Situating emotional experience

Aphantasia and autism: An investigation of mental imagery vividness

OBJECTIVE

The present study investigated whether autistic adults report different levels of mental imagery vividness than non-autistic adults, and, moreover, if autism is associated with aphantasia which is defined as a condition of reduced or absent voluntary imagery.

DESIGN AND METHODS

Clinically diagnosed and self-identifying autistic participants were compared with non-autistic participants in their mental imagery vividness (vision, sound, smell, taste, touch, bodily sensation and emotional feeling) and autistic traits using an online survey (N = 121).

RESULTS

The autistic group scored significantly lower than the non-autistic group on imagery vividness (d = -0.44), in addition to having a higher proportion of participants scoring at cut-off for aphantasia. Moreover, a similar difference was observed for the emotional feel (η2 = 0.11).

CONCLUSION

The vividness of visual and emotional mental imagery was on average lower for autistic individuals, with a higher proportion presenting at cut-off to be considered an aphantasic.

More than labels: neural representations of emotion words are widely distributed across the brain

Although emotion words such as "anger," "disgust," "happiness," or "pride" are often thought of as mere labels, increasing evidence points to language as being important for emotion perception and experience. Emotion words may be particularly important for facilitating access to the emotion concepts. Indeed, deficits in semantic processing or impaired access to emotion words interfere with emotion perception. Yet, it is unclear what these behavioral findings mean for affective neuroscience. Thus, we examined the brain areas that support processing of emotion words using representational similarity analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging data (N = 25). In the task, participants saw 10 emotion words (e.g. "anger," "happiness") while in the scanner. Participants rated each word based on its valence on a continuous scale ranging from 0 (Pleasant/Good) to 1 (Unpleasant/Bad) scale to ensure they were processing the words. Our results revealed that a diverse range of brain areas including prefrontal, midline cortical, and sensorimotor regions contained information about emotion words. Notably, our results overlapped with many regions implicated in decoding emotion experience by prior studies. Our results raise questions about what processes are being supported by these regions during emotion experience.

Visualizing Compassion: Episodic Simulation as Contemplative Practice

Contemplative interventions designed to cultivate compassion are receiving increasing empirical attention. Accumulating evidence suggests that these interventions bolster prosocial motivation and warmth towards others. Less is known about how these practices impact compassion in everyday life. Here we consider one mechanistic pathway through which compassion practices may impact perception and action in the world: simulation. Evidence suggests that vividly imagining a situation simulates that experience in the brain as if it were, to a degree, actually happening. Thus, we hypothesize that simulation during imagery-based contemplative practices can construct sensorimotor patterns in the brain that prime an individual to act compassionately in the world. We first present evidence across multiple literatures in Psychology that motivates this hypothesis, including the neuroscience of mental imagery and the emerging literature on prosocial episodic simulation. Then, we examine the specific contemplative practices in compassion-based interventions that may construct such simulations. We conclude with future directions for investigating how compassion-based interventions may shape prosocial perception and action in everyday life.

Understanding anxiety symptoms as aberrant defensive responding along the threat imminence continuum

Threat-anticipatory defensive responses have evolved to promote survival in a dynamic world. While inherently adaptive, aberrant expression of defensive responses to potential threat could manifest as pathological anxiety, which is prevalent, impairing, and associated with adverse outcomes. Extensive translational neuroscience research indicates that normative defensive responses are organized by threat imminence, such that distinct response patterns are observed in each phase of threat encounter and orchestrated by partially conserved neural circuitry. Anxiety symptoms, such as excessive and pervasive worry, physiological arousal, and avoidance behavior, may reflect aberrant expression of otherwise normative defensive responses, and therefore follow the same imminence-based organization. Here, empirical evidence linking aberrant expression of specific, imminence-dependent defensive responding to distinct anxiety symptoms is reviewed, and plausible contributing neural circuitry is highlighted. Drawing from translational and clinical research, the proposed framework informs our understanding of pathological anxiety by grounding anxiety symptoms in conserved psychobiological mechanisms. Potential implications for research and treatment are discussed.

Structural and functional neural substrates underlying the concreteness effect

The concreteness effect refers to the advantage in speed and accuracy of processing concrete words over abstract words. Previous studies have shown that the processing of the two types of words is mediated by distinct neural mechanisms, but these studies were mainly conducted with task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging. This study investigates the associations between the concreteness effect and grey matter volume (GMV) of brain regions as well as resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) of these identified regions. The results show that the GMV of left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), right middle temporal gyrus (MTG), right supplementary motor area and right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) negatively correlates with the concreteness effect. The rsFC of the left IFG, the right MTG and the right ACC with the nodes, mainly in default mode network, frontoparietal network and dorsal attention network positively correlates with the concreteness effect. The GMV and rsFC jointly and respectively predict the concreteness effect in individuals. In conclusion, stronger connectivity amongst functional networks and higher coherent engagement of the right hemisphere predict a greater difference in the verbal memory of abstract and concrete words.

Neural correlates of understanding emotional words in late childhood

Prior studies involving adults have shown that words can elicit emotional processing, with emotion-label (e.g., happiness) and emotion-laden words (e.g., gift) having distinct processes. However, limited studies have explored the developmental changes in these processes in relation to emotional valence. To address this question, this exploratory study measured event-related potentials (ERPs) in 11-14-year-old children/adolescents (N = 25) and adults (N = 23) while performing an emotional categorization task. The stimuli used were two-character Chinese words, with factors for word type (emotion-label versus emotion-laden) and valence (positive versus negative). To confirm word emotionality, neutral words were also included and compared with all emotional words. The results showed that adults exhibited reduced N400 amplitudes to emotion-label words compared to emotion-laden ones in both positive and negative valence contexts. The differentiation was only sustained for negative valence in the late positive component (LPC). Similar scalp distributions of the effects of word type were found in children/adolescents; however, they exhibited a more prolonged processing of all emotional words than adults. These results suggest that the processing of emotion-label and emotion-laden words are distinct in late childhood, and this discrepancy varies with emotional valence and increasing age.

