Risk assessment of influenza transmission between workers and pigs on US indoor hog growing units

On pig farms ample opportunity exists for pig-to-human and human-to-pig (cross-species) influenza transmission. The purpose of this study was to assess the risks of cross-species influenza transmission within an indoor pig grower unit in the United States and to prioritize data gaps. Using the World Organization for Animal Health risk assessment framework we evaluated influenza transmission across two risk pathways: 1. What is the likelihood that based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one hog becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with swine (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 1a] and that at least one worker becomes infected as a result [step 1b] and that the worker develops symptoms [step 1c]? And 2. What is the likelihood that, based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one worker becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with people (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 2a] and that at least one pig becomes infected as a result [step 2b] and that the pig(s) develop(s) symptoms [step 2c]? Semi-quantitative probability and uncertainty assessments were based on literature review including passive and active influenza surveillance data. We assumed a typical pig-grower farm has capacity for 4,000 pigs, two workers, and minimal influenza control measures. Probability and uncertainty categories were assessed for each risk step and the combined risk pathway. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway one was estimated to be Very Low for H1N1 and H1N2 with an overall High level of uncertainty. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway two was estimated to be Extremely Low for H1N1 and H3N2 with a High degree of uncertainty. Scenario analyses in which influenza control measures were assumed to be implemented separately (implementing vaccinating sows, mass vaccinating incoming pigs or improved personal protective equipment adherence) showed no reduction in the combined risk category. When implementing three influenza control methods altogether, the combined risk could be reduced to Extremely Low for risk pathway one and remained Extremely Low for risk pathway two. This work highlights that multiple influenza control methods are needed to reduce the risks of inter-species influenza transmission on swine farms.

Influenza surveillance in pigs: balancing act between broad diagnostic coverage and specific virus characterization

BACKGROUND

Monitoring of infectious diseases on swine farms requires a high diagnostic sensitivity and specificity of the test system. Moreover, particularly in cases of swine influenza A virus (swIAV) it is desirable to include characterization of the virus as precisely as possible. This is indispensable for strategies concerning prophylaxis of swIAV and furthermore, to meet the requirements of a purposeful monitoring of newly emerging swIAV strains in terms of vaccine design and public health. Within the present cross-sectional study, we compared the diagnostic value of group samples (wipes of surfaces with direct contact to mouth/nose, dust wipes, udder skin wipes, oral fluids) to individual samples (nasal swabs, tracheobronchial swabs) for both swIAV identification and characterization. Sampling included different stages of pig production on 25 sow farms with attached nursery considered as enzootically infected with swIAV. Firstly, samples were analyzed for IAV genome and subsequently samples with Ct-values < 32 were subtyped by multiplex RT-qPCR.

RESULTS

Nasal swabs of suckling piglets and nursery pigs resulted in a higher odds to detect swIAV (p < 0.001) and to identify swIAV subtypes by RT-qPCR (p < 0.05) compared to nasal swabs of sows. In suckling piglets, significant higher rates of swIAV detection could be observed for nasal swabs (p = 0.007) and sow udder skin wipes (p = 0.036) compared to contact wipes. In the nursery, group sampling specimens were significantly more often swIAV positive compared to individual samples (p < 0.01), with exception of the comparison between contact wipes and nasal swabs (p = 0.181). However, in general nasal swabs were more likely to have Ct-value < 32 and thus, to be suitable for subtyping by RT-qPCR compared to dust wipes, contact wipes, udder skin wipes and tracheobronchial swabs (p < 0.05). Interestingly, different subtypes were found in different age groups as well as in different specimens in the same holding.

CONCLUSION

Although population-based specimens are highly effective for swIAV monitoring, nasal swabs are still the preferable sampling material for the surveillance of on-farm circulating strains due to significantly higher virus loads. Remarkably, sampling strategies should incorporate suckling piglets and different age groups within the nursery to cover as many as possible of the on-farm circulating strains.

Avian influenza and gut microbiome in poultry and humans: A "One Health" perspective

A gradual increase in avian influenza outbreaks has been found in recent years. It is highly possible to trigger the next human pandemic due to the characteristics of antigenic drift and antigenic shift in avian influenza virus (AIV). Although great improvements in understanding influenza viruses and the associated diseases have been unraveled, our knowledge of how these viruses impact the gut microbiome of both poultry and humans, as well as the underlying mechanisms, is still improving. The "One Health" approach shows better vitality in monitoring and mitigating the risk of avian influenza, which requires a multi-sectoral effort and highlights the interconnection of human health with environmental sustainability and animal health. Therefore, monitoring the gut microbiome may serve as a sentinel for protecting the common health of the environment, animals, and humans. This review summarizes the interactions between AIV infection and the gut microbiome of poultry and humans and their potential mechanisms. With the presented suggestions, we hope to address the current major challenges in the surveillance and prevention of microbiome-related avian influenza with the "One Health" approach.

Characteristics of two zoonotic swine influenza A(H1N1) viruses isolated in Germany from diseased patients

Interspecies transmission of influenza A viruses (IAV) from pigs to humans is a concerning event as porcine IAV represent a reservoir of potentially pandemic IAV. We conducted a comprehensive analysis of two porcine A(H1N1)v viruses isolated from human cases by evaluating their genetic, antigenic and virological characteristics. The HA genes of those human isolates belonged to clades 1C.2.1 and 1C.2.2, respectively, of the A(H1N1) Eurasian avian-like swine influenza lineage. Antigenic profiling revealed substantial cross-reactivity between the two zoonotic H1N1 viruses and human A(H1N1)pdm09 virus and some swine viruses, but did not reveal cross-reactivity to H1N2 and earlier human seasonal A(H1N1) viruses. The solid-phase direct receptor binding assay analysis of both A(H1N1)v showed a predominant binding to α2-6-sialylated glycans similar to human-adapted IAV. Investigation of the replicative potential revealed that both A(H1N1)v viruses grow in human bronchial epithelial cells to similar high titers as the human A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. Cytokine induction was studied in human alveolar epithelial cells A549 and showed that both swine viruses isolated from human cases induced higher amounts of type I and type III IFN, as well as IL6 compared to a seasonal A(H1N1) or a A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. In summary, we demonstrate a remarkable adaptation of both zoonotic viruses to propagate in human cells. Our data emphasize the needs for continuous monitoring of people and regions at increased risk of such trans-species transmissions, as well as systematic studies to quantify the frequency of these events and to identify viral molecular determinants enhancing the zoonotic potential of porcine IAV.

Applying valency-based immuno-selection to generate broadly cross-reactive antibodies against influenza hemagglutinins

Conserved epitopes shared between virus subtypes are often subdominant, making it difficult to induce broadly reactive antibodies by immunization. Here, we generate a plasmid DNA mix vaccine that encodes protein heterodimers with sixteen different influenza A virus hemagglutinins (HA) representing all HA subtypes except H1 (group 1) and H7 (group 2). Each single heterodimer expresses two different HA subtypes and is targeted to MHC class II on antigen presenting cells (APC). Female mice immunized with the plasmid mix produce antibodies not only against the 16 HA subtypes, but also against non-included H1 and H7. We demonstrate that individual antibody molecules cross-react between different HAs. Furthermore, the mix vaccine induces T cell responses to conserved HA epitopes. Immunized mice are partially protected against H1 viruses. The results show that application of valency-based immuno-selection to diversified antigens can be used to direct antibody responses towards conserved (subdominant) epitopes on viral antigens.

