A New Stress-Based Model of Political Extremism: Personal Exposure to Terrorism, Psychological Distress, and Exclusionist Political Attitudes

When Are Social Protests Effective?

Around the world, people engage in social protests aimed at addressing major societal problems. Certain protests have led to significant progress, yet other protests have resulted in little demonstrable change. We introduce a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of social protest made up of three components: (i) what types of action are being considered; (ii) what target audience is being affected; and (iii) what outcomes are being evaluated? We then review relevant research to suggest how the framework can help synthesize conflicting findings in the literature. This synthesis points to two key conclusions: that nonviolent protests are effective at mobilizing sympathizers to support the cause, whereas more disruptive protests can motivate support for policy change among resistant individuals.

Generation and influence of eccentric ideas on social networks

Studying extreme ideas in routine choices and discussions is of utmost importance to understand the increasing polarization in society. In this study, we focus on understanding the generation and influence of extreme ideas in routine conversations which we label "eccentric" ideas. The eccentricity of any idea is defined as the deviation of that idea from the norm of the social neighborhood. We collected and analyzed data from two sources of different nature: public social media and online experiments in a controlled environment. We compared the popularity of ideas against their eccentricity to understand individuals' fascination towards eccentricity. We found that more eccentric ideas have a higher probability of getting a greater number of "likes". Additionally, we demonstrate that the social neighborhood of an individual conceals eccentricity changes in one's own opinions and facilitates generation of eccentric ideas at a collective level.

Exploring the Influence of Perceived Ingroup and Outgroup Threat on Quality of Life in a Region Impacted by Protracted Conflict

While the detrimental effects of protracted political conflict on the wellbeing of Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) are generally recognized, the impact of perceived threat on quality of life (QoL) faced from within their community (ingroup; Palestinians) and from the outgroup (Israelis) is unexplored. This cross-sectional study examined the following: (1) The status of perceptions of QoL on four domains measured by the World Health Organization Quality of Life (WHOQoL-Bref) instrument, physical health, psychological health, social relationships, and environment, among Palestinian adults (n = 709) living in the Gaza Strip; (2) The associations between perceived ingroup threat (PIT) and QoL on the four domains; (3) The associations between perceived outgroup threat (POT) and QoL on the four domains. Multivariable linear regression models revealed PIT was negatively associated with QoL in each of the four domains (p < 0.001). POT was positively associated with QoL in three of the four domains: physical health (p < 0.001), psychological health (p < 0.001), and social relationships (p < 0.001). This study contributes valuable insights into how QoL is viewed by a group experiencing collective existential threat. The findings expand the limited recognition of the reciprocal roles of perceived threat from the ingroup and outgroup on the QoL of vulnerable populations.

Public Opinion and Cyberterrorism

Research into cyber-conflict, public opinion, and international security is burgeoning, yet the field suffers from an absence of conceptual agreement about key terms. For instance, every time a cyberattack takes place, a public debate erupts as to whether it constitutes cyberterrorism. This debate bears significant consequences, seeing as the ascription of a "terrorism" label enables the application of heavy-handed counterterrorism powers and heightens the level of perceived threat among the public. In light of widespread conceptual disagreement in cyberspace, we assert that public opinion plays a heightened role in understanding the nature of cyber threats. We construct a typological framework to illuminate the attributes that drive the public classification of an attack as cyberterrorism, which we test through a ratings-based conjoint experiment in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (N = 21,238 observations). We find that the public (1) refrains from labeling attacks by unknown actors or hacker collectives as cyberterrorism; and (2) classifies attacks that disseminate sensitive data as terrorism to a greater extent even than physically explosive attacks. Importantly, the uniform public perspectives across the three countries challenge a foundational tenet of public opinion and international relations scholarship that divided views among elites on foreign policy matters will be reflected by a divided public. This study concludes by providing a definitive conceptual baseline to support future research on the topic.

War trauma and PTSD in Ukraine's civilian population: comparing urban-dwelling to internally displaced persons

INTRODUCTION

War in Ukraine started in March 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and continues today in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine. Over 1.5 million people in these regions have been displaced from their homes. We conducted this study 36 months after the conflict began and interviewed civilians residing in Ukraine.

PURPOSE

This study examines the prevalence of exposure to war trauma, rates of PTSD by symptom clusters, and whether socio-demographic factors are associated with positive scores for PTSD among civilian urban-dwelling and internally displaced persons in Ukraine during the ongoing conflict in its Donbass region.

METHODS

Face-to-face interviews were conducted using a multi-stage random sample of the general population in two large cities (Kharkiv and Lviv) in Ukraine (n = 1247) and a purposive sample of internally displaced persons (n = 300), half living in each city. Exposure to trauma, symptom clusters for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and overall PTSD were assessed.

RESULTS

We found widespread direct exposure to conflict-related traumatic events (65%) among internally displaced people (IDPs) compared to a sizable minority (23%) of urban-dwelling people (UDPs). We found elevated prevalence of PTSD symptoms that were also uniformly spread within several socio-demographic factors. There were, however, significant differences in PTSD between (1) IDPs compared to UDPs and (2) those UDPs with Ukrainian compared to Russian ethnic identity, the former of each pair showing increased likelihoods of positive PTSD scores.

