Is political anxiety different than general anxiety?

Recently, there has been growing interest in the concept of political anxiety. One important question that remains unanswered is whether political anxiety is just a symptom of general anxiety-that those reporting anxiety tied to politics are the same individuals who would already score highly on measures of general anxiety. Using survey data collected in 2023 (N = 436), we find that measures of political and generalized anxiety do not appear to be tapping into a single underlying construct. In addition, the systematic correlates of these measures identified by previous literature are not equivalent predictors of the different types of anxiety. Politics seems to be a source of apprehensiveness and worry that affects individuals who are not necessarily suffering from general anxiety.

Suspicious Minds: Unexpected Election Outcomes, Perceived Electoral Integrity and Satisfaction With Democracy in American Presidential Elections

A great amount of research has noted the existence of a gap between election winners and losers in relation to perceptions of electoral fairness and satisfaction with democracy. One aspect of the winner-loser gap that has been overlooked is the impact of citizens' expectations about election outcomes on these attitudes. More precisely, how do citizens react to unexpected defeats and victories? Are individuals on the losing side less critical of the electoral process or dissatisfied with democracy when they recognize beforehand that their favourite party or candidate was likely to be defeated? Does experiencing a surprise victory lead to a boost in perceived electoral integrity or democratic satisfaction? To answer these questions, I use data from the 1996, 2000, 2004, 2012, 2016 and 2020 ANES. While there is little evidence that expectations exert a major influence on post-election attitudes, outcome unexpectedness seems to have decreased confidence in the vote counting process among losers, independents and even winners in the 2020 election. The results show the considerable influence that fraud claims and conspiracy theories can have on public opinion when elected officials and candidates push a consistent story line of electoral malfeasance and corruption in an effort to denigrate political opponents.

Election-Related Post-Traumatic Stress: Evidence from the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election

The 2020 U.S. presidential election saw rising political tensions among ordinary voters and political elites, with fears of election violence culminating in the January 6 riot. We hypothesized that the 2020 election might have been traumatic for some voters, producing measurable symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). We also hypothesized that negative sentiment toward the opposing party correlates with PTSD. We measured PTSD using a modified version of the PCL-5, a validated PTSD screener, for 573 individuals from a nationally representative YouGov sample. We modeled the association between affective polarization and PTSD, controlling for political, demographic, and psychological traits. We estimate that 12.5% of American adults (95% CI: 9.2% to 15.9%) experienced election-related PTSD, far higher than the annual PTSD prevalence of 3.5%. Additionally, negativity toward opposing partisans correlated with PTSD symptoms. These findings highlight a potential need to support Americans affected by election-related trauma.

Dark defaults: How choice architecture steers political campaign donations

In the months before the 2020 U.S. election, several political campaign websites added prechecked boxes (defaults), automatically making all donations into recurring weekly contributions unless donors unchecked them. Since these changes occurred at different times for different campaigns, we use a staggered difference-in-differences design to measure the causal effects of defaults on donors' behavior. We estimate that defaults increased campaign donations by over $43 million while increasing requested refunds by almost $3 million. The weekly default only impacted weekly recurring donations, and not other donations, suggesting that donors may not have intended to make weekly donations. The longer defaults were displayed, the more money campaigns raised through weekly donations. Donors did not compensate by changing the amount they donated. We found that the default had a larger impact on smaller donors and on donors who had no prior experience with defaults, causing them to start more chains and donate a larger proportion of their money through weekly recurring donations.

Electoral Democracy and Working-Age Mortality

Policy Points The erosion of electoral democracy in the United States in recent decades may have contributed to the high and rising working-age mortality rates, which predate the COVID-19 pandemic. Eroding electoral democracy in a US state was associated with higher working-age mortality from homicide, suicide, and especially from drug poisoning and infectious disease. State and federal efforts to strengthen electoral democracy, such as banning partisan gerrymandering, improving voter enfranchisement, and reforming campaign finance laws, could potentially avert thousands of deaths each year among working-age adults.

CONTEXT

Working-age mortality rates are high and rising in the United States, an alarming fact that predates the COVID-19 pandemic. Although several reasons for the high and rising rates have been hypothesized, the potential role of democratic erosion has been overlooked. This study examined the association between electoral democracy and working-age mortality and assessed how economic, behavioral, and social factors may have contributed to it.

METHODS

We used the State Democracy Index (SDI), an annual summary of each state's electoral democracy from 2000 to 2018. We merged the SDI with annual age-adjusted mortality rates for adults 25-64 years in each state. Models estimated the association between the SDI and working-age mortality (from all causes and six specific causes) within states, adjusting for political party control, safety net generosity, union coverage, immigrant population, and stable characteristics of states. We assessed whether economic (income, unemployment), behavioral (alcohol consumption, sleep), and social (marriage, violent crime, incarceration) factors accounted for the association.

