Effect of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Renal Outcomes Among Patients With Early-Stage Chronic Kidney Disease in Taiwan

BACKGROUND

With the promising outcomes of the pre-ESRD (end-stage renal disease) pay-for-performance (P4P) program, the National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA) of Taiwan launched a P4P program for patients with early chronic kidney disease (CKD) in 2011, targeting CKD patients at stages 1, 2, and 3a. This study aimed to examine the long-term effect of the early-CKD P4P program on CKD progression.

METHODS

We conducted a matched cohort study using electronic medical records from a large healthcare delivery system in Taiwan. The outcome of interest was CKD progression to estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) <45 mL/min/1.73 m2 between P4P program enrolees and non-enrolees. The difference in the cumulative incidence of CKD progression between the P4P and non-P4P groups was tested using Gray's test. We adopted a cause-specific (CS) hazard model to estimate the hazard in the P4P group as compared to non-P4P group, adjusting for age, sex, baseline renal function, and comorbidities. A subgroup analysis was further performed in CKD patients with diabetes to evaluate the interactive effects between the early-CKD P4P and diabetes P4P programs.

RESULTS

The incidence per 100 person-months of disease progression was significantly lower in the P4P group than in the non-P4P group (0.44 vs. 0.69, P<.0001), and the CS hazard ratio (CS-HR) for P4P program enrolees compared with non-enrolees was 0.61 (95% CI: 0.58-0.64, P<.0001). The results of the subgroup analysis further revealed an additive effect of the diabetes P4P program on CKD progression; compared to none of both P4P enrolees, the CS-HR for CKD disease progression was 0.60 (95% CI: 0.54-0.67, P<.0001) for patients who were enrolled in both early-CKD P4P and diabetes P4P programs.

CONCLUSION

The present study results suggest that the early-CKD P4P program is superior to usual care to decelerate CKD progression in patients with early-stage CKD.

Assessment of a Large-Scale Peer Learning Program's Value by Manual Review of Case Submissions

OBJECTIVE

Prior studies used submission numbers or report addendum rates to measure peer learning programs' (PLP) impact. We assessed the educational value of a PLP by manually reviewing cases submitted to identify factors correlating with meaningful learning opportunities (MLOs).

METHODS

This institutional review board-exempted, retrospective study was performed in a large academic radiology department generating >800,000 reports annually. A PLP facilitating radiologist-to-radiologist feedback was implemented May 1, 2017, with subsequent pay-for-performance initiatives encouraging increasing submissions, >18,000 by 2019. Two radiologists blinded to submitter and receiver identity categorized 336 randomly selected submissions as a MLO, not meaningful, or equivocal, resolving disagreements in consensus review. Primary outcome was proportion of MLOs. Secondary outcomes included percent engagement by subspecialty clinical division and comparing MLO and report addendum rates via Fisher's exact tests. We assessed association between peer learning category, pay-for-performance interventions, and subspecialty division with MLOs using logistic regression.

RESULTS

Of 336 PLP submissions, 65.2% (219 of 336) were categorized as meaningful, 27.4% (92 of 336) not meaningful, and 7.4% (25 of 336) equivocal, with substantial reviewer agreement (86.0% [289 of 336], κ = 0.71, 95% confidence interval 0.64-0.78). MLO rate (65.2% [219 of 336]) was five times higher than addendum rate (12.9% [43 of 333]) for the cohort. MLO proportion (adjusted odds ratios 0.05-1.09) and percent engagement (0.5%-3.6%) varied between subspecialty divisions, some submitting significantly fewer MLOs (P < .01). MLO proportion did not vary between peer learning categories.

CONCLUSION

Educational value of a large-scale PLP, estimated through manual review of case submissions, is likely a more accurate measure of program impact. Incentives to enhance PLP use did not diminish the program's educational value.

Hospital-physician integration and risk-coding intensity

Hospital-physician integration has surged in recent years. Integration may allow hospitals to share resources and management practices with their integrated physicians that increase the reported diagnostic severity of their patients. Greater diagnostic severity will increase practices' payment under risk-based arrangements. We offer the first analysis of whether hospital-physician integration affects providers' coding of patient severity. Using a two-way fixed effects model, an event study, and a stacked difference-in-differences analysis of 5 million patient-year observations from 2010 to 2015, we find that the integration of a patient's primary care doctor is associated with a robust 2%-4% increase in coded severity, the risk-score equivalent of aging a physician's patients by 4-8 months. This effect was not driven by physicians treating different patients nor by physicians seeing patients more often. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that hospitals share organizational resources with acquired physician practices to increase the measured clinical severity of patients. Increases in the intensity of coding will improve vertically-integrated practices' performance in alternative payment models and pay-for-performance programs while raising overall health care spending.

