Exposure to intergroup conspiracy theories promotes prejudice which spreads across groups

Do conspiracy beliefs fuel support for reactionary social movements? Effects of misbeliefs on actions to oppose lockdown and to "stop the steal"

Pundits have speculated that the spread of conspiracies and misinformation (termed "misbeliefs") is leading to a resurgence of right-wing, reactionary movements. However, the current empirical picture regarding the relationship between misbeliefs and collective action is mixed. We help clarify these associations by using two waves of data collected during the COVID-19 Pandemic (in Australia, N = 519, and the United States, N = 510) and democratic elections (in New Zealand N = 603, and the United States N = 609) to examine the effects of misbeliefs on support for reactionary movements (e.g., anti-lockdown protests, Study 1; anti-election protests, Study 2). Results reveal that within-person changes in misbeliefs correlate positively with support for reactionary collective action both directly (Studies 1-2) and indirectly by shaping the legitimacy of the authority (Study 1b). The relationship between misbelief and legitimacy is, however, conditioned by the stance of the authority in question: the association is positive when authorities endorse misbeliefs (Study 1a) and negative when they do not (Study 1b). Thus, the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and action hinges upon the alignment of the content of the conspiracy and the goals of the collective action.

The sociodemographic correlates of conspiracism

Despite hundreds of studies examining belief in conspiracy theories, it is still unclear who-demographically-is most likely to believe such theories. To remedy this knowledge gap, we examine survey data containing various operationalizations of conspiracism across diverse sociopolitical contexts. Study 1 employs a 2021 U.S. survey (n = 2021) to examine associations between sociodemographic characteristics and beliefs in 39 conspiracy theories. Study 2 similarly employs a survey of 20 countries (n = 26,416) and 11 conspiracy theory beliefs. Study 3 reports results from a 2020 U.S. survey (n = 2015) measuring perceptions about which groups are engaging in conspiracies. Study 4 interrogates data from nine U.S. surveys (2012-2022; n = 14,334) to examine the relationships between sociodemographic characteristics and generalized conspiracy thinking. Study 5 synchronizes studies 1-4 to provide an intersectional analysis of conspiracy theory belief. Across studies, we observe remarkably consistent patterns: education, income, age (older), and White identification are negatively related to conspiracism, while Black identification is positively related. We conclude by discussing why conspiracy theories may appeal most to historically marginalized groups and how our findings can inform efforts to mitigate the negative effects of conspiracy theories.

'They are conspiring against us': How outgroup conspiracy theories stimulate environmental neglect in intergroup resource dilemmas

Natural resources are limited, and people often share these limited resources in groups, which creates an intergroup resource dilemma. To understand individuals' sustainable behaviours in intergroup resource dilemmas in the context of group interactions, the present research systematically investigates the effect of outgroup conspiracy theories on sustainable behaviours and preliminarily explores the internal mechanism underlying this effect. First, a survey study (Study 1) relying on real-world intergroup relations first confirmed the negative correlation between outgroup conspiracy beliefs and sustainable intentions in intergroup resource dilemmas. Then, an online experimental study that utilized the real situation of a region in China (Study 2) tested the causal relationship between exposure to an outgroup conspiracy theory and sustainable intentions, as well as showing the mediating role of intergroup threat perception underlying this relationship. Finally, a preregistered experimental laboratory study (Study 3) further verified the causal effect of exposure to an outgroup conspiracy theory on sustainable behaviours, again confirming the mediating role of intergroup threat perception. In general, our research demonstrates that exposure to an outgroup conspiracy theory stimulates individuals' environmental neglect and reduces their sustainable behaviours by increasing their perceptions of intergroup threat when faced with intergroup resource dilemmas.

The impact of conspiracy beliefs on a targeted group: Perceived popularity of Jewish-targeted conspiracy beliefs elicits outgroup avoidant behaviours

In three studies with Jewish participants, we explored the consequences of intergroup conspiracy theories on those targeted. In Study 1 (N = 250), perceived Jewish conspiracy theory popularity was positively associated with intergroup threat and negatively associated with the closeness of contact with non-Jewish people. Study 2 (n = 194) employed an experimental design where Jewish participants were exposed to the idea that many (vs. few) non-Jewish people believe in Jewish conspiracy theories. A path model demonstrated that exposure to the many (vs. few) manipulation increased intergroup threat, which was then positively associated with emotional reactions. Intergroup anxiety and ingroup anger were then positively associated with avoidance, whilst ingroup anxiety was positively associated with approach tendencies. Study 3 (n = 201) used the same experimental design, and a path model revealed that conspiracy popularity increased intergroup threat, which, in turn, was positively associated with ingroup anger and anxiety. Ingroup anxiety was then associated with intentions to help ingroup members. Notably, conspiracy popularity rendered participants less likely to interact with a non-Jewish partner in a behavioural task. Our work provides evidence that conspiracy beliefs, especially when perceived to be widely held, are likely to significantly impact targeted ingroup members.

