First Description of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Two Feral American Mink (Neovison vison) Caught in the Wild

Widespread exposure to SARS-CoV-2 in wildlife communities

Pervasive SARS-CoV-2 infections in humans have led to multiple transmission events to animals. While SARS-CoV-2 has a potential broad wildlife host range, most documented infections have been in captive animals and a single wildlife species, the white-tailed deer. The full extent of SARS-CoV-2 exposure among wildlife communities and the factors that influence wildlife transmission risk remain unknown. We sampled 23 species of wildlife for SARS-CoV-2 and examined the effects of urbanization and human use on seropositivity. Here, we document positive detections of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in six species, including the deer mouse, Virginia opossum, raccoon, groundhog, Eastern cottontail, and Eastern red bat between May 2022-September 2023 across Virginia and Washington, D.C., USA. In addition, we found that sites with high human activity had three times higher seroprevalence than low human-use areas. We obtained SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences from nine individuals of six species which were assigned to seven Pango lineages of the Omicron variant. The close match to variants circulating in humans at the time suggests at least seven recent human-to-animal transmission events. Our data support that exposure to SARS-CoV-2 has been widespread in wildlife communities and suggests that areas with high human activity may serve as points of contact for cross-species transmission.

Survey of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in captive and free-ranging wildlife from Spain

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), considered a zoonotic agent of wildlife origin, can infect various animal species, including wildlife in free-range and captive environments. Detecting susceptible species and potential reservoirs is crucial for preventing the transmission, spread, genetic evolution, and further emergence of viral variants that are major threats to global health. This study aimed to detect exposure or acute infection by SARS-CoV-2 in 420 animals from 40 different wildlife species, including terrestrial and aquatic mammals, from different regions of Spain during the 2020-2023 coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19) pandemic. In total, 8/137 animals were positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies against the receptor binding domain and/or viral nucleoprotein according to independent ELISAs. However, only one ELISA-positive sample of a captive bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies with a low titre (SNT50 38.15) according to a virus neutralization test. Cetaceans are expected to have a high risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2 according to early predictive studies due to the similarity of their angiotensin converting enzyme 2 cell receptor to that of humans. Moreover, of 283 animals analysed for SARS-CoV-2 RNA using RT-qPCR, none tested positive. Our results reinforce the importance of considering cetaceans at risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection and support taking preventive biosecurity measures when interacting with them, especially in the presence of individuals with suspected or confirmed COVID-19. Although most animals in this study tested negative for acute infection or viral exposure, ongoing surveillance of wildlife species and potentially susceptible animals is important to prevent future spillover events and detect potential novel reservoirs.

The reverse zoonotic potential of SARS-CoV-2

There has been considerable emphasis recently on the zoonotic origins of emerging infectious diseases in humans, including the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic; however, reverse zoonoses (infections transmitted from humans to other animals) have received less attention despite their potential importance. The effects can be devastating for the infected species and can also result in transmission of the pathogen back to human populations or other animals either in the original form or as a variant. Humans have transmitted SARS-CoV-2 to other animals, and the virus is able to circulate and evolve in those species. As global travel resumes, the potential of SARS-CoV-2 as a reverse zoonosis threatens humans and endangered species. Nonhuman primates are of particular concern given their susceptibility to human respiratory infections. Enforcing safety measures for all people working in and visiting wildlife areas, especially those with nonhuman primates, and increasing access to safety measures for people living near protected areas that are home to nonhuman primates will help mitigate reverse zoonotic transmission.

Exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the endangered Iberian lynx (Lynx pardinus)

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is an emerging zoonotic virus of public and animal health concern, of which felids have been suggested as potential reservoirs. Although SARS-CoV-2 exposure has been detected in domestic and wild captive animals belonging to Felidae family, surveillance has not been carried out in free-ranging wild felids so far. The aim of the present study was to assess SARS-CoV-2 exposure in the Iberian lynx (Lynx pardinus), the most endangered felid in the world. Between 2019 and 2022, we conducted a seroepidemiological study of SARS-CoV-2 in 276 free-ranging and captive Iberian lynxes. Our results evidenced limited (0.4%; 95%CI: 0.0-1.1) but not negligible exposure to this emerging virus in this endangered felid species, increasing the SARS-CoV-2 host range. The circulation of this virus in wildlife evidences the need of integrated European wildlife monitoring.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals: Patterns, transmission routes, and drivers

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is more widespread in animals than previously thought, and it may be able to infect a wider range of domestic and wild species. To effectively control the spread of the virus and protect animal health, it is crucial to understand the cross-species transmission mechanisms and risk factors of SARS-CoV-2. This article collects published literature on SARS-CoV-2 in animals and examines the distribution, transmission routes, biophysical, and anthropogenic drivers of infected animals. The reported cases of infection in animals are mainly concentrated in South America, North America, and Europe, and species affected include lions, white-tailed deer, pangolins, minks, and cats. Biophysical factors influencing infection of animals with SARS-CoV-2 include environmental determinants, high-risk landscapes, air quality, and susceptibility of different animal species, while anthropogenic factors comprise human behavior, intensive livestock farming, animal markets, and land management. Due to current research gaps and surveillance capacity shortcomings, future mitigation strategies need to be designed from a One Health perspective, with research focused on key regions with significant data gaps in Asia and Africa to understand the drivers, pathways, and spatiotemporal dynamics of interspecies transmission.

Emergence of SARS and COVID-19 and preparedness for the next emerging disease X

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) are two human Coronavirus diseases emerging in this century, posing tremendous threats to public health and causing great loss to lives and economy. In this review, we retrospect the studies tracing the molecular evolution of SARS-CoV, and we sort out current research findings about the potential ancestor of SARS-CoV-2. Updated knowledge about SARS-CoV-2-like viruses found in wildlife, the animal susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2, as well as the interspecies transmission risk of SARS-related coronaviruses (SARSr-CoVs) are gathered here. Finally, we discuss the strategies of how to be prepared against future outbreaks of emerging or re-emerging coronaviruses.

Lack of detection of SARS-CoV-2 in wildlife from Kerala, India in 2020-21

Spillover of SARS-CoV-2 into a variety of wild and domestic animals has been an ongoing feature of the human pandemic. The establishment of a new reservoir in white-tailed deer in North America and increasing divergence of the viruses circulating in them from those circulating in the human population has highlighted the ongoing risk this poses for global health. Some parts of the world have seen more intensive monitoring of wildlife species for SARS-CoV-2 and related coronaviruses but there are still very large gaps in geographical and species-specific information. This paper reports negative results for SARS-CoV-2 PCR based testing using a pan coronavirus end point RDRP PCR and a Sarbecovirus specific E gene qPCR on lung and or gut tissue from wildlife from the Indian State of Kerala. These animals included: 121 Rhinolophus rouxii (Rufous Horsehoe Bat), six Rhinolophus bedommei (Lesser Woolly Horseshoe Bat), 15 Rossettus leschenaultii (Fulvous Fruit Bat), 47 Macaca radiata (Bonnet macaques), 35 Paradoxurus hermaphroditus (Common Palm Civet), five Viverricula indica (Small Indian Civet), four Herpestes edwardsii (Common Mongoose), ten Panthera tigris (Bengal Tiger), eight Panthera pardus fusca (Indian Leopard), four Prionailurus bengalensis (Leopard cats), two Felis chaus (Jungle cats), two Cuon alpinus (Wild dogs) and one Melursus ursinus (sloth bear).