Neurosurgical Performance in the First 2 Years of Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: A Descriptive Analysis and Predictors of Receiving Bonus Payments

BACKGROUND

The merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS) program was implemented to tie Medicare reimbursements to value-based care measures. Neurosurgical performance in MIPS has not yet been described.

OBJECTIVE

To characterize neurosurgical performance in the first 2 years of MIPS.

METHODS

Publicly available data regarding MIPS performance for neurosurgeons in 2017 and 2018 were queried. Descriptive statistics about physician characteristics, MIPS performance, and ensuing payment adjustments were performed, and predictors of bonus payments were identified.

RESULTS

There were 2811 physicians included in 2017 and 3147 in 2018. Median total MIPS scores (99.1 vs 90.4, P < .001) and quality scores (97.9 vs 88.5, P < .001) were higher in 2018 than in 2017. More neurosurgeons (2758, 87.6%) received bonus payments in 2018 than in 2017 (2013, 71.6%). Of the 2232 neurosurgeons with scores in both years, 1347 (60.4%) improved their score. Reporting through an alternative payment model (odds ratio [OR]: 32.3, 95% CI: 16.0-65.4; P < .001) and any practice size larger than 10 (ORs ranging from 2.37 to 10.2, all P < .001) were associated with receiving bonus payments. Increasing years in practice (OR: 0.99; 95% CI: 0.982-0.998, P = .011) and having 25% to 49% (OR: 0.72; 95% CI: 0.53-0.97; P = .029) or ≥50% (OR: 0.48; 95% CI: 0.28-0.82; P = .007) of a physician's patients eligible for Medicaid were associated with lower rates of bonus payments.

CONCLUSION

Neurosurgeons performed well in MIPS in 2017 and 2018, although the program may be biased against surgeons who practice in small groups or take care of socially disadvantaged patients.

Time trends in contraceptive prescribing in UK primary care 2000-2018: a repeated cross-sectional study

BACKGROUND

Over the last 20 years, new contraceptive methods became available and incentives to increase contraceptive uptake were introduced. We aimed to describe temporal trends in non-barrier contraceptive prescribing in UK primary care for the period 2000-2018.

METHODS

A repeated cross-sectional study using patient data from the IQVIA Medical Research Data (IMRD) database. The proportion (95% CI) of women prescribed non-barrier contraception per year was captured.

RESULTS

A total of 2 705 638 women aged 15-49 years were included. Between 2000 and 2018, the proportion of women prescribed combined hormonal contraception (CHC) fell from 26.2% (26.0%-26.3%) to 14.3% (14.2%-14.3%). Prescriptions for progestogen-only pills (POPs) and long-acting reversible contraception (LARC) rose from 4.3% (4.3%-4.4%) to 10.8% (10.7%-10.9%) and 4.2% (4.1%-4.2%) to 6.5% (6.5%-6.6%), respectively. Comparing 2018 data for most deprived versus least deprived areas, women from the most deprived areas were more likely to be prescribed LARC (7.7% (7.5%-7.9%) vs 5.6% (5.4%-5.8%)) while women from the least deprived areas were more likely to be prescribed contraceptive pills (20.8% (21.1%-21.5%) vs 26.2% (26.5%-26.9%)). In 2009, LARC prescriptions increased irrespective of age and social deprivation in line with a pay-for-performance incentive. However, following the incentive's withdrawal in 2014, LARC prescriptions for adolescents aged 15-19 years fell from 6.8% (6.6%-7.0%) in 2013 to 5.6% (5.4%-5.8%) in 2018.

CONCLUSIONS

CHC prescribing fell by 46% while POP prescribing more than doubled. The type of contraception prescribed was influenced by social deprivation. Withdrawal of a pay-for-performance incentive may have adversely affected adolescent LARC uptake, highlighting the need for further intervention to target this at-risk group.