FINDINGS

Increasing electoral democracy in a state from a moderate level (defined as the third quintile of the SDI distribution) to a high level (defined as the fifth quintile) was associated with an estimated 3.2% and 2.7% lower mortality rate among working-age men and women, respectively, over the next year. Increasing electoral democracy in all states from the third to the fifth quintile of the SDI distribution may have resulted in 20,408 fewer working-age deaths in 2019. The democracy-mortality association mainly reflected social factors and, to a lesser extent, health behaviors. Increasing electoral democracy in a state was mostly strongly associated with lower mortality from drug poisoning and infectious diseases, followed by reductions in homicide and suicide.

CONCLUSIONS

Erosion of electoral democracy is a threat to population health. This study adds to growing evidence that electoral democracy and population health are inextricably linked.

Part of the gender gap in voting for Democrats arises because a higher proportion of women than men voters are Black

Women voted for the Democratic candidate more than men did in each US presidential election since 1980. We show that part of the gender gap stems from the fact that a higher proportion of women than men voters are Black, and Black voters overwhelmingly choose Democratic candidates. Past research shows that Black men have especially high rates of death, incarceration, and disenfranchisement due to criminal convictions. These disparities reduce the share of men voters who are Black. We show that the gender difference in racial composition explains 24% of the gender gap in voting Democratic. The gender gap in voting Democratic is especially large among those who are never-married, and, among them, the differing racial composition of men and women voters is more impactful than in the population at large, explaining 43% of the gender gap. We consider an alternative hypothesis that income differences between single men and women explain the gender gap in voting, but our analysis leads us to reject it. Although unmarried women are poorer than unmarried men, and lower-income voters vote slightly more Democratic, the latter difference is too small for income to explain much of the gender gap in voting. In short, the large gender gap among unmarried voters is not a reflection of the lower incomes of women's households but does reflect the fact that women voters are disproportionately Black. We used the General Social Survey as the data source for the analysis, then replicated results with the American National Election Survey data.

Who benefits from voter identification laws?

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, many American state governments implemented voter identification (ID) laws for elections held in their states. These laws, which commonly mandate photo ID and/or require significant effort by voters lacking ID, sparked an ongoing national debate over the tension between election security and access in a democratic society. The laws' proponents-primarily politicians in the Republican Party-claim that they prevent voter fraud, while Democratic opponents denounce the disproportionate burden they place on historically disadvantaged groups such as the poor and people of color. While these positions may reflect sincerely held beliefs, they also align with the political parties' rational electoral strategies because the groups most likely to be disenfranchised by the laws tend to support Democratic candidates. Are these partisan views on the impact of voter ID correct? Existing research focuses on how voter ID laws affect voter turnout and fraud. But the extent to which they produce observable electoral benefits for Republican candidates and/or penalize Democrats remains an open question. We examine how voter ID impacts the parties' electoral fortunes in races at the state level (state legislatures and governorships) and federal level (United States Congress and president) during 2003 to 2020. Our results suggest negligible average effects but with some heterogeneity over time. The first laws implemented produced a Democratic advantage, which weakened to near zero after 2012. We conclude that voter ID requirements motivate and mobilize supporters of both parties, ultimately mitigating their anticipated effects on election results.

"When the political becomes personal": evaluation of an elected president, election distress, and college students' psychological well-being

Objective: Although emerging adults' civic engagement is generally associated with positive outcomes, concerns about an elected candidate's leadership ability and the implications of administrative turnover may negatively impact youths' well-being. Using longitudinal data collected during the 2016 election cycle, the current study examined whether negative evaluation of a presidential candidate-who is eventually elected-may be indirectly associated with college students' psychological well-being due to increased election distress.Participants: 286 college-attending emerging adults (Mage= 20, SDage = 1.40) participated in the current study.Methods: Path models linking evaluation of Trump's leadership ability (pre-election) to psychological well-being (approx. 100 days in office) via election distress (presidential inauguration) were computed.Results: Reporting lower confidence in Trump's leadership ability prior to the election was associated with greater election distress 3 months post-election, and in turn, poorer psychological well-being 6 months post-election.Conclusion: Findings underscore the importance of centering college students' well-being within a broader sociopolitical context.

Election cycles and global religious intolerance

Mass elections are key mechanisms for collective decision-making. But they are also blamed for creating intergroup enmity, particularly while they are underway; politicians use polarizing campaign strategies, and losing sides feel resentful and marginalized after results are announced. I investigate the impact of election proximity-that is, closeness to elections in time-on social cleavages related to religion, a salient form of group identity worldwide. Integrating data from ∼1.2 million respondents across 25 cross-country survey series, I find no evidence that people interviewed shortly before or after national elections are more likely to express negative attitudes toward religious outgroups than those interviewed at other times. Subgroup analysis reveals little heterogeneity, including by levels of political competition. Generalized social trust, too, is unaffected by election calendars. Elections may not pose as great a risk to social cohesion as is commonly feared.

