Mechanistic studies in pathological health anxiety: A systematic review and emerging conceptual framework

BACKGROUND

Pathological health anxiety (PHA) (e.g., hypochondriasis and illness anxiety disorder) is common in medical settings and associated with increased healthcare costs. However, the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms contributing to the development and maintenance of PHA are incompletely understood.

METHODS

We performed a systematic review to characterize the mechanistic understanding of PHA. PubMed, PsycINFO, and Embase databases were searched to find articles published between 1/1/1990 and 12/31/2022 employing a behavioral task and/or physiological measures in individuals with hypochondriasis, illness anxiety disorder, and PHA more broadly.

RESULTS

Out of 9141 records identified, fifty-seven met inclusion criteria. Article quality varied substantially across studies, and was overall inadequate. Cognitive, behavioral, and affective findings implicated in PHA included health-related attentional and memory recall biases, a narrow health concept, threat confirming thought patterns, use of safety-seeking behaviors, and biased explicit and implicit affective processing of health-related information among other observations. There is initial evidence supporting a potential overestimation of interoceptive stimuli in those with PHA. Neuroendocrine, electrophysiology, and brain imaging research in PHA are particularly in their early stages.

LIMITATIONS

Included articles evaluated PHA categorically, suggesting that sub-threshold and dimensional health anxiety considerations are not contextualized.

CONCLUSIONS

Within an integrated cognitive-behavioral-affective and predictive processing formulation, we theorize that sub-optimal illness and health concepts, altered interoceptive modeling, biased illness-based predictions and attention, and aberrant prediction error learning are mechanisms relevant to PHA requiring more research. Comprehensively investigating the pathophysiology of PHA offers the potential to identify adjunctive diagnostic biomarkers and catalyze new biologically-informed treatments.

Reward processes in extinction learning and applications to exposure therapy

Anxiety disorders are common and highly distressing mental health conditions. Exposure therapy is a gold-standard treatment for anxiety disorders. Mechanisms of Pavlovian fear learning, and particularly fear extinction, are central to exposure therapy. A growing body of evidence suggests an important role of reward processes during Pavlovian fear extinction. Nonetheless, predominant models of exposure therapy do not currently incorporate reward processes. Herein, we present a theoretical model of reward processes in relation to Pavlovian mechanisms of exposure therapy, including a focus on dopaminergic prediction error signaling, coinciding positive emotional experiences (i.e., relief), and unexpected positive outcomes. We then highlight avenues for further research and discuss potential strategies to leverage reward processes to maximize exposure therapy response, such as pre-exposure interventions to increase reward sensitivity or post-exposure rehearsal (e.g., savoring, imaginal recounting strategies) to enhance retrieval and retention of learned associations.

A second chance for first impressions: evidence for altered impression updating in borderline personality disorder

BACKGROUND

Individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) frequently alter between idealizing and devaluing other persons, which has been linked to an increased tendency to update self-relevant beliefs and impressions. We hypothesized that increased impression updating could stem from reduced attitude contextualization, i.e., a process in which impression-disconfirming information is linked to contextual cues.

METHODS

Individuals diagnosed with BPD and controls (recruited online, with unknown diagnostic status) completed an impression formation paradigm. They first learned about the positive or negative behaviors of others in one Context A (e.g., Person 1 is helpful), followed by learning about behaviors of the opposite valence in a second Context B (Person 1 is rude). We also manipulated between participants whether the observed behaviors were directed toward the study participants (self-relevant) or, more generally, at other people (other-relevant). The contexts were marked by differently-colored backgrounds (e.g., yellow vs. blue), to avoid influences of prior knowledge or experiences. After exposure to information in both contexts, participants rated their impressions of the persons in Context A, Context B, and, crucially, a previously unknown Context C (white background). We examined whether the initial or an updated impression (re-)emerged in Context C.

RESULTS

Initial impressions remained stable and dominated the ratings of controls across contexts A, B, and C for both self-relevant and other-relevant behaviors, consistent with contextualizing impression-disconfirming information. As expected, however, individuals with BPD only showed updated impression ratings in Context C for self-relevant behaviors, consistent with the assumed reduced tendency to contextualize impression-disconfirming self-relevant information. Further exploratory analyses suggest that more severe BPD symptoms predicted more pronounced impression updating in the self-relevant condition.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings help to illuminate the mechanisms underlying interpersonal problems in individuals with BPD. People with BPD are not just more inclined to discard positive first impressions but to re-evaluate disliked others when they behave positively, contributing to the volatility of interactions with others. Contextualization has known and modifiable antecedents, and the study may thus provide potential targets for therapeutic intervention. Future studies will need to replicate the findings with specified controls.

Sexual health beliefs and prevention of sexually transmitted infections among cisgender women sex workers in Colombia

INTRODUCTION

The stigma and social discrimination against cisgender women sex workers lead many of them to live in conditions characterized by social inequality, marginalization, persecution, and limited opportunities for sexual health literacy. Consequently, they are often compelled to establish a framework of preventive beliefs with little scientific validity, which they use to identify, mitigate, or avoid sexual health risks arising from their interactions with clients. This study investigates the sexual health beliefs that influence self-care practices aimed at preventing sexually transmitted infections among cisgender women sex workers in Colombia.

METHODS

We conducted a qualitative study framed in Hermeneutic Phenomenology. In-depth interviews and discussion groups were conducted with 34 cisgender women sex workers over 18 years of age in the center of the cities of Bogotá and Barranquilla in Colombia.

RESULTS

Seven themes emerged from the reflective and inductive thematic analysis of the narratives: (1) popular habits for the prevention of contagion, (2) ocular assessment of genitals, (3) condom lubrication, (4) suspicion of a hidden infection in the client, (5) saliva and oral contact as a source of contagion, (6) avoidance of semen contact, (7) and trust in God as protection.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings reflect the need for health and social professionals to promote participatory and inclusive cooperation with sex workers to update the framework of preventive beliefs that help them guide sexual health self-care with autonomy and self-efficacy, strengthening favorable beliefs and negotiating unfavorable ones. It is also essential to have a sex worker-informed sexual health policy that guides the promotion of sexual health that is sensitive to the needs and consistent with the risks of sex work and ensures friendly and non-oppressive preventive care environments for sex workers.