Reflections on the battle against COVID-19: The effects of emotional design factors on the communication of audio-visual art

Fighting against the epidemic is an arduous and prolonged battle where many artists hope to inspire people with the power of art through cultural creativity. To explore the effects of emotional design factors on the communication of audio-visual art and the audience's perceptive experience, this research takes the original anti-epidemic song and the film China Braves Headwind as the research object. The research also uses such methods as questionnaires, Structural Equation Models, and dependent samples t-tests to conduct statistical analysis. The results are as follows: First, the emotional design evaluation matrix based on the emotional communication model is reasonable, and the scales of this research are feasible. Second, the emotional design of audio-visual works can significantly affect the audience's emotional experience and further improve sharing intention. Third, Attribute A2 (Artistic style, Thematic perception) and attribute C3 (Emotional resonance, Spiritual sublimation) serve as common factors affecting the emotional experience in terms of both musical works and film and television works. Fourth, compared with musical works, film and television works are likely to resonate with the audience. The combination of music and visual sensation can help open up the conception of artistic works and convey their meanings to viewers. Therefore, it's necessary to explore the emotional communication mode between audio-visual artists and the audience. It helps artists think about how to create works innovatively and is conducive to marketizing works and stimulating cultural consumption demand.

Context reconsidered: Complex signal ensembles, relational meaning, and population thinking in psychological science

This article considers the status and study of "context" in psychological science through the lens of research on emotional expressions. The article begins by updating three well-trod methodological debates on the role of context in emotional expressions to reconsider several fundamental assumptions lurking within the field's dominant methodological tradition: namely, that certain expressive movements have biologically prepared, inherent emotional meanings that issue from singular, universal processes which are independent of but interact with contextual influences. The second part of this article considers the scientific opportunities that await if we set aside this traditional understanding of "context" as a moderator of signals with inherent psychological meaning and instead consider the possibility that psychological events emerge in ecosystems of signal ensembles, such that the psychological meaning of any individual signal is entirely relational. Such a fundamental shift has radical implications not only for the science of emotion but for psychological science more generally. It offers opportunities to improve the validity and trustworthiness of psychological science beyond what can be achieved with improvements to methodological rigor alone. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Predictive processing in depression: Increased prediction error following negative valence contexts and influence of recent mood-congruent yet irrelevant experiences

BACKGROUND

Novel theoretical models of depression have recently emerged based on an influential new perspective in neuroscience known as predictive processing. In these models, depression may be understood as an imbalance of predictive signals in the brain; more specifically, a dominance of predictions leading to a relative insensitivity to prediction error. Despite these important theoretical advances, empirical evidence remains limited, and how expectations are generated and used dynamically in individuals with depression remains largely unexplored.

METHODS

In this study, we induced facial expression predictions using emotion contexts in 34 individuals with depression and 34 healthy controls.

RESULTS

Compared to controls, individuals with depression perceived displayed facial expressions as less similar to their expectations (i.e., increased difference between expectations and actual sensory input) following contexts evoking negative valence emotions, indicating that depressed individuals have increased prediction error in such contexts. This effect was amplified by recent mood-congruent yet irrelevant experiences.

LIMITATIONS

The clinical sample included participants with comorbid psychopathology and taking medication. Additionally, the two groups were not evaluated in the same setting, and only three emotion categories (fear, sadness, and happiness) were explored.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results shed light on potential mechanisms underlying processing abnormalities regarding negative information, which has been consistently reported in depression, and may be a relevant point of departure for exploring transdiagnostic vulnerability to mental illness. Our data also has the potential to improve clinical practice through the implementation of novel diagnostic and therapeutic tools based on the assessment and modulation of predictive signals.

The structure of lay-concepts within the fear spectrum revealed using emotional verbal fluency

Given the fact that natural language analysis can distinguish constituents of mental constructs, the present research was designed to investigate the structure of concepts related to the broad spectrum of emotions comprising worry, fear, anxiety, and panic, which in this article is referred to as the ‘fear spectrum’. A new technique presented here is based on a word association task and enables a description of the structure of emotion concepts. The technique is a variant of a verbal fluency task, i.e. emotional verbal fluency technique. Two studies have been conducted: the first to examine the cognitive structure of concepts within the fear spectrum (n = 280, 150 women, 130 men) and the second to confirm the stability of word association in the fear tasks and differentiation of the fear concepts in relation to trait anxiety and dogmatism (n = 190, 100 women, 90 men). A hierarchical clustering analysis, based on the linguistic material, i.e. words produced by the participants for the task of anxiety, was performed to present in what way the emotional verbal fluency technique can be applied to explore the structure of emotional concepts. According to our results, there is a relatively constant tendency in producing semantic clusters (emotional word association) among lay people. Moreover, produced clusters allow to describe the structure and to differentiate lay-concepts within the fear spectrum, such as worry, fear, anxiety, panic [respectively in Polish: obawa, lęk, strach, panika].