The political system through a partisan lens: Within-person changes in support for political parties precede political system attitudes

Although political party support and attitudes towards the political system are closely related, the temporal ordering of these associations is unclear. Indeed, prior research identifies both partisan-led change in system attitudes and system attitude-led change in party support. Using a ten-year (2010-2020) national probability sample of New Zealand adults (N = 66,359), we test these associations by modelling the within-person cross-lagged effects between conservative and liberal party support, and political system justification. During conservative-led governments, increases in conservative party support predicted increases in political system justification more strongly than vice versa. The 2017 shift to a liberal-led government was met with an immediate reversal of the effects of party support on system justification, but the effect of system justification on party support took a full year to reverse. These results demonstrate people's perceptions of the fairness of the political system depend on their support for the party in power.

Immigrants Serving in Local Government: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Factors Affecting Candidacy and Election

Descriptive representation, the extent to which politicians reflect the descriptive characteristics (e.g., ethnicity or gender) of their constituents, has been studied at various scales since it was first introduced in Hanna Pitkin's seminal work several decades ago. In recent years, scholars have also begun to investigate immigrant representation in politics, including at the local, state, and national levels of government. This study evaluates the current research on the factors affecting the election of immigrant candidates to municipal government. In addressing the lack of data-driven reviews in this type of research, the paper employs a scoping review methodological framework. Fifty-six distinct factors are identified as important for immigrants' electoral fortunes. The factors are classified under: Macro-level electoral structures and situational elements, meso-level immigrant group dynamics, and micro-level individual candidate characteristics. The most salient factors are elaborated on, together with a discussion on policy implications and future potential areas of inquiry.

Conceptualizing Municipal Elections: The Case of Toronto 2018

Since Angus Campbell and colleagues first introduced the "levels of conceptualization" (LoC) framework as a measure of political sophistication, a number of scholars have applied the approach to subsequent American national elections. In this study, we present the first application of the LoC framework to a municipal election, and focus upon the 2018 Toronto mayoral race. After describing the method and data we use to adapt the framework to this new context, we replicate previous analyses, and find that LoC is related to local voter turnout and several measures of political sophistication. We then consider the question of whether major candidates were discussed at different LoC, and if their supporters view local politics at different LoC. We conclude by making the case that the LoC framework is helpful for resolving the debate over whether local politics are ideological or managerial in nature.

Americans discount the effect of friction on voter turnout

Whether or not someone turns out to vote depends on their beliefs (such as partisanship or sense of civic duty) and on friction-external barriers such as long travel distance to the polls. In this exploratory study, we tested whether people underestimate the effect of friction on turnout and overestimate the effect of beliefs. We surveyed a representative sample of eligible US voters before and after the 2020 election (n = 1,280). Participants' perceptions consistently underemphasized friction and overemphasized beliefs (mean d = 0.94). In participants' open-text explanations, 91% of participants listed beliefs, compared with just 12% that listed friction. In contrast, turnout was shaped by beliefs only slightly more than friction. The actual belief-friction difference was about one-fourth the size of participants' perceptions (d = 0.24). This bias emerged across a range of survey measures (open- and close-ended; other- and self-judgments) and was implicated in downstream consequences such as support for friction-imposing policies and failing to plan one's vote.

Online engagement with 2020 election misinformation and turnout in the 2021 Georgia runoff election

Following the 2020 general election, Republican elected officials, including then-President Donald Trump, promoted conspiracy theories claiming that Joe Biden's close victory in Georgia was fraudulent. Such conspiratorial claims could implicate participation in the Georgia Senate runoff election in different ways-signaling that voting doesn't matter, distracting from ongoing campaigns, stoking political anger at out-partisans, or providing rationalizations for (lack of) enthusiasm for voting during a transfer of power. Here, we evaluate the possibility of any on-average relationship with turnout by combining behavioral measures of engagement with election conspiracies online and administrative data on voter turnout for 40,000 Twitter users registered to vote in Georgia. We find small, limited associations. Liking or sharing messages opposed to conspiracy theories was associated with higher turnout than expected in the runoff election, and those who liked or shared tweets promoting fraud-related conspiracy theories were slightly less likely to vote.

Political information consumption and electoral turnout during COVID: the case of the 2020 municipal elections

The effects on political participation of the consumption of political information from traditional and digital media are widely addressed in the literature. However, what happens in times of pandemic when people have other pressing concerns that are likely to receive significant media coverage? Does the consumption of political information—which increases in times of pandemic—mobilize or rather demobilize voters in local elections? By focusing on the two rounds of the French municipal elections in March and June 2020, we explore how the pandemic affected turnout through the consumption of political information distributed by official news media and users on social media during the first peak of the crisis (March 2020) and during the first period of decline in contagion rates (June 2020). Our results show that the association between consumption of political information and participation is detectable but remains less relevant than traditional predictors of turnout such as socio-demographic variables or an interest in politics. Moreover, we show that the strength of the effect of consumption of political information varies according to both the type of election and the type of political information consumption (local or national news, online or offline). Overall, it seems that the pandemic context had little effect on the relations between political information consumption and electoral participation.