Zoonosis and zooanthroponosis of emerging respiratory viruses

Lung infections in Influenza-Like Illness (ILI) are triggered by a variety of respiratory viruses. All human pandemics have been caused by the members of two major virus families, namely Orthomyxoviridae (influenza A viruses (IAVs); subtypes H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2) and Coronaviridae (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, SARS-CoV-2). These viruses acquired some adaptive changes in a known intermediate host including domestic birds (IAVs) or unknown intermediate host (SARS-CoV-2) following transmission from their natural reservoirs (e.g. migratory birds or bats, respectively). Verily, these acquired adaptive substitutions facilitated crossing species barriers by these viruses to infect humans in a phenomenon that is known as zoonosis. Besides, these adaptive substitutions aided the variant strain to transmit horizontally to other contact non-human animal species including pets and wild animals (zooanthroponosis). Herein we discuss the main zoonotic and reverse-zoonosis events that occurred during the last two pandemics of influenza A/H1N1 and SARS-CoV-2. We also highlight the impact of interspecies transmission of these pandemic viruses on virus evolution and possible prophylactic and therapeutic interventions. Based on information available and presented in this review article, it is important to close monitoring viral zoonosis and viral reverse zoonosis of pandemic strains within a One-Health and One-World approach to mitigate their unforeseen risks, such as virus evolution and resistance to limited prophylactic and therapeutic interventions.

Integrated analysis of miRNA-mRNA expression of newly emerging swine H3N2 influenza virus cross-species infection with tree shrews

BACKGROUND

Cross-species transmission of zoonotic IAVs to humans is potentially widespread and lethal, posing a great threat to human health, and their cross-species transmission mechanism has attracted much attention. miRNAs have been shown to be involved in the regulation of IAVs infection and immunity, however, few studies have focused on the molecular mechanisms underlying miRNAs and mRNAs expression after IAVs cross-species infection.

METHODS

We used tree shrews, a close relative of primates, as a model and used RNA-Seq and bioinformatics tools to analyze the expression profiles of DEMs and DEGs in the nasal turbinate tissue at different time points after the newly emerged swine influenza A virus SW2783 cross-species infection with tree shrews, and miRNA-mRNA interaction maps were constructed and verified by RT-qPCR, miRNA transfection and luciferase reporter assay.

RESULTS

14 DEMs were screened based on functional analysis and interaction map, miR-760-3p, miR-449b-2, miR-30e-3p, and miR-429 were involved in the signal transduction process of replication and proliferation after infection, miR-324-3p, miR-1301-1, miR-103-1, miR-134-5p, miR-29a, miR-31, miR-16b, miR-34a, and miR-125b participate in negative feedback regulation of genes related to the immune function of the body to activate the antiviral immune response, and miR-106b-3p may be related to the cross-species infection potential of SW2783, and the expression level of these miRNAs varies in different days after infection.

CONCLUSIONS

The miRNA regulatory networks were constructed and 14 DEMs were identified, some of them can affect the replication and proliferation of viruses by regulating signal transduction, while others can play an antiviral role by regulating the immune response. It indicates that abnormal expression of miRNAs plays a crucial role in the regulation of cross-species IAVs infection, which lays a solid foundation for further exploration of the molecular regulatory mechanism of miRNAs in IAVs cross-species infection and anti-influenza virus targets.

Robust evidence for bats as reservoir hosts is lacking in most African virus studies: a review and call to optimize sampling and conserve bats

Africa experiences frequent emerging disease outbreaks among humans, with bats often proposed as zoonotic pathogen hosts. We comprehensively reviewed virus-bat findings from papers published between 1978 and 2020 to evaluate the evidence that African bats are reservoir and/or bridging hosts for viruses that cause human disease. We present data from 162 papers (of 1322) with original findings on (1) numbers and species of bats sampled across bat families and the continent, (2) how bats were selected for study inclusion, (3) if bats were terminally sampled, (4) what types of ecological data, if any, were recorded and (5) which viruses were detected and with what methodology. We propose a scheme for evaluating presumed virus-host relationships by evidence type and quality, using the contrasting available evidence for Orthoebolavirus versus Orthomarburgvirus as an example. We review the wording in abstracts and discussions of all 162 papers, identifying key framing terms, how these refer to findings, and how they might contribute to people's beliefs about bats. We discuss the impact of scientific research communication on public perception and emphasize the need for strategies that minimize human-bat conflict and support bat conservation. Finally, we make recommendations for best practices that will improve virological study metadata.

An Update in Knowledge of Pigs as the Source of Zoonotic Pathogens

The available data indicate that the human world population will constantly grow in the subsequent decades. This constant increase in the number of people on the Earth will lead to growth in food demand, especially in food of high nutritional value. Therefore, it is expected that the world livestock population will also increase. Such a phenomenon enhances the risk of transmitting pathogens to humans. As pig production is one of the most significant branches of the world's livestock production, zoonoses of porcine origins seem to be of particular importance. Therefore, in this review, we aim to introduce the latest data concerning, among other things, epidemiology and available preventive measures to control the most significant porcine zoonoses of viral, bacterial, and parasitic origin.

Evidence for the circulation of genotype 4 Eurasian avian-like lineage swine H1N1 influenza A viruses on Korean swine farms, obtained using a newly developed one-step multiplex RT-qPCR assay

Genotype 4 (G4) Eurasian avian-like lineage swine H1N1 influenza A viruses, which are reassortants containing sequences from the pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus lineage, triple-reassortant-lineage internal genes, and EA-lineage external genes, have been reported in China since 2013. These have been predominant in pig populations since 2016 and have exhibited pandemic potential. In this study, we developed a one-step multiplex RT-qPCR assay targeting the M, HA1, and PB2 genes to detect G4 and related EA H1N1 viruses, with detection limits of 1.5 × 101 copies/μL and 1.15 × 10-2 ng/μL for the purified PCR products and RNA templates, respectively. The specificity of the detection method was confirmed using various influenza virus subtypes. When the one-step multiplex RT-qPCR assay was applied to swine respiratory samples collected between 2020 and 2022 in Korea, a virus related to G4 EA H1N1 strains was detected. Phylogenetic analysis based on portions of all eight genome segments showed that the positive sample contained HA, NA, PB2, NS, and NP genes closely related to those of G4 EA H1N1 viruses, confirming the ability of our assay to accurately detect G4 EA H1N1 viruses in the field.

Zoonotic Animal Influenza Virus and Potential Mixing Vessel Hosts

Influenza viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae with a negative-sense, single-stranded segmented RNA genome. They infect a wide range of animals, including humans. From 1918 to 2009, there were four influenza pandemics, which caused millions of casualties. Frequent spillover of animal influenza viruses to humans with or without intermediate hosts poses a serious zoonotic and pandemic threat. The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic overshadowed the high risk raised by animal influenza viruses, but highlighted the role of wildlife as a reservoir for pandemic viruses. In this review, we summarize the occurrence of animal influenza virus in humans and describe potential mixing vessel or intermediate hosts for zoonotic influenza viruses. While several animal influenza viruses possess a high zoonotic risk (e.g., avian and swine influenza viruses), others are of low to negligible zoonotic potential (e.g., equine, canine, bat and bovine influenza viruses). Transmission can occur directly from animals, particularly poultry and swine, to humans or through reassortant viruses in "mixing vessel" hosts. To date, there are less than 3000 confirmed human infections with avian-origin viruses and less than 7000 subclinical infections documented. Likewise, only a few hundreds of confirmed human cases caused by swine influenza viruses have been reported. Pigs are the historic mixing vessel host for the generation of zoonotic influenza viruses due to the expression of both avian-type and human-type receptors. Nevertheless, there are a number of hosts which carry both types of receptors and can act as a potential mixing vessel host. High vigilance is warranted to prevent the next pandemic caused by animal influenza viruses.