Large environmental changes reduce valence-dependent belief updating

When updating beliefs, humans tend to integrate more desirable information than undesirable information. In stable environments (low uncertainty and high predictability), this asymmetry favors motivation towards action and perceived self-efficacy. However, in changing environments (high uncertainty and low predictability), this process can lead to risk underestimation and increase unwanted costs. Here, we examine how people (n = 388) integrate threatening information during an abrupt environmental change (mandatory quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic). Given that anxiety levels are associated with the magnitude of the updating belief asymmetry; we explore its relationship during this particular context. We report a significant reduction in asymmetrical belief updating during a large environmental change as individuals integrated desirable and undesirable information to the same extent. Moreover, this result was supported by computational modeling of the belief update task. However, we found that the reduction in asymmetrical belief updating was not homogeneous among people with different levels of Trait-anxiety. Individuals with higher levels of Trait-anxiety maintained a valence-dependent updating, as it occurs in stable environments. On the other hand, updating behavior was not associated with acute anxiety (State-Anxiety), health concerns (Health-Anxiety), or having positive expectations (Trait-Optimism). These results suggest that highly uncertain environments can generate adaptive changes in information integration. At the same time, it reveals the vulnerabilities of individuals with higher levels of anxiety to adapt the way they learn.

Belief Updating, Childhood Maltreatment, and Paranoia in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Disorders

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Exposure to childhood maltreatment-a risk factor for psychosis is associated with paranoia-may impact one's beliefs about the world and how beliefs are updated. We hypothesized that increased exposure to childhood maltreatment is related to volatility-related belief updating, specifically higher expectations of volatility, and that these relationships are strongest for threat-related maltreatment. Additionally, we tested whether belief updating mediates the relationship between maltreatment and paranoia.

STUDY DESIGN

Belief updating was measured in 75 patients with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and 76 nonpsychiatric controls using a 3-option probabilistic reversal learning (3PRL) task. A Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) was used to estimate computational parameters of belief updating, including prior expectations of volatility (μ03). The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ) was used to assess cumulative maltreatment, threat, and deprivation exposure. Paranoia was measured using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and the revised Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (R-GPTS).

RESULTS

Greater exposure to childhood maltreatment is associated with higher prior expectations of volatility in the whole sample and in individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. This was specific to threat-related maltreatment, rather than deprivation, in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Paranoia was associated with both exposure to childhood maltreatment and volatility priors, but we did not observe a significant indirect effect of volatility priors on the relationship between maltreatment and paranoia.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study suggests that individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders who were exposed to threatening experiences during childhood expect their environment to be more volatile, potentially facilitating aberrant belief updating and conferring risk for paranoia.

Does disconfirmatory evidence shape safety-and danger-related beliefs of trauma-exposed individuals?

Recent accounts of predictive processing in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suggest that trauma-exposed individuals struggle to update trauma-related hypotheses predicting danger, which may be involved in the etiology and maintenance of this disorder. Initial research supports this account, documenting an association between trauma-exposure, impaired expectation updating, and PTSD symptoms. Yet, no study to date has examined biased belief updating in PTSD using a scenario-based approach.Objective: Here, we examined the predictive processing account among trauma-exposed and non-trauma-exposed individuals using a modified Trauma-Related version of the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence task.Method: The task presents both danger-and safety-related scenarios highly relevant for trauma-exposed individuals. For each scenario, participants viewed several explanations and rated their plausibility. Their ability to update their initial interpretation following new-contradictory information was assessed.Results: Preregistered analyses did not reveal any significant findings. Based on indications that our sample may not have been sufficiently powered, we conducted exploratory analyses in an extended sample of participants. These analyses yielded a significant association between reduced belief updating and PTSD symptoms which was evident for disconfirming both safety and danger scenarios. However, the effect sizes we found were in the small-to-medium range.Conclusion: Although preliminary, our current findings support initial evidence that individuals with higher PTSD symptoms show a higher resistance to update their beliefs upon new disconfirmatory evidence. Our results should be interpreted cautiously in light of the extended sample and the limitations of the current study.

Borderline personality disorder features are associated with inflexible social interpretations

BACKGROUND

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is thought to involve aberrant social learning, including impaired revision of social interpretations with new evidence (social interpretation inflexibility). However, this topic has received little empirical attention outside of specific literatures, such as moral inference or behavioral economics. Further, the contribution of comorbid depression to BPD-related interpretation inflexibility has not yet been assessed.

METHODS

In two independent samples (Study 1: N = 213; Study 2: N = 210, oversampled for BPD features), we assessed the associations between BPD symptoms, depressive symptoms, and task-based measures of social interpretation flexibility.

RESULTS

We found that BPD symptoms, particularly volatility of identity and relationships, were associated with less revision of social interpretations with both positive and negative evidence. Meanwhile, depressive symptoms were associated with a pattern of less revision of social interpretations with positive versus negative information.

LIMITATIONS

The use of cross-sectional, crowdsourced samples limits causal interpretations. Translation to clinical populations should be assessed in future studies.

CONCLUSIONS

Results suggest that inflexible social interpretations across valences may be a feature of BPD-related pathology, and could be connected to symptoms involving volatility in social contexts. Future studies should investigate whether treatments geared toward increasing the flexibility of social interpretations are effective in treating BPD symptoms, especially those involving interpersonal difficulties.

Comparison standards shape everyday judgments of low and high wellbeing in individuals with and without psychopathology: a diary-based investigation

People can easily rate and express their current levels of wellbeing, but the cognitive foundations for such judgments are poorly understood. We examined whether comparisons to varying standards underlie fluctuating wellbeing judgments within-person (i.e., throughout daily episodes) and between-person (i.e., high vs. low levels of psychopathology). Clinical and non-clinical participants recorded subjective affect for each distinct episode for one week. Participants briefly described current, best, and worst daily episodes, which we coded for presence and type of comparison standard (social, past temporal, criteria-based, counterfactual, prospective temporal, and dimensional). Participants also rated their engagement with these standards and the respective affective impact. During best episodes, participants reported more downward (vs. upward) comparisons that resulted in positive affective impact. In worst episodes, upward (vs. downward) comparisons were more frequent. In best and worst episodes, we most frequently identified past-temporal and criteria-based comparisons, respectively. The clinical group engaged more often with all potential standard types during worst daily episodes and was more negatively affected by comparative thoughts, amid consistently more negative affect levels across all episode types. Our data suggest that judgments of affect and wellbeing may indeed rely on comparative thinking, whereby certain standards may characterize states of negative affect and poor mental health.

