-generated reward motivating us to assimilate an ever-greater spectrum of sensory and affective states in our predictive representation of ourselves and the world and supporting the intentionality of contact. Expecting beauty, in the psychotherapeutic encounter, can help therapists tolerate uncertainty avoiding impulsive behaviours and to stay tuned to the process of change.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pietro Sarasso
- BraIn Plasticity and Behaviour Changes Research Group, Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
- *Correspondence: Pietro Sarasso,
| | - Gianni Francesetti
- International Institute for Gestalt Therapy and Psychopathology, Turin Center for Gestalt Therapy, Turin, Italy
| | - Jan Roubal
- Psychotherapy Training Gestalt Studia, Training in Psychotherapy Integration, Center for Psychotherapy Research in Brno, Masaryk University, Brno, Czechia
| | - Michela Gecele
- International Institute for Gestalt Therapy and Psychopathology, Turin Center for Gestalt Therapy, Turin, Italy
| | - Irene Ronga
- BraIn Plasticity and Behaviour Changes Research Group, Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Marco Neppi-Modona
- BraIn Plasticity and Behaviour Changes Research Group, Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Katiuscia Sacco
- BraIn Plasticity and Behaviour Changes Research Group, Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
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Everything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions. Schizophr Res 2022; 245:5-22. [PMID: 34384664 PMCID: PMC9241990 DOI: 10.1016/j.schres.2021.07.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2021] [Revised: 07/21/2021] [Accepted: 07/23/2021] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Abstract
Delusions are, by popular definition, false beliefs that are held with certainty and resistant to contradictory evidence. They seem at odds with the notion that the brain at least approximates Bayesian inference. This is especially the case in schizophrenia, a disorder thought to relate to decreased - rather than increased - certainty in the brain's model of the world. We use an active inference Markov decision process model (a Bayes-optimal decision-making agent) to perform a simple task involving social and non-social inferences. We show that even moderate changes in some model parameters - decreasing confidence in sensory input and increasing confidence in states implied by its own (especially habitual) actions - can lead to delusions as defined above. Incorporating affect in the model increases delusions, specifically in the social domain. The model also reproduces some classic psychological effects, including choice-induced preference change, and an optimism bias in inferences about oneself. A key observation is that no change in a single parameter is both necessary and sufficient for delusions; rather, delusions arise due to conditional dependencies that create 'basins of attraction' which trap Bayesian beliefs. Simulating the effects of antidopaminergic antipsychotics - by reducing the model's confidence in its actions - demonstrates that the model can escape from these attractors, through this synthetic pharmacotherapy.
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Kiverstein J, Kirchhoff MD, Froese T. The Problem of Meaning: The Free Energy Principle and Artificial Agency. Front Neurorobot 2022; 16:844773. [PMID: 35812784 PMCID: PMC9260223 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.844773] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/28/2021] [Accepted: 05/17/2022] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Biological agents can act in ways that express a sensitivity to context-dependent relevance. So far it has proven difficult to engineer this capacity for context-dependent sensitivity to relevance in artificial agents. We give this problem the label the “problem of meaning”. The problem of meaning could be circumvented if artificial intelligence researchers were to design agents based on the assumption of the continuity of life and mind. In this paper, we focus on the proposal made by enactive cognitive scientists to design artificial agents that possess sensorimotor autonomy—stable, self-sustaining patterns of sensorimotor interaction that can ground values, norms and goals necessary for encountering a meaningful environment. More specifically, we consider whether the Free Energy Principle (FEP) can provide formal tools for modeling sensorimotor autonomy. There is currently no consensus on how to understand the relationship between enactive cognitive science and the FEP. However, a number of recent papers have argued that the two frameworks are fundamentally incompatible. Some argue that biological systems exhibit historical path-dependent learning that is absent from systems that minimize free energy. Others have argued that a free energy minimizing system would fail to satisfy a key condition for sensorimotor agency referred to as “interactional asymmetry”. These critics question the claim we defend in this paper that the FEP can be used to formally model autonomy and adaptivity. We will argue it is too soon to conclude that the two frameworks are incompatible. There are undeniable conceptual differences between the two frameworks but in our view each has something important and necessary to offer. The FEP needs enactive cognitive science for the solution it provides to the problem of meaning. Enactive cognitive science needs the FEP to formally model the properties it argues to be constitutive of agency. Our conclusion will be that active inference models based on the FEP provides a way by which scientists can think about how to address the problems of engineering autonomy and adaptivity in artificial agents in formal terms. In the end engaging more closely with this formalism and its further developments will benefit those working within the enactive framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julian Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Center, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- *Correspondence: Julian Kiverstein
| | - Michael D. Kirchhoff
- Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities, School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
| | - Tom Froese
- Embodied Cognitive Science Unit, Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University, Okinawa, Japan
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Valenzo D, Ciria A, Schillaci G, Lara B. Grounding Context in Embodied Cognitive Robotics. Front Neurorobot 2022; 16:843108. [PMID: 35812785 PMCID: PMC9262126 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.843108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/24/2021] [Accepted: 05/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Biological agents are context-dependent systems that exhibit behavioral flexibility. The internal and external information agents process, their actions, and emotions are all grounded in the context within which they are situated. However, in the field of cognitive robotics, the concept of context is far from being clear with most studies making little to no reference to it. The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation of the notion of context and its core elements based on different studies in natural agents, and how these core contextual elements have been modeled in cognitive robotics, to introduce a new hypothesis about the interactions between these contextual elements. Here, global context is categorized as agent-related, environmental, and task-related context. The interaction of their core elements, allows agents to first select self-relevant tasks depending on their current needs, or for learning and mastering their environment through