Pathogenicity and anti-infection immunity of animal H3N2 and H6N6 subtype influenza virus cross-species infection with tree shrews

Animal influenza viruses can spread across species and pose a fatal threat to human health due to the high pathogenicity and mortality. Animal models are crucial for studying cross-species infection and the pathogenesis of influenza viruses. Tupaia belangeri (tree shrew) has been emerging as an animal model for multiple human virus infections recently because of the close genetic relationship and phylogeny with humans. So far, tree shrew has been reported to be susceptible to human influenza virus subtype H1N1, avian influenza viruses subtype H9N2, subtype H5N1, and subtype H7N9. However, the pathogenicity, infection, and immunity of swine and land avian influenza viruses with low pathogenicity and the potential to jump to humans remain largely unexplored in the tree shrew model. Previously, our team has successfully isolated the newly emerging swine influenza virus subtype H3N2 (A/Swine/GX/NS2783/2010, SW2783) and avian influenza virus subtype H6N6 (A/CK/ZZ/346/2014, ZZ346). In this study, we observed the pathogenicity, immune characteristics, and cross-species infection potential ability of SW2783 and ZZ346 strains in tree shrew model with 50% tissue culture infective dose (TCID₅₀), hematoxylin and eosin (HE) staining, immunohistochemistry (IHC), real-time quantitative PCR (qRT-PCR) and other experimental methods. Both animal-borne influenza viruses had a strong ability on tissue infection in the turbinate and the trachea of tree shrews in vitro, in which SW2783 showed stronger replication ability than in ZZ346. SW2783 and ZZ346 both showed pathogenic ability with infected tree shrews model in vivo without prior adaptive culture, which mainly happened in the upper respiratory tract. However, the infection ability was weak, the clinical symptoms were mild, and the histopathological changes in the respiratory tract were relatively light. Furthermore, innate immune responses and adaptive immunity were observed in the tree shrew model after the infection of SW2783 and ZZ346 strains. We observed that the unadapted SW2783 and ZZ346 virus could transmit among tree shrews by direct contact. We also observed that SW2783 virus could transmit from tree shrews to guinea pigs. These results indicated that both animal-borne influenza viruses could induce similar pathogenicity and immune response to those caused by human-common influenza viruses. Tree shrews may be an excellent animal model for studying the interaction between the influenza virus and the host and the cross-species infection mechanism of the animal influenza virus.

Human Immunity and Susceptibility to Influenza A(H3) Viruses of Avian, Equine, and Swine Origin

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) of subtype H3 that infect humans are antigenically divergent from those of birds, horses, and swine. Human immunity against these viruses might be limited, implying potential pandemic risk. To determine human risk, we selected 4 avian, 1 equine, and 3 swine IAVs representing major H3 lineages. We tested serum collected during 2017-2018 from 286 persons in Belgium for hemagglutination inhibiting antibodies and virus neutralizing antibodies against those animal-origin IAVs and tested replication in human airway epithelia. Seroprevalence rates for circulating IAVs from swine in North America were >51%, swine in Europe 7%-37%, and birds and equids ≤12%. Replication was efficient for cluster IV-A IAVs from swine in North America and IAVs from swine in Europe, intermediate for IAVs from horses and poultry, and absent for IAVs from wild birds and a novel human-like swine IAV in North America. Public health risk may be highest for swine H3 IAVs.

Adaptive evolution of PB1 from influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus towards an enhanced fitness

PB1 influenza virus retain traces of interspecies transmission and adaptation. Previous phylogenetic analyses highlighted mutations L298I, R386K and I517V in PB1 to have putatively ameliorated the A(H1N1)pdm09 adaptation to the human host. This study aimed to evaluate the reversal of these mutations and infer the role of these residues in the virus overall fitness and adaptation. We generate PB1-mutated viruses introducing I298L, K386R and V517I mutations in PB1 and evaluate their phenotypic impact on viral growth and on antigen yield. We observed a decrease in viral growth accompanied by a reduction in hemagglutination titer and neuraminidase activity, in comparison with wt. Our data indicate that the adaptive evolution occurred in the PB1 leads to an improved overall viral fitness; and such biologic advantaged has the potential to be applied to the optimization of influenza vaccine seed prototypes.

JMM Profile: Swine influenza A virus: a neglected virus with pandemic potential

Swine influenza is an acute respiratory disease of swine caused by swine influenza A virus (SwIAV). The ability of SwIAV to spread bidirectionally from animals to humans (zoonotic), and from humans to animals (reverse zoonotic), drives coinfection that can result in gene segment exchange and elevates the risk of generating viruses with pandemic potential. Compared to human-origin influenza A viruses, current data indicate a greater diversity amongst circulating SwIAVs, with three major subtypes (classified by haemagglutinin and neuraminidase) circulating globally in swine (H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2). The lack of protection afforded by human seasonal influenza vaccines against SwIAVs exacerbates the risk associated with reassortment of human, swine and potentially avian viruses. As such, global monitoring of SwIAVs is important for both human and animal health as they represent a true 'One Health' challenge with pandemic potential.

Severe Human Case of Zoonotic Infection with Swine-Origin Influenza A Virus, Denmark, 2021

During routine surveillance at the National Influenza Center, Denmark, we detected a zoonotic swine influenza A virus in a patient who became severely ill. We describe the clinical picture and the genetic characterization of this variant virus, which is distinct from another variant found previously in Denmark.

A Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine influenza reassortant virus became pathogenic and highly transmissible due to mutations in its PA gene

Previous studies have shown that the Eurasian avian-like H1N1 (EA H1N1) swine influenza viruses circulated widely in pigs around the world and formed multiple genotypes by acquiring non-hemagglutinin and neuraminidase segments derived from other swine influenza viruses. Swine influenza control is not a priority for the pig industry in many countries, and it is worrisome that some strains may become more pathogenic and/or transmissible during their circulation in nature. Our routine surveillance indicated that the EA H1N1 viruses obtained different internal genes from different swine influenza viruses and formed various new genotypes. In this study, we found that a naturally isolated swine influenza reassortant, A/swine/Liaoning/265/2017 (LN265), a representative strain of one of the predominant genotypes in recent years, is lethal in mice and transmissible in ferrets. LN265 contains the hemagglutinin, neuraminidase, and matrix of the EA H1N1 virus; the basic polymerase 2, basic polymerase 1, acidic polymerase (PA), and nucleoprotein of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus; and the nonstructural protein of the North American triple-reassortment H1N2 virus. By generating and testing a series of reassortants and mutants, we found that four gradually accumulated mutations in PA are responsible for the increased pathogenicity and transmissibility of LN265. We further revealed that these mutations increase the messenger RNA transcription of viral proteins by enhancing the endonuclease cleavage activity and viral RNA-binding ability of the PA protein. Our study demonstrates that EA H1N1 swine influenza virus became pathogenic and transmissible in ferrets by acquiring key mutations in PA and provides important insights for monitoring field strains with pandemic potential.

Are pigs overestimated as a source of zoonotic influenza viruses?

Background

Swine influenza caused by influenza A viruses (IAV) directly affects respiratory health and indirectly impairs reproduction rates in pigs causing production losses. In Europe, and elsewhere, production systems have intensified featuring fewer holdings but, in turn, increased breeding herd and litter sizes. This seems to foster swine IAV (swIAV) infections with respect to the entrenchment within and spread between holdings. Disease management of swine influenza is difficult and relies on biosecurity and vaccination measures. Recently discovered and widely proliferating forms of self-sustaining modes of swIAV infections in large swine holdings challenge these preventive concepts by generating vaccine-escape mutants in rolling circles of infection.

Main body

The most recent human IAV pandemic of 2009 rooted at least partly in IAV of porcine origin highlighting the zoonotic potential of swIAV. Pigs constitute a mixing vessel of IAV from different species including avian and human hosts. However, other host species such as turkey and quail but also humans themselves may also act in this way; thus, pigs are not essentially required for the generation of IAV reassortants with a multispecies origin. Since 1918, all human pandemic influenza viruses except the H2N2 virus of 1958 have been transmitted in a reverse zoonotic mode from human into swine populations. Swine populations act as long-term reservoirs of these viruses. Human-derived IAV constitute a major driver of swIAV epidemiology in pigs. Swine-to-human IAV transmissions occurred rarely and mainly sporadically as compared to avian-to-human spill-over events of avian IAV. Yet, new swIAV variants that harbor zoonotic components continue to be detected. This increases the risk that such components might eventually reassort into viruses with pandemic potential.