Pathogenesis of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 in nonhuman primates

The continued pressure of COVID-19 on public health worldwide underlines the need for a better understanding of the mechanisms of disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2. Though many animal models are readily available for use, the nonhuman primate (NHP) models are considered the gold standard in recapitulating disease progression in humans. In this review, we highlight the relevant research since the beginning of the pandemic to critically evaluate the importance of this model. We characterize the disease's clinical manifestations, aspects of viral replication and shedding, induction of the host's immune response, and pathological findings that broaden our understanding of the importance of NHPs in research to strengthen our public health approach to the pandemic.

Lack of detection of SARS-CoV-2 in British wildlife 2020-21 and first description of a stoat (Mustela erminea) Minacovirus

Repeat spillover of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) into new hosts has highlighted the critical role of cross-species transmission of coronaviruses and establishment of new reservoirs of virus in pandemic and epizootic spread of coronaviruses. Species particularly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 spillover include Mustelidae (mink, ferrets and related animals), cricetid rodents (hamsters and related animals), felids (domestic cats and related animals) and white-tailed deer. These predispositions led us to screen British wildlife with sarbecovirus-specific quantitative PCR and pan coronavirus PCR assays for SARS-CoV-2 using samples collected during the human pandemic to establish if widespread spillover was occurring. Fourteen wildlife species (n=402) were tested, including: two red foxes (Vulpes vulpes), 101 badgers (Meles meles), two wild American mink (Neogale vison), 41 pine marten (Martes martes), two weasels (Mustela nivalis), seven stoats (Mustela erminea), 108 water voles (Arvicola amphibius), 39 bank voles (Myodes glareolous), 10 field voles (Microtus agrestis), 15 wood mice (Apodemus sylvaticus), one common shrew (Sorex aranaeus), two pygmy shrews (Sorex minutus), two hedgehogs (Erinaceus europaeus) and 75 Eurasian otters (Lutra lutra). No cases of SARS-CoV-2 were detected in any animals, but a novel minacovirus related to mink and ferret alphacoronaviruses was detected in stoats recently introduced to the Orkney Islands. This group of viruses is of interest due to pathogenicity in ferrets. The impact of this virus on the health of stoat populations remains to be established.

Transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 from humans to animals: is there a risk of novel reservoirs?

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a zoonotic virus able to infect humans and multiple nonhuman animal species. Most natural infections in companion, captive zoo, livestock, and wildlife species have been related to a reverse transmission, raising concern about potential generation of animal reservoirs due to human-animal interactions. To date, American mink and white-tailed deer are the only species that led to extensive intraspecies transmission of SARS-CoV-2 after reverse zoonosis, leading to an efficient spread of the virus and subsequent animal-to-human transmission. Viral host adaptations increase the probability of new SARS-CoV-2 variants' emergence that could cause a major global health impact. Therefore, applying the One Health approach is crucial to prevent and overcome future threats for human, animal, and environmental fields.

A comprehensive dataset of animal-associated sarbecoviruses

Zoonotic spillover of sarbecoviruses (SarbeCoVs) from non-human animals to humans under natural conditions has led to two large-scale pandemics, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic in 2003 and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Knowledge of the genetic diversity, geographical distribution, and host specificity of SarbeCoVs is therefore of interest for pandemic surveillance and origin tracing of SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2. This study presents a comprehensive repository of publicly available animal-associated SarbeCoVs, covering 1,535 viruses identified from 63 animal species distributed in 43 countries worldwide (as of February 14,2023). Relevant meta-information, such as host species, sampling time and location, was manually curated and included in the dataset to facilitate further research on the potential patterns of viral diversity and ecological characteristics. In addition, the dataset also provides well-annotated sequence sets of receptor-binding domains (RBDs) and receptor-binding motifs (RBMs) for the scientific community to highlight the potential determinants of successful cross-species transmission that could be aid in risk estimation and strategic design for future emerging infectious disease control and prevention.

Asymptomatic viral infection is associated with lower host reproductive output in wild mink populations

Many endemic viruses circulate in populations without hosts showing visible signs of disease, while still having the potential to alter host survival or reproduction. Aleutian Mink Disease Virus (AMDV) circulates in many American mink (Neogale vison) populations in its native and introduced ranges. In this study, we analysed how AMDV infection in female American mink affects the reproduction of a feral population. Females infected with AMDV delivered significantly smaller litters (5.8 pups) than uninfected females (6.3 pups), meaning their litter size was reduced by 8%. Larger females and yearling females had larger litters than smaller and older females. There were no significant differences in whole litter survival between infected and uninfected females; however, offspring survival until September or October within litters of infected females was 14% lower than that within those of uninfected females. This negative link between infection and reproductive output means that Aleutian disease could seriously affect the wild mink population. This study increases our understanding of the threats posed by the spread of viruses to wildlife from farm animals or humans, highlighting that viruses circulating in wildlife, even in the absence of clinical manifestation, can be important drivers of population dynamics in wildlife.

Evaluation of SARS-CoV-2 passive surveillance in Lithuanian mink farms, 2020-2021

The newly emerged SARS-CoV-2, causing COVID-19 in humans, is also infecting American mink (Neovison vison), used in fur production. Since 2020, passive surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in mink farms was implemented in Lithuania. Here, we describe data from a survey of all 57 active Lithuanian mink farms carried out during November-December 2021 to complement passive surveillance in the country. In all 57 mink farms, nasopharyngeal swab samples were collected from dead or live mink and tested by real-time RT-PCR. Dead mink samples were tested in pools of 5, while live mink samples were tested individually. In 19 mink farms, blood serum was collected and tested for antibodies to determine previous exposure to the virus. Environmental samples from 55 farms were also collected and tested in pooled samples by real-time RT-PCR. The present survey has detected 22.81% viral RNA-positive mink farms and a high number of mink farms that were exposed (84.21, 95% CI 67.81-100%) to the virus. The increasing exposure of mink farms to the virus due to growing human COVID-19 cases and limitations of passive surveillance could explain the observed epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in Lithuanian mink farms, compared to the few positive farms previously detected by passive surveillance. The unexpected widespread exposure of mink farms to SARS-CoV-2 suggests that passive surveillance is ineffective for early detection of SARS-CoV-2 in mink. Further studies are needed to reveal the present status in previously infected mink farms.

COVID-19 and One Health: potential role of human and animals in SARS-CoV-2 life cycle

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in humans has zoonotic tendencies, which can potentially provoke cross-species transmission, including human-to-animal and animal-to-human infection. Consequently, the objective was to analyze the scientific evidence regarding SARS-CoV-2 animal infections from potential human transmission. A systematic review was executed following the PRISMA guidelines, in the PubMed/MEDLINE, Google Scholar and LILACS, using the descriptors combined in the following way: (("SARS-CoV-2" OR "COVID-19" OR "2019-nCoV") AND (animals OR zoonosis)). The results contemplated the viral susceptibility of about thirty animal species when induced naturally and/or experimentally. The mink & hamster species demonstrated ostensible animal-to-human transmission. Overall, there have been more reports of human contamination by other species than human retransmission from the pathogen. The natural infection of the virus was discovered in domestic dogs & cats, wild cats, deer, minks, rabbits and hamsters. Several animals, including the African green monkeys and rabbits, manifested high levels of viremia, respiratory secretions and fecal excretions of infectious virus conducive to environmental/aerosol transmission. It is still inadequately documented the intrinsic role of such processes, such as the animals' involvement in viral mutations, the emergence of new variants/lineages and the role of the animal host species. Accordingly, this research model type, natural and experimental analysis on varying animal species, corroborates the link between the two aforementioned forms of transmission. Epidemiological surveillance through extensive sequencing of the viral genomes of infected animals and humans can reveal the SARS-CoV-2 transmission routes and anticipate appropriate prophylactic strategies.

