The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief

Inconsistent and very weak evidence for a direct association between childhood personality and adult ideology

OBJECTIVE

We add depth and breadth to the study of the childhood personality-adult ideology link with additional data, measures, and measurement approaches.

BACKGROUND

Past research in (political) psychology has put forward that individual differences in psychological needs shape ideology. Most evidence supporting this claim is cross-sectional. Two previous longitudinal studies showed preliminary evidence that childhood personality traits linked to negativity bias correlate with political ideology in adulthood, yet these studies have limitations.

METHODS

We report the results from two longitudinal studies (combined N = 13,822) conducted in the United Kingdom that measure childhood personality (5-11 years old) and political ideology from puberty (age 16) to early (age 26) and middle adulthood (age 42).

RESULTS

We find very weak and inconsistent evidence that childhood personality traits related to negativity bias are directly associated with general conservatism, social conservatism, or economic conservatism across different stages of adulthood. Across the board, Bayes Factors most often indicate strong evidence for the null hypothesis.

CONCLUSION

We offer evidence that the results of previous research are not as robust or as consistent as scholars in the extant literature presume. Our findings call for more, not less, research on the link between childhood personality and political ideology.

Rejecting ingroup loyalty for the truth: Children's and adolescents' evaluations of deviant peers within a misinformation intergroup context

Typically, children and adolescents dislike peers who deviate from their peer group's norm, preferring normative peers who are loyal to the peer ingroup. Yet children and adolescents also consider whether the behavior displayed by a deviant peer aligns with generic societally valued norms when evaluating peers within intergroup contexts. In an age where misinformation is rampant online, seeking the truth exemplifies a generic norm that is widely valued but not always upheld given that individuals often show loyalty to the ingroup. The current research explored the conflict between ingroup loyalty and seeking the truth. In this study, participants (N = 266; 8-15 years old) read about their school participating in an inter-school competition where their ingroup peer either accidentally or deliberately shared misinformation about their outgroup competitor. Participants with a peer group norm of ingroup loyalty positively morally evaluated a norm deviant seeking the truth, whereas those with a peer group norm of seeking the truth negatively morally evaluated a norm deviant showing ingroup loyalty. Participants also took into account the intentions of the misinformer in their evaluations of a deviant who was either loyal or questioning toward the misinformer. Overall, this study suggests that the norm of truth-seeking is welcomed and regarded as an important value to uphold both generically and at a peer group level, even when it violates the norm of ingroup loyalty. This research provides a novel contribution to understanding how factors like norms and intentionality interact with children's and adolescents' navigation of information in an age of misinformation.

The Costs of Polarizing a Pandemic: Antecedents, Consequences, and Lessons

Polarization has been rising in the United States of America for the past few decades and now poses a significant-and growing-public-health risk. One of the signature features of the American response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been the degree to which perceptions of risk and willingness to follow public-health recommendations have been politically polarized. Although COVID-19 has proven more lethal than any war or public-health crisis in American history, the deadly consequences of the pandemic were exacerbated by polarization. We review research detailing how every phase of the COVID-19 pandemic has been polarized, including judgments of risk, spatial distancing, mask wearing, and vaccination. We describe the role of political ideology, partisan identity, leadership, misinformation, and mass communication in this public-health crisis. We then assess the overall impact of polarization on infections, illness, and mortality during the pandemic; offer a psychological analysis of key policy questions; and identify a set of future research questions for scholars and policy experts. Our analysis suggests that the catastrophic death toll in the United States was largely preventable and due, in large part, to the polarization of the pandemic. Finally, we discuss implications for public policy to help avoid the same deadly mistakes in future public-health crises.

Divided we fall: Constructive dialoguing about our political differences within family therapy training

Widespread political polarization throughout the United States is a threat to the time-honored democratic tradition of utilizing civil discussion and respectful debate to express divergent views and strive for common ground. The political differences that divide us now are so deep and rife with toxic emotion that they threaten to undermine our social well-being at both the micro and macro levels. While family therapists are trained to work with relational tensions and to help family members to constructively negotiate their differences, the severity of the hostility and resentment tied to divergent political orientations has made this work increasingly difficult to achieve. This article explores how family therapy training programs can help trainees deepen their capacity for constructive political dialoguing that includes learning how to effectively manage their reactivity to those whose values and views may be dramatically different from their own so that they can support clients in doing the same.

Explaining contentious political issues promotes open-minded thinking

Cognitive scientists suggest that inviting people to explain contentious political issues might reduce intergroup toxicity because it exposes people to how poorly they understand the issue. However, whether providing explanations can result in more open-minded political thinking remains unclear. On one hand, inviting people to explain a political issue might make them more impartial and open-minded in their thinking. On the other hand, an invitation to explain a contentious political issue might lead to myside bias-rationalization of one's default position. Here, we address these contrasting predictions in five experiments (N = 1884; three pre-registered), conducted across a variety of contexts: with graduate students interacting with an actor in a laboratory setting, with US residents at the peak of the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections, with UK residents before the highly polarized 2019 Brexit vote, and with gun-control partisans. Across studies, we found that explaining politically contentious topics resulted in more open-minded thinking, an effect that generalized across coded (Studies 1-4) and self-report (Studies 3-4) measures. We also observed that participants who were made to feel like their explanations were welcomed felt closer to their discussion partner (Studies 3-4), an effect that generalized to all outgroup members with whom they disagreed with about the politically contentious issue (Study 4). We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, and the potential for explanations to foster open-minded political engagement.