Individual Differences in Belief in Fake News about Election Fraud after the 2020 U.S. Election

Fake news is a serious problem because it misinforms people about important issues. The present study examined belief in false headlines about election fraud after the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Belief in election fraud had dangerous consequences, including the deadly insurrection at the U.S. Capitol in January 2021. In the present study, participants rated the truthfulness of true and false headlines about the election, and then completed individual difference measures eight days after the election. Participants with more conservative ideology, greater presidential approval of the outgoing president, greater endorsement of general conspiracy narratives and poorer cognitive reflection demonstrated greater belief in false headlines about election fraud. Additionally, consuming more politically conservative election news was associated with greater belief in false headlines. Identifying the factors related to susceptibility to false claims of election fraud offers a path toward countering the influence of these claims by tailoring interventions aimed at decreasing belief in misinformation and decreasing conspiracy beliefs to those most susceptible.

How "Us" and "Them" Relates to Voting Behavior-Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice

The last decades have seen the emergence of a divide pitting the new left against the far right in advanced democracies. We study how this universalism-particularism divide is crystallizing into a full-blown cleavage, complete with structural, political and identity elements. So far, little research exists on the identities that voters themselves perceive as relevant for drawing in- and out-group boundaries along this divide. Based on an original survey from Switzerland, a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment, we show that voters' "objective" socio-demographic characteristics relate to distinctive, primarily culturally connoted identities. We then inquire into the degree to which these group identities have been politicized, that is, whether they divide new left and far right voters. Our results strongly suggest that the universalism-particularism "cleavage" not only bundles issues, but shapes how people think about who they are and where they stand in a group conflict that meshes economics and culture.

Men and women candidates are similarly persistent after losing elections

Are women more likely to quit politics after losing their first race than men? Women's first-time candidacies skyrocketed in the wake of the 2016 presidential election. Yet we have little sense of the long-term impact of this surge in women candidates on women's representation writ large: Inexperienced candidates are more likely to lose, and women might be especially discouraged by a loss. This might make the benefits of such a surge in candidacies fleeting. Using a regression discontinuity design and data that feature 212,805 candidates across 22,473 jurisdictions between 1950 and 2018, we find that women who narrowly lose these elections are no more likely to quit politics than men who narrowly lose. Drawing on scholarship on women's lower political ambition, we interpret these findings to mean that women's decision-making differs from men's at the point of entry into politics-not at the point of reentry.

Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms

Democratic stability depends on citizens on the losing side accepting election outcomes. Can rhetoric by political leaders undermine this norm? Using a panel survey experiment, we evaluate the effects of exposure to multiple statements from former president Donald Trump attacking the legitimacy of the 2020 US presidential election. Although exposure to these statements does not measurably affect general support for political violence or belief in democracy, it erodes trust and confidence in elections and increases belief that the election is rigged among people who approve of Trump's job performance. These results suggest that rhetoric from political elites can undermine respect for critical democratic norms among their supporters.

Results from a 2020 field experiment encouraging voting by mail

The ability to cast a mail ballot can safeguard the franchise. However, because there are often additional procedural protections to ensure that a ballot cast in person counts, voting by mail can also jeopardize people’s ability to cast a recorded vote. An experiment carried out during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates both forces. Philadelphia officials randomly sent 46,960 Philadelphia registrants postcards encouraging them to apply to vote by mail in the lead-up to the June 2020 primary election. While the intervention increased the likelihood a registrant cast a mail ballot by 0.4 percentage points (P = 0.017)—or 3%—many of these additional mail ballots counted only because a last-minute policy intervention allowed most mail ballots postmarked by Election Day to count.

Electoral College bias and the 2020 presidential election

Donald Trump's 2016 victory in the Electoral College without leading in the popular vote has led to speculation of a repeat in 2020. If the Democrats were to win the popular vote but by less than a landslide, could they be thwarted from stopping Trump once again? We examine how Electoral College outcomes are conditioned by how states had voted in previous elections. Our simulations suggest that in 2020, the Electoral College bias is likely to again favor the Republicans. However, the expectation is less distortion of the popular will than in 2016. There is even the possibility that if Trump was to win the 2020 popular vote by a slim margin, it could be he who loses the Electoral College.

Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states’ most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.

Sociopolitical stress and acute cardiovascular disease hospitalizations around the 2016 presidential election

Previous research suggests that stressors may trigger the onset of acute cardiovascular disease (CVD) events within hours to days, but there has been limited research around sociopolitical events such as presidential elections. Among adults ≥18 y of age in Kaiser Permanente Southern California, hospitalization rates for acute CVD were compared in the time period immediately prior to and following the 2016 presidential election date. Hospitalization for CVD was defined as an inpatient or emergency department discharge diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction (AMI) or stroke using International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision codes. Rate ratios (RR) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated comparing CVD rates in the 2 d following the 2016 election to rates in the same 2 d of the prior week. In a secondary analysis, AMI and stroke were analyzed separately. The rate of CVD events in the 2 d after the 2016 presidential election (573.14 per 100,000 person-years [PY]) compared to the rate in the window prior to the 2016 election (353.75 per 100,000 PY) was 1.62 times higher (95% CI 1.17, 2.25). Results were similar across sex, age, and race/ethnicity groups. The RRs were similar for AMI (RR 1.67, 95% CI 1.00, 2.76) and stroke (RR 1.59, 95% CI 1.03, 2.44) separately. Transiently heightened cardiovascular risk around the 2016 election may be attributable to sociopolitical stress. Further research is needed to understand the intersection between major sociopolitical events, perceived stress, and acute CVD events.