How does economic inequality shape conspiracy theories? Empirical evidence from China

Conspiracy theories tend to be prevalent, particularly in societies with high economic inequality. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic inequality and belief in conspiracy theories. We propose that economic inequality leads people to believe conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups (i.e., upwards conspiracy theories) and that moral evaluations of those groups mediate this relationship. Study 1 (N = 300) found support for these ideas in a survey among Chinese residents. Study 2 (N = 160) manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in a virtual society. The manipulation shaped moral evaluations of economically advantaged groups, and conspiracy beliefs, in the predicted manner. In Study 3 (N = 191) and Study 4 (N = 210), we experimentally manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in real Chinese society and replicated the results of Study 2. In addition, in Study 4, we find that economic inequality predicts belief in conspiracy theories about economically disadvantaged groups (i.e., downward conspiracy theories), which was mediated by anomie. We conclude that perceived economic inequality predicts conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups and that moral evaluations account for this effect. Also, upward and downward conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with different psychological processes.

The shared psychological roots of prejudice and conspiracy theory belief

The psychological literature on prejudice and conspiracy theory belief have generally remained distinct, implicitly treating the two as unrelated phenomena. In this brief review, I demonstrate that the two phenomena share at least three dispositional precursors: ingroup bias, right-wing ideology (specifically right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), and need for closure. The evidence I present suggests that prejudice and conspiracy beliefs may be more closely related both conceptually and normatively than existing research has indicated. In particular, they may appear in the same individuals, cause similar kinds of harms in adherents as well as target populations, and respond to similar counteractive interventions.

Sexism and Feminist Conspiracy Beliefs: Hostile Sexism Moderates the Link Between Feminist Conspiracy Beliefs and Rape Myth Acceptance

This research examined the effect of belief in feminist conspiracy theories and sexist ideology on endorsing rape myths. Study 1 (N = 201) uncovered that the relationship between feminist conspiracy beliefs and rape myth acceptance was conditional on higher levels of hostile sexism. Study 2 (N = 552) demonstrated that for those with higher hostile sexism, exposure to feminist conspiracy theories (vs. control) increased feminist conspiracy beliefs, which were then associated with rape myths. The current research suggests that the link between feminist conspiracy beliefs and rape myths could result from such beliefs upholding a hostile sexist view of women.

Curious about threats: Morbid curiosity and interest in conspiracy theories in US adults

Conspiracy theories allege secret plots between two or more powerful actors to achieve an outcome, sometimes explaining important events or proposing alternative understandings of reality in opposition to mainstream accounts, and commonly highlight the threat presented by the plot and its conspirators. Research in psychology proposes that belief in conspiracy theories is motivated by a desire to understand threats and is predicted by increased anxiety. Morbid curiosity describes the tendency to seek out information about threatening or dangerous situations and is associated with an interest in threat-related entertainment and increased anxiety. Across three studies, we investigated the relationship between morbid curiosity and conspiracy theories in US-based samples. We found that higher trait morbid curiosity was associated with higher general conspiracist beliefs (Study 1) and the perceived threat of conspiratorial explanations of events (Study 2). Using a behavioural choice paradigm, we found that participants who chose to investigate morbidly curious stimuli were more likely to choose to learn about conspiratorial explanations for events (Study 3). Greater curiosity about the minds of dangerous people was consistently the strongest predictor of conspiratorial ideation and interest. These results suggest that morbid curiosity is an important but hitherto unstudied predictor of conspiratorial interest and belief.