Flexibility Retained: Unimpaired Updating of Expectations in Schizophrenia

Flexibly and actively updating expectations based on feedback is crucial for navigating daily life. Previous research has shown that people with schizophrenia (PSZ) have difficulty adjusting their expectations. However, there are studies suggesting otherwise. To explore this further, we used a novel trial-based expectation updating paradigm called attribute amnesia. In the task, the participants needed to report the location of a target stimulus among distractors in pre-surprise trials. In the surprise trial, they were unexpectedly asked to report the identity of the target before reporting its location. Afterward, control trials were conducted whereby the participants were asked the same questions as in the surprise trial. Notably, the surprise trial and control trials were nearly identical, except that the participants expected to be asked about identity information in the control trials but not in the surprise trial. Thus, an improvement in identity reporting accuracy in the control trials in comparison with the surprise trial indicated active updating of expectations. In the current study, a total of 63 PSZ and 60 healthy control subjects (HCS) were enrolled. We found that both the PSZ and the HCS were unable to report information that they had fully attended to (i.e., identity) in the surprise trial. However, both groups showed a significant improvement in reporting identity information even in the first control trial. Critically, there was no significant difference in the magnitude of improvement between the two groups. The current findings indicate that PSZ have the ability to update their expectations as quickly and flexibly as HCS, at least in the context of the current task. The possible factors that might contribute to the discrepancy regarding expectation updating are discussed.

Transdiagnostic inflexible learning dynamics explain deficits in depression and schizophrenia

Deficits in reward learning are core symptoms across many mental disorders. Recent work suggests that such learning impairments arise by a diminished ability to use reward history to guide behaviour, but the neuro-computational mechanisms through which these impairments emerge remain unclear. Moreover, limited work has taken a transdiagnostic approach to investigate whether the psychological and neural mechanisms that give rise to learning deficits are shared across forms of psychopathology. To provide insight into this issue, we explored probabilistic reward learning in patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder (n = 33) or schizophrenia (n = 24) and 33 matched healthy controls by combining computational modelling and single-trial EEG regression. In our task, participants had to integrate the reward history of a stimulus to decide whether it is worthwhile to gamble on it. Adaptive learning in this task is achieved through dynamic learning rates that are maximal on the first encounters with a given stimulus and decay with increasing stimulus repetitions. Hence, over the course of learning, choice preferences would ideally stabilize and be less susceptible to misleading information. We show evidence of reduced learning dynamics, whereby both patient groups demonstrated hypersensitive learning (i.e. less decaying learning rates), rendering their choices more susceptible to misleading feedback. Moreover, there was a schizophrenia-specific approach bias and a depression-specific heightened sensitivity to disconfirmational feedback (factual losses and counterfactual wins). The inflexible learning in both patient groups was accompanied by altered neural processing, including no tracking of expected values in either patient group. Taken together, our results thus provide evidence that reduced trial-by-trial learning dynamics reflect a convergent deficit across depression and schizophrenia. Moreover, we identified disorder distinct learning deficits.

The relationship between multiple traumatic events and the severity of posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms – evidence for a cognitive link

Background: Previous research has shown that multiple traumatic experiences cumulatively increase the risk for the development of severe symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Yet, little is known about the specific psychological mechanism through which this increased risk comes about.Objective: In the present study, we examined a possible cognitive link between multiple traumatic events and PTSD symptom severity through dysfunctional cognitions and expectations.Methods: A sample of patients with a diagnosed PTSD (N = 70; M_Age= 42.06; 82% female) and high symptom burden (IES-R M = 79.24) was examined. On average, patients had experienced 5.31 different traumatic events. In a structural equation model, we tested the hypothesis that the relationship between multiple traumatic experiences and PTSD symptom severity is mediated through dysfunctional general cognitions and dysfunctional situation-specific expectations. General trauma-related cognitions were assessed with the Posttraumatic Cognition Inventory (PTCI) and trauma-related situational expectations were assessed with the Posttraumatic Expectations Scale (PTES).Results: The direct effect of the number of traumatic events on PTSD symptom severity was non-significant. Instead, as hypothesised, there was evidence for a significant indirect effect via dysfunctional general cognitions and situation-specific expectations.Conclusions: The current results further specify the cognitive model of PTSD by indicating that the relationship between the number of traumatic events and PTSD symptom severity is mediated through dysfunctional cognitions and expectations. These findings emphasise the importance of focused cognitive treatment approaches that seek to modify dysfunctional cognitions and expectations in people with multiple traumatic experiences.

How to modify expectations of social rejection? An experimental study using a false-feedback paradigm

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Negative expectations (NEs) are fundamental to various mental disorders. Finding ways to modulate NEs would help to improve clinical treatment. The present study investigated how previously formed expectations of social rejection are revised in the context of novel positive social experiences, and whether their revision can be modulated by differentially shifting participants' attentional focus.

METHODS

Our sample of 124 healthy participants was randomly assigned to four experimental conditions and received manipulated social feedback in multiple alleged webcam conferences. All groups went through three experimental phases that began with predominantly negative social feedback, then either transitioned to predominantly positive social feedback or continued to predominantly negative social feedback, and ultimately transitioning to a phase with no explicit social feedback. The experimental conditions differed in what they were instructed to focus on when receiving positive social feedback.

RESULTS

Receiving novel positive social feedback led to substantial changes in social expectations, but this effect was not modulated by the instructions the participants were given. Descriptive trends revealed that both instructions improved NE modification, although this effect was not robust to extinction in one condition.

LIMITATIONS

To prevent our cover story from being compromised, we could not perform an immediate manipulation check of the instructions given. Nevertheless, some of the sample seemed suspicious about the cover story.

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that established expectations of social rejection can be revised when unexpectedly experiencing social acceptance. Nevertheless, more research is needed on potential instructions that could be used to optimize the modification of NEs.

Social interpretation inflexibility moderates emotional reactions to social situations in children and adolescents

Interpretation biases and inflexibility (i.e., difficulties revising interpretations) have been linked to increased internalizing symptoms. Although adolescence is a developmental period characterized by novel social situations and increased vulnerability to internalizing disorders, no studies have examined interpretation inflexibility in adolescents. Additionally, no studies (on adolescents or adults) have examined interpretation flexibility as a protective factor against adverse outcomes of interpersonal events. Using a novel task and a 28-day diary we examined relations among interpretation bias and inflexibility, internalizing symptoms, and negative interpersonal events in a sample of children and adolescents (N = 159, ages 9-18). At baseline, negative interpretation bias was positively correlated with social anxiety symptoms, and positive interpretation bias negatively correlated with social anxiety and depressive symptoms. Inflexible positive interpretations were correlated with higher social anxiety and depressive symptoms, while inflexible negative interpretations were correlated with higher social anxiety. Finally, interpretation inflexibility moderated daily associations between negative interpersonal events and depressive symptoms in daily life, such that higher inflexibility was associated with stronger associations between interpersonal events and subsequent depressive symptoms, potentially increasing depressive symptom instability. These results suggest that interpretation biases and inflexibility may act as both risk and protective factors for adolescent anxiety and depression.

Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases

One of the essential insights from psychological research is that people's information processing is often biased. By now, a number of different biases have been identified and empirically demonstrated. Unfortunately, however, these biases have often been examined in separate lines of research, thereby precluding the recognition of shared principles. Here we argue that several-so far mostly unrelated-biases (e.g., bias blind spot, hostile media bias, egocentric/ethnocentric bias, outcome bias) can be traced back to the combination of a fundamental prior belief and humans' tendency toward belief-consistent information processing. What varies between different biases is essentially the specific belief that guides information processing. More importantly, we propose that different biases even share the same underlying belief and differ only in the specific outcome of information processing that is assessed (i.e., the dependent variable), thus tapping into different manifestations of the same latent information processing. In other words, we propose for discussion a model that suffices to explain several different biases. We thereby suggest a more parsimonious approach compared with current theoretical explanations of these biases. We also generate novel hypotheses that follow directly from the integrative nature of our perspective.

The Nepean Belief Scale (NBS) as a tool to investigate the intensity of beliefs in anorexia nervosa: psychometric properties of the Italian version

BACKGROUND

People with anorexia nervosa (AN) show a peculiar impairment of insight regarding their condition, often manifesting a denial of extreme emaciation and sometimes hiding or underreporting socially undesirable abnormal eating patterns. Sometimes the intensity of the beliefs held by patients with AN reach a delusional intensity.

OBJECTIVES

In this study, the Italian version of the Nepean Belief Scale was applied to a sample of patients diagnosed with AN to investigate the intensity of their beliefs and convictions and its clinical correlates.

METHODS

The Nepean Belief Scale (NBS) was translated and adapted to Italian and applied to a sample of patients diagnosed with AN based on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5).

RESULTS

The Italian version of the 5-item NBS showed excellent reliability. Convergent validity was proved by negative association with levels of insight measured with the Schedule for the Assessment of Insight in Eating Disorders. Beliefs of delusional intensity were reported by 10% of participants. Those with a greater intensity of beliefs, either overvalued or delusional ideas, were more likely to report poorer general cognitive performances on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment. No association was observed between NBS score and age, body mass index, symptoms of eating disorders, body dissatisfaction, or levels of depression. Fear of weight gain and control seeking were the most often reported themes at the NBS.

CONCLUSIONS

The Italian version of the NBS is a reasonably reliable, valid, and usable tool for the multidimensional assessment of insight in AN. Level of evidence Level III, Evidence obtained from well-designed cohort or case-control analytic studies.

Setting up and assessing a therapeutic education program for asthmatic patients

BACKGROUND

Asthma is a major public health issue. It remains uncontrolled, despite the availability of effective treatments. Appropriate education programs are required to improve the situation. The study aims to design and assess an educational program based on asthma patients' perceived needs.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A cross-sectional prospective study was conducted in the pulmonology department of the Hassan II University Hospital in Fez. A convenience sample of asthma patients, whether hospitalized or not, was recruited. Two hundred and twenty adult asthma patients completed an educational needs survey (ENS). An asthma knowledge questionnaire for adult patients was used to assess the program on the criterion of improving asthma knowledge. Data collected by ENS was analyzed by standard descriptive statistics. The Student's T test for paired samples was used to compare the means of the Asthma Knowledge Questionnaire scores before and after therapeutic education.

RESULTS

Most patients were married and residing in urban areas. The illiteracy rate was 50%. One patient was a regular smoker. 125 patients (56.82%) reported non-compliance to treatment. The pathophysiology of asthma (chronic airway inflammation, bronchial hyperreactivity, and bronchial obstruction), causes and complications, treatment (inhalation technique), asthma attacks and environmental management, lifestyle, and psychological support were the patients' main perceived educational needs. Based on these findings, an instructional program was created and evaluated with 30 patients. After the program, asthma knowledge increased significantly.

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that an educational intervention can improve asthma knowledge.

Factors influencing the update of beliefs regarding controversial political issues

Selectively integrating new information contributes to belief polarization and compromises public discourse. To better understand factors that underlie biased belief updating, I conducted three pre-registered studies covering different controversial political issues. The main hypothesis was that cognitively devaluing new information hinders belief updating. Support for this hypothesis was found in only one of the three issues. The only factor that consistently influenced belief updating across issues was the discrepancy between prior beliefs and new information. These results suggest that usually people do use evidence to correct their beliefs, but may refuse to do so if doubts about its generalizability arise.

There is no belief update bias for neutral events: failure to replicate Burton et al. (2022)

In a recent paper, Burton et al. claim that individuals update beliefs to a greater extent when learning an event is less likely compared to more likely than expected. Here, we investigate Burton's et al.'s, findings. First, we show how Burton et al.'s data do not in fact support a belief update bias for neutral events. Next, in an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.'s design and analysis. This includes mis-specifying a reinforcement learning approach to model the data and failing to follow standard computational model fitting sanity checks such as parameter recovery, model comparison and out of sample prediction. Together, the results find little evidence for biased updating for neutral events.

Biased belief updating in depression

Cognitive approaches to depression have benefitted from recent research on belief updating, examining how new information is used to alter beliefs. This review presents recent advances in understanding various sources of bias in belief updating in depression. Specifically, research has demonstrated that people with depression have difficulty revising negative beliefs in response to novel positive information, whereas belief updating in depression is not related to an enhanced integration of negative information. In terms of mechanisms underlying the deficient processing of positive information, research has shown that people with depression use defensive cognitive strategies to devalue novel positive information. Furthermore, the disregard of novel positive information can be amplified by the presence of state negative affect, and the resulting persistence of negative beliefs in turn perpetuates chronically low mood, contributing to a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop of beliefs and affect. Synthesising previous research, this review proposes a coherent framework of when belief change is likely to occur, and argues that future research also needs to elucidate why people with depression hesitate to abandon negative beliefs. Recent insights from belief updating have not only improved the understanding of the psychopathology of depression, but also have the potential to improve its cognitive-behavioural treatment.

If the discrepancy between expectations and actual information is too large, expectation change decreases - A replication study

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Mental disorders have been related to aberrations in using novel positive information to revise established negative beliefs. Previous research used to make a binary distinction between belief-confirming vs. -disconfirming information, but recently it has been examined how varying levels of positive information is used to update beliefs. The present study aimed to replicate a recent finding suggesting that positive information that deviates to a large extent from people's prior expectations raises doubts about the credibility of new information and therefore hardly leads to change in expectations.

METHODS

In a heterogenous sample (N = 144), participants were provided with slightly positive, moderately positive, or extremely positive information in relation to their prior expectations about other people's behaviour.

RESULTS

Replicating previous research, the present study found that expectation change was greatest for moderately positive information. It also provided evidence for a possible mechanism underlying the inverse U-shaped relationship between the positivity of new information and change in expectations: Extremely positive information was devalued through defensive cognitive strategies, referred to as cognitive immunisation.