America's electorate is increasingly polarized along partisan lines about voting by mail during the COVID-19 crisis

Are voters as polarized as political leaders when it comes to their preferences about how to cast their ballots in November 2020 and their policy positions on how elections should be run in light of the COVID-19 outbreak? Prior research has shown little party divide on voting by mail, with nearly equal percentages of voters in both parties choosing to vote this way where it is an option. Has a divide opened up this year in how voters aligned with the Democratic and Republican parties prefer to cast a ballot? We address these questions with two nationally diverse, online surveys fielded from April 8 to 10 and June 11 to 13, of 5,612 and 5,818 eligible voters, respectively, with an embedded experiment providing treated respondents with scientific projections about the COVID-19 outbreak. We find a nearly 10 percentage point difference between Democrats and Republicans in their preference for voting by mail in April, which had doubled in size to nearly 20 percentage points in June. This partisan gap is wider still for those exposed to scientific projections about the pandemic. We also find that support for national legislation requiring states to offer no-excuse absentee ballots has emerged as an increasingly polarized issue.

Humanitarian aid and local power structures: lessons from Haiti's 'shadow disaster'

This paper investigates the confluence of humanitarian aid, centralisation, and politics. The 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti on 12 January 2010 led to more than USD 16 billion in pledges. By contrast, Hurricane Matthew, which made landfall in Haiti on 4 October 2016, stayed in the shadows, attracting about one per cent of the amount. While the earthquake exhibited one face of centralisation, the Category 4 storm laid bare rural vulnerabilities shaped by postcolonial state neglect, and reinforced by the influx of non-governmental organisations in the 'Republic of Port-au-Prince'. The study draws on data from four case studies in two departments to illuminate the legacies of hyper-centralisation in Haiti. Compounding matters, Matthew struck in the middle of an extended election that the international community attempted to control again. The paper argues that disaster assistance and politics are uncomfortably close, while reflecting on the momentary decentralisation of aid after the hurricane and its effectiveness.

Universal vote-by-mail has no impact on partisan turnout or vote share

In response to COVID-19, many scholars and policy makers are urging the United States to expand voting-by-mail programs to safeguard the electoral process, but there are concerns that such a policy could favor one party over the other. We estimate the effects of universal vote-by-mail, a policy under which every voter is mailed a ballot in advance of the election, on partisan election outcomes. We find that universal vote-by-mail does not affect either party’s share of turnout or either party’s vote share. These conclusions support the conventional wisdom of election administration experts and contradict many popular claims in the media. Our results imply that the partisan outcomes of vote-by-mail elections closely resemble in-person elections, at least in normal times.

In response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), many scholars and policy makers are urging the United States to expand voting-by-mail programs to safeguard the electoral process. What are the effects of vote-by-mail? In this paper, we provide a comprehensive design-based analysis of the effect of universal vote-by-mail—a policy under which every voter is mailed a ballot in advance of the election—on electoral outcomes. We collect data from 1996 to 2018 on all three US states that implemented universal vote-by-mail in a staggered fashion across counties, allowing us to use a difference-in-differences design at the county level to estimate causal effects. We find that 1) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to affect either party’s share of turnout, 2) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to increase either party’s vote share, and 3) universal vote-by-mail modestly increases overall average turnout rates, in line with previous estimates. All three conclusions support the conventional wisdom of election administration experts and contradict many popular claims in the media.

The Citizen as Contributor-Letters to the Editor in the Austrian Tabloid Paper Kronen Zeitung (2008-2017)

This paper addresses the subject of letters to the editor as one of the longest standing forums for public discussion and debate by ordinary citizens. To show how the voice of ordinary citizens is presented in letters to the editor during national election campaigns over a period of ten years (2008, 2013 & 2017), we are focusing on the Austrian Kronen Zeitung: A newspaper with an exceptionally high market share of up to 40% during the examination period, a heavy focus on the letters section with three pages per day, and a self-declared willingness to take a stance, especially during election periods. Based on a quantitative content analysis of 530 letters to the editor and 525 articles in the politics section as well as survey data from the Austrian national election study on the political positions of the Kronen Zeitung's readers, we find that letters to the editor in the Kronen Zeitung do not reflect, but complement the articles in the politics section. The tone of the letters is more negative than that of news articles, but the letters closely reflect the readers' political positions, therefore offering identification with the paper.