Assessment and strategy development for SARS-CoV-2 screening in wildlife: A review

Coronaviruses (members of the Coronaviridae family) are prominent in veterinary medicine, with several known infectious agents commonly reported. In contrast, human medicine has disregarded coronaviruses for an extended period. Within the past two decades, coronaviruses have caused three major outbreaks. One such outbreak was the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by the coronavirus severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). Over the 3-year COVID-19 outbreak, several instances of zooanthroponosis have been documented, which pose risks for virus modifications and possible re-emergence of the virus into the human population, causing a new epidemic and possible threats for vaccination or treatment failure. Therefore, widespread screening of animals is an essential technique for mitigating future risks and repercussions. However, mass detection of SARS-CoV-2 in wild animals might be challenging. In silico prediction modeling, experimental studies conducted on various animal species, and natural infection episodes recorded in various species might provide information on the potential threats to wildlife. They may be useful for diagnostic and mass screening purposes. In this review, the possible methods of wildlife screening, based on experimental data and environmental elements that might play a crucial role in its effective implementation, are reviewed.

Disease threats to tigers and their prey

The contraction of the global tiger population over the last 100 years into small, often isolated subpopulations has made them increasingly vulnerable to the impact of disease. Despite this, the health of wild tigers continues to be insufficiently funded and explored. For example, canine distemper virus (CDV), has been associated with localized declines and increased risk of extinction, and yet has received little research attention in most tiger range countries. The emergence of new pathogenic threats has posed fresh challenges, including African swine fever virus (ASFV), which has the potential to devastate wild boar populations, and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV2) with implications for tiger conservation that remain unknown. The objective of this review is to synthesize current research on the health of tigers and their prey that impacts the conservation of tigers in the wild. Published sources are interpreted based on three mechanisms through which disease can affect the viability of tiger populations: (1) by reducing the survival of adult tigers, (2) by reducing breeding productivity, and (3) by reducing the carrying capacity of tiger habitat through decreased prey abundance. Examples of CDV, SARS-CoV2, carnivore protoparvovirus 1 and ASFV are used to illustrate these processes and inform discussion of research and mitigation priorities.

SARS-CoV-2 in animals: susceptibility of animal species, risk for animal and public health, monitoring, prevention and control

The epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and animals is continually evolving. To date, animal species known to transmit SARS-CoV-2 are American mink, raccoon dog, cat, ferret, hamster, house mouse, Egyptian fruit bat, deer mouse and white-tailed deer. Among farmed animals, American mink have the highest likelihood to become infected from humans or animals and further transmit SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, 44 outbreaks were reported in 2021 in mink farms in seven MSs, while only six in 2022 in two MSs, thus representing a decreasing trend. The introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into mink farms is usually via infected humans; this can be controlled by systematically testing people entering farms and adequate biosecurity. The current most appropriate monitoring approach for mink is the outbreak confirmation based on suspicion, testing dead or clinically sick animals in case of increased mortality or positive farm personnel and the genomic surveillance of virus variants. The genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 showed mink-specific clusters with a potential to spill back into the human population. Among companion animals, cats, ferrets and hamsters are those at highest risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, which most likely originates from an infected human, and which has no or very low impact on virus circulation in the human population. Among wild animals (including zoo animals), mostly carnivores, great apes and white-tailed deer have been reported to be naturally infected by SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, no cases of infected wildlife have been reported so far. Proper disposal of human waste is advised to reduce the risks of spill-over of SARS-CoV-2 to wildlife. Furthermore, contact with wildlife, especially if sick or dead, should be minimised. No specific monitoring for wildlife is recommended apart from testing hunter-harvested animals with clinical signs or found-dead. Bats should be monitored as a natural host of many coronaviruses.

Evolutionary rate of SARS-CoV-2 increases during zoonotic infection of farmed mink

To investigate genetic signatures of adaptation to the mink host, we characterised the evolutionary rate heterogeneity in mink-associated severe acute respiratory syndrome coronaviruses (SARS-CoV-2). In 2020, the first detected anthropozoonotic spillover event of SARS-CoV-2 occurred in mink farms throughout Europe and North America. Both spill-back of mink-associated lineages into the human population and the spread into the surrounding wildlife were reported, highlighting the potential formation of a zoonotic reservoir. Our findings suggest that the evolutionary rate of SARS-CoV-2 underwent an episodic increase upon introduction into the mink host before returning to the normal range observed in humans. Furthermore, SARS-CoV-2 lineages could have circulated in the mink population for a month before detection, and during this period, evolutionary rate estimates were between 3 × 10^-3 and 1.05 × 10^-2 (95 per cent HPD, with a mean rate of 6.59 × 10^-3) a four- to thirteen-fold increase compared to that in humans. As there is evidence for unique mutational patterns within mink-associated lineages, we explored the emergence of four mink-specific Spike protein amino acid substitutions Y453F, S1147L, F486L, and Q314K. We found that mutation Y453F emerged early in multiple mink outbreaks and that mutations F486L and Q314K may co-occur. We suggest that SARS-CoV-2 undergoes a brief, but considerable, increase in evolutionary rate in response to greater selective pressures during species jumps, which may lead to the occurrence of mink-specific mutations. These findings emphasise the necessity of ongoing surveillance of zoonotic SARS-CoV-2 infections in the future.

Lack of SARS-CoV-2 RNA evidence in the lungs from wild European polecats (Mustela putorius) from Spain

Data on SARS-CoV-2 infection in wildlife species is limited. The high prevalences found in mustelid species such as free-ranging American minks (Neovison vison) and domestic ferrets (Mustela putorius furo) justify the study of this virus in the closely related autochthonous free-ranging European polecat (Mustela putorius). We analysed lung samples from 48 roadkilled polecats collected when the human infection reached its highest levels in Spain (2020-2021). We did not detect infections by SARS-CoV-2; however, surveillance in wild carnivores and particularly in mustelids is still warranted, due to their susceptibility to this virus.

The role of invasive alien species in the emergence and spread of zoonoses

The role of invasive alien species in the transmission dynamics of zoonotic pathogens is often overlooked, despite the rapid escalation in biological invasions globally. Here we synthesise available information on the influence of invasive alien species on zoonotic pathogen dynamics in invaded ranges, focussing on Europe, and identify key associated knowledge gaps. We identified 272 documented interactions between alien species and zoonotic pathogens within invaded ranges. The majority of these involved invasive alien mammals followed by birds with only a few occurrences of other taxa documented. A wide range of potential interactions between invasive alien species and zoonotic pathogens were identified but few studies considered transmission to humans and so there was limited evidence of actual impacts on human health. However, there is an urgent need to raise awareness of the potential risks posed to human health by the transmission of zoonotic diseases by invasive alien species; the role of invasive alien species in zoonotic disease transmission may exceed that of native wildlife and occur in a relatively short period following the arrival of an invasive alien species within a new region. Ecological and social mechanisms govern the dynamics of zoonotic disease transmission but wildlife diseases are not consistently included within animal, plant and human policies. Rapid advances in the development of systems frameworks that integrate the ecological, economic and social processes promoting spillover in rapidly changing environments will increase understanding to inform decision-making.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10530-022-02978-1.