Performance bonuses and the quality of primary health care delivered by family health teams in Brazil: A difference-in-differences analysis

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care have been widely implemented globally. Despite intuitive appeal, evidence on the effectiveness of P4P is mixed, potentially due to differences in how schemes are designed. We exploited municipality variation in the design features of Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ) to examine whether performance bonuses given to family health team workers were associated with changes in the quality of care and whether the size of bonus mattered.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

For this quasi-experimental study, we used a difference-in-differences approach combined with matching. We compared changes over time in the quality of care delivered by family health teams between (bonus) municipalities that chose to use some or all of the PMAQ money to provide performance-related bonuses to team workers with (nonbonus) municipalities that invested the funds using traditional input-based budgets. The primary outcome was the PMAQ score, a quality of care index on a scale of 0 to 100, based on several hundred indicators (ranging from 598 to 660) of health care delivery. We did one-to-one matching of bonus municipalities to nonbonus municipalities based on baseline demographic and economic characteristics. On the matched sample, we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the association of any bonus and size of bonus with the prepost change over time (between November 2011 and October 2015) in the PMAQ score. We performed subgroup analyses with respect to the local area income of the family health team. The matched analytical sample comprised 2,346 municipalities (1,173 nonbonus municipalities; 1,173 bonus municipalities), containing 10,275 family health teams that participated in PMAQ from the outset. Bonus municipalities were associated with a 4.6 (95% CI: 2.7 to 6.4; p < 0.001) percentage point increase in the PMAQ score compared with nonbonus municipalities. The association with quality of care increased with the size of bonus: the largest bonus group saw an improvement of 8.2 percentage points (95% CI: 6.2 to 10.2; p < 0.001) compared with the control. The subgroup analysis showed that the observed improvement in performance was most pronounced in the poorest two-fifths of localities. The limitations of the study include the potential for bias from unmeasured time-varying confounding and the fact that the PMAQ score has not been validated as a measure of quality of care.

CONCLUSIONS

Performance bonuses to family health team workers compared with traditional input-based budgets were associated with an improvement in the quality of care.

From pay for performance to collaborative quality initiatives: quality care and implications for the limb salvage center

Management of chronic wounds, specifically those of the lower extremity, varies considerably by geographic region. The consequences of low-quality care perpetuate poor outcomes and low value for patients and the health care system. The emergence of value-based health care has forced stakeholders to evaluate care from quality and cost perspectives. This review presents a replicable quality assessment model for limb salvage specialists to apply to their practices. This model will foster increased collaboration between caregivers across all disciplines in an effort to increase quality care assurances for patients with chronic wounds of the lower extremity. Current approaches to quality assessment in the management of such wounds are outlined, and areas for innovation, such as collaborative initiatives, are highlighted. Use of the Donabedian model to provide quality and value to patients undergoing treatment for chronic wounds at a tertiary limb salvage center is also described. A value-based care system can be comprehensively assessed using the Donabedian framework. A pay-for-performance approach has largely guided health care reform in the United States; however, the effects of this approach have been incongruent with its intent. Limb salvage centers work to rectify this imbalance and continually evaluate quality measures to improve care. Collaborative quality initiatives have resulted in improved outcomes and cost savings in multiple specialties, and multidisciplinary limb salvage centers may benefit from such infrastructure. Limb salvage specialists have an important role in determining whether health care quality improvements are internally or externally driven. Existing quality assessment tools are imperfect, and the consequences of low-quality care of chronic wounds can be devastating. Through collaboration across institutions and the use of validated quality assessment tools such as the Donabedian model, chronic wound specialists can be leaders in developing and implementing quality care measures.

Learning From England's Best Practice Tariff: Process Measure Pay-for-Performance Can Improve Hip Fracture Outcomes

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study was to evaluate England's Best Practice Tariff (BPT) and consider potential implications for Medicare patients should the US adopt a similar plan.

SUMMARY BACKGROUND DATA

Since the beginning of the Affordable Care Act, Medicare has renewed efforts to improve the outcomes of older adults through introduction of an expanding set of alternative-payment models. Among trauma patients, recommended arrangements met with mixed success given concerns about the heterogeneous nature of trauma patients and resulting outcome variation. A novel approach taken for hip fractures in England could offer a viable alternative.

METHODS

Linear regression, interrupted time-series, difference-in-difference, and counterfactual models of 2000 to 2016 Medicare (US), HES-APC (England) death certificate-linked claims (≥65 years) were used to: track US hip fracture trends, look at changes in English hip fracture trends before-and-after BPT implementation, compare changes in US-versus-English mortality, and estimate total/theoretical lives saved.

RESULTS

A total of 806,036 English and 3,221,109 US hospitalizations were included. After BPT implementation, England's 30-day mortality decreased by 2.6 percentage-points (95%CI: 1.7-3.5) from a baseline of 9.9% (relative reduction 26.3%). 90- and 365-day mortality decreased by 5.6 and 5.4 percentage-points. 30/90/365-day readmissions also declined with a concurrent shortening of hospital length-of-stay. From 2000 to 2016, US outcomes were stagnant (P > 0.05), resulting in an inversion of the countries' mortality and >38,000 potential annual US lives saved.