Fighting misinformation among the most vulnerable users

Misinformation undermines trust in the integrity of democratic elections, the safety of vaccines, and the authenticity of footage from war zones. Social scientists have proposed many solutions to reduce individuals' demand for fake news, but it is unclear how to evaluate them. Efficacy can mean that an intervention increases discernment (the ability to distinguish true from false content), works over a delay, scales up, and engages users. I argue that experts should also consider differences in exposure prevalence before declaring success. Misleading content makes up a small fraction of the average person's news diet, but some groups are at increased risk - conservatives and older adults see and share the most fake news. Targeting the whole population (universal prevention) could concentrate benefits among the users who already see the least misinformation to begin with. In complement to these approaches, we should design interventions for the people who need them most - conservatives and older adults (selective prevention), as well as users who have already shared low-quality news (indicated prevention).

Testing influences of openness, conscientiousness, nationalism, media diversity, social class, and informational echo chambers on support for official responses to COVID-19 in Wuhan in November, 2020

Introduction

As the COVID-19 pandemic raged, controversies about governmental responses to the epidemic also emerged in China. Previous studies mainly described the phenomenon of individual differences on support for governmental responses to COVID-19 with less attention to the underlying causal mechanisms. Thus, this study tries to verify the factors influencing public support for official behaviors in COVID-19.

Method

A questionnaire survey was drew on in Wuhan city during the COVID-19 outbreak. The quota sampling method was adopted according to the gender and age structure of the population in Wuhan as well as the educational structure of the urban population in China.

Results

Through structural equation analysis, this study confirms that personal factors (namely conscientiousness and nationalistic ideology), behavioral factors (namely media diversity and echo chamber acts) exert significantly positive impacts on support for governmental responses. The echo chamber acts play important mediating roles in the relationship between each independent variable and support for governmental responses.

Discussion

The originality of this study is that it constructs a comprehensive model of influencing factors of support for governmental responses with the personal, behavioral, and environmental factors. While contributing insight to political attitude in China, the research results also have significance for promoting public trust and constructing healthy public opinion in China.

Religious polarization and justification of belief in invisible scientific versus religious entities

Children and adults express greater confidence in the existence of invisible scientific as compared to invisible religious entities. To further examine this differential confidence, 5- to 11-year-old Turkish children and their parents (N = 174, 122 females) from various regions in Türkiye, a country with an ongoing tension between secularism and religion, were tested in 2021 for their belief in invisible entities. Participants expressed more confidence in the existence of scientific than religious entities. For scientific entities, children justified their belief primarily by elaborating on the properties of the entity, rather than referring to the testimonial source of their judgment. This pattern was reversed for religious entities, arguably, highlighting the role of polarization in shaping the testimony children typically hear.

Longitudinal attenuation in political polarization: Evidence from COVID-19 vaccination adherence in Brazil

BACKGROUND

While political polarization in policy opinions, preferences, and observance is well established, little is known about whether and how such divisions evolve, and possibly attenuate, over time. Using the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil as the backdrop, we examine the longitudinal evolution of a highly relevant and polarizing policy: adherence to the COVID-19 vaccination.

METHODS

Studies 1 (N = 3346) and 2 (N = 10,214) use nationwide surveys to document initial differences and subsequent changes in vaccination adherence between conservatives ("Bolsonaristas") and non-conservatives ("non-Bolsonaristas"). Study 3 (N = 742) uses an original dataset to investigate belief changes among conservatives and their association with asymmetric changes in vaccination adherence.

RESULTS

Despite substantial differences at the early stages of rollout, the gap in vaccination adherence between conservatives and non-conservatives significantly decreased with the passage of time, driven essentially by a much faster uptake among the initially most skeptic-the conservatives. Study 3 demonstrates that the asymmetric changes in vaccination adherence were associated with meaningful belief changes among the conservatives, especially about the perceived effectiveness of the COVID-19 vaccines and the expected adherence of peers to the vaccination campaign.

CONCLUSIONS

Together, these studies show that, in a context where the superiority of the promoted policy becomes clear over time and individuals have the opportunity to revisit prior beliefs, even intense political polarization can be attenuated.

Research Report: A Link between Sertraline Treatment and Susceptibility to (Mis)information