CONCLUSIONS

Ukraine's adult civilians, enduring the prolonged engagement in war with Russia and Russian separatists, have elevated rates of PTSD. Moreover, those who have been displaced by the ongoing conflict (IDPs) have significantly higher levels of PTSD compared to UDPs.

I hate you when I am anxious: Anxiety during the COVID-19 epidemic and ideological hostility

Most previous studies that examined the effect of anxiety on hostility towards a distinct group have focused on cases in which we hate those we are afraid of. The current study, on the other hand, examines the relationship between anxiety in one domain and hostility towards a distinct group that is not the source of that anxiety. We focus here on symptoms of anxiety during the COVID-19 pandemic, which have become increasingly frequent, and show that the implications of such mental difficulties are far-reaching, posing a threat to relationships between ideological groups. In two studies conducted in both Israel and the United States, we found that high levels of anxiety during the COVID-19 epidemic are associated with higher levels of hatred towards ordinary people from the respective political outgroups, lower levels of willingness to sustain interpersonal relations with these people (i.e., greater social distancing), and greater willingness to socially exclude them. This relationship was mediated by the perception of threat posed by the political outgroup. This study is the first to show that mental difficulty driven by an external threat can be a fundamental factor that explains levels of intergroup hostility.

To shoot or not to shoot: experiments on moral injury in the context of West Bank checkpoints and COVID-19 restrictions enforcement

BACKGROUND

Does exposure to events that transgress accepted norms, such as killing innocent civilians, prompt the psychological and emotional consequences of moral injury among soldiers? Moral injury is associated with negative emotions such as guilt, shame and anger, and a sense of betrayal and is identified among veterans following exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIE).

OBJECTIVE

We experimentally investigate how PMIE characteristics affect the intensity of MI and related negative moral emotions in participants with varied military experience.

METHOD

We conducted three controlled, randomized experiments. Each exposed male respondents with active combat experience (Study 1) and varied military experience (Study 2) to four textual vignettes describing PMIE (child/adult and innocent/non-innocent suspect) that transpire at an Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank. In study 3, we exposed participants to two scenarios, where descriptions of police officers enforcing COVID 19 restrictions confronted lockdown violators.

RESULTS

Participants assigned to vignettes describing killing an innocent civilian exhibited more intense levels of shame and guilt than those assigned to vignettes describing killing a person carrying a bomb. Religiosity and political ideology were strong predictors of guilt and shame in response to descriptions of checkpoint shootings. These effects disappeared in Study 3, suggesting that political ideology drives MI in intergroup conflict.

CONCLUSIONS

Background and PMIE-related characteristics affect the development of moral injury. Additionally, lab experiments demonstrate the potential and limitations of controlled studies of moral injury and facilitate an understanding of the aetiology of moral injury in a way unavailable to clinicians. Finally, experimental findings and methodologies offer further insights into the genesis of moral injury and avenues for therapy and prophylaxis.

The impact of language in conflicts over urban coyotes

Wildlife managers and others charged with resolving human-coyote conflict in urban and suburban areas cannot focus solely on ecology and coyote behavior. The perceptions of the people living in the affected communities play a significant role in the resolution of human-coyote conflict. In this study, we explore how residents of two communities in suburban Denver, CO, USA, mentally processed, made sense of, and acted upon human–coyote interactions in the face of conflict. By conducting interviews and using qualitative content analysis to explore existing documents, we examined how the use of language reflected and exacerbated the conflict over coyote management. Themes of violence, crime and war ran throughout our data. Anger and accusations of extremism were prevalent. Closely tied to the violent language and imagery used was a discussion of tolerance and intolerance, taking what is generally human-centric language and using it with wildlife. In addition, labeling coyotes as not belonging in an area (although they are a native species) further increased the urge to protect family and pets from the perception of the threat against ‘the other’, sometimes expressed in inflammatory language. Political and other messaging can either enhance or reduce a sense of threat, and we found that the language used in this debate enhanced the perceived threat of both coyotes and policy opponents. Finding ways to defuse this language could be a step toward a greater understanding of how to live with local wildlife in a way that minimizes harm to people and to the animals.