CONCLUSIONS

Process measure pay-for-performance led to significant improvements in English hip fracture outcomes. As efforts to improve US older adult health continue to increase, there are important lessons to be learned from a successful initiative like the BPT.

Monetary incentives and peer referral in promoting secondary distribution of HIV self-testing among men who have sex with men in China: A randomized controlled trial

BACKGROUND

Digital network-based methods may enhance peer distribution of HIV self-testing (HIVST) kits, but interventions that can optimize this approach are needed. We aimed to assess whether monetary incentives and peer referral could improve a secondary distribution program for HIVST among men who have sex with men (MSM) in China.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

Between October 21, 2019 and September 14, 2020, a 3-arm randomized controlled, single-blinded trial was conducted online among 309 individuals (defined as index participants) who were assigned male at birth, aged 18 years or older, ever had male-to-male sex, willing to order HIVST kits online, and consented to take surveys online. We randomly assigned index participants into one of the 3 arms: (1) standard secondary distribution (control) group (n = 102); (2) secondary distribution with monetary incentives (SD-M) group (n = 103); and (3) secondary distribution with monetary incentives plus peer referral (SD-M-PR) group (n = 104). Index participants in 3 groups were encouraged to order HIVST kits online and distribute to members within their social networks. Members who received kits directly from index participants or through peer referral links from index MSM were defined as alters. Index participants in the 2 intervention groups could receive a fixed incentive ($3 USD) online for the verified test result uploaded to the digital platform by each unique alter. Index participants in the SD-M-PR group could additionally have a personalized peer referral link for alters to order kits online. Both index participants and alters needed to pay a refundable deposit ($15 USD) for ordering a kit. All index participants were assigned an online 3-month follow-up survey after ordering kits. The primary outcomes were the mean number of alters motivated by index participants in each arm and the mean number of newly tested alters motivated by index participants in each arm. These were assessed using zero-inflated negative binomial regression to determine the group differences in the mean number of alters and the mean number of newly tested alters motivated by index participants. Analyses were performed on an intention-to-treat basis. We also conducted an economic evaluation using microcosting from a health provider perspective with a 3-month time horizon. The mean number of unique tested alters motivated by index participants was 0.57 ± 0.96 (mean ± standard deviation [SD]) in the control group, compared with 0.98 ± 1.38 in the SD-M group (mean difference [MD] = 0.41),and 1.78 ± 2.05 in the SD-M-PR group (MD = 1.21). The mean number of newly tested alters motivated by index participants was 0.16 ± 0.39 (mean ± SD) in the control group, compared with 0.41 ± 0.73 in the SD-M group (MD = 0.25) and 0.57 ± 0.91 in the SD-M-PR group (MD = 0.41), respectively. Results indicated that index participants in intervention arms were more likely to motivate unique tested alters (control versus SD-M: incidence rate ratio [IRR = 2.98, 95% CI = 1.82 to 4.89, p-value < 0.001; control versus SD-M-PR: IRR = 3.26, 95% CI = 2.29 to 4.63, p-value < 0.001) and newly tested alters (control versus SD-M: IRR = 4.22, 95% CI = 1.93 to 9.23, p-value < 0.001; control versus SD-M-PR: IRR = 3.49, 95% CI = 1.92 to 6.37, p-value < 0.001) to conduct HIVST. The proportion of newly tested testers among alters was 28% in the control group, 42% in the SD-M group, and 32% in the SD-M-PR group. A total of 18 testers (3 index participants and 15 alters) tested as HIV positive, and the HIV reactive rates for alters were similar between the 3 groups. The total costs were $19,485.97 for 794 testers, including 450 index participants and 344 alter testers. Overall, the average cost per tester was $24.54, and the average cost per alter tester was $56.65. Monetary incentives alone (SD-M group) were more cost-effective than monetary incentives with peer referral (SD-M-PR group) on average in terms of alters tested and newly tested alters, despite SD-M-PR having larger effects. Compared to the control group, the cost for one more alter tester in the SD-M group was $14.90 and $16.61 in the SD-M-PR group. For newly tested alters, the cost of one more alter in the SD-M group was $24.65 and $49.07 in the SD-M-PR group. No study-related adverse events were reported during the study. Limitations include the digital network approach might neglect individuals who lack internet access.

CONCLUSIONS

Monetary incentives alone and the combined intervention of monetary incentives and peer referral can promote the secondary distribution of HIVST among MSM. Monetary incentives can also expand HIV testing by encouraging first-time testing through secondary distribution by MSM. This social network-based digital approach can be expanded to other public health research, especially in the era of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

TRIAL REGISTRATION

Chinese Clinical Trial Registry (ChiCTR) ChiCTR1900025433.