Conclusions

Domestic pig populations should not be globally stigmatized as the only or most important reservoir of potentially zoonotic IAV. The likely emergence from swine of the most recent human IAV pandemic in 2009, however, emphasized the principal risks of swine populations in which IAV circulate unimpededly. Implementation of regular and close-meshed IAV surveillance of domestic swine populations to follow the dynamics of swIAV evolution is clearly demanded. Improved algorithms for directly inferring zoonotic potential from whole IAV genome sequences as well as improved vaccines are still being sought.

Mutations in PB2 and HA are crucial for the increased virulence and transmissibility of H1N1 swine influenza virus in mammalian models

Genetic analyses indicated that the pandemic H1N1/2009 influenza virus originated from a swine influenza virus (SIV). However, SIVs bearing the same constellation of genetic features as H1N1/2009 have not been isolated. Understanding the adaptation of SIVs with such genotypes in a new host may provide clues regarding the emergence of pandemic strains such as H1N1/2009. In this study, an artificial SIV with the H1N1/2009 genotype (rH1N1) was sequentially passaged in mice through two independent series, yielding multiple mouse-adapted mutants with high genetic diversity and increased virulence. These experiments were meant to mimic genetic bottlenecks during adaptation of wild viruses with rH1N1 genotypes in a new host. Molecular substitutions in the mouse-adapted variants mainly occurred in genes encoding surface proteins (hemagglutinin [HA] and neuraminidase [NA]) and polymerase proteins (polymerase basic 2 [PB2], polymerase basic 1 [PB1], polymerase acid [PA] proteins and nucleoprotein [NP]). The PB2D309N and HAL425M substitutions were detected at high frequencies in both passage lines and enhanced the replication and pathogenicity of rH1N1 in mice. Moreover, these substitutions also enabled direct transmission of rH1N1 in other mammals such as guinea pigs. PB2D309N showed enhanced polymerase activity and HAL425M showed increased stability compared with the wild-type proteins. Our findings indicate that if SIVs with H1N1/2009 genotypes emerge in pigs, they could undergo rapid adaptive changes during infection of a new host, especially in the PB2 and HA genes. These changes may facilitate the emergence of pandemic strains such as H1N1/2009.

Influenza A and D Viruses in Non-Human Mammalian Hosts in Africa: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis to investigate the prevalence and current knowledge of influenza A virus (IAV) and influenza D virus (IDV) in non-human mammalian hosts in Africa. PubMed, Google Scholar, Wiley Online Library and World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE-WAHIS) were searched for studies on IAV and IDV from 2000 to 2020. Pooled prevalence and seroprevalences were estimated using the quality effects meta-analysis model. The estimated pooled prevalence and seroprevalence of IAV in pigs in Africa was 1.6% (95% CI: 0-5%) and 14.9% (95% CI: 5-28%), respectively. The seroprevalence of IDV was 87.2% (95% CI: 24-100%) in camels, 9.3% (95% CI: 0-24%) in cattle, 2.2% (95% CI: 0-4%) in small ruminants and 0.0% (95% CI: 0-2%) in pigs. In pigs, H1N1 and H1N1pdm09 IAVs were commonly detected. Notably, the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus was also detected in pigs. Other subtypes detected serologically and/or virologically included H3N8 and H7N7 in equids, H1N1, and H3N8 and H5N1 in dogs and cats. Furthermore, various wildlife animals were exposed to different IAV subtypes. For prudent mitigation of influenza epizootics and possible human infections, influenza surveillance efforts in Africa should not neglect non-human mammalian hosts. The impact of IAV and IDV in non-human mammalian hosts in Africa deserves further investigation.

Emergence, Evolution, and Pathogenicity of Influenza A(H7N4) Virus in Shorebirds, China

A 2-year surveillance study of influenza A viruses in migratory birds was conducted to understand the subsequent risk during the migratory seasons in Dandong Yalu River Estuary Coastal Wetland National Nature Reserve, Liaoning Province, China, a major stopover site on the East Asian-Australasian flyway. Overall, we isolated 27 influenza A viruses with multiple subtypes, including H3N8 (n = 2), H4N6 (n = 2), H4N7 (n = 2), H7N4 (n = 9), H7N7 (n = 1), H10N7 (n = 7), and H13N6 (n = 4). Particularly, a novel reassortant influenza A(H7N4) virus was first identified in a woman and her backyard poultry flock in Jiangsu Province, China, posing a serious threat to public health. Here, we describe the genetic characterization and pathogenicity of the nine influenza A(H7N4) isolates. Phylogenetic analysis indicated that complex viral gene flow occurred among Asian countries. We also demonstrated a similar evolutionary trajectory of the surface genes of the A(H7N4) isolates and Jiangsu human-related A(H7N4) viruses. Our A(H7N4) isolates exhibited differing degrees of virulence in mice, suggesting a potential risk to other mammalian species, including humans. We revealed multiple mutations that might affect viral virulence in mice. Our report highlights the importance and need for the long-term surveillance of avian influenza virus in migratory birds combined with domestic poultry surveillance along migratory routes and flyways and, thereby, the development of measures to manage potential health threats.

IMPORTANCE The H7 subtype avian influenza viruses, such as H7N2, H7N3, H7N4, H7N7, and H7N9, were documented as being capable of infecting humans, and the H7 subtype low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses are capable of mutating into highly pathogenic avian influenza; therefore, they pose a serious threat to public health. Here, we investigated the evolutionary history, molecular characteristics, and pathogenicity of shorebird-origin influenza A(H7N4) viruses, showing a similar evolutionary trajectory with Jiangsu human A(H7N4) viruses in HA and NA genes. Moreover, our isolates exhibited variable virulence (including moderate virulence) in mice, suggesting a potential risk to other mammalian species, including humans.

Influenza A Viruses and Zoonotic Events-Are We Creating Our Own Reservoirs?

Zoonotic infections of humans with influenza A viruses (IAVs) from animal reservoirs can result in severe disease in individuals and, in rare cases, lead to pandemic outbreaks; this is exemplified by numerous cases of human infection with avian IAVs (AIVs) and the 2009 swine influenza pandemic. In fact, zoonotic transmissions are strongly facilitated by manmade reservoirs that were created through the intensification and industrialization of livestock farming. This can be witnessed by the repeated introduction of IAVs from natural reservoirs of aquatic wild bird metapopulations into swine and poultry, and the accompanied emergence of partially- or fully-adapted human pathogenic viruses. On the other side, human adapted IAV have been (and still are) introduced into livestock by reverse zoonotic transmission. This link to manmade reservoirs was also observed before the 20th century, when horses seemed to have been an important reservoir for IAVs but lost relevance when the populations declined due to increasing industrialization. Therefore, to reduce zoonotic events, it is important to control the spread of IAV within these animal reservoirs, for example with efficient vaccination strategies, but also to critically surveil the different manmade reservoirs to evaluate the emergence of new IAV strains with pandemic potential.

The Emergence and Zoonotic Transmission of H10Nx Avian Influenza Virus Infections

Avian influenza viruses pose a continuous threat to both poultry and human health, with significant economic impact. The ability of viruses to reassort and jump the species barrier into mammalian hosts generates a constant pandemic threat. H10Nx avian viruses have been shown to replicate in mammalian species without prior adaptation and have caused significant human infection and fatalities. They are able to rapidly reassort with circulating poultry strains and go undetected due to their low pathogenicity in chickens. Novel detections of both human reassortant strains and increasing endemicity of H10Nx poultry infections highlight the increasing need for heightened surveillance and greater understanding of the distribution, tropism, and infection capabilities of these viruses. In this minireview, we highlight the gap in the current understanding of this subtype and its prevalence across a vast range of host species and geographical locations.