Institutionalising electoral uncertainty and authoritarian regime survival

Authoritarian incumbents routinely use democratic emulation as a strategy to extend their tenure in power. Yet, there is also evidence that multiparty competition makes electoral authoritarianism more vulnerable to failure. Proceeding from the assumption that the outcomes of authoritarian electoral openings are inherently uncertain, it is argued in this article that the institutionalisation of elections determines whether electoral authoritarianism promotes stability or vulnerability. By 'institutionalisation', it is meant the ability of authoritarian regimes to reduce uncertainty over outcomes as they regularly hold multiparty elections. Using discrete-time event-history models for competing risks, the effects of sequences of multiparty elections on patterns of regime survival and failure in 262 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010 are assessed, conditioned on their degree of competitiveness. The findings suggest that the institutionalisation of electoral uncertainty enhances authoritarian regime survival. However, for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes this entails substantial risk. The first three elections substantially increase the probability of democratisation, with the danger subsequently diminishing. This suggests that convoking multiparty competition is a risky game with potentially high rewards for autocrats who manage to institutionalise elections. Yet, only a small number of authoritarian regimes survive as competitive beyond the first few elections, suggesting that truly competitive authoritarianism is hard to institutionalise. The study thus finds that the question of whether elections are dangerous or stabilising for authoritarianism is dependent on differences between the ability of competitive and hegemonic forms of electoral authoritarianism to reduce electoral uncertainty.

The political dynamics of voter retrospection and disaster responses

Natural hazards not only have socioeconomic ramifications, they also have political repercussions. This paper takes stock of the fast-growing area of research linking disasters triggered by natural hazards to voting behaviour. It is based on the central tenet of voter retrospection: voters place emphasis on past events when making their selection. The study uncovers a great disparity in analysis of electoral outcomes in the wake of disasters, part of which can be explained by the different methodological choices of authors. However, the unpredictability of voting behaviour in the aftermath of disasters also points to the relevance of introducing an intermediate variable when elucidating voter movements. This variable should capture the prevailing political discourses that surround disasters, as these are likely to shape the dynamics of voter retrospection. The paper demonstrates the analytical relevance of such political discourses by contrasting political dynamics in Denmark and Sweden following the Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004.

The Role of Face and Voice Cues in Predicting the Outcome of Student Representative Elections

First impressions formed after seeing someone's face or hearing their voice can affect many social decisions, including voting in political elections. Despite the many studies investigating the independent contribution of face and voice cues to electoral success, their integration is still not well understood. Here, we examine a novel electoral context, student representative ballots, allowing us to test the generalizability of previous studies. We also examine the independent contributions of visual, auditory, and audiovisual information to social judgments of the candidates, and their relationship to election outcomes. Results showed that perceived trustworthiness was the only trait significantly related to election success. These findings contrast with previous reports on the importance of perceived competence using audio or visual cues only in the context of national political elections. The present study highlights the role of real-world context and emphasizes the importance of using ecologically valid stimulus presentation in understanding real-life social judgment.

Survey of Women Physicians' Experience with Elected Leadership Positions

Purpose: Women physicians do not advance in academic promotion or leadership at the same rate as their male counterparts. One factor contributing to academic promotion and advancement is the experience of serving in elected leadership positions. Although >400 women are running for political office in 2018, fewer than a handful are physicians and there has never been a woman physician elected to the Congress. Yet, little is known about women physicians who run for elected positions within their institutions, medical/professional societies, or government. This study sought to examine how women physicians experience elections using a cross-sectional survey of women physicians to gain insight into patterns of reported experiences and perceived barriers to elected leadership positions. Methods: A cross-sectional survey study of 1221 women physicians. Results: 43.8% (N=535) of women physicians ran for an elected office from high school through medical school graduation, in contrast to only 16.7% (N=204) after graduating from medical school. Only 8.5% of women physicians surveyed reported a boss or supervisor encouraged them to run for an elected position. Conclusion: Women physicians are less likely to run for elected positions and for those with previous election experience, the most common barriers cited were lack of institutional time and support, experience, and mentorship.

SMS texts on corruption help Ugandan voters hold elected councillors accountable at the polls

Text messages providing salient, nonpartisan, official information on budget corruption prompted Ugandan voters to take the performance of some politicians into account when voting. Holding politicians accountable via elections is a fundamental precursor to effective governance, economic development, and high-quality public services. The results indicate that communication technologies can combine with data on budget management to help voters make better informed choices at the polls and thus have the potential to enhance local electoral accountability by providing information that is difficult for politicians to control and manipulate.