Who is Paid in Pay-For-Performance? Inequalities in the Distribution of Financial Bonuses Amongst Health Centres in Zimbabwe

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been implemented across low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), little is known about their distributional consequences. A key concern is that financial bonuses are primarily captured by providers who are already better able to perform (for example, those in wealthier areas), P4P could exacerbate existing inequalities within the health system. We examine inequalities in the distribution of pay-outs in Zimbabwe’s national P4P scheme (2014–2016) using quantitative data on bonus payments and facility characteristics and findings from a thematic policy review and 28 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders at all system levels. We found that in Zimbabwe, facilities with better baseline access to guidelines, more staff, higher consultation volumes and wealthier and less remote target populations earned significantly higher P4P bonuses throughout the programme. For instance, facilities that were 1 SD above the mean in terms of access to guidelines, earned 90 USD more per quarter than those that were 1 SD below the mean. Differences in bonus pay-outs for facilities that were 1 SD above and below the mean in terms of the number of staff and consultation volumes are even more pronounced at 348 USD and 445 USD per quarter. Similarly, facilities with villages in the poorest wealth quintile in their vicinity earned less than all others—and 752 USD less per quarter than those serving villages in the richest quintile. Qualitative data confirm these findings. Respondents identified facility baseline structural quality, leadership, catchment population size and remoteness as affecting performance in the scheme. Unequal distribution of P4P pay-outs was identified as having negative consequences on staff retention, absenteeism and motivation. Based on our findings and previous work, we provide some guidance to policymakers on how to design more equitable P4P schemes.

Scores of peripheral neuropathic pain predicting long-term mortality in patients with type 2 diabetes: A retrospective cohort study

OBJECTIVES

Diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain (DPNP) is a prevalent chronic complication in patients with diabetes. Using a questionnaire is helpful for DPNP screening in outpatients. In this retrospective cohort, we aimed to examine whether DPNP diagnosed based on scoring questionnaires could predict long-term mortality in outpatients with type 2 diabetes.

METHODS

We enrolled 2318 patients who had joined the diabetes pay-for-performance program and completed the annual assessments, including both the identification pain questionnaire (ID pain) and Douleur Neuropathique en 4 questionnaire (DN4), between January 2013 and October 2013. Information on registered deaths was collected up to August 2019.

RESULTS

There was high consistency in the scores between the ID pain and DN4 (r = 0.935, P < 0.001). During the median follow-up of 6.2 years (interquartile range: 5.9-6.4 years), 312 patients deceased. Patients with an ID pain score of ≥ 2 had a higher mortality risk than those with a score of < 2 (hazard ratio [HR] = 1.394, 95%CI: 1.090-1.782), and patients with a DN4 score of ≥ 4 had a higher mortality risk than those with a score of < 4 (HR = 1.668, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.211-2.297). Patients consistently diagnosed with DPNP by the ID pain and DN4 had a significantly higher mortality risk (HR = 1.713, 95% CI: 1.223-2.398, P = 0.002), but not those discrepantly diagnosed with DPNP (P = 0.107), as compared with those without DPNP.

CONCLUSIONS

Both the ID pain and DN4 for DPNP screening were predictive of long-term mortality in patients with type 2 diabetes. However, a discrepancy in the diagnosis of DPNP weakened the power of mortality prediction.

Patient characteristics associated with enrolment under voluntary programs implemented within fee-for-service systems in British Columbia and Quebec: a cross-sectional study

BACKGROUND

There is a paucity of information on patient characteristics associated with enrolment under voluntary programs (e.g. incentive payments) implemented within fee-for-service systems. We explored patient characteristics associated with enrolment under these programs in British Columbia and Quebec.

METHODS

We used linked administrative data and a cross-sectional design to compare people aged 40 years or more enrolled under voluntary programs to those who were eligible but not enrolled. We examined 2 programs in Quebec (enrolment of vulnerable patients with qualifying conditions [implemented in 2003] and enrolment of the general population [2009]) and 3 in BC (Chronic disease incentive [2003], Complex care incentive [2007] and enrolment of the general population [A GP for Me, 2013]). We used logistic regression to estimate the odds of enrolment by neighbourhood income, rural versus urban residence, previous treatment for mental illness, previous treatment for substance use disorder and use of health care services before program implementation, controlling for characteristics linked to program eligibility.