Recent research revealed that several psycho-cognitive processes, such as insensitivity to positive and negative feedback, cognitive rigidity, pessimistic judgment bias, and anxiety, are involved in susceptibility to fake news. All of these processes have been previously associated with depressive disorder and are sensitive to serotoninergic manipulations. In the current study, a link between chronic treatment with the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) sertraline and susceptibility to true and fake news was examined. Herein, a sample of 1162 participants was recruited via Prolific Academic for an online study. Half of the sample reported taking sertraline (Zoloft) for at least 8 weeks (sertraline group), and the other half confirmed not taking any psychiatric medication (control group). The sertraline group was further divided according to their daily dosage (50, 100, 150, and 200 mg/day). All participants completed a susceptibility to misinformation scale, wherein they were asked to determine the veracity of the presented true and fake news and their willingness to behaviorally engage with the news. The results were compared between those of the sertraline groups and the control group. The results showed that sertraline groups did not differ significantly in the assessment of the truthfulness of information or their ability to discern the truth. However, those taking sertraline appeared to have a significantly increased likelihood of behavioral engagement with the information, and this effect was observed for both true and fake news. The research presented here represents the initial endeavor to comprehend the neurochemical foundation of the susceptibility to misinformation. The association between sertraline treatment and increased behavioral engagement with information observed in this study can be explained in light of previous studies showing positive correlations between serotonin (5-HT) system activity and the inclination to engage in social behaviors. It can also be attributed to the anxiolytic effects of sertraline treatment, which mitigate the fear of social judgment. The heightened behavioral engagement with information in people taking sertraline may, as part of a general phenomenon, also shape their interactions with fake news. Future longitudinal studies should reveal the specificity and exact causality of these interactions.

How does economic inequality shape conspiracy theories? Empirical evidence from China

Conspiracy theories tend to be prevalent, particularly in societies with high economic inequality. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic inequality and belief in conspiracy theories. We propose that economic inequality leads people to believe conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups (i.e., upwards conspiracy theories) and that moral evaluations of those groups mediate this relationship. Study 1 (N = 300) found support for these ideas in a survey among Chinese residents. Study 2 (N = 160) manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in a virtual society. The manipulation shaped moral evaluations of economically advantaged groups, and conspiracy beliefs, in the predicted manner. In Study 3 (N = 191) and Study 4 (N = 210), we experimentally manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in real Chinese society and replicated the results of Study 2. In addition, in Study 4, we find that economic inequality predicts belief in conspiracy theories about economically disadvantaged groups (i.e., downward conspiracy theories), which was mediated by anomie. We conclude that perceived economic inequality predicts conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups and that moral evaluations account for this effect. Also, upward and downward conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with different psychological processes.

Conservatism, anti-vaccination attitudes, and intellectual humility: examining their associations through a social judgment theory framework

Previous research has consistently found that more political conservatism is related to higher anti-vaccination attitudes. However, little work has investigated how intellectual humility could potentially contribute to this relationship. Employing the social judgment theory of attitude change, we examined whether conservatism could mediate the association between intellectual humility and anti-vaccination attitudes. Participants (N = 1,293; 40.1% female; Mage = 38.23 years, SDage = 11.61, range of age was 18-78) completed a multifaceted measure of intellectual humility, an assessment of four types of anti-vaccination attitudes, and a measure of political orientation. Results from structural equation modeling revealed that decreased levels of most aspects of intellectual humility (i.e., independence of intellect and ego, openness to revising one's viewpoint, and lack of intellectual overconfidence) are associated with more conservative political views, which in turn is associated with stronger anti-vaccination attitudes, particularly worries about unforeseen future effects, concerns about commercial profiteering, and preference for natural immunity. These findings suggest that intellectual humility could reflect one's latitude widths, thereby predicting their openness to vaccine massaging, and thus may play an important role in addressing anti-vaccination attitudes, especially when politics is involved.

Updating the identity-based model of belief: From false belief to the spread of misinformation

The spread of misinformation threatens democratic societies, hampering informed decision-making. Partisan identity biases perceptions of reality, promoting false beliefs. The Identity-based Model of Political Belief explains how social identity shapes information processing and contributes to misinformation. According to this model, social identity goals can override accuracy goals, leading to belief alignment with party members rather than facts. We propose an extended version of this model that incorporates the role of informational context in misinformation belief and sharing. Partisanship involves cognitive and motivational aspects that shape party members' beliefs and actions. This includes whether they seek further evidence, where they seek that evidence, and which sources they trust. Understanding the interplay between social identity and accuracy is crucial in addressing misinformation.

Managing emotions in the age of political polarization: A randomized controlled trial comparing mindfulness to cognitive reappraisal

Emotional appraisals of political stimuli (e.g., videos) have been shown to drive shared neural encoding, which correspond to shared, yet divisive, interpretations of such stimuli. However, mindfulness practice may entrain a form of emotion regulation that de-automatizes social biases, possibly through alteration of such neural mechanisms. The present study combined a naturalistic neuroimaging paradigm and a randomized controlled trial to examine the effects of short-term mindfulness training (MT) (n = 35) vs structurally equivalent Cognitive Reappraisal training (CT) (n = 37) on politically-situated emotions while evaluating the mechanistic role of prefrontal cortical neural synchrony. Participants underwent functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) recording while viewing inflammatory partisan news clips and continuously rating their momentary discrete emotions. MT participants were more likely to respond with extreme levels of anger (odds ratio = 0.12, p < .001) and disgust (odds ratio = 0.08, p < .001) relative to CT participants. Neural synchrony-based analyses suggested that participants with extreme emotion reactions exhibited greater prefrontal cortical neural synchrony, but that this pattern was less prominent in participants receiving MT relative to CT (CT > MT; channel 1 ISC = .040, p = .030).