Many politicians manipulate information to prevent voters from holding them accountable; however, mobile text messages may make it easier for nongovernmental organizations to credibly share information on official corruption that is difficult for politicians to counter directly. We test the potential for texts on budget management to improve democratic accountability by conducting a large (n = 16,083) randomized controlled trial during the 2016 Ugandan district elections. In cooperation with a local partner, we compiled, simplified, and text-messaged official information on irregularities in local government budgets. Verified recipients of messages that described more irregularities than expected reported voting for incumbent councillors 6% less often; verified recipients of messages conveying fewer irregularities than expected reported voting for incumbent councillors 5% more often. The messages had no observable effect on votes for incumbent council chairs, potentially due to voters’ greater reliance on other sources of information for higher profile elections. These mixed results suggest that text messages on budget corruption help voters hold some politicians accountable in settings where elections are not free and fair.

Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote

Support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 election was widely attributed to citizens who were “left behind” economically. These claims were based on the strong cross-sectional relationship between Trump support and lacking a college education. Using a representative panel from 2012 to 2016, I find that change in financial wellbeing had little impact on candidate preference. Instead, changing preferences were related to changes in the party’s positions on issues related to American global dominance and the rise of a majority–minority America: issues that threaten white Americans’ sense of dominant group status. Results highlight the importance of looking beyond theories emphasizing changes in issue salience to better understand the meaning of election outcomes when public preferences and candidates’ positions are changing.

This study evaluates evidence pertaining to popular narratives explaining the American public’s support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 presidential election. First, using unique representative probability samples of the American public, tracking the same individuals from 2012 to 2016, I examine the “left behind” thesis (that is, the theory that those who lost jobs or experienced stagnant wages due to the loss of manufacturing jobs punished the incumbent party for their economic misfortunes). Second, I consider the possibility that status threat felt by the dwindling proportion of traditionally high-status Americans (i.e., whites, Christians, and men) as well as by those who perceive America’s global dominance as threatened combined to increase support for the candidate who emphasized reestablishing status hierarchies of the past. Results do not support an interpretation of the election based on pocketbook economic concerns. Instead, the shorter relative distance of people’s own views from the Republican candidate on trade and China corresponded to greater mass support for Trump in 2016 relative to Mitt Romney in 2012. Candidate preferences in 2016 reflected increasing anxiety among high-status groups rather than complaints about past treatment among low-status groups. Both growing domestic racial diversity and globalization contributed to a sense that white Americans are under siege by these engines of change.

Correlates of Voting Participation of People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

People with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) vote less frequently than nondisabled people and people with other disabilities. This study explores what factors facilitate and hinder people with IDD's voting participation. To do so, 1,341 people with IDD were surveyed using the Personal Outcome Measures®. Binary logistic regressions revealed significant relationships between voting participation, and support needs, residence types, guardianship statuses, and organizational supports. Along with the right supports, attention to barriers that might exist can ensure people with IDD are able to make use of their civil rights and participate in this crucial form of civic engagement.

Provincial elections and timing of cancer drug funding

BACKGROUND

Concerns have been raised about the potential influence of political pressures on drug funding decisions. We evaluated the temporal relationship between cancer drug funding and provincial elections in 9 Canadian provinces.

METHODS

New indications for cancer drugs between January 2003 and December 2012 were identified, and the dates of official provincial funding dates and election dates between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2014 were retrieved. The probability of drug funding announcements in the 60-day period preceding a provincial election was evaluated using binomial probability distribution analysis.

RESULTS

Data from 9 provinces (all Canadian provinces except Quebec) were available. During the period of interest, 69 new indications for 39 individual drugs were identified. Variation in the availability of funding dates was identified. At the time of data collection, 2 provinces did not have data available for all 69 indications. For the 9 provinces, the number of funded indications during the 60-day period preceding an election ranged from 0 to 3; however, no differences in the proportion of indications funded pre-election were identified. Additional analyses also failed to demonstrate any significant associations with the 90-day period before an election, or the 60- and 90-day periods after an election.

CONCLUSIONS

We observed no clear temporal relationship between provincial election dates and funding decisions in this recent Canadian sample of new indications for cancer drugs.

College football, elections, and false-positive results in observational research

A recent, widely cited study [Healy AJ, Malhotra N, Mo CH (2010) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107(29):12804-12809] finds that college football games influence voting behavior. Victories within 2 weeks of an election reportedly increase the success of the incumbent party in presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections in the home county of the team. We reassess the evidence and conclude that there is likely no such effect, despite the fact that Healy et al. followed the best practices in social science and used a credible research design. Multiple independent sources of evidence suggest that the original finding was spurious-reflecting bad luck for researchers rather than a shortcoming of American voters. We fail to estimate the same effect when we leverage situations where multiple elections with differing incumbent parties occur in the same county and year. We also find that the purported effect of college football games is stronger in counties where people are less interested in college football, just as strong when the incumbent candidate does not run for reelection, and just as strong in other parts of the state outside the home county of the team. Lastly, we detect no effect of National Football League games on elections, despite their greater popularity. We conclude with recommendations for evaluating surprising research findings and avoiding similar false-positive results.