RESULTS

In Quebec, we identified 1 569 010 people eligible for the vulnerable enrolment program (of whom 505 869 [32.2%] were enrolled within the first 2 yr of program implementation) and 2 394 923 for the general enrolment program (of whom 352 380 [14.7%] were enrolled within the first 2 yr). In BC, we identified 133 589 people eligible for the Chronic disease incentive, 47 619 for the Complex care incentive and 1 349 428 for A GP for Me; of these, 60 764 (45.5%), 28 273 (59.4%) and 1 066 714 (79.0%), respectively, were enrolled within the first 2 years. The odds of enrolment were higher in higher-income neighbourhoods for programs without enrolment criteria (adjusted odds ratio [OR] comparing highest to lowest quintiles 1.21 [95% confidence interval (CI) 1.20-1.23] in Quebec and 1.67 [95% CI 1.64-1.69] in BC) but were similar across neighbourhood income quintiles for programs with health-related eligibility criteria. The odds of enrolment by urban versus rural location varied by program. People treated for substance use disorders had lower odds of enrolment in all programs (adjusted OR 0.60-0.72). Compared to people eligible but not enrolled, those enrolled had similar or higher numbers of primary care visits and longitudinal continuity of care in the year before enrolment.

INTERPRETATION

People living in lower-income neighbourhoods and those treated for substance use disorders were less likely than people in higher-income neighbourhoods and those not treated for such disorders to be enrolled in programs without health-related eligibility criteria. Other strategies are needed to promote equitable access to primary care.

Emergency clinician participation and performance in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System

BACKGROUND

The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the largest national pay-for-performance program and the first to afford emergency clinicians unique financial incentives for quality measurement and improvement. With little known regarding its impact on emergency clinicians, we sought to describe participation in the MIPS and examine differences in performance scores and payment adjustments based on reporting affiliation and reporting strategy.

METHODS

We performed a cross-sectional analysis using the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2018 Quality Payment Program (QPP) Experience Report data set. We categorized emergency clinicians by their reporting affiliation (individual, group, MIPS alternative payment model [APM]), MIPS performance scores, and Medicare Part B payment adjustments. We calculated performance scores for common quality measures contributing to the quality category score if reported through qualified clinical data registries (QCDRs) or claims-based reporting strategies.

RESULTS

In 2018, a total of 59,828 emergency clinicians participated in the MIPS-1,246 (2.1%) reported as individuals, 43,404 (72.5%) reported as groups, and 15,178 (25.4%) reported within MIPS APMs. Clinicians reporting as individuals earned lower overall MIPS scores (median [interquartile range {IQR}] = 30.8 [15.0-48.2] points) than those reporting within groups (median [IQR] = 88.4 [49.3-100.0]) and MIPS APMs (median [IQR] = 100.0 [100.0-100.0]; p < 0.001) and more frequently incurred penalties with a negative payment adjustment. Emergency clinicians had higher measure scores if reporting QCDR or QPP non-emergency medicine specialty set measures.

CONCLUSIONS

Emergency clinician participation in national value-based programs is common, with one in four participating through MIPS APMs. Those employing specific strategies such as QCDR and group reporting received the highest MIPS scores and payment adjustments, emphasizing the role that reporting strategy and affiliation play in the quality of care.

Physician Practice Leaders' Perceptions of Medicare's Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS)

BACKGROUND

Medicare's Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major value-based purchasing program. Little is known about how physician practice leaders view the program and its benefits and challenges.

OBJECTIVE

To understand practice leaders' perceptions of MIPS.

DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS

Interviews were conducted from December 12, 2019, to June 23, 2020, with leaders of 30 physician practices of various sizes and specialties across the USA. Practices were randomly selected using the Medical Group Management Association's membership database. Practices included small primary care and general surgery practices (1-9 physicians); medium primary care and general surgery practices (10-25 physicians); and large multispecialty practices (50 or more physicians). Participants were asked about their perceptions of MIPS measures; the program's effect on patient care; administrative burden; and rationale for participation.

MAIN MEASURES

Major themes related to practice participation in MIPS.

KEY RESULTS

Interviews were conducted with 30 practices representing all US census regions. Six major themes emerged: (1) MIPS is understood as a continuation of previous value-based payment programs and a precursor to future programs; (2) measures are more relevant to primary care practices than other specialties; (3) leaders are conflicted on whether the program improves patient care; (4) MIPS creates a substantial administrative burden, exacerbated by annual programmatic changes; (5) incentives are small relative to the effort needed to participate; and (6) external support for participation can be helpful. Many participants indicated that their practice only participated in MIPS to avoid financial penalties; some reported that physicians cared for fewer patients due to the program's administrative burden.