Modelling social norms: an integration of the norm-utility approach with beliefs dynamics

We review theoretical approaches for modelling the origin, persistence and change of social norms. The most comprehensive models describe the coevolution of behaviours, personal, descriptive and injunctive norms while considering influences of various authorities and accounting for cognitive processes and between-individual differences. Models show that social norms can improve individual and group well-being. Under some conditions though, deleterious norms can persist in the population through conformity, preference falsification and pluralistic ignorance. Polarization in behaviour and beliefs can be maintained, even when societal advantages of particular behaviours or belief systems over alternatives are clear. Attempts to change social norms can backfire through cognitive processes including cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance. Under some conditions social norms can change rapidly via tipping point dynamics. Norms can be highly susceptible to manipulation, and network structure influences their propagation. Future models should incorporate network structure more thoroughly, explicitly study online norms, consider cultural variations and be applied to real-world processes. This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

The Misleading count: an identity-based intervention to counter partisan misinformation sharing

Interventions to counter misinformation are often less effective for polarizing content on social media platforms. We sought to overcome this limitation by testing an identity-based intervention, which aims to promote accuracy by incorporating normative cues directly into the social media user interface. Across three pre-registered experiments in the US (N = 1709) and UK (N = 804), we found that crowdsourcing accuracy judgements by adding a Misleading count (next to the Like count) reduced participants' reported likelihood to share inaccurate information about partisan issues by 25% (compared with a control condition). The Misleading count was also more effective when it reflected in-group norms (from fellow Democrats/Republicans) compared with the norms of general users, though this effect was absent in a less politically polarized context (UK). Moreover, the normative intervention was roughly five times as effective as another popular misinformation intervention (i.e. the accuracy nudge reduced sharing misinformation by 5%). Extreme partisanship did not undermine the effectiveness of the intervention. Our results suggest that identity-based interventions based on the science of social norms can be more effective than identity-neutral alternatives to counter partisan misinformation in politically polarized contexts (e.g. the US). This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

A Network Approach to Investigate the Dynamics of Individual and Collective Beliefs: Advances and Applications of the BENDING Model

Changing entrenched beliefs to alter people's behavior and increase societal welfare has been at the forefront of behavioral-science research, but with limited success. Here, we propose a new framework of characterizing beliefs as a multidimensional system of interdependent mental representations across three cognitive structures (e.g., beliefs, evidence, and perceived norms) that are dynamically influenced by complex informational landscapes: the BENDING (Beliefs, Evidence, Norms, Dynamic Information Networked Graphs) model. This account of individual and collective beliefs helps explain beliefs' resilience to interventions and suggests that a promising avenue for increasing the effectiveness of misinformation-reduction efforts might involve graph-based representations of communities' belief systems. This framework also opens new avenues for future research with meaningful implications for some of the most critical challenges facing modern society, from the climate crisis to pandemic preparedness.

Motivational drivers of costly information search

Acquiring information that aids decision-making is subject to a trade-off of accuracy versus cost, given that time, effort, or money are required to obtain decision-relevant information. Three studies (N = 2010) investigated the motivational dynamics shaping the priorities that govern this trade-off. Motivational orientations related to both the decision-making process and its outcome were examined. Regulatory focus theory describes two broad orientations to goal pursuit: promotion focus, prioritizing eager achievement, versus prevention focus, prioritizing vigilant security. We hypothesized that when the framing of a decision-making task activates a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus, individuals would be more willing to assume the costs of acquiring additional information before making their decisions. To test this hypothesis, participants made incentivized decisions with the option of acquiring additional information before making a final decision; importantly, obtaining this information incurred financial costs. Results consistently confirmed that prevention-focused decision makers were indeed more willing to assume the costs of acquiring additional information than promotion-focused individuals. The first two studies involved a scenario where participants were indifferent to the specific outcome of the decision process; accuracy was their only concern. In the final study, searchable, accuracy-enhancing information was also related to decision makers' partisan political preferences. Regulatory focus and the preference for partisan-congenial information were observed to be co-occurring but functionally orthogonal drivers of costly information search. Thus, prevention-framed messages can motivate the search for decision-relevant information, even when this search is costly and could lead to disagreeable data.

The Impact of Social Media on Users' Self-Efficacy and Loneliness: An Analysis of the Mediating Mechanism of Social Support

Purpose

The integration of social media into all areas of society has become a typical phenomenon of the Internet era. This study's core objective is to dissect the relationship between social media, self-efficacy and loneliness, especially emphasizing the mediating function of social support.

Patients and Methods

The research data is derived from the pooled cross-sectional data combined from the four-period data of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS). The study employs Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression as the basic research method, and utilizes Instrumental Variables (IV) and other methods to conduct robustness checks.

Results

Social media usage frequency (SMUF) enhances self-efficacy and loneliness through social support. Social support promotes self-efficacy and alleviates users' loneliness. In self-efficacy, social support plays a fully mediating role. Moreover, education (human capital) has a significant moderating effect. There are noticeable differences in the response of different characteristics groups to SMUF.

Conclusion

This study reveals how social media impacts self-efficacy and loneliness through social support. Based on the research results, avoiding prolonged usage of social media and improving digital literacy are the crucial means to exert the positive benefits of social media.

Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs

People with bad beliefs - roughly beliefs that conflict with those of the relevant experts and are maintained regardless of counter-evidence - are often cast as bad believers. Such beliefs are seen to be the result of, e.g., motivated or biased cognition and believers are judged to be epistemically irrational and blameworthy in holding them. Here I develop a novel framework to explain why people form bad beliefs. People with bad beliefs follow the social epistemic norms guiding how agents are supposed to form and share beliefs within their respective communities. Beliefs go bad because these norms aren't reliably knowledge-conducive. In other words, bad beliefs aren't due to bad believers but due bad social epistemic norms. The framework also unifies different explanations of bad beliefs, is testable and provides distinct interventions to combat such beliefs. The framework also helps to capture the complex and often contextual normative landscape surrounding bad beliefs more adequately. On this picture, it's primarily groups that are to be blamed for bad beliefs. I also suggest that some individuals will be blameless for forming their beliefs in line with their group's norms, whereas others won't be. And I draw attention to the factors that influence blameworthiness-judgements in these contexts.

Two-Sided Messages Promote Openness for a Variety of Deeply Entrenched Attitudes

Prior research showed that people holding attitudes on relatively moral topics became more open to two- rather than one-sided messages as the moral basis of their attitudes increased. Across three studies (N = 963), we extend this finding to relatively non-moral topics by demonstrating that two-sided messages can encourage people with strong attitudes indexed by various non-moral attitude strength measures to be more open to contrary positions. Study 1 demonstrated this for four indicators of attitude strength (e.g., certainty). As the strength of one's attitude increased, two-sided messages increased in relative effectiveness over one-sided communication. This was mediated by perceived appreciation for the speaker acknowledging one's view. Study 2 replicated this finding in a preregistered experiment. Study 3 conceptually replicated and extended it to people holding attitudes based on their political identity. Finally, evidence was obtained supporting perceived appreciation (rather than source evaluation) as the key driver of this interactive effect.

The association between political orientation and political knowledge in 45 nations

Political knowledge is crucial for well-functioning democracies, with most scholars assuming that people at the political extremes are more knowledgeable than those at the center. Here, we adopt a data-driven approach to examine the relationship between political orientation and political knowledge by testing a series of polynomial curves in 45 countries (N = 63,544), spread over 6 continents. Contrary to the dominant perspective, we found no evidence that people at the political extremes are the most knowledgeable about politics. Rather, the most common pattern was a fourth-degree polynomial association in which those who are moderately left-wing and right-wing are more knowledgeable than people at the extremes and center of the political spectrum. This pattern was especially, though not exclusively, prevalent in Western countries. We conclude that the relationship between political orientation and political knowledge is more context-dependent and complex than assumed, and caution against (implicit) universal conclusions in social sciences.

Understanding belief in political statements using a model-driven experimental approach: a registered report

Misinformation harms society by affecting citizens' beliefs and behaviour. Recent research has shown that partisanship and cognitive reflection (i.e. engaging in analytical thinking) play key roles in the acceptance of misinformation. However, the relative importance of these factors remains a topic of ongoing debate. In this registered study, we tested four hypotheses on the relationship between each factor and the belief in statements made by Argentine politicians. Participants (N = 1353) classified fact-checked political statements as true or false, completed a cognitive reflection test, and reported their voting preferences. Using Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian modeling, we found a reliable positive association between political concordance and overall belief in a statement (median = 0.663, CI95 = [0.640, 0.685]), a reliable positive association between cognitive reflection and scepticism (median = 0.039, CI95 = [0.006, 0.072]), a positive but unreliable association between cognitive reflection and truth discernment (median = 0.016, CI95 = [- 0.015, 0.046]) and a negative but unreliable association between cognitive reflection and partisan bias (median = - 0.016, CI95 = [- 0.037, 0.006]). Our results highlight the need to further investigate the relationship between cognitive reflection and partisanship in different contexts and formats. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 22 August 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/EBRGC .

Partisan conflict over content moderation is more than disagreement about facts

Social media companies have come under increasing pressure to remove misinformation from their platforms, but partisan disagreements over what should be removed have stymied efforts to deal with misinformation in the United States. Current explanations for these disagreements center on the "fact gap"-differences in perceptions about what is misinformation. We argue that partisan differences could also be due to "party promotion"-a desire to leave misinformation online that promotes one's own party-or a "preference gap"-differences in internalized preferences about whether misinformation should be removed. Through an experiment where respondents are shown false headlines aligned with their own or the opposing party, we find some evidence of party promotion among Democrats and strong evidence of a preference gap between Democrats and Republicans. Even when Republicans agree that content is false, they are half as likely as Democrats to say that the content should be removed and more than twice as likely to consider removal as censorship.

Enhanced EPIRISK tool for rapid epidemic risk analysis

OBJECTIVES

This study aims to create an enhanced EPIRISK tool in order to correctly predict COVID-19 severity in various countries. The original EPIRISK tool was developed in 2018 to predict the epidemic risk and prioritise response. The tool was validated against nine historical outbreaks prior to 2020. However, it rated many high-income countries that had poor performance during the COVID-19 pandemic as having lower epidemic risk.

STUDY DESIGN

This study was designed to modify EPIRISK by reparameterizing risk factors and validate the enhanced tool against different outbreaks, including COVID-19.

METHODS

We identified three factors that could be indicators of poor performance witnessed in some high-income countries: leadership, culture and universal health coverage. By adding these parameters to EPIRISK, we created a series of models for the calibration and validation. These were tested against non-COVID outbreaks in nine countries and COVID-19 outbreaks in seven countries to identify the best-fit model. The COVID-19 severity was determined by the global incidence and mortality, which were equally divided into four levels.