SARS-CoV-2 and animals, a long story that doesn't have to end now: What we need to learn from the emergence of the Omicron variant

OIE, the world organization for animal health, recently released an update on the state of the art of knowledge regarding SARS-CoV-2 in animals. For farmed animals, ferrets and minks were found to be highly susceptible to the virus and develop symptomatic disease both in natural conditions and in experimental infections. Lagomorphs of the species Oryctolagus cuniculus are indicated as highly susceptible to the virus under experimental conditions, but show no symptoms of the disease and do not transmit the virus between conspecifics, unlike raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides), which in addition to being highly susceptible to the virus under experimental conditions, can also transmit the virus between conspecifics. Among felines, the circulation of the virus has reached a level of cases such as sometimes suggests the experimental use of vaccines for human use or treatments with monoclonal antibodies. But even among wild animals, several species (White-tailed deer, Egyptian rousettes, and minks) have now been described as potential natural reservoirs of the virus. This proven circulation of SARS-CoV-2 among animals has not been accompanied by the development of an adequate surveillance system that allows following the evolution of the virus among its natural hosts. This will be all the more relevant as the surveillance system in humans inevitably drops and we move to surveillance by sentinels similar to the human flu virus. The lesson that we can draw from the emergence of Omicron and, more than likely, its animal origin must not be lost, and in this mini-review, we explain why.

SARS-CoV-2 as a Zooanthroponotic Infection: Spillbacks, Secondary Spillovers, and Their Importance

In the midst of a persistent pandemic of a probable zoonotic origin, one needs to constantly evaluate the interplay of SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus-2) with animal populations. Animals can get infected from humans, and certain species, including mink and white-tailed deer, exhibit considerable animal-to-animal transmission resulting in potential endemicity, mutation pressure, and possible secondary spillover to humans. We attempt a comprehensive review of the available data on animal species infected by SARS-CoV-2, as presented in the scientific literature and official reports of relevant organizations. We further evaluate the lessons humans should learn from mink outbreaks, white-tailed deer endemicity, zoo outbreaks, the threat for certain species conservation, the possible implication of rodents in the evolution of novel variants such as Omicron, and the potential role of pets as animal reservoirs of the virus. Finally, we outline the need for a broader approach to the pandemic and epidemics, in general, incorporating the principles of One Health and Planetary Health.

Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in a dog with hemorrhagic diarrhea

Background

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of COVID-19, has infected several animal species, including dogs, presumably via human-to-animal transmission. Most infected dogs reported were asymptomatic, with low viral loads. However, in this case we detected SARS-CoV-2 in a dog from the North African coastal Spanish city of Ceuta presenting hemorrhagic diarrhea, a disease also reported earlier on in an infected dog from the USA.

Case presentation

In early January 2021, a West Highland Terrier pet dog from Ceuta (Spain) presented hemorrhagic diarrhea with negative tests for candidate microbial pathogens. Since the animal was in a household whose members suffered SARS-CoV-2 in December 2020, dog feces were analyzed for SARS-CoV-2, proving positive in a two-tube RT-PCR test, with confirmation by sequencing a 399-nucleotide region of the spike (S) gene. Furthermore, next-generation sequencing (NGS) covered > 90% SARS-CoV-2 genome sequence, allowing to classify it as variant B.1.177. Remarkably, the sequence revealed the Ile402Val substitution in the spike protein (S), of potential concern because it mapped in the receptor binding domain (RBD) that mediates virus interaction with the cell. NGS reads mapping to bacterial genomes showed that the dog fecal microbiome fitted best the characteristic microbiome of dog’s acute hemorrhagic diarrhea.

Conclusion

Our findings exemplify dog infection stemming from the human SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, providing nearly complete-genome sequencing of the virus, which is recognized as belonging to the B.1.177 variant, adding knowledge on variant circulation in a geographic region and period for which there was little viral variant characterization. A single amino acid substitution found in the S protein that could have been of concern is excluded to belong to this category given its rarity and intrinsic nature. The dog’s pathology suggests that SARS-CoV-2 could affect the gastrointestinal tract of the dog.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12917-022-03453-8.

Risks of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between free-ranging animals and captive mink in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, 69 of the 126 (55%) mink farms in total became infected with SARS-CoV-2 in 2020. Despite strict biosecurity measures and extensive epidemiological investigations, the main transmission route remained unclear. A better understanding of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms is of relevance for countries where mink farming is still common practice and can be used as a case study to improve future emerging disease preparedness. We assessed whether SARS-CoV-2 spilled over from mink to free-ranging animals, and whether free-ranging animals may have played a role in farm-to-farm transmission in the Netherlands. The study encompassed farm visits, farm questionnaires, expert workshops and SARS-CoV-2 RNA and antibody testing of samples from target animal species (bats, birds and free-ranging carnivores). In this study, we show that the open housing system of mink allowed access to birds, bats and most free-ranging carnivores, and that direct and indirect contact with mink was likely after entry, especially for free-ranging carnivores and birds. This allowed SARS-CoV-2 exposure to animals entering the mink farm, and subsequent infection or mechanical carriage by the target animal species. Moreover, mink can escape farms in some cases, and two SARS-CoV-2-positive mink were found outside farm premises. No other SARS-CoV-2-RNA-positive free-ranging animals were detected, suggesting there was no abundant circulation in the species tested during the study period. To investigate previous SARS-CoV-2 infections, SARS-CoV-2 antibody detection using lung extracts of carcasses was set up and validated. One tested beech marten did have SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, but the closest SARS-CoV-2-infected mink farm was outside of its home range, making infection at a mink farm unlikely. Knowing that virus exchange between different species and the formation of animal reservoirs affects SARS-CoV-2 evolution, continued vigilance and monitoring of mink farms and surrounding wildlife remains vital.

SARS-CoV-2 does not infect pigs, but this has to be verified regularly

For successful xenotransplantation, freedom of the xenocraft donor from certain viral infections that may harm the organ recipient is important. A novel human coronavirus (CoV) with a respiratory tropism, designated as SARS-CoV-2, was first identified in January 2020 in China, but likely has been circulating unnoticed for some time before. Since then, this virus has reached most inhabited areas, resulting in a major global pandemic which is still ongoing. Due to a high number of subclinical infections, re-infections, geographic differences in diagnostic tests used, and differences in result reporting programs, the percentage of the population infected with SARS-CoV-2 at least once has been challenging to estimate. With continuous ongoing infections in people and an overall high viral load, it makes sense to look into possible viral spillover events in pets and farm animals, who are often in close contact with humans. The pig is currently the main species considered for xenotransplantation and hence there is interest to know if pigs can become infected with SARS-CoV-2 and if so what the infection dynamics may look like. This review article summarizes the latest research findings on this topic. It would appear that pigs can currently be considered a low risk species, and hence do not pose an immediate risk to the human population or xenotransplantation recipients per se. Monitoring the ever-changing SARS-CoV-2 variants appears important to recognize immediately should this change in the future.

No Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Wild Mink (Mustela lutreola and Neogale vison) from Northern Spain during the First Two Years of Pandemic

Simple Summary

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) causing coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) is a betacoronavirus (β-CoV) closely related to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-CoV) and the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), which have also caused severe outbreaks of disease in human populations. Human-to-animal transmission events during the COVID-19 pandemic have been documented in several countries. Different animal species have been proven to be susceptible to infection with SARS-CoV-2 both naturally and by experimental infection, including mustelids such as ferrets, otters, and American mink (Neogale vison). In this sense, infected farmed American mink develop respiratory signs associated with viral pneumonia. This study evaluates the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in European mink (Mustela lutreola) and American mink from Spain, by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) using the receptor binding domain (RBD) of Spike protein antigen in serum samples and/or by RT-qPCR assays in oropharyngeal and rectal swabs. From January 2020 to February 2022, a total of 162 animals (127 European mink and 35 American mink) with no evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection were included in the study. Of the 126 serum samples analysed by serology, anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies were not detected in the mink included in this study. In the same way, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has not been detected in any of the 160 swabs samples analysed by RT-qPCR. This study shows the absence of the wild mink exposure to SARS-CoV-2 in a geographic area seriously affected by COVID-19. With these results, it can be considered that the probability that the virus is circulating in wild mink is low. With this, the risk of virus transmission to humans by this route is also considered improbable.