What is hiding behind the rainbow plot? The gender ideology and LGBTQ+ lobby conspiracies (GILC) scale

Previous literature on conspiracy beliefs has an important gap, as it has almost completely excluded conspiracy beliefs relating to LGBTQ+ people. The purpose of the present research was to develop and validate a specific tool to measure the Gender Ideology and LGBTQ+ Lobby Conspiracies Beliefs: the GILC scale. Two independent data collections (Ntot  = 1.908) were run involving both heterosexual and gay, lesbian and bisexual people. We expected a mono-factorial structure of the tool, with high levels of internal reliability, invariant by respondents' gender, sexual orientation and previous knowledge or hearsay of gender ideology. Furthermore, we expected that GILC scale manages to measure a differentiated construct: (a) compared to other specific and general conspiracy contents; (b) compared to a generic disposition to engage in conspiratorial mentality; (c) compared to existing measures of sexual prejudice, stereotypes and negative attitudes towards sexual minority people. In relation to criterion validity, we expected that several psychosocial and socio-political ideology variables (i.e. RWA and SDO), would associate with high levels in GILC scale. The results confirmed our expectations, showing that GILC scale is a short tool which include nine items with a mono-factorial structure and with excellent psychometric properties. Limitations and further research directions are discussed.

Insomnia is associated with conspiracy mentality, psychological distress, and psychological well-being

RATIONALE

Conspiracy theories are frequently encountered as they exist across all domains of life, from interpersonal issues in the workplace to global events. Research has primarily focused on uncovering the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs; meanwhile, little research has examined the impacts of possessing a conspiracy mentality.

OBJECTIVE

In the current research, we examined the relationships of conspiracy mentality with perceived control, insomnia, psychological well-being (i.e., positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning, and achievement), and psychological distress (i.e., anxiety and depression).

METHODS

Participants (N = 388) reported their conspiracy mentality at Time 1 and then completed measures assessing perceived control, insomnia, psychological well-being, and psychological distress 1 month later at Time 2. We conducted regression analyses, structural equation modeling, and bootstrapping analyses to test our predictions that conspiracy mentality predicts insomnia through thwarted perceived control and that this relationship carries direct implications for psychological well-being and distress.

RESULTS

As predicted, regression analyses showed that conspiracy mentality is negatively associated with perceived control and indicators of psychological well-being, and positively associated with insomnia and indicators of psychological distress 1 month later. The results of structural equation modeling and bootstrapping analyses provided empirical support to our theoretical model that perceived control and insomnia serially mediate the relationship between conspiracy mentality and both psychological well-being and psychological distress.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings offer important contributions to the literature on conspiracy beliefs. Practically, they offer potential routes of intervention to weaken insomnia and psychological distress and enhance psychological well-being.

Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research.

Conspiracy mentality, subclinical paranoia, and political conservatism are associated with perceived status threat

Status threat (i.e., concern that one's dominant social group will be undermined by outsiders) is a significant factor in current United States politics. While demographic factors such as race (e.g., Whiteness) and political affiliation (e.g., conservatism) tend to be associated with heightened levels of status threat, its psychological facets have yet to be fully characterized. Informed by a "paranoid" model of American politics, we explored a suite of possible psychological and demographic associates of perceived status threat, including race/ethnicity, political conservatism, analytic thinking, magical ideation, subclinical paranoia, and conspiracy mentality. In a small, quota sample drawn from the United States (N = 300), we found that conspiracy mentality, subclinical paranoia, conservatism, and age were each positively (and uniquely) associated with status threat. In addition to replicating past work linking conservatism to status threat, this study identifies subclinical paranoia and conspiracy mentality as novel psychological associates of status threat. These findings pave the way for future research regarding how and why status threat concerns may become exaggerated in certain individuals, possibly to the detriment of personal and societal wellbeing.

The role of perceived minority-group status in the conspiracy beliefs of factual majority groups

Research suggests that minority-group members sometimes are more susceptible to misinformation. Two complementary studies examined the influence of perceived minority status on susceptibility to misinformation and conspiracy beliefs. In study 1 (n = 2140), the perception of belonging to a minority group, rather than factually belonging to it, was most consistently related with an increased susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation across national samples from the USA, the UK, Germany and Poland. Specifically, perceiving that one belongs to a gender minority group particularly predicted susceptibility to misinformation when participants factually did not belong to it. In pre-registered study 2 (n = 1823), an experiment aiming to manipulate the minority perceptions of men failed to influence conspiracy beliefs in the predicted direction. However, pre-registered correlational analyses showed that men who view themselves as a gender minority were more prone to gender conspiracy beliefs and exhibited a heightened conspiracy mentality. This effect was correlationally mediated by increased feelings of system identity threat, collective narcissism, group relative deprivation and actively open-minded thinking. Especially, the perception of being a minority in terms of power and influence (as compared to numerically) was linked to these outcomes. We discuss limitations and practical implications for countering misinformation.