Assessing the Power of Words to Facilitate Emotion Category Learning

Previous research suggests that labels shape the categorization of emotional stimuli such as facial configurations, yet the strongest evidence of labels' influence on category learning comes from work on object categories. In particular, Lupyan et al. (Psychol Sci 18(12):1077-1083, 2007) found that novel categories of aliens were learned faster by participants provided with nonsense labels during feedback. We summarize a series of five studies in which we examined whether this word-enhancement effect on learning would extend to novel categories of emotion. These studies were conceptual replications of the paradigm used by Lupyan et al. (Psychol Sci 18(12):1077-1083, 2007) designed so that participants would associate novel expressive behaviors with situated experiences. We hypothesized that participants would learn to categorize exemplars of novel emotion categories over the duration of the task, and that categorization would be facilitated for participants who were presented with category labels during learning. We simultaneously analyzed data from all five studies in an integrative data analysis, allowing us to test the effects of learning over time and label condition with increased statistical power. Across all five studies, we found that, while participant performance did improve over time, in no case was it facilitated by including emotion labels at feedback. These results join others in suggesting that the effect of labels on emotion categorization may be more context-dependent than previously supposed-varying by the type of category learning task as well as the specific categories being learned and their relationship to previously acquired knowledge-such that there may be multiple pathways for emotion category learning.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-021-00084-4.

Cultivating Emotional Granularity

An emerging focus in affective science is the expertise that underlies healthy emotionality. A growing literature highlights emotional granularity - the ability to make fine-grained distinctions in one's affective feelings - as an important skill. Cross-sectional evidence indicating the benefits of emotional granularity raises the question of how emotional granularity might be intentionally cultivated through training. To address this question, we present shared theoretical features of centuries-old Buddhist philosophy and modern constructionist theory that motivate the hypothesis that contemplative practices may improve granularity. We then examine the specific mindfulness-style practices originating in Buddhist traditions that are hypothesized to bolster granularity. We conclude with future directions to empirically test whether emotional granularity can be intentionally cultivated.

Bodily Information and Top-Down Affective Priming Jointly Affect the Processing of Fearful Faces

According to embodied theories, the processing of emotions such as happiness or fear is grounded in emotion-specific perceptual, bodily, and physiological processes. Under these views, perceiving an emotional stimulus (e.g., a fearful face) re-enacts interoceptive and bodily states congruent with that emotion (e.g., increases heart rate); and in turn, interoceptive and bodily changes (e.g., increases of heart rate) influence the processing of congruent emotional content. A previous study by Pezzulo et al. (2018) provided evidence for this embodied congruence, reporting that experimentally increasing heart rate with physical exercise facilitated the processing of facial expressions congruent with that interoception (fear), but not those conveying incongruent states (disgust or neutrality). Here, we investigated whether the above (bottom-up) interoceptive manipulation and the (top-down) priming of affective content may jointly influence the processing of happy and fearful faces. The fact that happiness and fear are both associated with high heart rate but have different (positive and negative) valence permits testing the hypothesis that their processing might be facilitated by the same interoceptive manipulation (the increase of heart rate) but two opposite (positive and negative) affective primes. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to perform a gender-categorization task of happy, fearful, and neutral faces, which were preceded by positive, negative, and neutral primes. Participants performed the same task in two sessions (after rest, with normal heart rate, or exercise, with faster heart rate) and we recorded their response times and mouse movements during the choices. We replicated the finding that when participants were in the exercise condition, they processed fearful faces faster than when they were in the rest condition. However, we did not find the same reduction in response time for happy (or neutral) faces. Furthermore, we found that when participants were in the exercise condition, they processed fearful faces faster in the presence of negative compared to positive or neutral primes; but we found no equivalent facilitation of positive (or neutral) primes during the processing of happy (or neutral) faces. While the asymmetries between the processing of fearful and happy faces require further investigation, our findings promisingly indicate that the processing of fearful faces is jointly influenced by both bottom-up interoceptive states and top-down affective primes that are congruent with the emotion.

Aging bodies, aging emotions: Interoceptive differences in emotion representations and self-reports across adulthood

Bodily sensations are closely linked to emotional experiences. However, most research assessing the body-emotion link focuses on young adult samples. Inspired by prior work showing age-related declines in autonomic reactivity and interoception, we present 2 studies investigating age-related differences in the extent to which adults (18-75 years) associate interoceptive or internal bodily sensations with emotions. Study 1 (N = 150) used a property association task to assess age effects on adults' tendencies to associate interoceptive sensations, relative to behaviors or situations, with negative emotion categories (e.g., anger, sadness). Study 2 (N = 200) used the Day Reconstruction experience sampling method to assess the effect of age on adults' tendencies to report interoceptive sensations and emotional experiences in daily life. Consistent with prior literature suggesting that older adults have more muted physiological responses and interoceptive abilities than younger adults, we found that older adults' mental representations (Study 1) and self-reported experiences (Study 2) of emotion are less associated with interoceptive sensations than are those of younger adults. Across both studies, age effects were most prominent for high arousal emotions (e.g., anger, fear) and sensations (e.g., racing heart) that are often associated with peripheral psychophysiological concomitants in young adults. These findings are consistent with psychological constructionist models and a "maturational dualism" account of emotional aging, suggesting additional pathways by which emotions may differ across adulthood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The N400 indexes acquisition of novel emotion concepts via conceptual combination