Abstract

The impact of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic on wildlife is largely unevaluated, and extended surveillance of animal species is needed to reach a consensus on the role of animals in the emergence and maintenance of SARS-CoV-2. This infection has been detected in farmed and domestic animals and wild animals, mainly in captivity. The interactions or shared resources with wildlife could represent a potential transmission pathway for the SARS-CoV-2 spill over to other wild species and could lead to health consequences or the establishment of new reservoirs in susceptible hosts. This study evaluated the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in European mink (Mustela lutreola) and American mink (Neogale vison) in Spain by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) using the receptor binding domain (RBD) of Spike antigen in serum samples and/or by RT-qPCR assays in oropharyngeal and rectal swabs. From January 2020 to February 2022, a total of 162 animals (127 European mink and 35 American mink) with no evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection were included in the study. Antibodies against the SARS-CoV-2 were not found in the serum samples analysed (n = 126), nor was the virus amplified by RT-qPCR (n = 160 swabs). Our results suggest that the potential role of wild mink and the European mink bred in captivity and released to the wild as dispersers of SARS-CoV-2 is so far low. However, wildlife surveillance for early detection of human and animal risks should be continued. In this sense, epidemiological monitoring measures, including serology and molecular analysis, are necessary.

Evidence of antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 in wild mustelids from Brittany (France)

In the French region of Brittany, mainly in the department of the Côtes d'Armor, during the first half of 2021, seropositivity for SARS‐CoV‐2 was detected in five wild mustelids out of 33 animals tested (15.6%). Anti‐SARS‐CoV‐2 IgG was detected against at least four out of five recombinant viral proteins (S1 receptor binding domain, nucleocapsid, S1 subunit, S2 subunit and spike) in three pine martens (Martes martes) and in two badgers (Meles meles) using the automated western blot technique. An ELISA test also identified seropositive cases, although these did not align with western blot results. Although the 171 qPCRs carried out on samples from the 33 mustelids were all negative, these preliminary results from this observational study nevertheless bear witness to infections of unknown origin. The epidemiological surveillance of Covid‐19 in wildlife must continue, in particular with effective serology tools.

An Updated Review on SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Animals

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has lasted for two years and caused millions of infections and deaths in humans. Although the origin of SARS-CoV-2 infection in humans remains unknown, infection in animals has been frequently reported in varieties of animals all over the world. Both experimental and natural infections of SARS-CoV-2 in different animal species provide useful information on viral host range and pathogenicity. As the pandemic continues to evolve, SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals will be expanding. In this review, we summarized SARS-CoV-2 testing and infection in animals as well as SARS-CoV-2 strains and transmission in animals. Current data showed that at least 18 different animal species tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. These 18 animal species belong to pet, captive, farmed, and wild animals. Fifteen of the eighteen animal species were known to be positive for the Delta variant and ten animal species were infected with two different types of variants. Human-to-animal, animal-to-animal, and animal-to-human transmission events were suggested in different outbreaks involved in animal infection with SARS-CoV-2. Continued testing, immunization, and surveillance are warranted.

Understanding and strengthening wildlife and zoonotic disease policy processes: A research imperative

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the urgency and importance of monitoring, managing and addressing zoonotic diseases, and the acute challenges of doing so with sufficient inter-jurisdictional coordination in a dynamic global context. Although wildlife pathogens are well-studied clinically and ecologically, there is very little systematic scholarship on their management or on policy implications. The current global pandemic therefore presents a unique social science research imperative: to understand how decisions are made about preventing and responding to wildlife diseases, especially zoonoses, and how those policy processes can be improved as part of early warning systems, preparedness and rapid response. To meet these challenges, we recommend intensified research efforts towards: (i) generating functional insights about wildlife and zoonotic disease policy processes, (ii) enabling social and organizational learning to mobilize those insights, (iii) understanding epistemic instability to address populist anti-science and (iv) anticipating evolving and new zoonotic emergences, especially their human dimensions. Since policy processes for zoonoses can be acutely challenged during the early stages of an epidemic or pandemic, such insights can provide a pragmatic, empirically-based roadmap for enhancing their robustness and efficacy, and benefiting long-term decision-making efforts.

Genetic and phenotypic parameters for feed efficiency and component traits in American mink

Feed cost is the largest expense of mink production systems, and therefore, improvement of feed efficiency (FE) through selection for high feed efficient mink is a practical way to increase the mink industry's sustainability. In this study, we estimated the heritability, phenotypic and genetic correlations for different FE measures and component traits, including harvest weight (HW), harvest length (HL), final body length (FBL), final body weight (FBW), average daily gain (ADG), daily feed intake (DFI), feed conversion ratio (FCR), residual feed intake (RFI), residual gain (RG), residual intake and gain (RIG), and Kleiber ratio (KR), using data from 2,288 American mink (for HW and HL), and 1,038-1,906 American mink (for other traits). Significance (P < 0.05) of fixed effects (farm, sex, and color-type), a covariate (age of animal), and random effects (additive genetic, maternal, and common litter) were evaluated through univariate models implemented in ASReml-R version 4. Genetic parameters were estimated via fitting a set of bivariate models using ASReml-R version 4. Estimates of heritabilities (±SE) were 0.28±0.06, 0.23±0.06, 0.28±0.10, 0.27±0.11, 0.25±0.09, 0.26±0.09, 0.20±0.09, 0.23±0.09, 0.21±0.10, 0.25±0.10, and 0.26±0.10 for HW, HL, FBL, FBW, ADG, DFI, FCR, RFI, RG, RIG, and KR, respectively. RIG had favorable genetic correlations with DFI (-0.62±0.24) and ADG (0.58±0.21), and non-significant (P > 0.05) genetic correlations with FBW (0.14±0.31) and FBL (-0.15±0.31). These results revealed that RIG might be superior trait as it guarantees reduced feed intake with faster-growing mink yet with no negative impacts on body weight and length. In addition, the strong positive genetic correlations (±SE) between KR with component traits (0.88±0.11 with FBW; 0.68±0.17 with FBL; and 0.97±0.02 with ADG) suggested KR as an applicable indirect measure of FE for improvement of component traits as it did not require the individual feed intake to be measured. Overall, our results confirmed the possibility of including FE traits in mink breeding programs to effectively select feed-efficient animals.

Investigating SARS-CoV-2 Susceptibility in Animal Species: A Scoping Review

In the early stages of response to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, it was imperative for researchers to rapidly determine what animal species may be susceptible to the virus, under low knowledge and high uncertainty conditions. In this scoping review, the animal species being evaluated for SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility, the methods used to evaluate susceptibility, and comparing the evaluations between different studies were conducted. Using the PRISMA-ScR methodology, publications and reports from peer-reviewed and gray literature sources were collected from databases, Google Scholar, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), snowballing, and recommendations from experts. Inclusion and relevance criteria were applied, and information was subsequently extracted, categorized, summarized, and analyzed. Ninety seven sources (publications and reports) were identified which investigated 649 animal species from eight different classes: Mammalia, Aves, Actinopterygii, Reptilia, Amphibia, Insecta, Chondrichthyes, and Coelacanthimorpha. Sources used four different methods to evaluate susceptibility, in silico, in vitro, in vivo, and epidemiological analysis. Along with the different methods, how each source described "susceptibility" and evaluated the susceptibility of different animal species to SARS-CoV-2 varied, with conflicting susceptibility evaluations evident between different sources. Early in the pandemic, in silico methods were used the most to predict animal species susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 and helped guide more costly and intensive studies using in vivo or epidemiological analyses. However, the limitations of all methods must be recognized, and evaluations made by in silico and in vitro should be re-evaluated when more information becomes available, such as demonstrated susceptibility through in vivo and epidemiological analysis.