Narcissistic susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs exaggerated by education, reduced by cognitive reflection

Conspiracy theories are alternate viewpoints of provided explanations; sensational stories revolving around small groups exerting control for nefarious reasons. Recent events and research have outlined myriad negative social and personal outcomes for those who endorse them. Prior research suggests several predictors of susceptibility to conspiracy theories, including narcissistic personality traits (grandiosity, need for uniqueness), cognitive processes (critical thinking, confirmation bias) and lack of education. The aim of the current paper was to explore how facets of narcissism predict susceptibility to conspiracy theories. It was expected that narcissism would be a positive predictor, but education and cognitive reflection would act as protective factors, reducing this effect. Study one utilized an international survey (N = 323) to investigate the role of education as a protective tool in the relationship between narcissistic traits and conspiratorial beliefs. Support was found for the hypotheses that individuals with higher levels of grandiosity, vulnerable narcissism, a strive for uniqueness, and a strive for supremacy predicted higher levels of conspiracy endorsement. Higher education and STEM education were associated with lower levels of conspiracy endorsement, however all significant moderations indicated that for narcissistic individuals, education increased their likelihood of adopting conspiracy beliefs, contrary to expectation. To investigate this further, study two analyzed a large-scale publicly available dataset (N = 51,404) to assess the relationship between narcissism, critical thinking skills (specifically cognitive reflection) and conspiracy beliefs pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic. As expected, analysis found narcissism and poor cognitive reflection (intuitive thinking) as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. Higher levels of cognitive reflection were found to be protective, moderating and reducing the impact of narcissism on endorsement of conspiracy theories. The findings suggest that cognitive reflection, but not education protect against narcissistic conspiracy belief. Moreover, that cognitive reflection may have a lessened effect against conspiracy theories adopted for social or ideological reasons. These findings improve understanding of both the role and limitations of education/critical thinking skills as protective factors against conspiracy theory endorsement.

I Wear a Mask for My Country: Conspiracy Theories, Nationalism, and Intention to Adopt Covid-19 Prevention Behaviors at the Later Stage of Pandemic Control in China

Various conspiracy theories have accompanied COVID-19 since its initial outbreak. Based on a nationwide survey in China, this study probes the health consequences of beliefs in different COVID-19 conspiracy theories in China. The research found that believing the coronavirus has a foreign natural origin was associated with increased rather than decreased intention to adopt protective behaviors. Nonetheless, believing that the source of the pandemic was a Chinese lab or that it is a foreign biological weapon was related to reduced intentions to protect one's health. In addition, measured as national pride and satisfaction with China's pandemic control effort, people's level of nationalism was strongly associated with their intention to adopt protective behaviors, which moderates the health consequences of believing in false conspiracy theories. Scientific literacy was also associated with an increased likelihood of adopting preventive measures. Despite revealing the diversified health consequences of conspiracy beliefs, this study demonstrates the importance of examining collectivist sociopolitical constructs in health communication.

What Are Conspiracy Theories? A Definitional Approach to Their Correlates, Consequences, and Communication

Conspiracy theories are abundant in social and political discourse, with serious consequences for individuals, groups, and societies. However, psychological scientists have started paying close attention to them only in the past 20 years. We review the spectacular progress that has since been made and some of the limitations of research so far, and we consider the prospects for further progress. To this end, we take a step back to analyze the defining features that make conspiracy theories different in kind from other beliefs and different in degree from each other. We consider how these features determine the adoption, consequences, and transmission of belief in conspiracy theories, even though their role as causal or moderating variables has seldom been examined. We therefore advocate for a research agenda in the study of conspiracy theories that starts-as is routine in fields such as virology and toxicology-with a robust descriptive analysis of the ontology of the entity at its center.

Individual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions.

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity-the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain-in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

The psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs

Understanding the individual-level characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs is vital to addressing and combatting those beliefs. While researchers have identified numerous psychological and political characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs, the generalizability of those findings is uncertain because they are typically drawn from studies of only a few conspiracy theories. Here, we employ a national survey of 2021 U.S. adults that asks about 15 psychological and political characteristics as well as beliefs in 39 different conspiracy theories. Across 585 relationships examined within both bivariate (correlations) and multivariate (regression) frameworks, we find that psychological traits (e.g., dark triad) and non-partisan/ideological political worldviews (e.g., populism, support for violence) are most strongly related to individual conspiracy theory beliefs, regardless of the belief under consideration, while other previously identified correlates (e.g., partisanship, ideological extremity) are inconsistently related. We also find that the correlates of specific conspiracy theory beliefs mirror those of conspiracy thinking (the predisposition), indicating that this predisposition operates like an 'average' of individual conspiracy theory beliefs. Overall, our findings detail the psychological and political traits of the individuals most drawn to conspiracy theories and have important implications for scholars and practitioners seeking to prevent or reduce the impact of conspiracy theories.