LIMITATIONS

Unlike previous research, the belief update task used in this study did not show any association with depressive symptoms, so it is questionable how suitable it is to study biased belief updating in depression.

CONCLUSIONS

Unlike traditional learning models, the present results suggest a tipping point above which the discrepancy between expectation and outcome is suspiciously large, so that the degree of expectation change decreases.

Computational mechanisms of belief updating in relation to psychotic-like experiences

Introduction

Psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) may occur due to changes in weighting prior beliefs and new evidence in the belief updating process. It is still unclear whether the acquisition or integration of stable beliefs is altered, and whether such alteration depends on the level of environmental and belief precision, which reflects the associated uncertainty. This motivated us to investigate uncertainty-related dynamics of belief updating in relation to PLEs using an online study design.

Methods

We selected a sample (n = 300) of participants who performed a belief updating task with sudden change points and provided self-report questionnaires for PLEs. The task required participants to observe bags dropping from a hidden helicopter, infer its position, and dynamically update their belief about the helicopter's position. Participants could optimize performance by adjusting learning rates according to inferred belief uncertainty (inverse prior precision) and the probability of environmental change points. We used a normative learning model to examine the relationship between adherence to specific model parameters and PLEs.

Results

PLEs were linked to lower accuracy in tracking the outcome (helicopter location) (β = 0.26 ± 0.11, p = 0.018) and to a smaller increase of belief precision across observations after a change point (β = -0.003 ± 0.0007, p < 0.001). PLEs were related to slower belief updating when participants encountered large prediction errors (β = -0.03 ± 0.009, p = 0.001). Computational modeling suggested that PLEs were associated with reduced overall belief updating in response to prediction errors (βPE = -1.00 ± 0.45, p = 0.028) and reduced modulation of updating at inferred environmental change points (βCPP = -0.84 ± 0.38, p = 0.023).

Discussion

We conclude that PLEs are associated with altered dynamics of belief updating. These findings support the idea that the process of balancing prior belief and new evidence, as a function of environmental uncertainty, is altered in PLEs, which may contribute to the development of delusions. Specifically, slower learning after large prediction errors in people with high PLEs may result in rigid beliefs. Disregarding environmental change points may limit the flexibility to establish new beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. The present study fosters a deeper understanding of inferential belief updating mechanisms underlying PLEs.

Associations between specific depressive symptoms and psychosocial functioning in psychotherapy

BACKGROUND

Psychotherapy for depression aims to reduce symptoms and to improve psychosocial functioning. We examined whether some symptoms are more important than others in the association between depression and functioning over the course of psychotherapy treatment.

METHODS

We studied associations between specific symptoms of depression (PHQ-9) and change in social and occupational functioning (SOFAS), both with structural equation models (considering liabilities of depression and each specific symptom) and with logistic regression models (considering the risk for individual patients). The study sample consisted of adult patients (n = 771) from the Finnish Psychotherapy Quality Registry (FPQR) who completed psychotherapy treatment between September 2018 and September 2021.

RESULTS

Based on our results of logistic regression analyses and SEM models, the baseline measures of depression symptoms were not associated with changes in functioning. Changes in depressed mood or hopelessness, problems with sleep, feeling tired, and feeling little interest or pleasure were associated with improved functioning during psychotherapy. The strongest evidence for symptom-specific effects was found for the symptom of depressed mood or hopelessness.

LIMITATIONS

Due to our naturalistic study design containing only two measurement points, we were unable to study the causal relationship between symptoms and functioning.

CONCLUSIONS

Changes in certain symptoms during psychotherapy may affect functioning independently of underlying depression. Knowledge about the dynamics between symptoms and functioning could be used in treatment planning or implementation. Depressed mood or hopelessness appears to have a role in the dynamic relationship between depression and functioning.

Can you trust this source? Advice taking in borderline personality disorder

Research suggests that patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) share a range of cognitive biases with patients with psychosis. As the disorder often manifests in dysfunctional social interactions, we assumed associated reasoning styles would be exaggerated in a social setting. For the present study, we applied the Judge-Advisor System by asking participants to provide initial estimates of a person's age and presumed hostility based on a portrait photo. Afterwards, we presented additional cues/advice in the form of responses by anonymous previous respondents. Participants could revise their estimate, seek additional advice, or make a decision. Contrary to our preregistered hypothesis, patients with BPD (n = 38) performed similarly to healthy controls (n = 30). Patients sought the same number of pieces of advice, were equally confident, and used advice in similar ways to revise their estimates. Thus, patients with BPD did trust advice. However, patients gave higher hostility ratings to the portrayed persons. In conclusion, patients with BPD showed no cognitive biases in seeking, evaluating, and integrating socially provided information. While the study implies emotional rather than cognitive biases in the disorder, cognitive biases may still prove to be useful treatment targets in order to encourage delaying and reflecting on extreme emotional responses in social interactions.

Association of pessimism with cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality

Poor psychological health is associated with Takotsubo cardiomyopathy, cardiac syndrome X, coronary microcirculatory dysfunction, peripheral artery disease, or spontaneous coronary artery dissection. Data regarding pessimism, cardiovascular disease (CVD) events and mortality and all-cause mortality remained inconclusive. This systematic review and meta-analysis aim to provide an overview of the association between pessimism, CVD outcomes and mortality. A systematic search of electronic databases was conducted from inception through July 2022 for studies evaluating pessimism and adverse outcomes. A total of 17 studies published between 1966 and July 2022 met our inclusion criteria, for a total of 232,533 individuals. Pooled hazard ratios were calculated in random-effects meta-analyses. Based on pooled analysis of adjusted HRs, pessimism was associated with adjusted HR of 1.13 (95% CI 1.07-1.19) for all-cause mortality with minimal heterogeneity (I² = 28.5%). Based on pooled analysis of adjusted HRs, pessimism was associated with adjusted HR of 1.30 (95% CI 0.43-3.95) for CHD mortality, adjusted HR of 1.41 (95% CI 1.05-1.91) for CVD mortality, and adjusted HR of 1.43 (95% CI 0.64-3.16) for stroke. In conclusion, pessimism seems to be significantly associated with a higher risk for and poorer outcomes from CVD events than optimistic styles. There are genetic and other bases for these life approaches, but behavioral, cognitive and meditative interventions can modify patients' level of pessimism, hopefully leading to better medical outcomes. Testing this theory would yield highly useful and practical data for clinical care.