Serologic Evidence of Occupational Exposure to Avian Influenza Viruses at the Wildfowl/Poultry/Human Interface

Ecological interactions between wild aquatic birds and outdoor-housed poultry can enhance spillover events of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) from wild reservoirs to domestic birds, thus increasing the related zoonotic risk to occupationally exposed workers. To assess serological evidence of AIV infection in workers operating in Northern Italy at the wildfowl/poultry interface or directly exposed to wildfowl, serum samples were collected between April 2005 and November 2006 from 57 bird-exposed workers (BEWs) and from 7 unexposed controls (Cs), planning three sample collections from each individual. Concurrently, AIV surveillance of 3587 reared birds identified 4 AIVs belonging to H10N7, H4N6 and H2N2 subtypes while serological analysis by hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay showed recent infections caused by H1, H2, H4, H6, H10, H11, H12, and H13 subtypes. Human sera were analyzed for specific antibodies against AIVs belonging to antigenic subtypes from H1 to H14 by using HI and virus microneutralization (MN) assays as a screening and a confirmatory test, respectively. Overall, antibodies specific to AIV-H3, AIV-H6, AIV-H8, and AIV-H9 were found in three poultry workers (PWs) and seropositivity to AIV-11, AIV-H13—still detectable in October 2017—in one wildlife professional (WP). Furthermore, seropositivity to AIV-H2, accounting for previous exposure to the “extinct” H2N2 human influenza viruses, was found in both BEWs and Cs groups. These data further emphasize the occupational risk posed by zoonotic AIV strains and show the possible occurrence of long-lived antibody-based immunity following AIV infections in humans.

Canonical features of human antibodies recognizing the influenza hemagglutinin trimer interface

Broadly reactive antibodies targeting the influenza A virus hemagglutinin (HA) head domain are thought to be rare and to require extensive somatic mutations or unusual structural features to achieve breadth against divergent HA subtypes. Here we describe common genetic and structural features of protective human antibodies from several individuals recognizing the trimer interface (TI) of the influenza A HA head, a recently identified site of vulnerability. We examined the sequence of TI-reactive antibodies, determined crystal structures for TI antibody-antigen complexes, and analyzed the contact residues of the antibodies on HA to discover common genetic and structural features of TI antibodies. Our data reveal that many TI antibodies are encoded by a light chain variable gene segment incorporating a shared somatic mutation. In addition, these antibodies have a shared acidic residue in the heavy chain despite originating from diverse heavy chain variable gene segments. These studies show that the TI region of influenza A HA is a major antigenic site with conserved structural features that are recognized by a common human B cell public clonotype. The canonical nature of this antibody-antigen interaction suggests that the TI epitope might serve as an important target for structure-based vaccine design.

Human Infection with Eurasian Avian-Like Swine Influenza A(H1N1) Virus, the Netherlands, September 2019

We report a zoonotic infection of a pig farmer in the Netherlands with a Eurasian avian-like swine influenza A(H1N1) virus that was also detected in the farmed pigs. Both viruses were antigenically and genetically characterized. Continued surveillance of swine influenza A viruses is needed for risk assessment in humans and swine.

Exploring the potential of foodborne transmission of respiratory viruses

The ongoing pandemic involving severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has raised the question whether this virus, which is known to be spread primarily though respiratory droplets, could be spread through the fecal-oral route or via contaminated food. In this article, we present a critical review of the literature exploring the potential foodborne transmission of several respiratory viruses including human coronaviruses, avian influenza virus (AVI), parainfluenza viruses, human respiratory syncytial virus, adenoviruses, rhinoviruses, and Nipah virus. Multiple lines of evidence, including documented expression of receptor proteins on gastrointestinal epithelial cells, in vivo viral replication in gastrointestinal epithelial cell lines, extended fecal shedding of respiratory viruses, and the ability to remain infectious in food environments for extended periods of time raises the theoretical ability of some human respiratory viruses, particularly human coronaviruses and AVI, to spread via food. However, to date, neither epidemiological data nor case reports of clear foodborne transmission of either viruses exist. Thus, foodborne transmission of human respiratory viruses remains only a theoretical possibility.

High Risk of Influenza Virus Infection Among Swine Workers: Examining a Dynamic Cohort in China

BACKGROUND

China is thought to be a hotspot for zoonotic influenza virus emergence, yet there have been few prospective studies examining the occupational risks of such infections.

METHODS

We present the first 2 years of data collected from a 5-year, prospective, cohort study of swine-exposed and -unexposed participants at 6 swine farms in China. We conducted serological and virological surveillance to examine evidence for swine influenza A virus infection in humans.

RESULTS

Of the 658 participants (521 swine-exposed and 137 swine-unexposed), 207 (31.5%) seroconverted against at least 1 swine influenza virus subtype (swine H1N1 or H3N2). Swine-exposed participants' microneutralization titers, especially those enrolled at confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), were higher against the swine H1N1 virus than were other participants at 12 and 24 months. Despite elevated titers, among the 187 study subjects for whom we had complete follow-up, participants working at swine CAFOs had significantly greater odds of seroconverting against both the swine H1N1 (odds ratio [OR] 19.16, 95% confidence interval [CI] 3.55-358.65) and swine H3N2 (OR 2.97, 95% CI 1.16-8.01) viruses, compared to unexposed and non-CAFO swine workers with less intense swine exposure.

CONCLUSIONS

While some of the observed increased risk against swine viruses may have been explained by exposure to human influenza strains, study data suggest that even with elevated preexisting antibodies, swine-exposed workers were at high risk of infection with enzootic swine influenza A viruses.

Mitigating Future Respiratory Virus Pandemics: New Threats and Approaches to Consider

Despite many recent efforts to predict and control emerging infectious disease threats to humans, we failed to anticipate the zoonotic viruses which led to pandemics in 2009 and 2020. The morbidity, mortality, and economic costs of these pandemics have been staggering. We desperately need a more targeted, cost-efficient, and sustainable strategy to detect and mitigate future zoonotic respiratory virus threats. Evidence suggests that the transition from an animal virus to a human pathogen is incremental and requires a considerable number of spillover events and considerable time before a pandemic variant emerges. This evolutionary view argues for the refocusing of public health resources on novel respiratory virus surveillance at human-animal interfaces in geographical hotspots for emerging infectious diseases. Where human-animal interface surveillance is not possible, a secondary high-yield, cost-efficient strategy is to conduct novel respiratory virus surveillance among pneumonia patients in these same hotspots. When novel pathogens are discovered, they must be quickly assessed for their human risk and, if indicated, mitigation strategies initiated. In this review, we discuss the most common respiratory virus threats, current efforts at early emerging pathogen detection, and propose and defend new molecular pathogen discovery strategies with the goal of preempting future pandemics.

Swine Influenza A Viruses and the Tangled Relationship with Humans

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) are the causative agents of one of the most important viral respiratory diseases in pigs and humans. Human and swine IAV are prone to interspecies transmission, leading to regular incursions from human to pig and vice versa. This bidirectional transmission of IAV has heavily influenced the evolutionary history of IAV in both species. Transmission of distinct human seasonal lineages to pigs, followed by sustained within-host transmission and rapid adaptation and evolution, represent a considerable challenge for pig health and production. Consequently, although only subtypes of H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2 are endemic in swine around the world, extensive diversity can be found in the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes, as well as the remaining six genes. We review the complicated global epidemiology of IAV in swine and the inextricably entangled implications for public health and influenza pandemic planning.