COVID-19, economic threat and identity status: Stability and change in prejudice against Chinese people within the Canadian population

OBJECTIVES

Previous studies found a general increase in prejudice against Chinese people during the first months of the pandemic. The present study aims to consider inter-individual heterogeneity in stability and change regarding prejudice involving Chinese people during the pandemic. The first objective is to identify and describe different trajectories of prejudice over a seven-month period during the pandemic. The second and third objectives are to test the association between trajectory group membership and antecedent variables such as: socio-demographic factors (i.e., age, gender, political affiliation) and two psychological mechanisms, namely economic threat and global citizenship identification.

METHODS

A representative Canadian sample (N = 3,617) according to age, gender and province of residence, was recruited for a 10-wave survey starting from April 2020 to December 2020. First, a group-based modeling approach was used to identify trajectories of prejudice. Second, a multinomial logistic regression model was used to test associations between membership in trajectories and antecedents.

RESULTS

Four trajectories were identified. The first three trajectories have a low (71.4% of the sample), high (18.5%) or very high (5.3%) level of prejudice against Chinese people which is relatively stable over time. The fourth trajectory (4.9%) reports low levels of prejudice in favor of Chinese people which become more positive throughout 2020. Regarding socio-demographic factors: gender is not associated with trajectory group membership, younger people are more likely to follow the trajectory in favor of Chinese people and conservatives are more likely to follow the highest trajectories against Chinese people. Regarding some psychological mechanisms: personal but not collective economic threat is associated with the trajectory in favor of Chinese people. Finally, the highest levels of prejudice are found when the strategy of identification is more local rather than global.

CONCLUSION

The present study shows that Canadians differ in terms of both their level and change in prejudice against Chinese people throughout the pandemic with some socio-demographic groups being more likely than others to be associated with prejudice. The results also suggest that a promising way to tackle the major social issue of prejudice is to highlight a vision of the world where individuals are all "global citizens" facing the same challenge.

Hate Speech in a Telegram Conspiracy Channel During the First Year of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Research has explored how the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a wave of conspiratorial thinking and online hate speech, but little is empirically known about how different phases of the pandemic are associated with hate speech against adversaries identified by online conspiracy communities. This study addresses this gap by combining observational methods with exploratory automated text analysis of content from an Italian-themed conspiracy channel on Telegram during the first year of the pandemic. We found that, before the first lockdown in early 2020, the primary target of hate was China, which was blamed for a new bioweapon. Yet over the course of 2020 and particularly after the beginning of the second lockdown, the primary targets became journalists and healthcare workers, who were blamed for exaggerating the threat of COVID-19. This study advances our understanding of the association between hate speech and a complex and protracted event like the COVID-19 pandemic, and it suggests that country-specific responses to the virus (e.g., lockdowns and re-openings) are associated with online hate speech against different adversaries depending on the social and political context.

Cross-national differences in willingness to believe conspiracy theories

Conspiracy beliefs are not just generated by "under-the-skull" individual factors, but are shaped also by cultural, economic, and institutional realities. A scan of the literature-complemented by our own secondary data analyses-suggests a reasonable convergence of evidence that conspiracy beliefs are higher in nations that are more corrupt, more collectivist, and lower in GDP per capita. There is some evidence that conspiracy beliefs may also be shaped by economic inequality, power distance, and authoritarianism, although the evidence base is thin. We also review literature that examines how individual correlates of conspiracy beliefs vary across nations. We discuss challenges associated with conducting international research on conspiracy beliefs and chart a future research agenda for creating truly global insights into conspiracist thinking.