The ability to learn new emotion concepts is adaptive and socially valuable as it communicates culturally held understandings about values, goals, and experiences. Yet, little work has examined the underlying mechanisms that allow for new emotion concepts and words to be integrated into the conceptual system. One such mechanism may be conceptual combination, or the ability to form novel concepts by dynamically combining previously acquired conceptual knowledge. In this study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the electrophysiological correlates of novel emotion concept acquisition via conceptual combination. Participants were briefly trained on 30 novel emotion combinations, each consisting of two English emotion words (the components; e.g., "sadness + fatigue") and a pseudoword (the target; e.g., "despip"). Participants then completed a semantic congruency task while ERPs were recorded. On each trial, two components were presented serially, followed by a target; participants judged whether the target was a valid combination of the preceding components. Targets could be correct or incorrect trained pseudowords, or new untrained pseudowords. Furthermore, components could be presented in reversed order (e.g., "fatigue" then "sadness") or as synonyms (e.g., "exhaustion" for "fatigue"). Consistent with our main hypotheses, we found a main effect of target, such that the correct combinations showed reduced N400 amplitudes when compared to both incorrect and untrained pseudowords. Critically, this effect held regardless of how the preceding components were presented, suggesting deeper semantic learning. These results extend prior findings on conceptual combination and novel word learning, and are congruent with predictive processing accounts of brain function.

Learning situated emotions

From the perspective of constructivist theories, emotion results from learning assemblies of relevant perceptual, cognitive, interoceptive, and motor processes in specific situations. Across emotional experiences over time, learned assemblies of processes accumulate in memory that later underlie emotional experiences in similar situations. A neuroimaging experiment guided participants to experience (and thus learn) situated forms of emotion, and then assessed whether participants tended to experience situated forms of the emotion later. During the initial learning phase, some participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving physical harm, whereas other participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving negative social evaluation. In the subsequent testing phase, both learning groups experienced fear and anger while their neural activity was assessed with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A variety of results indicated that the physical and social learning groups incidentally learned different situated forms of a given emotion. Consistent with constructivist theories, these findings suggest that learning plays a central role in emotion, with emotion adapted to the situations in which it is experienced.

Charting the development of emotion comprehension and abstraction from childhood to adulthood using observer-rated and linguistic measures

This study examined two facets of emotion development: emotion word comprehension (knowing the meaning of emotion words such as "anger" or "excitement") and emotion concept abstraction (representing emotions in terms of internal psychological states that generalize across situations). Using a novel emotion vocabulary assessment, we captured how a cross-sectional sample of participants aged 4-25 (N = 196) defined 24 emotions. Smoothing spline regression models suggested that emotion comprehension followed an emergent shape: Knowledge of emotion words increased across childhood and plateaued around age 11. Human coders rated the abstractness of participants' responses, and these ratings also followed an emergent shape but plateaued significantly later than comprehension, around age 18. An automated linguistic analysis of abstractness supported coders' perceptions of increased abstractness across age. Finally, coders assessed the definitional strategies participants used to describe emotions. Young children tended to describe emotions using concrete strategies such as providing example situations that evoked those emotions or by referring to physiological markers of emotional experiences. Whereas use of these concrete strategies decreased with age, the tendency to use more abstract strategies such as providing general definitions that delineated the causes and characteristics of emotions or by providing synonyms of emotion words increased with age. Overall, this work (a) provides a tool for assessing definitions of emotion terms, (b) demonstrates that emotion concept abstraction increases across age, and (c) suggests that adolescence is a period in which emotion words are comprehended but their level of abstraction continues to mature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion Perception in Hadza Hunter-Gatherers

It has long been claimed that certain configurations of facial movements are universally recognized as emotional expressions because they evolved to signal emotional information in situations that posed fitness challenges for our hunting and gathering hominin ancestors. Experiments from the last decade have called this particular evolutionary hypothesis into doubt by studying emotion perception in a wider sample of small-scale societies with discovery-based research methods. We replicate these newer findings in the Hadza of Northern Tanzania; the Hadza are semi-nomadic hunters and gatherers who live in tight-knit social units and collect wild foods for a large portion of their diet, making them a particularly relevant population for testing evolutionary hypotheses about emotion. Across two studies, we found little evidence of universal emotion perception. Rather, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that people infer emotional meaning in facial movements using emotion knowledge embrained by cultural learning.

Comment: Emotions Are Abstract, Conceptual Categories That Are Learned by a Predicting Brain

In their review, Ruba and Repacholi summarize the methods used to assess preverbal infants’ understanding of emotions, and analyze the existing evidence in light of classical and constructionist accounts of emotional development. They conclude that aspects of both accounts are plausible and propose a perceptual-to-conceptual shift in infants’ emotional development. In this comment, we clarify the nature of emotions as abstract, conceptual categories and suggest that infants may learn them as such from the start by using language to infer functional similarities across highly variable instances. This hypothesis is supported by predictive processing accounts of brain function, which can speak to the context-dependent nature of emotion and may be able to resolve debates in the study of emotion concept development.

Developing an Understanding of Emotion Categories: Lessons from Objects

How and when infants and young children begin to develop emotion categories is not yet well understood. Research has largely treated the learning problem as one of identifying perceptual similarities among exemplars (typically posed, stereotyped facial configurations). However, recent meta-analyses and reviews converge to suggest that emotion categories are abstract, involving high-dimensional and situationally variable instances. In this paper we consult research on the development of abstract object categorization to guide hypotheses about how infants might learn abstract emotion categories because the two domains present infants with similar learning challenges. In particular, we consider how a developmental cascades framework offers opportunities to understand how and when young children develop emotion categories.