I won't comply because it is a hoax: Conspiracy beliefs, lockdown compliance, and the importance of psychological flexibility

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented situations (government lockdowns, quarantines, etc.) and stressors (a seemingly “phantom” virus that can be lurking anywhere) causing uncertainty for the future, uncontrollable and unpredictable situations. It appears that especially during times of uncertainty and high stress, conspiracy theories flourish and these can affect the way individuals behave, especially in response to governmental recommendations for social isolation and quarantine. Psychological flexibility, we hypothesized, may act as a protective factor in the relation between COVID-19 distress, conspiracy theory beliefs and consequent behaving. In this respect, the aim of this paper was to examine how conspiracy theory beliefs, COVID-19 distress, adherence behavior, and psychological flexibility interact. Participants were 1001 individuals (802 women; Mage = 35.59years, SD = 10.07), who completed an online survey approximately one month after the first governmental measures of self-isolation and quarantine were enforced. Psychological flexibility was found to mediate the relation between conspiracy theory beliefs and compliance behavior. Further, being highly stressed appeared to increase the probability that a person will believe conspiracy theories, while such beliefs influenced whether a person would follow public health recommendations. Psychological flexibility appeared to be a protective factor at low and moderate distress levels. However, at high levels of COVID-19 distress, individuals prone to conspiracy theory beliefs would be less likely to conform to governmental public health recommendations irrespective of their psychological flexibility levels.

Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Metascientific Considerations

The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon-an event that hinges on human-to-human contact-we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger-not weaker-in its wake.

Job Stress and Burnout Among Employees Working in Terrorist-Ridden Areas

This article examines the relationship of effort-reward imbalance (ERI) on employee stress by considering job burnout (BO), organizational (in)justice (OJ), and sensitivity to terrorism (STT). This study uses the effort-reward imbalance (ERI) framework as a job stress model. After describing terrorism and a brief discussion on organizational justice and some of its challenges, we introduced "sensitivity to terrorism" as a moderator in the ERI framework. Using a 432 sample size of questionnaire data collected from two big cities where terrorist attacks are rampant and received during a period when terrorist attacks were at a peak. After analyzing data in EFA, results from the hierarchical regression analysis provided support for our developed model. Overall, the statistical model is significant (p < 0.05). We found significant relationships between ERI and facets of BO. Organizational (in)justice mediated the influence of ERI on facets of BO. We also found that STT significantly moderated ERI and facets of burnout. The article concludes with some implications and guidelines for future research.

Current and Future Costs of Intractable Conflicts-Can They Create Attitude Change?

Members of societies involved in an intractable conflict usually consider costs that stem from the continuation of the conflict as unavoidable and even justify for their collective existence. This perception is well-anchored in widely shared conflict-supporting narratives that motivate them to avoid information that challenges their views about the conflict. However, since providing information about such major costs as a method for moderating conflict-related views has not been receiving much attention, in this research, we explore this venue. We examine what kind of costs, and under what conditions, exposure to major costs of a conflict affects openness to information and conciliatory attitudes among Israeli Jews in the context of the intractable Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Study 1 (N = 255) revealed that interventions based on messages providing information on mental health cost, economic cost, and cost of the conflict to Israeli democracy had (almost) no significant effect on perceptions of the participants of these prices, openness to new information about the conflict, or support for conciliatory policies. However, the existing perceptions that participants had about the cost of the conflict to Israeli democracy were positively associated with openness to alternative information about the conflict and support for conciliatory policies. Therefore, in Study 2 (N = 255), we tested whether providing information about future potential costs to the two fundamental characteristics of Israel, a democracy or a Jewish state, created by the continuation of the conflict, will induce attitude change regarding the conflict. The results indicate that information on the future cost to the democratic identity of Israel significantly affected the attitude of the participants regarding the conflict, while the effect was moderated by the level of religiosity. For secular participants, this manipulation created more openness to alternative information about the conflict and increased support for conciliatory policies, but for religious participants, it backfired. We discuss implications for the role of information about losses and the relationship between religiosity and attitudes regarding democracy and conflict.

Terrorist attacks and minority perceived discrimination

A growing strand of the literature finds a causal negative impact of terrorism on undifferentiated discriminatory attitudes toward Muslims, migrants, and other minorities. In this paper, we argue that jihadist terrorism threatens first and foremost Muslims. To evaluate this claim, we estimate the causal effect of jihadist terrorism on the perceived discrimination among Muslims through a 2×2 quasi-experimental design. Exploiting "natural experiments" driven by exogenous variation in terror threat caused by jihadist attacks that unexpectedly occurred during the fieldwork of a large survey, we compare the perceived ethoracial discrimination of the relevant minority (Muslims) against other minorities (non-Muslims) before and after five different terror attacks in five different European countries. We find that jihadist attacks increase perceived ethnoracial discrimination among Muslims while reducing it among non-Muslims, and that individual-level factors including social status and economic insecurity mitigate public opinion responses to a greater extent than group-level factors do. Hence, while in-group attitudes toward out-groups tend to be undifferentiated, the experience of out-groups in the aftermath of jihadist attacks depends on the specific identity of the respondents.

Perceptions of Violent National-Political Protest among Arabs Living in Israel: A Pilot Study

This pilot study examines the perceptions of Arabs living in Israel (ALI) regarding violent national-political protests (VNPP). ALI, exposed to VNPP by organizations of their own ethnic minority, are trapped in a political and cultural conflict between their state and their nation. Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with 15 Muslim ALI identified four possible groups presenting four types of VNPP perceptions: (a) justifiers, who regard VNPP as a legitimate means of protecting the Palestinians and who profess Palestinian identity; (b) opponents, who strongly condemn VNPP and who profess Israeli identity; (c) those understanding but disagreeing with VNPP, professing a dual Palestinian-Israeli identity; and (d) the ambivalents, representing people with internal conflicts and mixed feelings regarding the Palestinian VNPP and their own identity. The study contributes to the understanding of how a group of ALI perceives the Palestinian VNPP, and implies that this population consists of different groups, each with its own unique identity.