Non-basic amino acids in the hemagglutinin proteolytic cleavage site of a European H9N2 avian influenza virus modulate virulence in turkeys

H9N2 avian influenza virus (AIV) is the most widespread low pathogenic (LP) AIV in poultry and poses a serious zoonotic risk. Vaccination is used extensively to mitigate the economic impact of the virus. However, mutations were acquired after long-term circulation of H9N2 virus in poultry, particularly in the hemagglutinin (HA) proteolytic cleavage site (CS), a main virulence determinant of AIV. Compared to chickens, little is known about the genetic determinants for adaptation of H9N2 AIV to turkeys. Here, we describe 36 different CS motifs in Eurasian H9N2 viruses identified from 1966 to 2019. The European H9N2 viruses specify unique HACS with particular polymorphism by insertion of non-basic amino acids at position 319. Recombinant viruses carrying single HACS mutations resembling field viruses were constructed (designated G319, A319, N319, S319, D319 and K319). Several viruses replicated to significantly higher titers in turkey cells than in chicken cells. Serine proteases were more efficient than trypsin to support multicycle replication in mammalian cells. Mutations affected cell-to-cell spread and pH-dependent HA fusion activity. In contrast to chickens, mutations in the HACS modulated clinical signs in inoculated and co-housed turkeys. G319 exhibited the lowest virulence, however, it replicated to significantly higher titers in contact-turkeys and in vitro. Interestingly, H9N2 viruses, particularly G319, replicated in brain cells of turkeys and to a lesser extent in mammalian brain cells independent of trypsin. Therefore, the silent circulation of potentially zoonotic H9N2 viruses in poultry should be monitored carefully. These results are important for understanding the adaptation of H9N2 in poultry and replication in mammalian cells.

Genetic incompatibilities and reduced transmission in chickens may limit the evolution of reassortants between H9N2 and panzootic H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4 avian influenza virus showing high virulence for mammals

The unprecedented spread of H5N8- and H9N2-subtype avian influenza virus (AIV) in birds across Asia, Europe, Africa, and North America poses a serious public health threat with a permanent risk of reassortment and the possible emergence of novel virus variants with high virulence in mammals. To gain information on this risk, we studied the potential for reassortment between two contemporary H9N2 and H5N8 viruses. While the replacement of the PB2, PA, and NS genes of highly pathogenic H5N8 by homologous segments from H9N2 produced infectious H5N8 progeny, PB1 and NP of H9N2 were not able to replace the respective segments from H5N8 due to residues outside the packaging region. Furthermore, exchange of the PB2, PA, and NS segments of H5N8 by those of H9N2 increased replication, polymerase activity and interferon antagonism of the H5N8 reassortants in human cells. Notably, H5N8 reassortants carrying the H9N2-subtype PB2 segment and to lesser extent the PA or NS segments showed remarkably increased virulence in mice as indicated by rapid onset of mortality, reduced mean time to death and increased body weight loss. Simultaneously, we observed that in chickens the H5N8 reassortants, particularly with the H9N2 NS segment, demonstrated significantly reduced transmission to co-housed chickens. Together, while the limited capacity for reassortment between co-circulating H9N2 and H5N8 viruses and the reduced bird-to-bird transmission of possible H5N8 reassortants in chickens may limit the evolution of such reassortant viruses, they show a higher replication potential in human cells and increased virulence in mammals.

Serological evidence of avian influenza virus subtype H5 and H9 in live bird market, Myanmar

Avian Influenza (AI), caused by Alphainfluenzaviruses (AIVs), is a contagious respiratory disease in birds and mammals. AIVs have been reported in poultry worldwide and the impact of AIVs on human health is immense. In this study, a serological survey of AIV subtype H5 and H9 was conducted in a live bird market (LBM) in Yangon, Myanmar during February 2016 to September 2016. A total of 621 serum samples were collected from chickens (n = 489) and ducks (n = 132) from 48 vendors in the LBM. The samples were examined for antibodies against influenza viruses by using NP-ELISA and specific antibodies against AIV-H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4) and AIV-H9N2 (Clade 9.4.2) by using Hemagglutination Inhibition (HI) assay. The result of NP-ELISA assay showed that 12.88 % (80/621) of poultry in LBM was positive for AIV antibodies. In detail, 38.06 % (51/134) of layers, 7.08 % (8/113) of backyard chicken, 2.07 % (5/242) of broilers and 12.12 % (16/132) of ducks were AIV positive. The HI test for specific antibodies against AIV-H5N1 and AIV-H9N2 were 1.77 % (11/621) and 4.51 % (28/621), respectively. Our findings revealed the evidence of AIV-H5N1 and AIV-H9N2 exposure in both chicken and ducks in the LBM in Yangon, Myanmar. Risks of influenza infections and transmission among poultry and humans in the LBMs could not be ignored.

A chimeric influenza hemagglutinin delivered by parainfluenza virus 5 vector induces broadly protective immunity against genetically divergent influenza a H1 viruses in swine

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An HA-based vaccine candidate, created by DNA shuffling (HA-113), can be immunogenic when recombinant antigen is expressed by PIV5 (PIV5-113).

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Immunity induced by the PIV5-113 vaccine can protect mice against infection with 4 of 5 parental HAs used to create the vaccine.

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Immunity induced by PIV5-113 can protect pigs against infection with an influenza virus isolate that is known to be infectious in pigs.

Pigs are an important reservoir for human influenza viruses, and influenza causes significant economic loss to the swine industry. As demonstrated during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, control of swine influenza virus infection is a critical step toward blocking emergence of human influenza virus. An effective vaccine that can induce broadly protective immunity against heterologous influenza virus strains is critically needed. In our previous studies [McCormick et al., 2015; PLoS One, 10(6):e0127649], we used molecular breeding (DNA shuffling) strategies to increase the breadth of the variable and conserved epitopes expressed within a single influenza A virus chimeric hemagglutinin (HA) protein. Chimeric HAs were constructed using parental HAs from the 2009 pandemic virus and swine influenza viruses that had a history of zoonotic transmission to humans. In the current study, we used parainfluenza virus 5 (PIV-5) as a vector to express one of these chimeric HA antigens, HA-113. Recombinant PIV-5 expressing HA-113 (PIV5-113) were rescued, and immunogenicity and protective efficacy were tested in both mouse and pig models. The results showed that PIV5-113 can protect mice and pigs against challenge with viruses expressing parental HAs. The protective immunity was extended against other genetically diversified influenza H1-expressing viruses. Our work demonstrates that PIV5-based influenza vaccines are efficacious as vaccines for pigs. The PIV5 vaccine vector and chimeric HA-113 antigen are discussed in the context of the development of universal influenza vaccines and the potential contribution of PIV5-113 as a candidate universal vaccine.

Normal modes analysis and surface electrostatics of haemagglutinin proteins as fingerprints for high pathogenic type A influenza viruses

Background

Type A influenza viruses circulate and spread among wild birds and mostly consist of low pathogenic strains. However, fast genome variation timely results in the insurgence of high pathogenic strains, which when infecting poultry birds may cause a million deaths and strong commercial damage. More importantly, the host shift may concern these viruses and sustained human-to-human transmission may result in a dangerous pandemic outbreak. Therefore, fingerprints specific to either low or high pathogenic strains may represent a very important tool for global surveillance.

Results

We combined Normal Modes Analysis and surface electrostatic analysis of a mixed strain dataset of influenza A virus haemagglutinins from high and low pathogenic strains in order to infer specific fingerprints. Normal Modes Analysis sorted the strains in two different, homogeneous clusters; sorting was independent of clades and specific instead to high vs low pathogenicity. A deeper analysis of fluctuations and flexibility regions unveiled a special role for the 110-helix region. Specific sorting was confirmed by surface electrostatics analysis, which further allowed to focus on regions and mechanisms possibly crucial to the low-to-high transition.

Conclusions

Evidence from previous work demonstrated that changes in surface electrostatics are associated with the evolution and spreading of avian influenza A virus clades, and seemingly involved also in the avian to mammalian host shift. This work shows that a combination of electrostatics and Normal Modes Analysis can also identify fingerprints specific to high and low pathogenicity. The possibility to predict which specific mutations may result in a shift to high pathogenicity may help in surveillance and vaccine development.

Influenza A virus vaccine research conducted in swine from 1990 to May 2018: A scoping review

BACKGROUND

Influenza A viruses of swine (IAV-S) are a global zoonotic and economic concern. Primary control is through vaccination yet a formal evidence map summarizing vaccine research conducted in pigs is not available.

OBJECTIVE

Ten characteristics of English language primary IAV-S vaccine research, conducted at the level of the pig or higher, were charted to identify research gaps, topics for systematic review, and coverage across different publication types.