The Structure of the Concepts Related to Love Spectrum: Emotional Verbal Fluency Technique Application, Initial Psychometrics, and Its Validation

Love has been thoroughly studied and a variety of definitions as well as types of love have been described in the literature. Given the data presenting natural language of love concept, the aim of the two present studies is to demonstrate a new technique which enables description of the structure of emotion concepts within love spectrum. This technique is based on emotional verbal fluency tasks. The procedure and the coding system used are reported in the article along with the data on reliability and standardization of the emotional verbal fluency technique. Construct validity is demonstrated by correlations of the emotional verbal fluency tasks with semantic and letter verbal fluency tasks, while discriminant validity is shown by correlations with other measures, such as the Triangular Love Scale, the Love Attitudes Scale, and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The article also presents how the emotional verbal fluency technique can be used in exploring the structure of emotion concepts within love spectrum. This is based on a hierarchical cluster analysis. An examination of connections between semantic clusters identified in the emotional verbal fluency tasks allows describing a structure of the concepts within love spectrum, such as liking, infatuation, love, and show of its differentiation. The presented technique taking into account natural language is of value in assessments of the structure of emotion concepts.

Age-related differences in neural activation and functional connectivity during the processing of vocal prosody in adolescence

The ability to recognize others' emotions based on vocal emotional prosody follows a protracted developmental trajectory during adolescence. However, little is known about the neural mechanisms supporting this maturation. The current study investigated age-related differences in neural activation during a vocal emotion recognition (ER) task. Listeners aged 8 to 19 years old completed the vocal ER task while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. The task of categorizing vocal emotional prosody elicited activation primarily in temporal and frontal areas. Age was associated with a) greater activation in regions in the superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri, b) greater functional connectivity between the left precentral and inferior frontal gyri and regions in the bilateral insula and temporo-parietal junction, and c) greater fractional anisotropy in the superior longitudinal fasciculus, which connects frontal areas to posterior temporo-parietal regions. Many of these age-related differences in brain activation and connectivity were associated with better performance on the ER task. Increased activation in, and connectivity between, areas typically involved in language processing and social cognition may facilitate the development of vocal ER skills in adolescence.

Emotion words, emotion concepts, and emotional development in children: A constructionist hypothesis

In this article, we integrate two constructionist approaches-the theory of constructed emotion and rational constructivism-to introduce several novel hypotheses for understanding emotional development. We first discuss the hypothesis that emotion categories are abstract and conceptual, whose instances share a goal-based function in a particular context but are highly variable in their affective, physical, and perceptual features. Next, we discuss the possibility that emotional development is the process of developing emotion concepts, and that emotion words may be a critical part of this process. We hypothesize that infants and children learn emotion categories the way they learn other abstract conceptual categories-by observing others use the same emotion word to label highly variable events. Finally, we hypothesize that emotional development can be understood as a concept construction problem: a child becomes capable of experiencing and perceiving emotion only when her brain develops the capacity to assemble ad hoc, situated emotion concepts for the purposes of guiding behavior and giving meaning to sensory inputs. Specifically, we offer a predictive processing account of emotional development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Moving beyond the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts

From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows. Over time, frequent patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of conceptual processing. As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations. In this framework, the concrete versus abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with two other distinctions becoming important instead: (i) external versus internal situational elements, (ii) situational elements versus situational integrations. Whereas concepts for situational elements originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal. We propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide relatively incomplete and distorted accounts.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.

The concreteness of abstract language: an ancient issue and a new perspective

This paper addresses the debated issue of abstract language in the framework of embodiment. First, we discuss the notion of abstractness in the light of the Western philosophical thought, with a focus on the English empiricist tradition. Second, we review the most relevant psychological models and neuroscientific empirical findings on abstract language. It turns out that abstract words are not such, because their meaning is "far from experience", but, because of the high complexity of the attached experiential clusters. Finally, we spell out the consequences of this understanding of abstractness in relation to the neural mechanisms subserving abstract language processing. If abstract words, as compared to concrete ones, imply an increasing complexity of the associated experiential clusters, then the processing of abstract language relies on the recruitment of several neural substrates coding for those experiences. We forward that, at the neural level, this complexity is coded by means of three main mechanisms: (1) the recruitment of the motor representations of different biological effectors (abstract meaning as effector-unspecific); (2) the recruitment of different systems, including sensory, motor, and emotional ones (abstract meaning as multi-systemic); (3) the recruitment of neural substrates coding for social contexts and levels of self-relatedness (abstract meaning as dynamic). As compared to the current approaches in the literature on abstract language that combine embodiment with some a-modal aspects, our proposal is fully embodied and rules out additional aspects. Our proposal may spur future empirical research on abstract language in the embodied approach.

Concepts dissolve artificial boundaries in the study of emotion and cognition, uniting body, brain, and mind

Theories of emotion have often maintained artificial boundaries: for instance, that cognition and emotion are separable, and that an emotion concept is separable from the emotional events that comprise its category (e.g. "fear" is distinct from instances of fear). Over the past several years, research has dissolved these artificial boundaries, suggesting instead that conceptual construction is a domain-general process-a process by which the brain makes meaning of the world. The brain constructs emotion concepts, but also cognitions and perceptions, all in the service of guiding action. In this view, concepts are multimodal constructions, dynamically prepared from a set of highly variable instances. This approach obviates old questions (e.g. how does cognition regulate emotion?) but generates new ones (e.g. how does a brain learn emotion concepts?). In this paper, we review this constructionist, predictive coding account of emotion, considering its implications for health and well-being, culture and development.