Can Debunked Conspiracy Theories Change Radicalized Views? Evidence from Racial Prejudice and Anti-China Sentiment Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic

With the advent of the 'age of conspiracism', the harmfulness of conspiratorial narratives and mindsets on individuals' mentalities, on social relations, and on democracy, has been widely researched by political scientists and psychologists. One known negative effect of conspiracy theories is the escalation toward political radicalism. This study goes beyond the exploration of mechanisms underpinning the relationship between conspiracy theory and radicalization to focus on possible approaches to mitigating them. This study sheds light on the role of counter-conspiracy approaches in the process of deradicalization, adopting the case study of anti-China sentiment and racial prejudice amid the Covid-19 pandemic, through conducting an experiment (N = 300). The results suggest that, during critical events such as the Covid-19 pandemic, exposure to countermeasures to conspiracist information can reduce individual acceptance of radicalism. We investigated two methods of countering conspiracy theory, and found that: (1) a content-targeted 'inoculation' approach to countering conspiracy theory can prevent the intensification of radicalization, but does not produce a significant deradicalization effect; and (2) an audience-focused 'disenchantment' method can enable cognitive deradicalization, effectively reducing the perception of competitive victimhood, and of real and symbolic threats. This study is one of the first attempts to address causality between deradicalization and countermeasures to conspiracy theories in the US-China relations.

Defining and explaining conspiracy theories: Comparing the lay representations of conspiracy believers and non-believers

Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.

Are Republicans and Conservatives More Likely to Believe Conspiracy Theories?

A sizable literature tracing back to Richard Hofstadter's The Paranoid Style (1964) argues that Republicans and conservatives are more likely to believe conspiracy theories than Democrats and liberals. However, the evidence for this proposition is mixed. Since conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with dangerous orientations and behaviors, it is imperative that social scientists better understand the connection between conspiracy theories and political orientations. Employing 20 surveys of Americans from 2012 to 2021 (total n = 37,776), as well as surveys of 20 additional countries spanning six continents (total n = 26,416), we undertake an expansive investigation of the asymmetry thesis. First, we examine the relationship between beliefs in 52 conspiracy theories and both partisanship and ideology in the U.S.; this analysis is buttressed by an examination of beliefs in 11 conspiracy theories across 20 more countries. In our second test, we hold constant the content of the conspiracy theories investigated-manipulating only the partisanship of the theorized villains-to decipher whether those on the left or right are more likely to accuse political out-groups of conspiring. Finally, we inspect correlations between political orientations and the general predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories over the span of a decade. In no instance do we observe systematic evidence of a political asymmetry. Instead, the strength and direction of the relationship between political orientations and conspiricism is dependent on the characteristics of the specific conspiracy beliefs employed by researchers and the socio-political context in which those ideas are considered.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09812-3.

Reflective thinking predicts lower conspiracy beliefs: A meta-analysis

One of the many established predictors of conspiracy beliefs is reflective thinking, but no meta-analysis so far has examined this relationship. In the current meta-analysis of published and unpublished correlational data (145 samples, 181 effect sizes), we found a significant negative association between reflective thinking and conspiracy beliefs with a medium-level effect size (r = –.189) . Similar levels of correlations were found across different types of measures (self-report vs. performance-based) and conspiracy beliefs (generic vs. specific). Further, no evidence suggested publication bias in this body of work. Suggestions for future research are discussed.

The problem with the internet: An affordance-based approach for psychological research on networked technologies

The internet is often viewed as the source of a myriad of benefits and harms. However, there are problems with using this notion of "the internet" and other high-level concepts to explain the influence of communicating via everyday networked technologies on people and society. Here, we argue that research on social influence in computer-mediated communication (CMC) requires increased precision around how and why specific features of networked technologies interact with and impact psychological processes and outcomes. By reviewing research on the affordances of networked technologies, we demonstrate how the relationship between features of "the internet" and "online behaviour" can be determined by both the affordances of the environment and the psychology of the user and community. To achieve advances in this field, we argue that psychological science must provide nuanced and precise conceptualisations, operationalisations, and measurements of "internet use" and "online behaviour". We provide a template for how future research can become more systematic by examining how and why variables associated with the individual user, networked technologies, and the online community interact and intersect. If adopted, psychological science will be able to make more meaningful predictions about online and offline outcomes associated with communicating via networked technologies.

An interpretation of meta-analytical evidence for the link between collective narcissism and conspiracy theories

Meta-analytical evidence indicates the robust association between collective narcissism and conspiracy theories is moderated by the content of conspiracy theories. Belief in conspiracies of specific outgroups fits collective narcissistic posture of intergroup hostility but collective narcissism is also bound to other conspiracy theories because it simultaneously comprises a committed belief (that the ingroup is great) and a threatening belief (that the ingroup is unrecognized). This creates compensatory motivations to believe in conspiracy theories that protect the committed belief and to seize on any conspiracy theory as a meaning-making activity. Collective narcissism and conspiracy theories may also co-occur because they serve to coordinate undemocratic leaders and their constituencies. They produce threatening environments that justify coercion, violence and undemocratic governance.