exploration. Second, to perform a task and continuously monitor its performance. Third, to abandon a task in case its execution is not going as expected. Here, the monitoring of prediction error, the difference between sensorimotor predictions and incoming sensory information, is at the core of behavioral flexibility during situated action cycles. Additionally, monitoring prediction error dynamics and its comparison with the expected reduction rate should indicate the agent its overall performance on executing the task. Sensitivity to performance evokes emotions that function as the driving element for autonomous behavior which, at the same time, depends on the processing of the interacting core elements. Taking all these into account, an interactionist model of contexts and their core elements is proposed. The model is embodied, affective, and situated, by means of the processing of the agent-related and environmental core contextual elements. Additionally, it is grounded in the processing of the task-related context and the associated situated action cycles during task execution. Finally, the model proposed here aims to guide how artificial agents should process the core contextual elements of the agent-related and environmental context to give rise to the task-related context, allowing agents to autonomously select a task, its planning, execution, and monitoring for behavioral flexibility.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diana Valenzo
- Laboratorio de Robótica Cognitiva, Centro de Investigación en Ciencias, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, Cuernavaca, Mexico
| | - Alejandra Ciria
- Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, Mexico
| | | | - Bruno Lara
- Laboratorio de Robótica Cognitiva, Centro de Investigación en Ciencias, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, Cuernavaca, Mexico
- *Correspondence: Bruno Lara
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Hipólito I, van Es T. Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference. Front Psychol 2022; 13:855074. [PMID: 35572328 PMCID: PMC9102990 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.855074] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/14/2022] [Accepted: 03/16/2022] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind (ToM). Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that (1) social cognition reduces to mental representation and (2) social cognition is a hardwired contentful ‘toolkit’ or ‘starter pack’ that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in (1). The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions (1) and (2), the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Inês Hipólito
- Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Department of Psychology, Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- *Correspondence: Inês Hipólito,
| | - Thomas van Es
- Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Universiteit Antwerpen, Antwerp, Belgium
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Kuchling F, Fields C, Levin M. Metacognition as a Consequence of Competing Evolutionary Time Scales. ENTROPY 2022; 24:e24050601. [PMID: 35626486 PMCID: PMC9141326 DOI: 10.3390/e24050601] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2022] [Revised: 04/15/2022] [Accepted: 04/19/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
Abstract
Evolution is full of coevolving systems characterized by complex spatio-temporal interactions that lead to intertwined processes of adaptation. Yet, how adaptation across multiple levels of temporal scales and biological complexity is achieved remains unclear. Here, we formalize how evolutionary multi-scale processing underlying adaptation constitutes a form of metacognition flowing from definitions of metaprocessing in machine learning. We show (1) how the evolution of metacognitive systems can be expected when fitness landscapes vary on multiple time scales, and (2) how multiple time scales emerge during coevolutionary processes of sufficiently complex interactions. After defining a metaprocessor as a regulator with local memory, we prove that metacognition is more energetically efficient than purely object-level cognition when selection operates at multiple timescales in evolution. Furthermore, we show that existing modeling approaches to coadaptation and coevolution—here active inference networks, predator–prey interactions, coupled genetic algorithms, and generative adversarial networks—lead to multiple emergent timescales underlying forms of metacognition. Lastly, we show how coarse-grained structures emerge naturally in any resource-limited system, providing sufficient evidence for metacognitive systems to be a prevalent and vital component of (co-)evolution. Therefore, multi-scale processing is a necessary requirement for many evolutionary scenarios, leading to de facto metacognitive evolutionary outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Franz Kuchling
- Department of Biology, Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USA;
| | - Chris Fields
- 23 Rue des Lavandières, 11160 Caunes Minervois, France;
| | - Michael Levin
- Department of Biology, Allen Discovery Center at Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USA;
- Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02138, USA
- Correspondence:
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50
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Cleeremans A, Tallon-Baudry C. Consciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac007. [PMID: 35479522 PMCID: PMC9036654 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2021] [Revised: 02/04/2022] [Accepted: 03/14/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
‘Why would we do anything at all if the doing was not doing something to us?’ In other words: What is consciousness good for? Here, reversing classical views, according to many of which subjective experience is a mere epiphenomenon that affords no functional advantage, we propose that subject-level experience—‘What it feels like’—is endowed with intrinsic value, and it is precisely the value agents associate with their experiences that explains why they do certain things and avoid others. Because experiences have value and guide behaviour, consciousness has a function. Under this hypothesis of ‘phenomenal worthiness’, we argue that it is only in virtue of the fact that conscious agents ‘experience’ things and ‘care’ about those experiences that they are ‘motivated’ to act in certain ways and that they ‘prefer’ some states of affairs vs. others. Overviewing how the concept of value has been approached in decision-making, emotion research and consciousness research, we argue that phenomenal consciousness has intrinsic value and conclude that if this is indeed the case, then it must have a function. Phenomenal experience might act as a mental currency of sorts, which not only endows conscious mental states with intrinsic value but also makes it possible for conscious agents to compare vastly different experiences in a common subject-centred space—a feature that readily explains the fact that consciousness is ‘unified’. The phenomenal worthiness hypothesis, in turn, makes the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness more tractable, since it can then be reduced to a problem about function.
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Affiliation(s)
- Axel Cleeremans
- Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group, Center for Research in Cognition & Neuroscience, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Catherine Tallon-Baudry
- Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience Laboratory, Inserm, École Normale Supérieure—PSL University, Paris, France
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