RESULTS

The enhanced EPIRISK tool has 17 parameters, including seven disease-related and 10 country-related factors, with an algorithm developed for risk level classification. It correctly predicted the risk levels of COVID-19 for all seven countries and all nine historical outbreaks.

CONCLUSIONS

The enhanced EPIRSIK is a multifactorial tool that can be widely used in global infectious disease outbreaks for rapid epidemic risk analysis, assisting first responders, government and public health professionals with early epidemic preparedness and prioritising response to infectious disease outbreaks.

Political Person-Culture Match and Longevity: The Partisanship-Mortality Link Depends on the Cultural Context

Recent studies demonstrate that Republicans live longer than Democrats. We examined whether these longevity benefits are universal or culturally varying. Following a person-culture match perspective, we hypothesized that Republicans' longevity benefits occur in Republican, but not in Democratic, states. To test this argument, we conducted two studies among U.S. adults. In preregistered Study 1, we used large survey data (extended U.S. General Social Survey; N = 42,855). In confirmatory Study 2, we analyzed obituaries/biographies of deceased U.S. political partisans (novel data web-scraped from an online cemetery; N = 9,177). Both studies supported the person-culture match perspective with substantial effect sizes. In Republican contexts, up to 50.1% of all Republicans but only 36.3% of all Democrats reached an age of 80 years. In Democratic contexts, there was no such longevity gap. Robustness tests showed that this effect generalizes to political ideology and holds across spatial levels but is limited to persons with strong political convictions.

Breaking (Fake) News: No Personal Relevance Effect on Misinformation Vulnerability

The massive spread of fake news (FN) requires a better understanding of both risks and protective psychological factors underlying vulnerability to misinformation. Prior studies have mostly dealt with news that do not bear any direct personal relevance to participants. Here, we ask whether high-stakes news topics may decrease vulnerability to FN. Data were collected during the national lockdown in Italy (COVID-19 news) and one year later (political news). We compared truth discrimination and overall belief for true news (TN) and FN concerning COVID-19 and political topics. Our findings indicate that psychological risk and protective factors have similar effects on truth discrimination, regardless of whether the news topic is highly or minimally personally relevant. However, we found different effects of psychological factors on overall belief, for high and low personal relevance. These results suggest that, given a high level of cognitive dissonance, individuals tend to rely on proximal or emotional sources of information. In summary, our study underscores the importance of understanding the psychological factors that contribute to vulnerability to misinformation, particularly in high-stakes news contexts.

A tale of two pandemics: The enduring partisan differences in actions, attitudes, and beliefs during the coronavirus pandemic

Early in the new coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, scholars and journalists noted partisan differences in behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs. Based on location data from a large sample of smartphones, as well as 13,334 responses to a proprietary survey spanning 10 months from April 1, 2020 to February 15, 2021, we document that the partisan gap has persisted over time and that the lack of convergence occurs even among individuals who were at heightened risk of death. Our results point to the existence and persistence of the interaction of partisanship and information acquisition and highlight the need for mandates and targeted informational campaigns towards those with high health risks.

They Saw a Hearing: Democrats' and Republicans' Perceptions of and Responses to the Ford-Kavanaugh Hearings

In several highly publicized hearings, Dr. Christine Blasey Ford and Judge Brett Kavanaugh presented two opposing accounts of an alleged sexual assault. In the wake of these proceedings, partisans appeared similarly divided in how they regarded this political event. Using a U.S. national sample (N = 2,474) and a mixed-methods design, we investigated partisans' perceptions of, and responses to, the Ford-Kavanaugh hearings. Respondents reported their views of the hearings soon after they occurred. We used topic modeling to analyze these open-ended responses and found uniquely partisan topics emerged, including judicial impartiality and due process. Acute stress (AS) responses to the hearings were also related to partisan identities and perceptions; both Republicans (incidence rate ratio [IRR] = 0.81, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [0.78, 0.84]) and individuals who wrote more about Republican topics (IRR = 0.72, 95% CI = [0.56, 0.92]) reported lower AS than their Democratic counterparts. Results demonstrate different partisan perceptions with implications for mental health outcomes.

The social media discourse of engaged partisans is toxic even when politics are irrelevant

Prevailing theories of partisan incivility on social media suggest that it derives from disagreement about political issues or from status competition between groups. This study-which analyzes the commenting behavior of Reddit users across diverse cultural contexts (subreddits)-tests the alternative hypothesis that such incivility derives in large part from a selection effect: Toxic people are especially likely to opt into discourse in partisan contexts. First, we examined commenting behavior across over 9,000 unique cultural contexts (subreddits) and confirmed that discourse is indeed more toxic in partisan (e.g. r/progressive, r/conservatives) than in nonpartisan contexts (e.g. r/movies, r/programming). Next, we analyzed hundreds of millions of comments from over 6.3 million users and found robust evidence that: (i) the discourse of people whose behavior is especially toxic in partisan contexts is also especially toxic in nonpartisan contexts (i.e. people are not politics-only toxicity specialists); and (ii) when considering only nonpartisan contexts, the discourse of people who also comment in partisan contexts is more toxic than the discourse of people who do not. These effects were not driven by socialization processes whereby people overgeneralized toxic behavioral norms they had learned in partisan contexts. In contrast to speculation about the need for partisans to engage beyond their echo chambers, toxicity in nonpartisan contexts was higher among people who also comment in both left-wing and right-wing contexts (bilaterally engaged users) than among people who also comment in only left-wing or right-wing contexts (unilaterally engaged users). The discussion considers implications for democratic functioning and theories of polarization.