Conspiracy theories as opportunistic attributions of power

A significant trend of research construes conspiracy theories as a power challenging phenomenon. Yet, there is evidence that conspiracy theories are sometimes promoted by members of relatively powerful groups (e.g., a national majority) in order to target relatively powerless groups (e.g., immigrants). Thus, conspiracy theories are not necessarily beliefs held by the relatively powerless. However, they always attribute power to the allegedly conspiring parties. As a matter of fact, without such power, the groups accused of conspiring would be unable to carry out their plans. In contrast to assuming conspiracy theories reflect objective power imbalances, we propose that they may be construed as opportunistic attributions of power that allow individuals to advance their interests (e.g., validate their worldview, strengthen or challenge social hierarchies).

Shining a spotlight on the dangerous consequences of conspiracy theories

The COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated how conspiracy beliefs–that explain important events as the secret actions of the powerful–can severely impact health choices (such as reduced infection-prevention behaviours). However, the consequences of conspiracy beliefs span far beyond the topic of COVID-19. This review shines a spotlight on how conspiracy beliefs could impact public and personal health (e.g., vaccine uptake), democratic citizenship (e.g., political engagement), intergroup relations (e.g., prejudice and discrimination), and may inspire violence and extremism. We argue that conspiracy beliefs are likely to have the power to mobilise citizens in ways detrimental to a smooth-running society. We conclude the review by offering a range of fruitful avenues for future investigation.

What Breeds Conspiracy Theories in COVID-19? The Role of Risk Perception in the Belief in COVID-19 Conspiracy

Conspiracy theories often emerge during public health crises, and can provide some explanation for the causes behind the crises. However, the prevalence of conspiracy theories also poses a serious threat to public health order and hinders the implementation of disease prevention and control measures. No studies have examined the role of multiple risk perceptions in the formation of beliefs in conspiracy theories from a cognitive perspective in the context of the epidemic. In this cross-sectional study, participants filled in an online survey in order to investigate the relationship between epidemic severity and beliefs in conspiracy theories and the mediating role of risk perception in this relationship. The results showed that COVID-19 epidemic severity positively predicted beliefs in both in- and out-group conspiracy theories. Risk perception mediated the positive relationship between COVID-19 epidemic severity and belief in in-group conspiracy theories. These results suggest that in a major public health crisis event: (1) residents at the epicenter may be more prone to believing in both in- and out-group conspiracy theories; and (2) beliefs in in- and out-group conspiracy theories may have different psychological mechanisms. Therefore, conspiracy theories about public health incidents, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, should be classified and treated by policy stakeholders.

Finding Someone to Blame: The Link Between COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs, Prejudice, Support for Violence, and Other Negative Social Outcomes

One of the appeals of conspiracy theories in times of crises is that they provide someone to blame for what has happened. Thereby, they increase distrust, negative feelings, and hostility toward implicated actors, whether those are powerful social outgroups or one’s own government representatives. Two studies reported here examine associations of COVID-19 conspiracy theories with prejudice, support for violence, and other and negative social outcomes. In Study 1 (N = 501), the endorsement of the more specific conspiracy theories about the alleged role of China was associated with more prejudiced views of Chinese and Italian people. In Study 2 (N = 1024), lowered trust in government regulations and increased hostility associated with the COVID-19 and generic conspiracy beliefs were correlated with justification of and willingness to engage in non-compliance with regulations, violent attacks on 5G masts, and anti-government protests. Across both of the studies, higher exposure to news about COVID-19 was associated with lower endorsement of conspiracy theories, but also with increased feelings of anxiety and lack of control, which in turn were correlated with higher COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs endorsement. We highlight the potential social problems which are associated with the wide-spread endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories.

The impact of information sources on COVID-19 knowledge accumulation and vaccination intention

During a global health crisis, people are exposed to vast amounts of information from a variety of sources. Here, we assessed which information source could increase knowledge about COVID-19 (Study 1) and COVID-19 vaccines (Study 2). In Study 1, a US census matched sample of 1060 participants rated the accuracy of a set of statements and then were randomly assigned to one of 10 between-subjects conditions of varying sources providing belief-relevant information: a political leader (Trump/Biden), a health authority (Fauci/CDC), an anecdote (Democrat/Republican), a large group of prior participants (Democrats/Republicans/Generic), or no source (Control). Finally, they rated the accuracy of the initial set of statements again. Study 2 involved a replication with a sample of 1876 participants and focused on the COVID-19 vaccine. We found that knowledge increased most when the source of information was a generic group of people, irrespective of participants’ political affiliation. We also found that while expert communications were most successful at increasing Democrats’ vaccination intentions, no source was successful at increasing Republicans’ vaccination intention. We discuss these findings in the context of the current misinformation epidemic.