The effect of perceived threat on human rights: A meta-analysis

Individuals express support for civil liberties and human rights, but when threatened tend to restrict rights for both others and themselves. However, the question of whether or not rights are restricted to punish others or protect ourselves remains unclear. This meta-analysis integrates the findings of the effect of perceived threats on support for restrictions of civil liberties from 1997 to 2019. It includes 163 effect-size estimates from 46 different articles involving 91,716 participants. The presence of threat increased support for restrictions against outgroup members significantly more than ingroup members, providing a possible punitive explanation for support for restrictions of civil liberties. These findings contribute to the debate on rights and their relationship with deservingness, suggesting that we delineate those who deserve human rights and those who do not.

Intrinsic functional connectivity of blue and red brains: neurobiological evidence of different stress resilience between political attitudes

Conservatives are more sensitive to threatening/anxious situations in perceptual and cognitive levels, experiencing emotional responses and stress, while liberals are more responsive to but tolerant of ambiguous and uncertain information. Interestingly, conservatives have greater psychological well-being and are more satisfied with their lives than liberals despite their psychological vulnerability to stress caused by threat and anxiety sensitivities. We investigated whether conservatives have greater resilience and self-regulation capacity, which are suggested to be psychological buffers that enhance psychological well-being, than liberals and moderates. We also explored associations between intrinsic functional brain organization and these psychological resources to expand our neurobiological understanding of self-regulatory processes in neuropolitics. We found that conservatives, compared to liberals and moderates, had greater psychological resilience and self-regulation capacity that were attributable to greater impulse control and causal reasoning. Stronger intrinsic connectivities between the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and precuneus and between the insula and frontal pole/OFC in conservatives were correlated with greater resilience and self-regulation capacity. These results suggest the neural underpinnings that may allow conservatives to manage the psychological stress and achieve greater life satisfaction. This study provides neuroscientific evidence for the different responses of liberals and conservatives to politically relevant social issues.

A Cyberterrorism Effect? Emotional Reactions to Lethal Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

To what extent does exposure to cyberterrorism arouse negative emotions? Cyberterrorism has developed the potential to cause similarly lethal consequences to conventional terrorism, especially when targeted at critical infrastructures. But like conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism aims to terrorize, and exposure to cyberterror attacks can affect emotional responses. This article is based on an experiment that explores emotional responses to cyberterrorism using specially designed news reports showing major cyber attacks against critical water infrastructure. Our findings indicate that cyberterrorism arouses heightened reactions of anger and stress (measured physiologically through cortisol levels, and through self-report measures). Our findings also reveal that (a) exposure to cyberterror attacks is associated with higher levels of stress than of anger; (b) that these emotional responses do not differ from the emotions triggered by conventional terrorism; and (c) these responses are not dependent on the lethality of the attack. Finally, cortisol levels remained constant across conditions. This study covers new ground as it explores the distinctive role of anger after cyberterrorism, while affirming studies that describe the presence of stress.

Exposure to Wartime Trauma Decreases Positive Emotions and Altruism Toward Rival Out-Groups (But Not Nonrival Out-Groups): A Survey Experiment in a Field Setting Among Syrian Refugees

A survey experiment, carried out in a field setting among Sunni Arab Syrian refugees ( N = 2,479), examined the effect of exposure to wartime trauma, ethnoreligious group affiliation, and degree of hostility of intergroup relations on altruism and positive emotional regard. The results showed that in-group targets were met with more positive emotional regard and altruism than relatively neutral out-group targets, which in turn were met with more positive emotional regard and altruism than individuals from a hostile out-group. These tendencies were elevated among participants with a high degree of exposure to wartime trauma. Emotions mediated the effect of ethnoreligious group affiliation on altruism, and this mediating effect was moderated by exposure to wartime trauma.

Political Efficacy as a Buffer of the Heightened Risk of Posttraumatic Stress in Disadvantaged Communities

External collective political efficacy (PE) is an individual's perception of the extent to which the government is responsive to the needs of his or her group or community or to its collective actions. Does PE play a role in the association between exposure to political violence and posttraumatic stress? The current study aimed to examine whether such PE may help explain why exposure to political violence results in posttraumatic stress for some people but not others. Based on the conservation of resource theory, research has found that residents of some types of communities are less likely to suffer from posttraumatic stress when exposed to political violence, due to the economic and psychological resources these communities provide. Political efficacy, as an individual-level factor that relates to the community, may help predict who will suffer more or less posttraumatic stress from exposure to political violence within a given community. Based on a panel study conducted immediately before and after the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict (N = 650) and hierarchical linear modeling analyses, we found that type of community indeed moderated the association between exposure to political violence and posttraumatic stress, Δ-2 log likelihood = 30.4, p < .001. In addition, we found that PE mitigated the psychological distress resulting from exposure to political conflict in disadvantaged communities, Δ-2 log likelihood = 22.8, p < .001. This study not only further untangled the association between exposure and distress during times of war but also identified the role that governments can play in preventing conflict-induced distress beyond offering physical protection.