The past, current and future epidemiological dynamic of SARS-CoV-2

SARS-CoV-2, the agent of the COVID-19 pandemic, emerged in late 2019 in China, and rapidly spread throughout the world to reach all continents. As the virus expanded in its novel human host, viral lineages diversified through the accumulation of around two mutations a month on average. Different viral lineages have replaced each other since the start of the pandemic, with the most successful Alpha, Delta and Omicron variants of concern (VoCs) sequentially sweeping through the world to reach high global prevalence. Neither Alpha nor Delta was characterized by strong immune escape, with their success coming mainly from their higher transmissibility. Omicron is far more prone to immune evasion and spread primarily due to its increased ability to (re-)infect hosts with prior immunity. As host immunity reaches high levels globally through vaccination and prior infection, the epidemic is expected to transition from a pandemic regime to an endemic one where seasonality and waning host immunization are anticipated to become the primary forces shaping future SARS-CoV-2 lineage dynamics. In this review, we consider a body of evidence on the origins, host tropism, epidemiology, genomic and immunogenetic evolution of SARS-CoV-2 including an assessment of other coronaviruses infecting humans. Considering what is known so far, we conclude by delineating scenarios for the future dynamic of SARS-CoV-2, ranging from the good-circulation of a fifth endemic 'common cold' coronavirus of potentially low virulence, the bad-a situation roughly comparable with seasonal flu, and the ugly-extensive diversification into serotypes with long-term high-level endemicity.

One Health response to SARS-CoV-2-associated risk from mink farming in British Columbia, Canada, October 2020 to October 2021

Background

Mink farms are susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreaks and carry an associated risk of novel SARS-CoV-2 variant emergence and non-human reservoir creation. In Denmark, control measures were insufficient to prevent onward transmission of a mink-associated variant, contributing to the nation-wide culling of farmed mink. To date, British Columbia (BC) is the only Canadian province to report mink farm SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks. The objective of this study is to describe BC's One Health response to SARS-CoV-2-associated risk from mink farming, its outcomes, and insights from implementation.

Methods

The detection of two mink farm outbreaks in December 2020 catalyzed BC's risk mitigation response for both infected and uninfected farms, including the following: farm inspections and quarantines; Public Health Orders mandating mink mortality surveillance, enhanced personal protective equipment, biosafety measures and worker coronavirus disease 2019 vaccination, at-a-minimum weekly worker viral testing, and wildlife surveillance.

Results

A One Health approach enabled a timely, evidence-informed and coordinated response as the situation evolved, including the use of various legislative powers, consistent messaging and combined human and mink phylogenetic analysis. Ongoing mink and worker surveillance detected asymptomatic/subclinical infections and facilitated rapid isolation/quarantine to minimize onward transmission. Voluntary testing and mandatory vaccination for workers were acceptable to industry; enhanced personal protective equipment requirements were challenging. Regular farm inspections helped to assess and improve compliance.

Conclusion

British Columbia's One Health response reduced the risk of additional outbreaks, viral evolution and reservoir development; however, a third outbreak was detected in May 2021 despite implemented measures, and long-term sustainability of interventions proved challenging for both industry and governmental agencies involved.

Assessing the risk of human-to-wildlife pathogen transmission for conservation and public health

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has led to increased concern over transmission of pathogens from humans to animals, and its potential to threaten conservation and public health. To assess this threat, we reviewed published evidence of human-to-wildlife transmission events, with a focus on how such events could threaten animal and human health. We identified 97 verified examples, involving a wide range of pathogens; however, reported hosts were mostly non-human primates or large, long-lived captive animals. Relatively few documented examples resulted in morbidity and mortality, and very few led to maintenance of a human pathogen in a new reservoir or subsequent "secondary spillover" back into humans. We discuss limitations in the literature surrounding these phenomena, including strong evidence of sampling bias towards non-human primates and human-proximate mammals and the possibility of systematic bias against reporting human parasites in wildlife, both of which limit our ability to assess the risk of human-to-wildlife pathogen transmission. We outline how researchers can collect experimental and observational evidence that will expand our capacity for risk assessment for human-to-wildlife pathogen transmission.

Experimental Infection of Mink with SARS-COV-2 Omicron Variant and Subsequent Clinical Disease

We report an experimental infection of American mink with SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant and show that mink remain positive for viral RNA for days, experience clinical signs and histopathologic changes, and transmit the virus to uninfected recipients. Preparedness is crucial to avoid spread among mink and spillover to human populations.

The Finding of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) in a Wild Eurasian River Otter (Lutra lutra) Highlights the Need for Viral Surveillance in Wild Mustelids

Animals have been involved in the three known outbreaks of severe respiratory syndromes due to coronaviruses (years 2005, 2012, and 2019). The pandemic nature of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak increases the likelihood of infection from humans of susceptible animal species that, thus, could become secondary viral hosts and even disease reservoirs. We present evidence of spillover infection of wild mustelids by reporting the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in a Eurasian river otter found near a water reservoir in the Valencian Community (Spain). We detected the virus using two different commercial RTqPCR assays on RNA extracted from the nasopharynx (swabbing) and from lung tissue and mediastinal lymph node homogenates. The corresponding samples from two additional otters from distant sites tested negative in identical assays. The diagnosis in the positive otter was confirmed by two-tube RT-PCR assay in which RNA was first retrotranscribed, and then specific regions of the spike (S), nucleocapsid (N), and ORF10 genes were separately amplified from the produced cDNA, followed by electrophoretic visualization and Sanger sequencing. The sequences of the amplified products revealed some non-synonymous changes in the N and ORF10 partial sequences, relative to the consensus sequence. These changes, identified already in human patient samples, point to human origin of the virus, although their specific combination was unique. These findings, together with our previous report of SARS-CoV-2 infection of feral American mink, highlight the need for SARS-CoV-2 surveillance of wild or feral mustelids to evaluate the risk that these animals could become SARS-CoV-2 reservoirs.

Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in urban stormwater: An environmental reservoir and potential interface between human and animal sources

While wastewater has been found to harbor SARS-CoV-2, the persistence of SARSCoV-2 in stormwater and potential transmission is poorly understood. It is plausible that the virus is detectable in stormwater samples where human-originated fecal contamination may have occurred from sources like sanitary sewer overflows, leaky wastewater pipes, and non-human animal waste. Because of these potential contamination pathways, it is possible that stormwater could serve as an environmental reservoir and transmission pathway for SARS-CoV-2. The objectives of this study are: 1) determine whether the presence of SARS-CoV-2 could be detected in stormwater via RT-ddPCR (reverse transcription-digital droplet PCR); 2) quantify human-specific fecal contamination using microbial source tracking; and 3) examine whether rainfall characteristics influence virus concentrations. To accomplish these objectives, we investigated whether SARS-CoV-2 could be detected from 10 storm sewer outfalls each draining a single, dominant land use in Columbus, Xenia, and Springboro, Ohio. Of the 25 samples collected in 2020, at minimum one SARS-CoV-2 target gene (N2 [US-CDC and CN-CDC], and E) was detected in 22 samples (88%). A single significant correlation (p = 0.001), between antecedent dry period and the USCDC N2 gene, was found between target gene concentrations and rainfall characteristics. Grouped by city, two significant relationships emerged showing cities had different levels of the SARS-CoV-2 E gene. Given the differences in scale, the county-level COVID-19 confirmed cases COVID-19 rates were not significantly correlated with stormwater outfall-scale SARS-CoV-2 gene concentrations. Countywide COVID-19 data did not accurately portray neighborhood-scale confirmed COVID-19 case rates. Potential hazards may arise when human fecal contamination is present in stormwater and facilitates future investigation on the threat of viral outbreaks via surfaces waters where fecal contamination may have occurred. Future studies should investigate whether humans are able to contract SARS-CoV-2 from surface waters and the factors that may affect viral longevity and transmission.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging white-tailed deer

Humans have infected a wide range of animals with SARS-CoV-21-5, but the establishment of a new natural animal reservoir has not been observed. Here we document that free-ranging white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) are highly susceptible to infection with SARS-CoV-2, are exposed to multiple SARS-CoV-2 variants from humans and are capable of sustaining transmission in nature. Using real-time PCR with reverse transcription, we detected SARS-CoV-2 in more than one-third (129 out of 360, 35.8%) of nasal swabs obtained from O. virginianus in northeast Ohio in the USA during January to March 2021. Deer in six locations were infected with three SARS-CoV-2 lineages (B.1.2, B.1.582 and B.1.596). The B.1.2 viruses, dominant in humans in Ohio at the time, infected deer in four locations. We detected probable deer-to-deer transmission of B.1.2, B.1.582 and B.1.596 viruses, enabling the virus to acquire amino acid substitutions in the spike protein (including the receptor-binding domain) and ORF1 that are observed infrequently in humans. No spillback to humans was observed, but these findings demonstrate that SARS-CoV-2 viruses have been transmitted in wildlife in the USA, potentially opening new pathways for evolution. There is an urgent need to establish comprehensive 'One Health' programmes to monitor the environment, deer and other wildlife hosts globally.

Distribution of introduced American mink in the Northern Apennine area (Central Italy)

The American mink Neovison vison is a widespread alien carnivore in Europe due to escapes from fur farms through this continent. Impacts by naturalized mink include competition with native species and predation of crayfish and small vertebrates. Therefore, an updated monitoring of mink distribution is required to design management plans. The American mink has been reported with an established population in North-Eastern Italy, in Sardinia, and two small nuclei respectively in the Central and in the Northern Apennine ridge. Available information for the latter dates back to early 1990s. In this note, we described the range expansion of the American mink population in the Northern Apennine ridge and we estimate the current distribution range and the extent of occurrence by using data collected from 2006 to 2021 through the Minimum Convex Polygon (MCP). We compared the current distribution range with that of 1990s. The American mink showed a remarkable range increase since its first escape in the Northern Apennines, thus requiring rapid actions to limit impacts on native biodiversity.

Animal models for SARS-CoV-2 infection and pathology

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the etiology of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Current variants including Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and Lambda increase the capacity of infection and transmission of SARS-CoV-2, which might disable the in-used therapies and vaccines. The COVID-19 has now put an enormous strain on health care system all over the world. Therefore, the development of animal models that can capture characteristics and immune responses observed in COVID-19 patients is urgently needed. Appropriate models could accelerate the testing of therapeutic drugs and vaccines against SARS-CoV-2. In this review, we aim to summarize the current animal models for SARS-CoV-2 infection, including mice, hamsters, nonhuman primates, and ferrets, and discuss the details of transmission, pathology, and immunology induced by SARS-CoV-2 in these animal models. We hope this could throw light to the increased usefulness in fundamental studies of COVID-19 and the preclinical analysis of vaccines and therapeutic agents.

Surveillance and control of SARS-CoV-2 in mustelids: An evolutionary perspective

The relevance of mustelids in SARS-CoV-2 transmission has become increasingly evident. Alongside experimental demonstration of airborne transmission among ferrets, the major animal model for human respiratory diseases, transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within- and/or between-commercial mink farms has occurred and continues to occur. The number of mink reared for the luxury fur trade is approximately 60.5 million, across 36 mustelid-farming countries. By July 2021, SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks have been reported in 12 of these countries, at 412 European and 20 North American mink farms. Reverse zoonotic transmission events (from humans to mink) have introduced the virus to farms with subsequent extensive mink-to-mink transmission as well as further zoonotic (mink-to-human) transmission events generating cases among both farm workers and the broader community. Overcrowded housing conditions inherent within intensive mink farms, often combined with poor sanitation and welfare, both guarantee spread of SARS-CoV-2 and facilitate opportunities for viral variants, thereby effectively representing biotic hubs for viral transmission and evolution of virulence. Adequate preventative, surveillance and control measures within the mink industry are imperative both for the control of the current global pandemic and to mitigate against future outbreaks.

Adaptation, spread and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed minks and associated humans in the Netherlands

In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (April 2020), SARS-CoV-2 was detected in farmed minks and genomic sequencing was performed on mink farms and farm personnel. Here, we describe the outbreak and use sequence data with Bayesian phylodynamic methods to explore SARS-CoV-2 transmission in minks and humans on farms. High number of farm infections (68/126) in minks and farm workers (>50% of farms) were detected, with limited community spread. Three of five initial introductions of SARS-CoV-2 led to subsequent spread between mink farms until November 2020. Viruses belonging to the largest cluster acquired an amino acid substitution in the receptor binding domain of the Spike protein (position 486), evolved faster and spread longer and more widely. Movement of people and distance between farms were statistically significant predictors of virus dispersal between farms. Our study provides novel insights into SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms and highlights the importance of combining genetic information with epidemiological information when investigating outbreaks at the animal-human interface.

SARS-CoV-2 was detected in mink farms in the Netherlands in the first wave of the pandemic with evidence of human-to-mink and mink-to-human transmission. Here, the authors investigate this outbreak using phylodynamic analysis and show that personnel links and spatial proximity are predictors of transmission between farms.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging white-tailed deer ( Odocoileus virginianus )

Human-to-animal spillover of SARS-CoV-2 virus has occurred in a wide range of animals, but thus far, the establishment of a new natural animal reservoir has not been detected. Here, we detected SARS-CoV-2 virus using rRT-PCR in 129 out of 360 (35.8%) free-ranging white-tailed deer ( Odocoileus virginianus ) from northeast Ohio (USA) sampled between January-March 2021. Deer in 6 locations were infected with at least 3 lineages of SARS-CoV-2 (B.1.2, B.1.596, B.1.582). The B.1.2 viruses, dominant in Ohio at the time, spilled over multiple times into deer populations in different locations. Deer-to-deer transmission may have occurred in three locations. The establishment of a natural reservoir of SARS-CoV-2 in white-tailed deer could facilitate divergent evolutionary trajectories and future spillback to humans, further complicating long-term COVID-19 control strategies.

ONE-SENTENCE SUMMARY

A significant proportion of SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging US white-tailed deer reveals a potential new reservoir.