Trial-by-trial fluctuations in amygdala activity track motivational enhancement of desirable sensory evidence during perceptual decision-making

People are biased toward seeing outcomes that they are motivated to see. For example, wanting their favored team to prevail biases sports fans to perceive an ambiguous foul in a manner that is favorable to the team they support. Here, we test the hypothesis that such motivational biases in perceptual decision-making are associated with amygdala activity. We used monetary incentives to experimentally manipulate participants to want to see one percept over another while they performed a categorization task involving ambiguous images. Participants were more likely to categorize an image as the category we motivated them to see, suggesting that wanting to see a particular percept biased their perceptual decisions. Heightened amygdala activity was associated with motivation consistent categorizations and tracked trial-by-trial enhancement of neural activity in sensory cortices encoding the desirable category. Analyses using a drift diffusion model further suggest that trial-by-trial amygdala activity was specifically associated with biases in the accumulation of sensory evidence. In contrast, frontoparietal regions commonly associated with biases in perceptual decision-making were not associated with motivational bias. Altogether, our results suggest that wanting to see an outcome biases perceptual decisions via distinct mechanisms and may depend on dynamic fluctuations in amygdala activity.

Believing and social interactions: effects on bodily expressions and personal narratives

The processes of believing integrate external perceptual information from the environment with internal emotional states and prior experience to generate probabilistic neural representations of events, i.e., beliefs. As these neural representations manifest mostly below the level of a person's conscious awareness, they may inadvertently affect the spontaneous person's bodily expressions and prospective behavior. By yet to be understood mechanisms people can become aware of these representations and reflect upon them. Typically, people can communicate the content of their beliefs as personal statements and can summarize the narratives of others to themselves or to other people. Here, we describe that social interactions may benefit from the consistency between a person's bodily expressions and verbal statements because the person appears authentic and ultimately trustworthy. The transmission of narratives can thus lay the groundwork for social cooperation within and between groups and, ultimately, between communities and nations. Conversely, a discrepancy between bodily expressions and narratives may cause distrust in the addressee(s) and eventually may destroy social bonds.

How childhood maltreatment alters perception and cognition - the predictive processing account of borderline personality disorder

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental disorder, comprised of heterogeneous psychological and neurobiological pathologies. Here, we propose a predictive processing (PP) account of BPD to integrate these seemingly unrelated pathologies. In particular, we argue that the experience of childhood maltreatment, which is highly prevalent in BPD, leaves a developmental legacy with two facets: first, a coarse-grained, alexithymic model of self and others - leading to a rigidity and inflexibility concerning beliefs about self and others. Second, this developmental legacy leads to a loss of confidence or precision afforded beliefs about the consequences of social behavior. This results in an over reliance on sensory evidence and social feedback, with concomitant lability, impulsivity and hypersensitivity. In terms of PP, people with BPD show a distorted belief updating in response to new information with two opposing manifestations: rapid changes in beliefs and a lack of belief updating despite disconfirmatory evidence. This account of distorted information processing has the potential to explain both the instability (of affect, self-image, and interpersonal relationships) and the rigidity (of beliefs about self and others) which is typical of BPD. At the neurobiological level, we propose that enhanced levels of dopamine are associated with the increased integration of negative social feedback, and we also discuss the hypothesis of an impaired inhibitory control of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of negative social information. Our account may provide a new understanding not only of the clinical aspects of BPD, but also a unifying theory of the corresponding neurobiological pathologies. We conclude by outlining some directions for future research on the behavioral, neurobiological, and computational underpinnings of this model, and point to some clinical implications of it.

Challenging depressive beliefs: Habitual and recollective components of stability or change

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Depressed people tend to hold stable negative beliefs that resist challenges. Two experiments investigated the cognitive bases of belief change or resistance to change following the provision of supportive or challenging pseudo-evidence.

METHOD

Students scoring high and low on a measure of depressed state read belief statements, each followed by invented experimental evidence to either verify or discount them. Two days later, they read all the belief statements again, together with new statements, this time rating belief.

RESULTS

The students agreed that the statements described common beliefs and that the evidence was plausible. Discounted statements were believed less than new statements on the test. Also, dysphoric students believed discounted and new statements less than verified statements, but that difference was larger for the nondysphoric students. Parameter estimates of the habitual basis for belief ratings, obtained with process-dissociation procedures, were higher in the dysphoric group, and estimates of evidence recollection were lower. The latter finding was conceptually supported by deficient recognition of the gist of the discounting evidence in the dysphoric group (Experiment 2).

LIMITATIONS

Experiment 2 results replicated the rating effects in Experiment 1, but not the parameter differences, due to low power as a consequence of the university response to the pandemic.

CONCLUSIONS

We interpret these results in the context of other evidence regarding belief change and depressive cognition, such as habitual rumination and deficient cognitive control.

Nudging societally relevant behavior by promoting cognitive inferences

Effective behavioral interventions are essential to address urgent societal challenges. Over the past decade, nudging interventions (i.e., arranging the environment to promote adaptive behavioral choices) have surged in popularity. Importantly, effective application of the nudging approach requires clear guiding principles with a firm basis in behavioral science. We present a framework for nudging interventions that builds on evidence about the goal-directed inferential processes underlying behavior (i.e., processes that involve context-dependent inferences about goals and the actions available to achieve these goals). We used this framework to develop nudging interventions that target context-relevant cognitive inferences. We examined the effectiveness of these inference nudging interventions for promoting two important types of societal behavior: pro-environmental actions and adherence to COVID-19 guidelines. As predicted, two online studies revealed that inference nudging interventions successfully increased energy conservation (Study 1) as well as social distancing during the COVID-19 crisis (Study 2). A field experiment found that inference nudging interventions increased hand disinfection in a real-life store during the COVID-19 crisis (Study 3). Our findings highlight the importance of applying state-of-the-art insights about the (inferential) determinants of behavior in behavior change interventions.

How expectancy violations facilitate learning to cope with pain - An experimental approach

BACKGROUND

Expectations of painful sensations constitute a core feature of chronic pain. An important clinical question is whether such expectations are revised when disconfirming experiences are made (e.g., less pain than expected). This study examined how people adjust their pain expectations when the experience of decreasing pain is expected vs. unexpected.

METHODS

In a novel randomized between-subjects design, a subclinical sample of people who frequently experience pain was provided with painful thermal stimulations. Unbeknownst to participants, the temperature applied was decreased from trial to trial. Based on the experimental instructions provided, this experience of decreasing pain was expected in one condition (expectation-confirmation; n = 34), whereas it was unexpected in another (expectation-disconfirmation; n = 39).

RESULTS

Perceived pain intensity was lower in the expectation-confirmation condition than in the expectation-disconfirmation condition (p = .014, η_p² = 0.083). The expectation-confirmation condition also showed a greater adjustment of their pain expectations than the expectation-disconfirmation condition (p = .046, η_p² = 0.047). Across groups, large expectation violations (i.e., less pain than expected) were associated with increases in pain tolerance and the ability to cope with pain at a one-week follow-up.