Serious violent behavior and antisocial outcomes as consequences of exposure to ethnic-political conflict and violence among Israeli and Palestinian youth

We examine whether cumulative-past and concurrent exposure to ethnic-political violence among Israeli and Palestinian youth predict serious violent behavior and antisocial outcomes toward the in-group and the out-group. We collected four waves of data from 162 Israeli Jewish and 400 Palestinian youths (three age cohorts: 8, 11, and 14 years old) and their parents. The first three waves were consecutive annual assessments, and the fourth was conducted 4 years after the third wave, when the three age cohorts were 14, 17, and 20 years old, respectively. Based on social-cognitive-ecological models of the development of aggression (Dubow et al., 2009, Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review, 12, 113-126; Huesmann, 1998) and models of the development of beliefs about the "other," (Bar-Tal, 2004, European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 677-701; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), we predicted that serious violent outcomes directed toward both the in-group and the out-group would be related to both concurrent and to persistent-past exposure to ethnic political violence. Bivariate regression models (prior to including covariates) indicated that both early cumulative exposure to ethnic-political violence during childhood and adolescence and concurrent exposure during late adolescence/early adulthood predicted all six serious violent and antisocial outcomes. When we added to the models the covariates of ethnic subgroup, age, sex, parents' education, and youths' prior physical aggression, concurrent exposure to ethnic-political violence was still significantly associated with a greater likelihood of concurrently perpetrating all six serious violent and nonviolent forms of antisocial behavior, and earlier cumulative exposure remained significantly related to three of these: severe physical aggression, participating in violent demonstrations, and our overall index of violent/antisocial behavior.

National Resilience: A New Self-Report Assessment Scale

The current paper presents a new self-report national resilience assessment scale (NRAS). The scale was constructed and validated using a sample of 1022 Jewish Israeli adults. The internal structure of the 25-item was determined by a Varimax factor analysis, which emitted four distinct factors pertaining to identifying with the state, solidarity and social justice, trust in national institutions and trust in public justice; which explained 61% of the variance. These factor scores were validated against two national resilience promoting factors (community resilience and sense of coherence), and two national resilience suppressing factors (distress symptoms and sense of danger); as well as four demographic characteristics (level of religiosity, political attitudes, income and level of exposure to terror/ war experiences in the last year). Results supported the validity of the NRAS and its four components, showing that it was consistently correlated with resilience promoting and resilience suppressing factors.

Exposure to the 2014 Gaza War and Support for Militancy: The Role of Emotion Dysregulation

How do wars shape emotions and attitudes in intractable conflicts? In two studies conducted in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War in the Middle East, we tested a new theoretical model wherein the ability to regulate emotions is central in determining the influence of war exposure on emotions (i.e., group-based humiliation) and support for militancy, through posttraumatic stress symptoms (PSS). Results supported our model: (a) higher exposure to the war predicted group-based humiliation in both studies and in Study 2 also greater support for militancy; in both studies, (b) higher exposure predicted more PSS only among participants high in emotion dysregulation, and, for them, (c) higher exposure predicted greater group-based humiliation, through increased levels of PSS. Results from Study 2 suggest that (d) group-based humiliation will ultimately lead to greater support for militancy. The findings' contribution to the different literatures and their integration is discussed.

Endorsing a Civic (vs. an Ethnic) Definition of Citizenship Predicts Higher Pro-minority and Lower Pro-majority Collective Action Intentions

Europe has witnessed a polarization of intergroup attitudes and action tendencies in the context of the refugee crisis of 2015 and the rise of right-wing populism. Participation in both pro-minority collective action and right-wing nationalist movements has increased among members of ethnic majority groups. We analyzed these collective action intentions toward Roma people and Muslim immigrants in Hungary related to concepts of citizenship. In an online survey relying on a probabilistic sample that is demographically similar to the Hungarian population (N = 1069), we tested whether relying on the concept of ethnic citizenship predicted higher intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action, and lower intentions to engage in pro-minority collective action, and whether the connection was mediated by fear and empathy. We expected that the connections would be the opposite for civic citizenship. Our results supported the hypotheses, but we found that the ethnic definition was a stronger predictor of intergroup action intentions toward the immigrant group, and the civic definition a stronger predictor in case of the Roma minority group. In a second study (N = 320) we collected experimental evidence to show that civic and ethnic citizenship affected both types of collective action tendencies. We found that the manipulation had an effect on the concept of citizenship only in the ethnic dimension. Nevertheless, it influenced pro-minority collective action intentions especially in the presence of high empathy and low fear in the expected direction, that is, pro-minority collective action intentions were higher in the civic citizenship condition than in the ethnic citizenship condition. The effect was not found with regard to pro-majority collective action intentions. These findings highlight the potential consequences of nationalist rhetoric on intergroup action intentions and point out both the scope and the limits of influencing its effect.