DESIGN

Six online databases and grey literature were searched, without geographic, population, or study type restrictions, and abstracts screened independently and in duplicate for relevant research published between 1990 and May 2018. Full text data was charted by a single reviewer.

RESULTS

Over 11,000 unique citations were screened, identifying 376 for charting, including 175 proceedings from 60 conferences, and 170 journal articles from 51 journals. Reported outcomes were heterogeneous with measures of immunity (86%, n = 323) and virus detection (65%, n = 246) reported far more than production metrics (9%, n = 32). Study of transmissibility under conditions of natural exposure (n = 7), use of mathematical modelling (n = 11), and autogenous vaccine research reported in journals (n = 7), was limited.

CONCLUSIONS

Most research used challenge trials (n = 219) and may have poor field relevance or suitability for systematic review if the purpose is to inform clinical decisions. Literature on vaccinated breeding herds (n = 89) and weaned pigs (n = 136) is potentially sufficient for systematic review. Research under field conditions is limited, disproportionately reported in conference proceedings versus journal articles, and may be insufficient to support systematic review.

Epidemiology of bacteria and viruses in the respiratory tract of humans and domestic pigs

Bacteria and viruses were analysed in the upper respiratory tract of symptomatic pig farmers and their domestic pigs. Eighty six human nasal and 495 (50 pools) porcine snout swabs were collected in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany. Staphylococcus (S.) aureus (62.8%, 54/86), human rhino- and coronaviruses (HRV, 29.1%, 25/86; HCoV, 16.3%, 14/86) were frequently detected in humans, while Haemophilus parasuis (90.0%, 45/50), Mycoplasma hyorhinis (78.6%, 11/14), Enterovirus G (EV-G, 56.0%, 28/50) and S. aureus (36.0%, 18/50), respectively, were highly prevalent in pigs. The detection of S. aureus in human follow-up samples indicates a carrier status. The methicillin-resistant phenotype (MRSA) was identified in 33.3% (18/54) of nasal swabs and in one of 18 (5.6%) pooled snout swabs that were tested positive for S. aureus. Strains were indicative of the livestock-associated clonal complex CC398, with t011 being the most common staphylococcal protein A type. Enterobacterales and non-fermenters were frequently isolated from swabs. Their detection in follow-up samples suggests a carrier status. All were classified as being non-multiresistant. There was no example for cross-species transmission of viruses. In contrast, transmission of S. aureus through occupational contact to pigs seems possible. The study contributes to the 'One Health' approach.

A Site of Vulnerability on the Influenza Virus Hemagglutinin Head Domain Trimer Interface

Here, we describe the discovery of a naturally occurring human antibody (Ab), FluA-20, that recognizes a new site of vulnerability on the hemagglutinin (HA) head domain and reacts with most influenza A viruses. Structural characterization of FluA-20 with H1 and H3 head domains revealed a novel epitope in the HA trimer interface, suggesting previously unrecognized dynamic features of the trimeric HA protein. The critical HA residues recognized by FluA-20 remain conserved across most subtypes of influenza A viruses, which explains the Ab's extraordinary breadth. The Ab rapidly disrupted the integrity of HA protein trimers, inhibited cell-to-cell spread of virus in culture, and protected mice against challenge with viruses of H1N1, H3N2, H5N1, or H7N9 subtypes when used as prophylaxis or therapy. The FluA-20 Ab has uncovered an exceedingly conserved protective determinant in the influenza HA head domain trimer interface that is an unexpected new target for anti-influenza therapeutics and vaccines.

Reproductive performance of pandemic influenza A virus infected sow herds before and after implementation of a vaccine against the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 virus

Background

Reproductive failure in sow herds due to infection with influenza A viruses has been described in the literature, but only a few studies have focused on the pathogenesis and the clinical signs of the infection. Case reports indicate an association between infections with influenza A viruses and reduced reproductive performance, although it has been difficult to experimentally reproduce the clinical outcome of poor reproductive performance. The aim of the present longitudinal field study was to compare the reproductive performance parameters before and after the implementation of vaccination against the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 virus in sow herds infected with pandemic influenza A virus. Therefore, farm-specific data of 137 sow herds in Germany, including 60,153 sows, as well as the clinical presentation of the infection were surveyed via questionnaire. Furthermore, average performance parameters (return to oestrus rate, abortion rate, stillbirth rate, number of piglets born alive per litter, preweaning mortality rate and number of piglets weaned per sow per year) were recorded for 6 months before vaccination and 6 months after completion of primary vaccination.

Results

In 79.8% of the farms, the clinical presentation of the infection was characterised by a reduced reproductive performance. These findings were confirmed by analysis of the performance parameters, which revealed a significant decline in the return to oestrus rate (p < 0.001), abortion rate (p < 0.001) and preweaning mortality rate (p = 0.023) and a significant increase of the number in piglets born alive (p = 0.001) and piglets weaned per sow per year (p < 0.001) after immunisation. The stillbirth rate did not change significantly.

Conclusion

The present study represents the first attempt to demonstrate the association of influenza A virus infection, vaccination and the alteration in reproductive performance parameters, investigating a large number of cases. The results show that by vaccinating against the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 virus, an improvement in reproductive performance can be achieved in sow herds infected with pandemic influenza A virus. Additionally, the large number of herds that were affected by poor reproductive performance after infection with the aforementioned virus confirms the assumption of an association between pandemic influenza A virus and reproductive losses.

Avian influenza viruses in humans: lessons from past outbreaks

BACKGROUND

Human infections with avian influenza viruses (AIV) represent a persistent public health threat. The principal risk factor governing human infection with AIV is from direct contact with infected poultry and is primarily observed in Asia and Egypt where live-bird markets are common.

AREAS OF AGREEMENT

Changing patterns of virus transmission and a lack of obvious disease manifestations in avian species hampers early detection and efficient control of potentially zoonotic AIV.

AREAS OF CONTROVERSY

Despite extensive studies on biological and environmental risk factors, the exact conditions required for cross-species transmission from avian species to humans remain largely unknown.

GROWING POINTS

The development of a universal ('across-subtype') influenza vaccine and effective antiviral therapeutics are a priority.

AREAS TIMELY FOR DEVELOPING RESEARCH

Sustained virus surveillance and collection of ecological and physiological parameters from birds in different environments is required to better understand influenza virus ecology and identify risk factors for human infection.

Genetic and biological characteristics of avian influenza virus subtype H1N8 in environments related to live poultry markets in China

Background

Since 2008, avian influenza surveillance in poultry-related environments has been conducted annually in China. Samples have been collected from environments including live poultry markets, wild bird habitats, slaughterhouses, and poultry farms. Multiple subtypes of avian influenza virus have been identified based on environmental surveillance, and an H1N8 virus was isolated from the drinking water of a live poultry market.

Methods

Virus isolation was performed by inoculating influenza A-positive specimens into embryonated chicken eggs. Next-generation sequencing was used for whole-genome sequencing. A solid-phase binding assay was performed to test the virus receptor binding specificity. Trypsin dependence plaque formation assays and intravenous pathogenicity index tests were used to evaluate virus pathogenicity in vitro and in vivo, respectively. Different cell lines were chosen for comparison of virus replication capacity.

Results

According to the phylogenetic trees, the whole gene segments of the virus named A/Environment/Fujian/85144/2014(H1N8) were of Eurasian lineage. The HA, NA, PB1, and M genes showed the highest homology with those of H1N8 or H1N2 subtype viruses isolated from local domestic ducks, while the PB2, PA, NP and NS genes showed high similarity with the genes of H7N9 viruses detected in 2017 and 2018 in the same province. This virus presented an avian receptor binding preference. The plaque formation assay showed that it was a trypsin-dependent virus. The intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) in chickens was 0.02. The growth kinetics of the A/Environment/Fujian/85144/2014(H1N8) virus in different cell lines were similar to those of a human-origin virus, A/Brisbane/59/2007(H1N1), but lower than those of the control avian-origin and swine-origin viruses.