CONCLUSIONS

In terms of assimilation, perceived pain intensity was shaped in the direction of pain expectations. The greater adjustment of expectations in the expectation-confirming condition is consistent with a confirmation bias in pain perception. Though participants who experienced large discrepancies between expected and experienced pain were hesitant to adjust their pain expectations immediately, expectation violations increased their ability to cope with pain one week later, suggesting some beneficial longer-term effects of expectation violations.

The Role of Predictions, Their Confirmation, and Reward in Maintaining the Self-Concept

The predictive processing framework posits that people continuously use predictive principles when interacting with, learning from, and interpreting their surroundings. Here, we suggest that the same framework may help explain how people process self-relevant knowledge and maintain a stable and positive self-concept. Specifically, we recast two prominent self-relevant motivations, self-verification and self-enhancement, in predictive processing (PP) terms. We suggest that these self-relevant motivations interact with the self-concept (i.e., priors) to create strong predictions. These predictions, in turn, influence how people interpret information about themselves. In particular, we argue that these strong self-relevant predictions dictate how prediction error, the deviation from the original prediction, is processed. In contrast to many implementations of the PP framework, we suggest that predictions and priors emanating from stable constructs (such as the self-concept) cultivate belief-maintaining, rather than belief-updating, dynamics. Based on recent findings, we also postulate that evidence supporting a predicted model of the self (or interpreted as such) triggers subjective reward responses, potentially reinforcing existing beliefs. Characterizing the role of rewards in self-belief maintenance and reframing self-relevant motivations and rewards in predictive processing terms offers novel insights into how the self is maintained in neurotypical adults, as well as in pathological populations, potentially pointing to therapeutic implications.

Social Context and Rejection Expectations Modulate Neural and Behavioral Responses to Social Feedback

When meeting other people, some are optimistic and expect to be accepted by others, whereas others are pessimistic and expect mostly rejections. How social feedback is evaluated in situations that meet or do not meet these biases and how people differ in their response to rejection and acceptance depending on the social situation are unknown. In this study, participants experienced rejection and acceptance by peers in two different social contexts, one with high (negative context) and the other with low probability of rejection (positive context). We examined how the neural and behavioral responses to rejection are altered by this context and whether it depends on the individual's sensitivity to rejection. Behavioral results show that, on average, people maintain an optimistic bias even when mostly experiencing rejection. Importantly, personality differences in rejection sensitivity affected both prior expectations to be rejected in the paradigm and the extent to which expectations changed during the paradigm. The context also strongly modulated ERPs and theta responses to rejection and acceptance feedback. Specifically, valence effects on neural responses were enhanced in the negative context, suggesting a greater relevance to monitor social feedback in such a situation. Moreover, midfrontal theta predicted how expectations were changed in response to prediction errors, stressing a role for theta in learning from social feedback. Surprisingly, interindividual differences in rejection sensitivity did not affect neural responses to feedback. Our results stress the importance of considering the interaction between subjective expectations and the social context for behavioral and neural responses to social rejection.

Is depression associated with reduced optimistic belief updating?

When asked to evaluate their probability of experiencing a negative life event, healthy individuals update their beliefs more following good news than bad. This is referred to as optimistic belief updating. By contrast, individuals with depression update their beliefs by a similar amount, showing reduced optimism. We conducted the first independent replication of this effect and extended this work to examine whether reduced optimistic belief updating in depression also occurs for positive life events. Replicating previous research, healthy and depression groups differed in belief updating for negative events (β = 0.71, 95% CI: 0.24, 1.18). Whereas healthy participants updated their beliefs more following good news than bad, individuals experiencing depression lacked this bias. However, our findings for positive events were inconclusive. While we did not find statistical evidence that patterns of belief updating between groups varied by valence (β = -0.51, 95% CI: -1.16, 0.15), mean update scores suggested that both groups showed largely similar updating for positive life events. Our results add confidence to previous findings that depression is characterized by negative future expectations maintained by reduced updating in response to good news. However, further research is required to understand the specificity of this to negative events, and into refining methods for quantifying belief updating in clinical and non-clinical research.

No Evidence for the Involvement of Cognitive Immunisation in Updating Beliefs About the Self in Three Non-Clinical Samples

BACKGROUND

Cognitive immunisation against disconfirmatory evidence (i.e., devaluing expectation-disconfirming information through cognitive mechanisms) has recently been discussed as an obstacle to the revision of dysfunctional beliefs in mental disorders such as depression. Yet, it is unclear whether cognitive immunisation is also involved in belief updating in non-clinical samples.

METHODS

Using a three-group modulation protocol (promotion vs. inhibition of cognitive immunisation vs. control group), we examined how cognitive immunisation influences belief updating in response to performance feedback in three non-clinical samples. In Experiments 1 (N = 99) and 2 (N = 93), participants received unexpectedly negative feedback, whereas participants from Experiment 3 (N = 118) received unexpectedly positive feedback. Depressive symptoms and dispositional optimism were examined as additional predictors of belief updating.

RESULTS

In all experiments, participants adjusted their expectations in line with the feedback received, but this effect was not influenced by the cognitive immunisation manipulation. In Experiment 3, expectation change remained stable over 2 weeks. Depressive symptoms were associated with a reduced integration of positive feedback, but not with an increased sensitivity to negative feedback.

CONCLUSIONS

Whereas previous research has shown that cognitive immunisation contributes to persistent beliefs in clinical populations, the present findings suggest that it does not affect belief updating in non-clinical samples.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10608-021-10256-y.

Dispositional and situational predictors of coping with violated achievement expectations

Most students experience expectation violations during their academic career, such as unexpected failed tests. However, contradictory evidence does not always result in expectation change (accommodation). Expectations often persist through stronger efforts to fulfil the expectation (assimilation) or ignoring the discrepancy (immunisation). Our study addresses possible situational and dispositional predictors that may be decisive influences on the use of the three coping strategies. We conducted an experimental study with n = 439 students who experienced an expectation violation in an achievement test. Dispositional coping tendencies, valence of expectation violation, and the interaction of valence and degree of expectation violation were found to predict situational coping. Furthermore, higher need for cognitive closure predicted stronger accommodation, and a large degree of expectation violation predicted stronger immunisation. Thus, our study provides initial evidence on which situational and dispositional factors predict coping with expectation violations in an educational context. Expectation violation in a performance context mainly resulted in stronger efforts to protect positive achievement expectations.

Enhanced rationality in autism spectrum disorder

Challenges in social cognition and communication are core characteristics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), but in some domains, individuals with ASD may display typical abilities and even outperform their neurotypical counterparts. These enhanced abilities are notable in the domains of reasoning, judgment and decision-making, in which individuals with ASD often show 'enhanced rationality' by exhibiting more rational and bias-free decision-making than do neurotypical individuals. We review evidence for enhanced rationality in ASD, how it relates to theoretical frameworks of information processing in ASD, its implications for basic research about human irrationality, and what it may mean for the ASD community.