What we imagine is what we do? A critical overview about mental imagery as a strategy to study human defensive responses

There is not a single and perfect instinctive behavior to react to threatening situations. However, the study of particular features of these situations suggests the existence of prototypical emotional reactions and associated defensive behaviors. Since all living beings are subjected to common evolutionary pressures, such as predation and conspecific competition, it is plausible that there is conservation of some basic defensive responses in their behavioral repertoire. The choice for approaching or withdrawing from a given situation depends, among others things, on environmental features, including the threat intensity and the distance from the source of the threat. If these basic responses were conserved in humans, they should be expressed in ways similar to those observed in non-human animals. Due to ethical reasons and easy application, mental imagery has been used to test this hypothesis. The studies included in this review point to the validity of this method, with both self-report and neurophysiological findings corroborating the hypothesis under scrutiny. Despite the need for additional investigation to deal with some limitations, the information obtained with this method can help to a better understanding of the conditions that provoke specific defensive behaviors and related emotions. This knowledge may also contribute to identify vulnerability factors for fear/anxiety-related disorders.

The vividness of imagining emotional feelings in positive situations is attenuated in non-clinical dysphoria and predicts the experience of positive emotional feelings

OBJECTIVE

The vividness of imagining emotional feelings in positive situations (EFP) in non-clinically dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals and its relation to dysphoric and positive feelings was examined.

METHOD

Participants were university students in Study 1 (N = 106, 84 women; 18-45 years), in Study 2 (N = 43, 39 women; 20-47 years), in Study 3 (N = 109, 92 women; 18-50 years) who filled out a set of questionnaires assessing depressive symptoms, cognition measures, and then completed an affective imagery task, using a cross-sectional design.

RESULTS

Non-clinically dysphoric participants imagined less vividly EFP than non-dysphoric participants. The vividness of imagining EFP accounted for group differences in positive feelings beyond positive and negative cognition and negative mood.

CONCLUSIONS

In addition to deficits in the general imagery of positive events, the attenuation of vividness of EFP in non-clinical dysphoric individuals warrants attention as a separate pathway by which non-clinically dysphoric individuals develop deficiencies of conscious positive feelings.

Primary Interoceptive Cortex Activity during Simulated Experiences of the Body

Studies of the classic exteroceptive sensory systems (e.g., vision, touch) consistently demonstrate that vividly imagining a sensory experience of the world-simulating it-is associated with increased activity in the corresponding primary sensory cortex. We hypothesized, analogously, that simulating internal bodily sensations would be associated with increased neural activity in primary interoceptive cortex. An immersive, language-based mental imagery paradigm was used to test this hypothesis (e.g., imagine your heart pounding during a roller coaster ride, your face drenched in sweat during a workout). During two neuroimaging experiments, participants listened to vividly described situations and imagined "being there" in each scenario. In Study 1, we observed significantly heightened activity in primary interoceptive cortex (of dorsal posterior insula) during imagined experiences involving vivid internal sensations. This effect was specific to interoceptive simulation: It was not observed during a separate affect focus condition in Study 1 nor during an independent Study 2 that did not involve detailed simulation of internal sensations (instead involving simulation of other sensory experiences). These findings underscore the large-scale predictive architecture of the brain and reveal that words can be powerful drivers of bodily experiences.

Emotion Perception as Conceptual Synchrony

Psychological research on emotion perception anchors heavily on an object perception analogy. We present static “cues,” such as facial expressions, as objects for perceivers to categorize. Yet in the real world, emotions play out as dynamic multidimensional events. Current theoretical approaches and research methods are limited in their ability to capture this complexity. We draw on insights from a predictive coding account of neural activity and a grounded cognition account of concept representation to conceive of emotion perception as a stream of synchronized conceptualizations between two individuals, which is supported and shaped by language. We articulate how this framework can illuminate the fundamental need to study culture, as well as other sources of conceptual variation, in unpacking conceptual synchrony in emotion. We close by suggesting that the conceptual system provides the necessary flexibility to overcome gaps in emotional synchrony.

Endogenous emotion generation ability is associated with the capacity to form multimodal internal representations

Training the capacity to self-generate emotions can be a potent "vaccine" against negative stressors and be an effective intervention for affective psychopathology. However, due to a lack of knowledge about sources of individual differences in generation abilities, it is unclear how to optimally design such interventions. We investigated one potential source of variation, namely preference for using different information modalities (Visual Imagery, Auditory Imagery, Bodily Interoception, and Semantic Analysis). A representative sample of 293 participants self-induced positive and negative emotional states, freely choosing to use these modalities singly or in combination. No evidence was found for modality usage being associated with differential efficacy at generating of positive or negative emotion. Rather, usage of all modalities (except Auditory Imagery) predicted success at generation of both positive and negative emotional states. Increasing age predicted capacity to generate, especially negative, emotions. While no specific combinations of modalities were superior, the overall degree to which participants adopted multimodal implementations did predict generation efficacy. These findings inform interventions aimed at improving emotional self-generation, suggesting these must be mindful of individual differences in generation abilities and implementation tendencies, and that they should focus on enhancing the capacity to use multiple modalities.