Epidemiological profiling of SARS-CoV-2 with focus on one-health approaches in mitigating COVID-19 pandemic

Of the 1,415 human pathogens identified, 175 are responsible for causing emerging diseases, 132 are zoonotic and majority of the diseases are categorized as emerging or re-emerging. Emerging novel Coronavirus (COVID- 19) is one of them, and it is responsible for causing social and economically critical disease in both humans and animals. This review presents the understanding of epidemiological characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic related to host, agent, and the environment with transmission and spread of the disease for better prevention of the COVID-19. The inclination of the viruses to spillover between different species and determining the number of the reservoir of coronaviruses in an entirely new host to create infection is of emerging importance. The understanding of disease patterns will potentiate our expertise to alert how, when, and where the potential epidemic will occur. One health approach involves co-operation from all the sectors, including healthcare (medical and veterinary), environmental, pharmaceutical, educational, research, police, and administration, to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and reduce the public health threat.

Natural and Experimental SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Domestic and Wild Animals

SARS-CoV-2 is the etiological agent responsible for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to spread with devastating effects on global health and socioeconomics. The susceptibility of domestic and wild animal species to infection is a critical facet of SARS-CoV-2 ecology, since reverse zoonotic spillover events resulting in SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in animal populations could result in the establishment of new virus reservoirs. Adaptive mutations in the virus to new animal species could also complicate ongoing mitigation strategies to combat SARS-CoV-2. In addition, animal species susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection are essential as standardized preclinical models for the development and efficacy testing of vaccines and therapeutics. In this review, we summarize the current findings regarding the susceptibility of different domestic and wild animal species to experimental SARS-CoV-2 infection and provide detailed descriptions of the clinical disease and transmissibility in these animals. In addition, we outline the documented natural infections in animals that have occurred at the human-animal interface. A comprehensive understanding of animal susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 is crucial to inform public health, veterinary, and agricultural systems, and to guide environmental policies.

Lack of Evidence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Spillover in Free-Living Neotropical Non-Human Primates, Brazil

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the agent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is responsible for the worst pandemic of the 21st century. Like all human coronaviruses, SARS-CoV-2 originated in a wildlife reservoir, most likely from bats. As SARS-CoV-2 has spread across the globe in humans, it has spilled over to infect a variety of non-human animal species in domestic, farm, and zoo settings. Additionally, a broad range of species, including one neotropical monkey, have proven to be susceptible to experimental infection with SARS-CoV-2. Together, these findings raise the specter of establishment of novel enzootic cycles of SARS-CoV-2. To assess the potential exposure of free-living non-human primates to SARS-CoV-2, we sampled 60 neotropical monkeys living in proximity to Manaus and São José do Rio Preto, two hotspots for COVID-19 in Brazil. Our molecular and serological tests detected no evidence of SAR-CoV-2 infection among these populations. While this result is reassuring, sustained surveillance efforts of wildlife living in close association with human populations is warranted, given the stochastic nature of spillover events and the enormous implications of SARS-CoV-2 spillover for human health.

Evolutionary Dynamics and Epidemiology of Endemic and Emerging Coronaviruses in Humans, Domestic Animals, and Wildlife

Diverse coronavirus (CoV) strains can infect both humans and animals and produce various diseases. CoVs have caused three epidemics and pandemics in the last two decades, and caused a severe impact on public health and the global economy. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to understand the emergence and evolution of endemic and emerging CoV diversity in humans and animals. For diverse bird species, the Infectious Bronchitis Virus is a significant one, whereas feline enteric and canine coronavirus, recombined to produce feline infectious peritonitis virus, infects wild cats. Bovine and canine CoVs have ancestral relationships, while porcine CoVs, especially SADS-CoV, can cross species barriers. Bats are considered as the natural host of diverse strains of alpha and beta coronaviruses. Though MERS-CoV is significant for both camels and humans, humans are nonetheless affected more severely. MERS-CoV cases have been reported mainly in the Arabic peninsula since 2012. To date, seven CoV strains have infected humans, all descended from animals. The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronaviruses (SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2) are presumed to be originated in Rhinolopoid bats that severely infect humans with spillover to multiple domestic and wild animals. Emerging alpha and delta variants of SARS-CoV-2 were detected in pets and wild animals. Still, the intermediate hosts and all susceptible animal species remain unknown. SARS-CoV-2 might not be the last CoV to cross the species barrier. Hence, we recommend developing a universal CoV vaccine for humans so that any future outbreak can be prevented effectively. Furthermore, a One Health approach coronavirus surveillance should be implemented at human-animal interfaces to detect novel coronaviruses before emerging to humans and to prevent future epidemics and pandemics.

Serological Detection of SARS-CoV-2 Antibodies in Naturally-Infected Mink and Other Experimentally-Infected Animals

The recent emergence of SARS-CoV-2 in humans from a yet unidentified animal reservoir and the capacity of the virus to naturally infect pets, farmed animals and potentially wild animals has highlighted the need for serological surveillance tools. In this study, the luciferase immunoprecipitation systems (LIPS), employing the spike (S) and nucleocapsid proteins (N) of SARS-CoV-2, was used to examine the suitability of the assay for antibody detection in different animal species. Sera from SARS-CoV-2 naturally-infected mink (n = 77), SARS-CoV-2 experimentally-infected ferrets, fruit bats and hamsters and a rabbit vaccinated with a purified spike protein were examined for antibodies using the SARS-CoV-2 N and/or S proteins. From comparison with the known neutralization status of the serum samples, statistical analyses including calculation of the Spearman rank-order-correlation coefficient and Cohen's kappa agreement were used to interpret the antibody results and diagnostic performance. The LIPS immunoassay robustly detected the presence of viral antibodies in naturally infected SARS-CoV-2 mink, experimentally infected ferrets, fruit bats and hamsters as well as in an immunized rabbit. For the SARS-CoV-2-LIPS-S assay, there was a good level of discrimination between the positive and negative samples for each of the five species tested with 100% agreement with the virus neutralization results. In contrast, the SARS-CoV-2-LIPS-N assay did not consistently differentiate between SARS-CoV-2 positive and negative sera. This study demonstrates the suitability of the SARS-CoV-2-LIPS-S assay for the sero-surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 infection in a range of animal species.

[Covid-19 and the animal world, from a still mysterious origin towards an always unpredictable future]

Bien que l’émergence de la Covid-19 en Chine n’ait pas été clairement élucidée, l’hypothèse d’une origine animale reste la plus probable. Elle est étayée par la présence de la chauve-souris fer à cheval suspectée d’être le progéniteur du SARS-CoV-2 et par la raréfaction de la viande de porc, due à la peste porcine africaine, détournant les consommateurs vers des animaux exotiques d’élevage vendus sur les marchés. Au cours de cette pandémie, plusieurs espèces animales ont été atteintes par le SARS-CoV-2. Des cas sporadiques ont d’abord été rapportés chez des animaux de compagnie (chiens et chats) contaminés par leurs propriétaires, puis des grands félins et des gorilles contaminés dans des zoos par leurs soigneurs. La transmission la plus importante de l’Homme à l’animal a eu lieu dans les élevages de visons, surtout aux Pays-Bas et au Danemark, nécessitant l’euthanasie de plusieurs millions d’animaux, les visons ayant, à leur tour, contaminé des hommes et des chats errants. L’étude des transmissions naturelles ou expérimentales du SARS-CoV-2 a permis d’identifier les espèces animales les plus réceptives : les visons d’Amérique et les chiens viverrins, et dans une moindre mesure les chats errants, qui pourraient devenir un réservoir animal en raison de leur sensibilité à ce virus et de leur prolificité. La Commission européenne a décidé le 17 mai 2021 de renforcer la surveillance des infections par le SARS-CoV-2 chez les visons et d’autres mustélidés, ainsi que chez des chiens viverrins, en soulignant que l’évaluation épidémiologique du risque que présente l’apparition du SARS-CoV-2 chez ces espèces sensibles était une priorité de santé publique.