What predicts threat perceptions toward people opposing to the government? A population-based study following Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong

We examined the incidence and predictors of threat perceptions toward people who oppose government action (i.e., protestors) following the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong (September 28th to December 15th, 2014). A population-representative sample of 1,208 citizens (mean age = 46.89 years; 52.4% female) was recruited two months after the conclusion of the Movement using random digit dialing. Upon giving their informed consent, respondents reported sociodemographics, perceived threats of protestors to the prospects of democracy, ways of life, and the economy, anxiety symptoms (STAI), and depressive symptoms (PHQ-9). More than half disagreed that protestors threatened the prospects of democracy (54.7%, 95% CI = .52, .57), ways of life (52.2%, 95% CI = .49, .55), and the economy (51.4%, 95% CI = .49, .54). Regression analyses revealed that male sex was associated with lower odds of perceiving threats to the prospects of democracy and ways of life. Being unmarried was associated with lower odds of perceiving threats to the economy. Secondary education level and depressive symptoms were associated with higher odds of perceiving threats to ways of life and the economy, respectively. This is one of the first population-based studies that measured socioeconomic and mental health correlates of political attitudes immediately following pro-democracy movements.

Psychological distress and prejudice following terror attacks in France

Terrorist attacks have the capacity to threaten our beliefs about the world, cause distress across populations and promote discrimination towards particular groups. We examined the impact of two different types of attacks in the same city and same year on psychological distress and probable posttraumatic stress symptoms, and the moderating effects of religion or media use on distress/posttraumatic symptoms and inter-group relations. Two panel surveys four weeks after the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack (N = 1981) and the November 2015 Bataclan concert hall/restaurant attacks (N = 1878), measured intrinsic religiosity, social and traditional media use, psychological distress (K6), probable posttraumatic stress symptoms (proposed ICD-11), symbolic racism and willingness to interact with Muslims by non-Muslims. Prevalence of serious mental illness (K6 score > 18) was higher after November 2015 attacks (7.0% after the first attack, 10.2% the second, χ2 (1) = 5.67, p < 0.02), as were probable posttraumatic stress symptoms (11.9% vs. 14.1%; χ2 (1) = 4.15, p < 0.04). In structural equation analyses, sex, age, geographic proximity, media use and religiosity were associated with distress, as was the interaction between event and religiosity. Distress was then associated with racism symbolism and willingness to interact with Muslims. Implications are considered for managing psychological trauma across populations, and protecting inter-group harmony.

Psychological Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Systematic Review

Despite ongoing local and international peace efforts, the Jews, Arabs, and other residents of Israel and the Palestinian territories (i.e., the West Bank and Gaza) have endured decades of political, social, and physical upheaval, with periodic eruptions of violence. It has been theorized that the psychological impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict extends beyond the bounds of psychiatric disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Exposure to the ongoing conflict may lead to changes in the way Israelis and Palestinians think, feel, and act; while these changes may not meet the thresholds of PTSD or depression, they nonetheless could have a strong public health impact. It is unclear whether existing studies have found associations between exposure to the conflict and nonclinical psychological outcomes. We conducted a systematic review to synthesize the empirical research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its psychological consequences. As a whole, the body of literature we reviewed suggests that exposure to regional political conflict and violence may have detrimental effects on psychological well-being and that these effects likely extend beyond the psychiatric disorders and symptoms most commonly studied. We found evidence that exposure to the conflict informs not only the way Israelis and Palestinians think, feel, and act but also their attitudes toward different religious and ethnic groups and their degree of support for peace or war. We also found that Palestinians may be at particularly high risk of experiencing psychological distress as a result of the conflict, though more research is needed to determine the extent to which this is due to socioeconomic stress. Our review suggests the need for more studies on the nonclinical psychological aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as for longitudinal studies on the impact of the conflict on both Israelis and Palestinians.

From victimhood to peace activism: The potential role of personal loss and inclusive victim beliefs

Most of the literature on collective victimhood has focused on its negative consequences for conflict resolution. Only recently has the understanding emerged that collective victimhood can also play a role in reconciliation. The present research aimed to test this recent insight in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. A sample of 200 Israeli Jews who participated in the 2015 Israeli–Palestinian Memorial Day ceremony organized by the Combatants for Peace organization completed online questionnaires. In line with our predictions, personal victimization (i.e., losing a significant other due to the conflict) and inclusive victim perceptions (i.e., perceptions of a “common victim identity,” namely, similarity between the ingroup’s and the outgroup’s suffering) predicted peace activism. However, perceptions of a common perpetrator identity failed to predict activism. These results were replicated in a sample of 106 Israeli Jews who participated in the 2016 ceremony. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

The Human Empowerment Sequence and the Development of Libertarian Values: A Theoretical and Empirical Adjustment to the Human Empowerment Sequence