Increased heart rate after exercise facilitates the processing of fearful but not disgusted faces

Embodied theories of emotion assume that emotional processing is grounded in bodily and affective processes. Accordingly, the perception of an emotion re-enacts congruent sensory and affective states; and conversely, bodily states congruent with a specific emotion facilitate emotional processing. This study tests whether the ability to process facial expressions (faces having a neutral expression, expressing fear, or disgust) can be influenced by making the participants’ body state congruent with the expressed emotion (e.g., high heart rate in the case of faces expressing fear). We designed a task requiring participants to categorize pictures of male and female faces that either had a neutral expression (neutral), or expressed emotions whose linkage with high heart rate is strong (fear) or significantly weaker or absent (disgust). Critically, participants were tested in two conditions: with experimentally induced high heart rate (Exercise) and with normal heart rate (Normal). Participants processed fearful faces (but not disgusted or neutral faces) faster when they were in the Exercise condition than in the Normal condition. These results support the idea that an emotionally congruent body state facilitates the automatic processing of emotionally-charged stimuli and this effect is emotion-specific rather than due to generic factors such as arousal.

Perceptual Sensitivity and Response to Strong Stimuli Are Related

To shed new light on the long-standing debate about the (in)dependence of sensitivity to weak stimuli and overreactivity to strong stimuli, we examined the relation between these tendencies within the neurobehavioral framework of the Predictive and Reactive Control Systems (PARCS) theory (Tops et al., 2010, 2014). Whereas previous studies only considered overreactivity in terms of the individual tendency to experience unpleasant affect (punishment reactivity) resulting from strong sensory stimulation, we also took the individual tendency to experience pleasant affect (reward reactivity) resulting from strong sensory stimulation into account. According to PARCS theory, these temperamental tendencies overlap in terms of high reactivity toward stimulation, but oppose each other in terms of the response orientation (approach or avoid). PARCS theory predicts that both types of reactivity to strong stimuli relate to sensitivity to weak stimuli, but that these relationships are suppressed due to the opposing relationship between reward and punishment reactivity. We measured punishment and reward reactivity to strong stimuli and sensitivity to weak stimuli using scales from the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (Evans and Rothbart, 2007). Sensitivity was also measured more objectively using the masked auditory threshold. We found that sensitivity to weak stimuli (both self-reported and objectively assessed) was positively associated with self-reported punishment and reward reactivity to strong stimuli, but only when these reactivity measures were controlled for each other, implicating a mutual suppression effect. These results are in line with PARCS theory and suggest that sensitivity to weak stimuli and overreactivity are dependent, but this dependency is likely to be obscured if punishment and reward reactivity are not both taken into account.

Bio-behavioral synchrony promotes the development of conceptualized emotions

As adults, we have structured conceptual representations of our emotions that help us to make sense of and regulate our ongoing affective experience. The ability to use emotion concepts is critical to make predictions about the world and choose appropriate action, such as 'I am afraid, and going to run away' or 'I am hungry and going to eat'. Thus, emotion concepts have an important role in helping us maintain our ongoing physiological balance, or allostasis. We will suggest here that infants can learn emotion concepts for the purpose of allostasis regulation, and that conceptualization is key component in emotional development. Moreover, we will suggest that social dyads facilitate concept learning because of a robust evolutionary feature seen in newborns of social species: they cannot survive alone and depend on conspecifics for allostasis regulation. Such social dependency creates a robust driving force for social learning of emotion concepts, and makes the social dyad, which is designed to regulate the infant's allostasis, an optimal medium for concept learning. In line with that, we will review evidence showing that the neural reference space for emotion overlaps with neural circuits that support allostasis (striatum, amygdala, and hypothalamus) and conceptualization (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex), and that their developmental trajectories are interrelated, and depend on synchronous social care.

Are event-related potentials to dynamic facial expressions of emotion related to individual differences in the accuracy of processing facial expressions and identity?

Despite a wealth of knowledge about the neural mechanisms behind emotional facial expression processing, little is known about how they relate to individual differences in social cognition abilities. We studied individual differences in the event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by dynamic facial expressions. First, we assessed the latent structure of the ERPs, reflecting structural face processing in the N170, and the allocation of processing resources and reflexive attention to emotionally salient stimuli, in the early posterior negativity (EPN) and the late positive complex (LPC). Then we estimated brain-behavior relationships between the ERP factors and behavioral indicators of facial identity and emotion-processing abilities. Structural models revealed that the participants who formed faster structural representations of neutral faces (i.e., shorter N170 latencies) performed better at face perception (r = -.51) and memory (r = -.42). The N170 amplitude was not related to individual differences in face cognition or emotion processing. The latent EPN factor correlated with emotion perception (r = .47) and memory (r = .32), and also with face perception abilities (r = .41). Interestingly, the latent factor representing the difference in EPN amplitudes between the two neutral control conditions (chewing and blinking movements) also correlated with emotion perception (r = .51), highlighting the importance of tracking facial changes in the perception of emotional facial expressions. The LPC factor for negative expressions correlated with the memory for emotional facial expressions. The links revealed between the latency and strength of activations of brain systems and individual differences in processing socio-emotional information provide new insights into the brain mechanisms involved in social communication.

Constructing emotion through simulation

Evidence increasingly suggests that simulations implement patterns of prior experience to construct one's current experience, whether that experience is oriented in the past, in the here and now, or in the future. Simulation is the mechanism by which the brain capitalizes on prior learning to efficiently navigate the situation at hand. This review examines the latest developments in theory and empirical research that address simulation during emotional phenomena. Integration of evidence across multiple literatures suggests that simulation accounts provide a unifying framework across many different emotional phenomena and highlights the importance of investigating dynamics, complexity, and variation in emotional experiences moving forward.