CONCLUSIONS

Practice leaders reported several challenges related to MIPS, including irrelevant measures, administrative burden, frequent programmatic changes, and small incentives. They held mixed views on whether the program improves patient care. These findings may be useful to policymakers hoping to improve MIPS.

A nationwide cohort investigation on pay-for-performance and major adverse limb events in patients with diabetes

A retrospective cohort study was conducted using claims data from Taiwan's National Health Insurance program to assess the effect of diabetic pay-for-performance (P4P) program on major adverse limb events (MALE) and major adverse cardiovascular events (MACE) in patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM). This study included patients with T2DM who had completed or not completed a 1-year P4P program from 2002 to 2013. Propensity-score matching was used to balance the baseline characteristics between groups. The Cox proportional-hazard model and Fine and Gray subdistribution hazard model were used to examine the association between P4P and the risks of MALE, MACE, systemic thromboembolism (ST), heart failure (HF) hospitalization, and all-cause mortality. Patients who underwent the P4P program had a significantly decreased incidence of MALE (2.0% vs. 2.6%, subdistribution hazard ratio [SHR] 0.73, 95% CI 0.71-0.76). Regarding the individual components, the P4P group demonstrated lower risks for foot ulcer (1.1% vs 1.3%, SHR 0.80, 95% CI 0.77-0.84), gangrene (0.57% vs 0.93%, SHR 0.59, 95% CI 0.56-0.63), percutaneous transluminal angioplasty (0.61% vs 0.79%, SHR 0.72, 95% CI 0.68-0.77), and amputation (0.46% vs 0.75%, SHR 0.58, 95% CI 0.55-0.62). In addition, the risks of MACE, ST, HF hospitalization, and all-cause mortality were remarkably lower in the P4P group. The P4P program might significantly reduce critical events of MALE, MACE, ST, HF, and mortality in the diabetic population.

Toward a Preliminary Theory of Organizational Incentives: Addressing Incentive Misalignment in Private Equity-Owned Long-Term Care Facilities

The COVID-19 pandemic brought critical debates regarding private equity ownership of long-term care facilities to the forefront of political, legal, and social landscapes. Like many of the historical concerns about long-term care, these debates center around low quality patient care. While the concerns present important challenges to overcome, this note theorizes the kinds of organizational incentives that may provide opportunities to align patient quality care with the financial goals of private equity investing. After a discussion of the historical context of long term care facilities and the more recent trends towards for-profit and private equity ownership of these facilities (Parts II and III), I engage with value-based models as a starting point to consider organizational level incentive possibilities (Part IV). In Part V, I consider an organizational-level pay for performance model, a time-bound incentive structure, and investor-specific incentives as three distinct possibilities for addressing the patient care issues identified.

Long-term effects of payment for performance on maternal and child health outcomes: evidence from Tanzania

BACKGROUND

The success of payment for performance (P4P) schemes relies on their ability to generate sustainable changes in the behaviour of healthcare providers. This paper examines short-term and longer-term effects of P4P in Tanzania and the reasons for these changes.

METHODS

We conducted a controlled before and after study and an embedded process evaluation. Three rounds of facility, patient and household survey data (at baseline, after 13 months and at 36 months) measured programme effects in seven intervention districts and four comparison districts. We used linear difference-in-difference regression analysis to determine programme effects, and differential effects over time. Four rounds of qualitative data examined evolution in programme design, implementation and mechanisms of change.

RESULTS

Programme effects on the rate of institutional deliveries and antimalarial treatment during antenatal care reduced overtime, with stock out rates of antimalarials increasing over time to baseline levels. P4P led to sustained improvements in kindness during deliveries, with a wider set of improvements in patient experience of care in the longer term. A change in programme management and funding delayed incentive payments affecting performance on some indicators. The verification system became more integrated within routine systems over time, reducing the time burden on managers and health workers. Ongoing financial autonomy and supervision sustained motivational effects in those aspects of care giving not reliant on funding.

CONCLUSION

Our study adds to limited and mixed evidence documenting how P4P effects evolve over time. Our findings highlight the importance of undertaking ongoing assessment of effects over time.