Social Psychological Perspectives on Political Polarization: Insights and Implications for Climate Change

Political polarization is a barrier to enacting policy solutions to global issues. Social psychology has a rich history of studying polarization, and there is an important opportunity to define and refine its contributions to the present political realities. We do so in the context of one of the most pressing modern issues: climate change. We synthesize the literature on political polarization and its applications to climate change, and we propose lines of further research and intervention design. We focus on polarization in the United States, examining other countries when literature was available. The polarization literature emphasizes two types of mechanisms of political polarization: (1) individual-level psychological processes related to political ideology and (2) group-level psychological processes related to partisan identification. Interventions that address group-level processes can be more effective than those that address individual-level processes. Accordingly, we emphasize the promise of interventions leveraging superordinate identities, correcting misperceived norms, and having trusted leaders communicate about climate change. Behavioral interventions like these that are grounded in scientific research are one of our most promising tools to achieve the behavioral wedge that we need to address climate change and to make progress on other policy issues.

The Best-Case Heuristic: Relative Optimism in Relationships, Politics, and a Global Health Pandemic

In four experiments covering three different life domains, participants made future predictions in what they considered the most realistic scenario, an optimistic best-case scenario, or a pessimistic worst-case scenario (N = 2,900 Americans). Consistent with a best-case heuristic, participants made "realistic" predictions that were much closer to their best-case scenario than to their worst-case scenario. We found the same best-case asymmetry in health-related predictions during the COVID-19 pandemic, for romantic relationships, and a future presidential election. In a fully between-subject design (Experiment 4), realistic and best-case predictions were practically identical, and they were naturally made faster than the worst-case predictions. At least in the current study domains, the findings suggest that people generate "realistic" predictions by leaning toward their best-case scenario and largely ignoring their worst-case scenario. Although political conservatism was correlated with lower covid-related risk perception and lower support of early public-health interventions, the best-case prediction heuristic was ideologically symmetric.

Scholarly rumors: Citation analysis of vast misinformation regarding parental alienation theory

Misinformation is widespread in political discourse, mental health literature, and hard science. This article describes recurrent publication of the same misinformation regarding parental alienation (PA), that is, variations of the statement: "PA theory assumes that the favored parent has caused PA in the child simply because the child refuses to have a relationship with the rejected parent, without identifying or proving alienating behaviors by the favored parent." Ninety-four examples of the same misinformation were identified and subjected to citation analysis using Gephi software, which displays the links between citing material and cited material. The recurrent misinformation reported here is not trivial; these statements are significant misrepresentations of PA theory. Plausible explanations for this trail of misinformation are the psychological mindset of the authors (i.e., confirmation bias) and the authors' writing skills (e.g., sloppy research practices such as persistent use of secondary sources for their information). The authors of this article recommend that publications containing significant misinformation should be corrected or retracted.

A meta-analysis of correction effects in science-relevant misinformation

Scientifically relevant misinformation, defined as false claims concerning a scientific measurement procedure or scientific evidence, regardless of the author's intent, is illustrated by the fiction that the coronavirus disease 2019 vaccine contained microchips to track citizens. Updating science-relevant misinformation after a correction can be challenging, and little is known about what theoretical factors can influence the correction. Here this meta-analysis examined 205 effect sizes (that is, k, obtained from 74 reports; N = 60,861), which showed that attempts to debunk science-relevant misinformation were, on average, not successful (d = 0.19, P = 0.131, 95% confidence interval -0.06 to 0.43). However, corrections were more successful when the initial science-relevant belief concerned negative topics and domains other than health. Corrections fared better when they were detailed, when recipients were likely familiar with both sides of the issue ahead of the study and when the issue was not politically polarized.

Understanding and combatting misinformation across 16 countries on six continents

The spread of misinformation online is a global problem that requires global solutions. To that end, we conducted an experiment in 16 countries across 6 continents (N = 34,286; 676,605 observations) to investigate predictors of susceptibility to misinformation about COVID-19, and interventions to combat the spread of this misinformation. In every country, participants with a more analytic cognitive style and stronger accuracy-related motivations were better at discerning truth from falsehood; valuing democracy was also associated with greater truth discernment, whereas endorsement of individual responsibility over government support was negatively associated with truth discernment in most countries. Subtly prompting people to think about accuracy had a generally positive effect on the veracity of news that people were willing to share across countries, as did minimal digital literacy tips. Finally, aggregating the ratings of our non-expert participants was able to differentiate true from false headlines with high accuracy in all countries via the 'wisdom of crowds'. The consistent patterns we observe suggest that the psychological factors underlying the misinformation challenge are similar across different regional settings, and that similar solutions may be broadly effective.