The Paradox of Conspiracy Theory: The Positive Impact of Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories on Preventive Actions and Vaccination Intentions during the COVID-19 Pandemic

This study aims to analyze the direct and indirect impact of beliefs in conspiracy theories on COVID-19-related preventive actions and vaccination intentions. The dominant theory in the literature is that beliefs in conspiracy theories have negative consequences. In particular, strong beliefs in conspiracy theories lower people’s intentions to engage in preventive actions and get vaccinated. Previous studies indicated that this dominant theory applies in Korea as well. However, we find that this dominant theory does not apply in Korea. Based on an analysis of survey data, we find that beliefs in conspiracy theories have positive impact on preventive actions and vaccination intentions. In addition, beliefs in conspiracy theories play indirect roles in these two responses to COVID-19. Specifically, when perceived benefits and trust in the government or science enhance preventive actions or increase vaccination intentions, strong beliefs in conspiracy theories promote this effect. This positive role of conspiracy theories is paradoxical because they are generally viewed as negative.

To get vaccinated or not? Social psychological factors associated with vaccination intent for COVID-19

Pandemic control not only requires effective COVID-19 vaccines but also that they are accepted by at least 80% of the population. For this reason, understanding the social psychological variables associated with vaccination intent is essential to achieve herd immunity. Drawing on the theory of reasoned action, this study seeks to analyze vaccination intent using the beliefs about vaccine effectiveness, conspiracy theories, and injunctive norms as predictors. A non-probabilistic national online survey was conducted during December 2020. A sample of 1,033 people in Chile answered a questionnaire with the study variables. Using structural equation models, it was found that vaccination intent was explained in 62.1% by beliefs about vaccine effectiveness and injunctive norms, controlling for age, political orientation, socioeconomic status, educational level, and gender. Specifically, beliefs about vaccine effectiveness are based on people's experience with previous immunization processes, which predict vaccination intent. Regarding injunctive norms, they act by influencing and encouraging vaccination by seeking the approval of significant others. Contrary to expected, conspiracy beliefs were not directly associated with the intention to receive a COVID-19 vaccine but were highly related to lower beliefs about vaccine effectiveness. This study suggests that to enhance the vaccination intent, socio-psychological and structural variables need to be considered.

The impact of social norms on health-related belief update

People are constantly bombarded with information they could use to adjust their beliefs. Here, we are interested in exploring the impact of social norms on health-related belief update. To investigate, we recruited a sample of 200 Princeton University students, who first rated the accuracy of a set of health statements (pre-test). They were then provided with relevant evidence either in favor or against the initial statements, and were asked to rate how convincing each piece of evidence was. The evidence was randomly assigned to appear as normative or non-normative, and anecdotal or scientific. Finally, participants rated the accuracy of the initial set of statements again (post-test). The results show that participants rationally updated their beliefs more when the evidence was scientific compared to when it was anecdotal. More importantly to our primary inquiry, the results show that participants changed their beliefs more in line with the evidence when the evidence was portrayed as normative compared to when the evidence was portrayed as non-normative, pointing to the impactful influence social norms have on health beliefs. Both effects were mediated by participants' subjective evaluation of the convincingness of the evidence, indicating the mechanism by which evidence is selectively incorporated into belief systems.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the search for structure: Social media and conspiracy theories

The study outlines a model for how the COVID-19 pandemic has uniquely exacerbated the propagation of conspiracy beliefs and subsequent harmful behaviors. The pandemic has led to widespread disruption of cognitive and social structures. As people face these disruptions they turn online seeking alternative cognitive and social structures. Once there, social media radicalizes beliefs, increasing contagion (rapid spread) and stickiness (resistance to change) of conspiracy theories. As conspiracy theories are reinforced in online communities, social norms develop, translating conspiracy beliefs into real-world action. These real-world exchanges are then posted back on social media, where they are further reinforced and amplified, and the cycle continues. In the broader population, this process draws attention to conspiracy theories and those who confidently espouse them. This attention can drive perceptions that conspiracy beliefs are less fringe and more popular, potentially normalizing such beliefs for the mainstream. We conclude by considering interventions and future research to address this seemingly intractable problem.