Monetary incentives increase COVID-19 vaccinations

The stalling of COVID-19 vaccination rates threatens public health. To increase vaccination rates, governments across the world are considering the use of monetary incentives. Here we present evidence about the effect of guaranteed payments on COVID-19 vaccination uptake. We ran a large preregistered randomized controlled trial (with 8286 participants) in Sweden and linked the data to population-wide administrative vaccination records. We found that modest monetary payments of 24 US dollars (200 Swedish kronor) increased vaccination rates by 4.2 percentage points (P = 0.005), from a baseline rate of 71.6%. By contrast, behavioral nudges increased stated intentions to become vaccinated but had only small and not statistically significant impacts on vaccination rates. The results highlight the potential of modest monetary incentives to raise vaccination rates.

Improving Care for Critical Care Patients by Strategic Alignment of Quality Goals With a Physician Financial Incentive Model

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The passage of the Affordable Care Act has ignited a shift from the pay-for-performance model to value-based care with a particular relevance in critical care settings. Provider incentive programs are widely considered as a means to reward providers based on the achievement of preset quality metrics. This article aims to demonstrate the effects of a provider incentive program in the critical care delivery system in a large academic center in the Northeastern United States.

METHODS

This article describes the results of a retrospective analysis of a performance-driven quality improvement initiative at a critical care facility of an academic medical center using a quasi-experimental pre-/posttest design. A set of quality measures was selected as outcome metrics. Selection criteria for the process measures are as follows: (i) the metric goals should be influenced by the physician's input to a large degree; (ii) the measure must be transparent and accessible within the hospital-wide data reporting system; (iii) the metric that required group effort and interdisciplinary collaboration to achieve; and (iv) the measure must directly affect patient outcome. The outcome metrics are central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) and catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTIs), standardized infection ratio (SIR), Foley catheter and central line utilization standardized utilization ratio (SUR), hand hygiene compliance, and adherence to respiratory recovery pathway goals. These metrics were tracked from for 3 years with success defined as achieving set benchmarks for each metric.

RESULTS

The average CLABSI SIR and CAUTI SIR across all intensive care units (ICUs) decreased by 44% (P = .05) and 87% (P = .02) over 3 years as well as the central line and Foley catheter utilization falling by 41% and 30%, respectively. Hand hygiene compliance in the ICUs improved for the same period by 27 percentage points, as did compliance with the respiratory recovery pathway program by 4 percentage points.

CONCLUSION

The use of a physician-driven financial incentive model in a critical care setting measured by outcome metrics dependent on physician input is successful with rigorous implementation and careful evaluation.

Project MIMIC (Maximizing Implementation of Motivational Incentives in Clinics): A cluster-randomized type 3 hybrid effectiveness-implementation trial

BACKGROUND

Opioid-related overdoses and harms have been declared a public health emergency in the United States, highlighting an urgent need to implement evidence-based treatments. Contingency management (CM) is one of the most effective behavioral interventions when delivered in combination with medication for opioid use disorder, but its implementation in opioid treatment programs is woefully limited. Project MIMIC (Maximizing Implementation of Motivational Incentives in Clinics) was funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse to identify effective strategies for helping opioid treatment programs improve CM implementation as an adjunct to medication. Specific aims will test the impact of two different strategies on implementation outcomes (primary aim) and patient outcomes (secondary aims), as well as test putative mediators of implementation effectiveness (exploratory aim).

METHODS

A 3-cohort, cluster-randomized, type 3 hybrid design is used with the opioid treatment programs as the unit of randomization. Thirty programs are randomized to one of two conditions. The control condition is the Addiction Technology Transfer Center (ATTC) Network implementation strategy, which consists of three core approaches: didactic training, performance feedback, and on-going consultation. The experimental condition is an enhanced ATTC strategy, with the same core ATTC elements plus two additional theory-driven elements. The two additional elements are Pay-for-Performance, which aims to increase implementing staff's extrinsic motivations, and Implementation & Sustainment Facilitation, which targets staff's intrinsic motivations. Data will be collected using a novel, CM Tracker tool to document CM session delivery, session audio recordings, provider surveys, and patient surveys. Implementation outcomes include CM Exposure (number of CM sessions delivered per patient), CM Skill (ratings of CM fidelity), and CM Sustainment (number of patients receiving CM after removal of support). Patient outcomes include self-reported opioid abstinence and opioid-related problems (both assessed at 3- and 6-months post-baseline).

DISCUSSION

There is urgent public health need to improve the implementation of CM as an adjunct to medication for opioid use disorder. Consistent with its hybrid type 3 design, Project MIMIC is advancing implementation science by comparing impacts of these two multifaceted strategies on both implementation and patient outcomes, and by examining the extent to which the impacts of those strategies can be explained by putative mediators.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

This clinical trial has been registered with clinicaltrials.gov (NCT03931174). Registered April 30, 2019. https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03931174?term=project+mimic&draw=2&rank=1.