Teaching psychology students to change (or correct) controversial beliefs about memory works

Therapists, judges, law enforcement, and students often believe in the existence of automatic and unconscious repression. Such a belief can be perilous as it might lead therapists to suggestively search for repressed memories leading to false memories. Recovering therapy-induced false memories of criminal acts can have serious consequences. Here, we tested whether erroneous beliefs in repressed memories can be corrected. Surveying two cohorts of Forensic and Legal Psychology Master's students, we examined whether education about the science of (eyewitness) memory can correct erroneous beliefs in repressed memories. Students assessed memory statements before taking a course on eyewitness memory, six weeks after the course exam, and 18 or 6 months later, respectively (Ns = 33-74 per cohort and measurement). As expected, students in both cohorts on average initially strongly agreed with the statement that memories of traumatic events can be unconsciously blocked, but strongly disagreed with the statement after the course. Belief-corrections also persisted after the longer delay. These findings show that educating people about the science of (eyewitness) memory can be effective in correcting false and controversial memory beliefs in general and the existence of repressed memories in specific.

Compassion As an Intervention to Attune to Universal Suffering of Self and Others in Conflicts: A Translational Framework

As interpersonal, racial, social, and international conflicts intensify in the world, it is important to safeguard the mental health of individuals affected by them. According to a Buddhist notion "if you want others to be happy, practice compassion; if you want to be happy, practice compassion," compassion practice is an intervention to cultivate conflict-proof well-being. Here, compassion practice refers to a form of concentrated meditation wherein a practitioner attunes to friend, enemy, and someone in between, thinking, "I'm going to help them (equally)." The compassion meditation is based on Buddhist philosophy that mental suffering is rooted in conceptual thoughts that give rise to generic mental images of self and others and subsequent biases to preserve one's egoism, blocking the ultimate nature of mind. To contextualize compassion meditation scientifically, we adopted a Bayesian active inference framework to incorporate relevant Buddhist concepts, including mind (buddhi), compassion (karuna), aggregates (skandhas), suffering (duhkha), reification (samaropa), conceptual thoughts (vikalpa), and superimposition (prapañca). In this framework, a person is considered a Bayesian Engine that actively constructs phenomena based on the aggregates of forms, sensations, discriminations, actions, and consciousness. When the person embodies rigid beliefs about self and others' identities (identity-grasping beliefs) and the resulting ego-preserving bias, the person's Bayesian Engine malfunctions, failing to use prediction errors to update prior beliefs. To counter this problem, after recognizing the causes of sufferings, a practitioner of the compassion meditation aims to attune to all others equally, friends and enemies alike, suspend identity-based conceptual thoughts, and eventually let go of any identity-grasping belief and ego-preserving bias that obscure reality. We present a brain model for the Bayesian Engine of three components: (a) Relation-Modeling, (b) Reality-Checking, and (c) Conflict-Alarming, which are subserved by (a) the Default-Mode Network (DMN), (b) Frontoparietal Network (FPN) and Ventral Attention Network (VAN), and (c) Salience Network (SN), respectively. Upon perceiving conflicts, the strengthening or weakening of ego-preserving bias will critically depend on whether the SN up-regulates the DMN or FPN/VAN, respectively. We propose that compassion meditation can strengthen brain regions that are conducive for suspending prior beliefs and enhancing the attunements to the counterparts in conflicts.

A continuum hypothesis of psychotomimetic rapid antidepressants

Ketamine, classical psychedelics and sleep deprivation are associated with rapid effects on depression. Interestingly, these interventions also have common psychotomimetic actions, mirroring aspects of psychosis such as an altered sense of self, perceptual distortions and distorted thinking. This raises the question whether these interventions might be acute antidepressants through the same mechanisms that underlie some of their psychotomimetic effects. That is, perhaps some symptoms of depression can be understood as occupying the opposite end of a spectrum where elements of psychosis can be found on the other side. This review aims at reviewing the evidence underlying a proposed continuum hypothesis of psychotomimetic rapid antidepressants, suggesting that a range of psychotomimetic interventions are also acute antidepressants as well as trying to explain these common features in a hierarchical predictive coding framework, where we hypothesise that these interventions share a common mechanism by increasing the flexibility of prior expectations. Neurobiological mechanisms at play and the role of different neuromodulatory systems affected by these interventions and their role in controlling the precision of prior expectations and new sensory evidence will be reviewed. The proposed hypothesis will also be discussed in relation to other existing theories of antidepressants. We also suggest a number of novel experiments to test the hypothesis and highlight research areas that could provide further insights, in the hope to better understand the acute antidepressant properties of these interventions.

Global Adversities, the Media, and Mental Health

Global communities are currently confronted with a number of complex problems and threats, the reality of which is amplified by the media. These environmental and socio-political stressors have been accompanied by the spread of problematic psychological and behavioural tendencies, such as the growing polarisation of opinions and values, online radicalisation and extremism, deepening xenophobia and nationalism, the proliferation of irrational beliefs and conspiracy theories, and resistance to rational public policy measures. Here we argue that although they fall outside the scope of psychopathology, they nevertheless currently constitute a major challenge for psychiatry as a research domain and a clinical practise. To substantiate this claim, we outline the mechanisms by which media-transmitted stressors impact mental well-being and possibly psychopathology. The common denominator of these global problems and the media's construction of reality is the increase in uncertainty, unpredictability, and uncontrollability, which prompts defensive responding and, in predisposed individuals, functions as a potent source of chronic stress. These contribute to cognitive inflexibility, a strong predisposing factor for the development of rigid beliefs and attitudes, which to varying degrees underlie the adverse psychological and behavioural tendencies mentioned above. We suggest that the tightening of beliefs and ideas that is the result of cognitive rigidity may correspond to the clinical characteristics of induced delusional disorder. This can be seen as a (ultimately maladaptive) defensive strategy for coping with a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. We conclude by briefly outlining the possible ways in which psychiatry can face this challenge.

Behavioural Experiments in Cognitive Therapy for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Why, When, and How?

Behavioural experiments are an integral component of cognitive therapy (CT) for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but they can be overlooked due to practical constraints and therapist concerns. Here we describe why behavioural experiments are an important part of CT, where they fit into different elements of treatment for PTSD, how to design and implement effective experiments including coping with unexpected outcomes, and how to incorporate behavioural experiments when therapy is delivered remotely. Clinical case examples are used to illustrate a range of idiosyncratic and creative behavioural experiments.