Conclusions

The H1N8 virus was identified in avian influenza-related environments in China for the first time and may have served as a gene carrier involved in the evolution of the H7N9 virus in poultry. This work further emphasizes the importance of avian influenza virus surveillance, especially in live poultry markets (LPMs). Active surveillance of avian influenza in LPMs is a major pillar supporting avian influenza control and response.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12879-019-4079-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Detection of Low Pathogenicity Influenza A(H7N3) Virus during Duck Mortality Event, Cambodia, 2017

In January 2017, an estimated 3,700 (93%) of 4,000 Khaki Campbell ducks (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus) died in Kampong Thom Province, Cambodia. We detected low pathogenicity avian influenza A(H7N3) virus and anatid herpesvirus 1 (duck plague) in the affected flock; however, the exact cause of the mortality event remains unclear.

Establishment of xMAP for the simultaneous detection of antibodies to Newcastle disease virus and avian influenza virus

Using Luminex xMAP (x = analyte, MAP = multi-analyte profiling) technology, a serological method for the simultaneous detection of antibodies to Newcastle disease virus (NDV) and avian influenza virus (AIV) was established. Nano-magnetic beads coated with purified NDV protein and AIV nucleoprotein were incubated with serum samples. Using biotinylated rabbit anti-chicken IgY and streptavidin-R-phycoerythrin, the optical signals measured by a Luminex 200 detection system indicated the quantification of NDV or AIV antibodies in the serum. Specific pathogen-free (SPF) chicken serum was used as a negative control. The Luminex xMAP assay developed in this study demonstrated high specificity as there was no cross-reaction with antibodies to infectious laryngotracheitis virus, infectious bronchitis virus, infectious bursal disease virus, avian leukosis virus, and Marek's disease virus. The results from reproducibility experiments showed that intra-coefficients of variation were 3.36 and 9.23% and inter-coefficients of variation were 6.50 and 7.66% for NDV and AIV, respectively. The results also indicated that the Luminex xMAP assay was 16 times more sensitive for NDV antibody detection and 1,024 times more sensitive for AIV antibody detection compared to the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). A total of 300 chicken serum samples were subjected to both Luminex xMAP assay and ELISA, showing the coincidence rates of 98.67 and 98% for NDV and AIV antibody detection, respectively. This study provides a new method for the simultaneous detection NDV and AIV antibodies in the serum with high specificity and sensitivity.

Protective Measures for Humans against Avian Influenza A(H5N8) Outbreaks in 22 European Union/European Economic Area Countries and Israel, 2016-17

We sought to better understand national approaches for managing potential human health risks during outbreaks of infection with avian influenza A(H5N8) virus during 2016–17. Twenty-three countries in the Union/European Economic Area and Israel participated in this study. Risk to the general public was assessed as low in 18 countries and medium in 1 country. Of 524 exposed persons identified, 274 were passively monitored and 250 were actively monitored. Of 29 persons tested, all were negative for H5N8 virus. Vaccination and antiviral drug recommendations varied across countries. A high level of personal protection was recommended although a low risk was assessed. No transmission of this virus to humans was identified.

Passively transferred M2e-specific monoclonal antibody reduces influenza A virus transmission in mice

Influenza represents a global public health threat. Currently available influenza vaccines are effective against strain-matched influenza A and B viruses but do not protect against novel pandemic viruses. Vaccine candidates that target conserved B or T cell epitopes of influenza viruses could circumvent this shortcoming. The conserved extracellular domain of matrix protein 2 (M2e) of influenza A is an example of such a broadly protective vaccine candidate. Protection by M2e-based vaccine candidates largely depends on M2e-specific IgG antibodies. Here we show that the M2e-specific IgG2a monoclonal antibody 65 (MAb 65) can reduce influenza A/Udorn/72 (H3N2) and A/Hong Kong/68 (H3N2) virus plaque formation. This effect was not observed with other influenza A virus strains tested. We further show that passive transfer of MAb 65 to mice can reduce viral loads in the upper and lower airways, which results in reduced transmission of A/Udorn/72 and A/Hong Kong/68 viruses to cohoused, unimmunized contact mice. Virus restriction by passively transferred Mab 65 was significantly less pronounced in Fcgr1^-/-Fcgr3^-/- mutant mice compared with wild type controls, suggesting that in vivo protection provided by MAb 65 depends on Fcγ receptor-mediated antibody effector mechanisms. We conclude that M2e-based antibody immune therapy has the potential to diminish influenza A virus replication in the immunized host as well as in exposed naïve contacts.

Zoonotic Influenza and Human Health-Part 1: Virology and Epidemiology of Zoonotic Influenzas

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Zoonotic influenza viruses are those that cross the animal-human barrier and can cause disease in humans, manifesting from minor respiratory illnesses to multiorgan dysfunction. They have also been implicated in the causation of deadly pandemics in recent history. The increasing incidence of infections caused by these viruses worldwide has necessitated focused attention to improve both diagnostic as well as treatment modalities. In this first part of a two-part review, we describe the structure of zoonotic influenza viruses, the relationship between mutation and pandemic capacity, pathogenesis of infection, and also discuss history and epidemiology.

RECENT FINDINGS

We are currently witnessing the fifth and the largest wave of the avian influenza A(H7N9) epidemic. Also in circulation are a number of other zoonotic influenza viruses, including avian influenza A(H5N1) and A(H5N6); avian influenza A(H7N2); and swine influenza A(H1N1)v, A(H1N2)v, and A(H3N2)v viruses. Most recently, the first human case of avian influenza A(H7N4) infection has been documented. By understanding the virology and epidemiology of emerging zoonotic influenzas, we are better prepared to face a new pandemic. However, continued effort is warranted to build on this knowledge in order to efficiently combat the constant threat posed by the zoonotic influenza viruses.

Pathogenesis and Transmission of Genetically Diverse Swine-Origin H3N2 Variant Influenza A Viruses from Multiple Lineages Isolated in the United States, 2011-2016

While several swine-origin influenza A H3N2 variant (H3N2v) viruses isolated from humans prior to 2011 have been previously characterized for their virulence and transmissibility in ferrets, the recent genetic and antigenic divergence of H3N2v viruses warrants an updated assessment of their pandemic potential. Here, four contemporary H3N2v viruses isolated during 2011 to 2016 were evaluated for their replicative ability in both in vitro and in vivo in mammalian models as well as their transmissibility among ferrets. We found that all four H3N2v viruses possessed similar or enhanced replication capacities in a human bronchial epithelium cell line (Calu-3) compared to a human seasonal influenza virus, suggestive of strong fitness in human respiratory tract cells. The majority of H3N2v viruses examined in our study were mildly virulent in mice and capable of replicating in mouse lungs with different degrees of efficiency. In ferrets, all four H3N2v viruses caused moderate morbidity and exhibited comparable titers in the upper respiratory tract, but only 2 of the 4 viruses replicated in the lower respiratory tract in this model. Furthermore, despite efficient transmission among cohoused ferrets, recently isolated H3N2v viruses displayed considerable variance in their ability to transmit by respiratory droplets. The lack of a full understanding of the molecular correlates of virulence and transmission underscores the need for close genotypic and phenotypic monitoring of H3N2v viruses and the importance of continued surveillance to improve pandemic preparedness.IMPORTANCE Swine-origin influenza viruses of the H3N2 subtype, with the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) derived from historic human seasonal influenza viruses, continue to cross species barriers and cause human infections, posing an indelible threat to public health. To help us better understand the potential risk associated with swine-origin H3N2v viruses that emerged in the United States during the 2011-2016 influenza seasons, we use both in vitro and in vivo models to characterize the abilities of these viruses to replicate, cause disease, and transmit in mammalian hosts. The efficient respiratory droplet transmission exhibited by some of the H3N2v viruses in the ferret model combined with the existing evidence of low immunity against such viruses in young children and older adults highlight their pandemic potential. Extensive surveillance and risk assessment of H3N2v viruses should continue to be an essential component of our pandemic preparedness strategy.