Building on the work of Inglehart and colleagues, Welzel sets out a step-by-step theory explaining how democracies arise from processes of modernization. The intermediary stages in the causal chain he sets out explain the connection between action resources and emancipatory values. In short, Welzel provides strong evidence that people must first have the material, intellectual, and connective resources to exercise certain freedoms before they develop values that will motivate them to seek out those freedoms. Although we are convinced by much of Welzel’s argument, we also note a substantial overlap between these intermediary stages of Welzel’s theory and the individual-level authoritarianism literature. Integrating current theory on authoritarianism into Welzel’s thesis at the point of overlap provides for a distinct set of hypotheses and a more nuanced understanding of how individual differences work in Welzel’s theory. Analyses of data from Wave 5 of the World Values Survey and Vanhanen provide some initial evidence in support of our amended view of the intermediary stages of Welzel’s modernization thesis.

God or Country? Fusion With Judaism Predicts Desire for Retaliation Following Palestinian Stabbing Intifada

Research indicates that existential threat may motivate in-group members to retaliate against out-group members. Less is known about the impact of alignment with one’s religious or national group on retaliatory activity. We addressed this deficiency in a longitudinal study before, and soon after, the beginning of the 2015 Palestinian Stabbing Intifada—a terror wave that is still ongoing. We assessed the predictive power of Israeli’s “identity fusion” (a visceral, family like bond to a group) to either religion or country. We found that fusion with religion (rather than country) predicted endorsement of retaliatory activity, especially after the intifada began. This pattern persisted even when controlling for rival measures such as religiosity, fundamentalism, and conservatism. Apparently, even in relatively secular Israel, ideological commitments to religion foment retaliatory activity that may precipitate further aggression. Future interventions might therefore address issues pertaining to religious identities, even when the conflict appears political or territorial.

Holocaust exposure and subsequent suicide risk: a population-based study

OBJECTIVES

To examine the association between the extent of genocide exposure and subsequent suicide risk among Holocaust survivors.

METHODS

Persons born in Holocaust-exposed European countries during the years 1922-1945 that immigrated to Israel by 1965 were identified in the Population Registry (N = 209,429), and followed up for suicide (1950-2014). They were divided into three groups based on likely exposure to Nazi persecution: those who immigrated before (indirect; n = 20,229; 10%), during (partial direct; n = 17,189; 8%), and after (full direct; n = 172,061; 82%) World War II. Groups were contrasted for suicide risk, accounting for the extent of genocide in their respective countries of origin, high (>70%) or lower levels (<50%). Cox model survival analyses were computed examining calendar year at suicide. Sensitivity analyses were recomputed for two additional suicide-associated variables (age and years since immigration) for each exposure group. All analyses were adjusted for confounders.

RESULTS

Survival analysis showed that compared to the indirect exposure group, the partial direct exposure group from countries with high genocide level had a statistically significant (P < .05) increased suicide risk for the main outcome (calendar year: HR 1.78, 95% CI 1.09, 2.90). This effect significantly (P < .05) replicated in two sensitivity analyses for countries with higher relative levels of genocide (age: HR 1.77, 95% CI 1.09, 2.89; years since immigration: HR 1.85, 95% CI 1.14, 3.02). The full direct exposure group was not at significant suicide risk compared to the indirect exposure group. Suicide associations for groups from countries with relative lower level of genocide were not statistically significant.

DISCUSSION

This study partly converges with findings identifying Holocaust survivors (full direct exposure) as a resilient group. A tentative mechanism for higher vulnerability to suicide risk of the partial direct exposure group from countries with higher genocide exposure includes protracted guilt feelings, having directly witnessed atrocities and escaped death.

How Cyberattacks Terrorize: Cortisol and Personal Insecurity Jump in the Wake of Cyberattacks

Do cyberattacks fuel the politics of threat? By what mechanism does it do so? To address these questions, we employ a technological and physiological experiment (2 × 2) involving a simulated cyberattack. Participants were randomly assigned to "cyberattack" (treatment) or "no attack" (control) conditions. We find that cyber-attacks make people more likely to express threat perceptions; we suggest salivary cortisol, a measure of stress, as the mechanism bridging cyber and the politics of threat. Contrary to existing evidence, salivary cortisol is the mechanism that translates simulated exposure to cyberattacks into political threat perceptions.

Value Fulfillment and Bicultural Identity Integration

What can facilitate bicultural identity integration (BII)? To answer this question, we introduce a new relevant construct—subjective value fulfillment. We contend that the subjective feeling of value fulfillment within a social identity can enhance the motivation to integrate this social identity with other identities. Furthermore, after distinguishing between central, peripheral, and conflictual identities that differ in level of identification, we contend that perceiving a conflictual identity as allowing value fulfillment is especially important to BII. We examine these hypotheses in four studies. Three examined Arab-Israelis (a total of N = 399), while the fourth study investigated Druze-Arab-Israelis ( N = 212). Our findings indicate that value fulfillment contributes to elevated BII, that manipulation of perceived value fulfillment elevates BII, and that perceived value fulfillment–BII relations are contingent on type of identity. More specifically, we found that perceived value fulfillment within a conflictual identity was more relevant to BII than perceived value fulfillment in a central identity. Last, we found that perceived value fulfillment predicted BII over and above identification.