Coal Is Not Black, Snow Is Not White, Food Is Not a Reinforcer: The Roles of Affordances and Dispositions in the Analysis of Behavior

Reinforcers comprise sequences of actions in context. Just as the white of snow and black of coal depend on the interaction of an organism's visual system and the reflectances in its surrounds, reinforcers depend on an organism's motivational state and the affordances-possibilities for perception and action-in its surrounds. Reinforcers are not intrinsic to things but are a relation between what the thing affords, its context, the organism, and his or her history as capitulated in their current state. Reinforcers and other affordances are potentialities rather than intrinsic features. Realizing those potentialities requires motivational operations and stimulus contexts that change the state of the organism-they change its disposition to make the desired response. An expansion of the three-term contingency is suggested in order to help keep us mindful of the importance of behavioral systems, states, emotions, and dispositions in our research programs.

The neural component-process architecture of endogenously generated emotion

Despite the ubiquity of endogenous emotions and their role in both resilience and pathology, the processes supporting their generation are largely unknown. We propose a neural component process model of endogenous generation of emotion (EGE) and test it in two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments (N = 32/293) where participants generated and regulated positive and negative emotions based on internal representations, usin self-chosen generation methods. EGE activated nodes of salience (SN), default mode (DMN) and frontoparietal control (FPCN) networks. Component processes implemented by these networks were established by investigating their functional associations, activation dynamics and integration. SN activation correlated with subjective affect, with midbrain nodes exclusively distinguishing between positive and negative affect intensity, showing dynamics consistent generation of core affect. Dorsomedial DMN, together with ventral anterior insula, formed a pathway supporting multiple generation methods, with activation dynamics suggesting it is involved in the generation of elaborated experiential representations. SN and DMN both coupled to left frontal FPCN which in turn was associated with both subjective affect and representation formation, consistent with FPCN supporting the executive coordination of the generation process. These results provide a foundation for research into endogenous emotion in normal, pathological and optimal function.

Involvement of Sensory Regions in Affective Experience: A Meta-Analysis

A growing body of work suggests that sensory processes may also contribute to affective experience. In this study, we performed a meta-analysis of affective experiences driven through visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory stimulus modalities including study contrasts that compared affective stimuli to matched neutral control stimuli. We found, first, that limbic and paralimbic regions, including the amygdala, anterior insula, pre-supplementary motor area, and portions of orbitofrontal cortex were consistently engaged across two or more modalities. Second, early sensory input regions in occipital, temporal, piriform, mid-insular, and primary sensory cortex were frequently engaged during affective experiences driven by visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory inputs. A classification analysis demonstrated that the pattern of neural activity across a contrast map diagnosed the stimulus modality driving the affective experience. These findings suggest that affective experiences are constructed from activity that is distributed across limbic and paralimbic brain regions and also activity in sensory cortical regions.

Cross-modal metaphorical mapping of spoken emotion words onto vertical space

From the field of embodied cognition, previous studies have reported evidence of metaphorical mapping of emotion concepts onto a vertical spatial axis. Most of the work on this topic has used visual words as the typical experimental stimuli. However, to our knowledge, no previous study has examined the association between affect and vertical space using a cross-modal procedure. The current research is a first step toward the study of the metaphorical mapping of emotions onto vertical space by means of an auditory to visual cross-modal paradigm. In the present study, we examined whether auditory words with an emotional valence can interact with the vertical visual space according to a 'positive-up/negative-down' embodied metaphor. The general method consisted in the presentation of a spoken word denoting a positive/negative emotion prior to the spatial localization of a visual target in an upper or lower position. In Experiment 1, the spoken words were passively heard by the participants and no reliable interaction between emotion concepts and bodily simulated space was found. In contrast, Experiment 2 required more active listening of the auditory stimuli. A metaphorical mapping of affect and space was evident but limited to the participants engaged in an emotion-focused task. Our results suggest that the association of affective valence and vertical space is not activated automatically during speech processing since an explicit semantic and/or emotional evaluation of the emotionally valenced stimuli was necessary to obtain an embodied effect. The results are discussed within the framework of the embodiment hypothesis.

Interoceptive predictions in the brain

Intuition suggests that perception follows sensation and therefore bodily feelings originate in the body. However, recent evidence goes against this logic: interoceptive experience may largely reflect limbic predictions about the expected state of the body that are constrained by ascending visceral sensations. In this Opinion article, we introduce the Embodied Predictive Interoception Coding model, which integrates an anatomical model of corticocortical connections with Bayesian active inference principles, to propose that agranular visceromotor cortices contribute to interoception by issuing interoceptive predictions. We then discuss how disruptions in interoceptive predictions could function as a common vulnerability for mental and physical illness.

The role of language in emotion: predictions from psychological constructionism

Common sense suggests that emotions are physical types that have little to do with the words we use to label them. Yet recent psychological constructionist accounts reveal that language is a fundamental element in emotion that is constitutive of both emotion experiences and perceptions. According to the psychological constructionist Conceptual Act Theory (CAT), an instance of emotion occurs when information from one's body or other people's bodies is made meaningful in light of the present situation using concept knowledge about emotion. The CAT suggests that language plays a role in emotion because language supports the conceptual knowledge used to make meaning of sensations from the body and world in a given context. In the present paper, we review evidence from developmental and cognitive science to reveal that language scaffolds concept knowledge in humans, helping humans to acquire abstract concepts such as emotion categories across the lifespan. Critically, language later helps individuals use concepts to make meaning of on-going sensory perceptions. Building on this evidence, we outline predictions from a psychological constructionist model of emotion in which language serves as the "glue" for emotion concept knowledge, binding concepts to embodied experiences and in turn shaping the ongoing processing of sensory information from the body and world to create emotional experiences and perceptions.