Politicization during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections: bridging the personal and the political through an identity content approach

We investigated U.S. citizens' politicization (i.e., switching from not self-defining to self-defining as an active political party supporter) during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections. We used a novel identity content approach to explore qualitative changes in overlap between personal and politicized identity traits. We collected longitudinal data from a community sample of U.S. citizens (N = 760), tracking whether and how personal and politicized identity content developed: two months before (T1), immediately before (T2), and 2 months after (T3) the election. We explored a subsample of participants who met inclusion criteria (n = 115), comparing 87 participants who did not politicize with 28 participants who self-labeled as unpoliticized at T1, but politicized at T2/T3. Results confirmed hypotheses: Only politicizers showed greater integration between their personal and politicized identity content over time; moreover, identity content was a significant positive predictor of politicization and action engagement. We discuss the value of identity content for politicization research.

Governance in managing public health resources in Brazilian municipalities

This study contributes to the health governance discussion by presenting a new data set that allows for comparisons of the management of health resources among Brazilian municipalities. Research on Brazil is particularly important as the provision of health services was decentralized in 1988 and since then municipalities have been given greater responsibilities for the management of fiscal resources for public health service provision. Based on detailed information on corruption practices (such as over-invoicing, illegal procurement and fake receipts) from audit reports of health programmes in 980 randomly selected Brazilian municipalities, this study deepens understanding of the relationship between health governance institutions and the incidence of corruption at the local level by exploring the extent to which horizontal and vertical accountabilities contribute to reducing the propensity of municipal government officials to divert public health resources for private gain. The results of our multiple regression analysis suggest that the experience of health municipal councils is correlated with reductions in the incidence of corruption in public health programmes. This impact is significant over time, with each additional year of health council experience reducing corruption incidence levels by 2.1% from baseline values. The findings reported in this study do not rely on the subjectivity of corruption measures which usually conflate the actual incidence of corruption with its perception by informants. Based on our results, we provide recommendations that can assist policy makers to reduce corruption.

Evolution, appearance, and occupational success

Visual characteristics, including facial appearance, are thought to play an important role in a variety of judgments and decisions that have real occupational outcomes in many settings. Indeed, there is growing evidence suggesting that appearance influences hiring decisions and even election results. For example, attractive individuals are more likely to be hired, taller men earn more, and the facial appearance of candidates has been linked to real election outcomes. In this article, we review evidence linking physical appearance to occupational success and evaluate the hypothesis that appearance based biases are consistent with predictions based on evolutionary theories of coalition formation and leadership choice. We discuss why appearance based effects are so pervasive, addressing ideas about a "kernel of truth" in attributions and about coalitional psychology. We additionally highlight that appearance may be differently related to success at work according to the types of job or task involved. For example, leaders may be chosen because the characteristics they possess are seen as best suited to lead in particular situations. During a time of war, a dominant-appearing leader may inspire confidence and intimidate enemies while during peace-time, when negotiation and diplomacy are needed, interpersonal skills may outweigh the value of a dominant leader. In line with these ideas, masculine-faced leaders are favored in war-time scenarios while feminine-faced leaders are favored in peace-time scenarios. We suggest that such environment or task specific competencies may be prevalent during selection processes, whereby individuals whose appearance best matches perceived task competences are most likely selected, and propose the general term "task-congruent selection" to describe these effects. Overall, our review highlights how potentially adaptive biases could influence choices in the work place. With respect to certain biases, understanding their origin and current prevalence is important in order to potentially reduce discrimination in the work place.

Cardiovascular events during general elections in Bayamon, Puerto Rico

Emotional stress has been linked to acute coronary events. We examined whether the emotional response to elections in Puerto Rico induced a similar response.

METHODS

We reviewed records at HIMA San Pablo Hospital (HIMASP) and Ramon Ruiz Arnau University Hospital (HURRA) in Bayamon and identified patients admitted with ICD-9 codes 410, 411, and 413 or corresponding diagnoses during a period surrounding the general elections and compared them with the same time period in non-election years.

RESULTS

Cardiovascular events accounted for 3.24% of election-year admissions vs. 5.51% during non-election years in HURRA (p=0.036, N=37), while accounting for 2.86% of election-year admissions in HIMASP vs. 3.27% during non-election years (non-significant).

DISCUSSION

There was a trend towards a lower rate of admission for cardiovascular events during general elections in both hospitals, reaching statistical significance at HURRA. Further study may elucidate reasons for this behavior and determine whether similar trends hold true in other populations.

Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections

We showed 10-second, silent video clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates to a group of experimental participants and asked them to predict the election outcomes. The participants' predictions explain more than 20 percent of the variation in the actual two-party vote share across the 58 elections in our study, and their importance survives a range of controls, including state fixed effects. In a horse race of alternative forecasting models, participants' forecasts significantly outperform economic variables in predicting vote shares, and are comparable in predictive power to a measure of incumbency status. Participants' forecasts seem to rest on judgments of candidates' personal attributes (such as likeability), rather than inferences about candidates' policy positions. Though conclusive causal inference is not possible in our context, our findings may be seen as suggestive evidence of a causal effect of candidate appeal on election outcomes.