Threatened or Threatening? How Ideology Shapes Asylum Seekers' Immigration Policy Attitudes in Israel and Australia

Can different political ideologies explain policy preferences regarding asylum seekers? We focus on attitudes regarding governmental policy towards out-group members and suggest that perceptions of threat help to shape these policy attitudes. Study 1 compared public opinion regarding asylum policy in Israel (N = 137) and Australia (N = 138), two countries with restrictive asylum policies and who host a large number of asylum seekers; Study 2, a longitudinal study, was conducted during two different time periods in Israel-before and during the Gaza conflict. Results of both studies showed that threat perceptions of out-group members drive the relationship between conservative political ideologies and support for exclusionary asylum policies among citizens. Perceptions of threat held by members of the host country (the in-group) towards asylum seekers (the out-group) may influence policy formation. The effect of these out-groups threats needs to be critically weighed when considering Israeli and Australian policies towards asylum seekers.

How Personality Affects Vulnerability among Israelis and Palestinians following the 2009 Gaza Conflict

Can the onset of PTSD symptoms and depression be predicted by personality factors and thought control strategies? A logical explanation for the different mental health outcomes of individuals exposed to trauma would seem to be personality factors and thought control strategies. Trauma exposure is necessary but not sufficient for the development of PTSD. To this end, we assess the role of personality traits and coping styles in PTSD vulnerability among Israeli and Palestinian students amid conflict. We also determine whether gender and exposure level to trauma impact the likelihood of the onset of PTSD symptoms. Five questionnaires assess previous trauma, PTSD symptoms, demographics, personality factors and thought control strategies, which are analyzed using path analysis. Findings show that the importance of personality factors and thought control strategies in predicting vulnerability increases in the face of political violence: the higher stress, the more important the roles of personality and thought control strategies. Thought control strategies associated with introverted and less emotionally stable personality-types correlate positively with higher levels of PTSD symptoms and depression, particularly among Palestinians. By extension, because mental health is key to reducing violence in the region, PTSD reduction in conflict zones warrants rethinking.

The psychological effects of cyber terrorism

When ordinary citizens think of cyber threats, most are probably worried about their passwords and banking details, not a terrorist attack. The thought of a shooting in a mall or a bombing at an airport is probably more frightening than a cyber breach. Yet terrorists aim for mental as well as physical destruction, and our research has found that, depending on who the attackers and the victims are, the psychological effects of cyber threats can rival those of traditional terrorism.

The Longitudinal Effects of Chronic Mediated Exposure to Political Violence on Ideological Beliefs About Political Conflicts Among Youths

This study examines the effects of chronic (i.e., repeated and cumulative) mediated exposure to political violence on ideological beliefs regarding political conflict. It centers on these effects on young viewers, from preadolescents to adolescents. Ideological beliefs refers here to support of war, perception of threat to one's nation, and normative beliefs concerning aggression toward the out-group. A longitudinal study was conducted on a sample of Israeli and Palestinian youths who experience the Israeli-Palestinian conflict firsthand (N = 1,207). Two alternative hypotheses were tested: that chronic exposure via the media increases support for war and aggression and elevates feeling of threat, or that chronic exposure via the media strengthens preexisting beliefs. Results demonstrated that higher levels of exposure were longitudinally related to stronger support for war. Regarding normative beliefs about aggression and threat to one's nation, mediated exposure reinforced initial beliefs, rendering the youths more extreme in their attitudes. These results mostly support the conceptualization of the relation between media violence and behaviors as "reciprocally determined" or "reinforcing spirals." The results are also discussed in light of the differences found between the effect of exposure to political violence firsthand and exposure via the media.

Inflamed by the flames? The impact of terrorism and war on immunity

The physiological impact on citizens of prolonged exposure to violence and conflict is a crucial, yet underexplored, issue within the political science and biology literature. We examined the effect of high levels of exposure to rocket and terrorist attacks on biological markers of immunity and inflammation in a sample of 92 Israelis. A stratified random sample of individuals was drawn from a pool of subjects in Israel who had previously been interviewed regarding their stress exposure and psychological distress during a period of active rocket and terrorist attacks. These individuals were reinterviewed and blood samples were collected to assess antibodies to cytomegalovirus (CMV antibodies) and C-reactive protein (CRP). Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was significantly related to CRP, β = .33, p = .034, with body mass index, depression, and exposure to terrorism included in the model. Depression scores were not significantly associated with CRP or CMV antibody levels. In contrast to the established convention that psychological distress is the sole outcome of terrorism exposure, these findings reveal that individuals exposed to terrorism experience higher levels of both PTSD/depression, and inflammation. This study has important ramifications for how policy makers and medical health professionals should formulate public health policies and medically treat individuals living in conflict zones.