Ideology Strength Versus Party Identity Strength: Ideology Strength Is the Key Predictor of Attitude Stability

We investigate the relationship between attitude instability and both party identity strength and ideology strength. We test the explorative hypotheses that higher party identity strength (H1) and ideology strength (H2) predict more attitude stability using intensive longitudinal data collected in the United States every 2 weeks over 1 year (Study 1, N = 552) and in the Netherlands over 6 months (Study 2, N = 1,670). We found mixed support for H1: In the United States, there was no association between party identity strength and attitude stability. In the Netherlands, people with stronger party identity had more stable attitudes. We found stronger support for H2: Individuals with a stronger ideology than average had more stable attitudes in the United States and the Netherlands. The context-dependent nature of relations is discussed.

When fixing problems kills personal development: fMRI reveals conflict between Real and Ideal selves

Many coaching approaches aim to change behavior by increasing self-knowledge. However, self-knowledge can be difficult to achieve. One hypothesis (e.g., Jung, Rogers) is that self-knowledge is challenging because there is inherent conflict between different aspects of the self. This hypothesis is foundational to Boyatzis' intentional change theory (ICT). ICT holds that effective coaching requires deliberate sequencing of the client's exploration of different aspects of their self. Coaches initially encourage clients to focus exclusively on their Ideal self. The ICT approach differs from that advocated by most coaching organizations that suggest collaborative goal setting at the start of the coaching engagement, encouraging clients to focus on fixing performance deficits and problematic behaviors-aspects of the Real self. If there is conflict between thinking about Ideal and Real selves, then this strategy will be suboptimal. The hypothesis of attentional conflict therefore has significant implications for coaching practice. Previous findings establish a link between attention to Ideal vs. Real selves and global vs. local visual processing, respectively. This association alone does not imply conflict because, in naturalistic settings, global and local perceptual processes usually work in concert. However, certain stimuli such as Navon figures (letters made from many smaller letters, e.g., a large E made of small R's) create conflict due to incongruence between the global and local features. Does thinking about the self inherently generate conflict, like a Navon figure, or is it more akin to everyday perception? To answer this question the current study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the overlap in brain activity in young adults between two pairs of otherwise very dissimilar tasks: coaching interactions focused on Ideal vs. Real self; and attention to global vs. local features of Navon figures. Despite the ostensible absence of overlap in the psychological processes involved in these pairs of tasks, we find a remarkable degree of overlap in brain activity. This overlap was pronounced in higher (parietal and temporal) areas known to be involved in resolving attentional conflict. These findings provide compelling biological evidence for inherent conflict between thinking about Ideal and Real selves.

Affective Polarization and Political Belief Systems: The Role of Political Identity and the Content and Structure of Political Beliefs

We investigate the extent that political identity, political belief content (i.e., attitude stances), and political belief system structure (i.e., relations among attitudes) differences are associated with affective polarization (i.e., viewing ingroup partisans positively and outgroup partisans negatively) in two multinational, cross-sectional studies (Study 1 N = 4,152, Study 2 N = 29,994). First, we found a large, positive association between political identity and group liking-participants liked their ingroup substantially more than their outgroup. Second, political belief system content and structure had opposite associations with group liking: Sharing similar belief system content with an outgroup was associated with more outgroup liking, but similarity with the ingroup was associated with less ingroup liking. The opposite pattern was found for political belief system structure. Thus, affective polarization was greatest when belief system content similarity was low and structure similarity was high.

Shared social identity and media transmission of trauma

When an individual or group trauma becomes a shared public experience through widespread media coverage (e.g., mass violence, being publicly outed), sharing a social identity with a targeted individual or group of victims may amplify feelings of personal vulnerability. This heightened perceived threat may draw people to engage with trauma-related media because of increased vigilance for self-relevant threats, which can, in turn, amplify distress. We studied this possibility among two U.S. national samples following the 2016 Pulse nightclub massacre in Orlando, FL (N = 4675) and the 2018 Dr. Christine Blasey Ford and Judge Brett Kavanaugh Supreme Court Senate hearings (N = 4894). Participants who shared LGBT or Hispanic identities with Pulse massacre victims reported greater exposure to massacre-related media and acute stress. Participants who shared Dr. Blasey Ford's identities as a victim of interpersonal violence and a Democrat reported more hearings-related media exposure and acute stress. Indirect effects of shared single identity on acute stress through self-reported event-related media exposure emerged in both studies. Results for sharing dual identities with victims were mixed. These findings have implications for media use and public health.

If graffiti changed anything, it would be illegal. The influence of political graffiti on the perception of neighborhoods and intergroup attitudes

In a series of three studies (total N = 956), we examined how political graffiti, which serves as a representation of prevailing social norms, influences the evaluation of social cohesion and neighborhood inhabitants depending on the individuals political orientation. In line with our hypothesis, results of Study 1 (N = 199) indicated that individuals tended to express more positive evaluations of the social cohesion within a neighborhood when the political graffiti aligns with their own political orientation. Conversely, when confronted with counter-attitudinal political graffiti, participants reported lower evaluations of social cohesion. In Study 2, a sensitive scale to assess social cohesion was developed. Study 3 (N = 550) investigated the dose-response relationship of right-wing political graffiti and replicated the results from Study 1. Consistent with our hypotheses, even a minimal presence of right-wing graffiti exerted a significant impact on participants' evaluations of the neighborhood and interacted with the participants political orientation. Taken together, our studies shed light on the crucial role of the individuals' own political orientation for the evaluation of neighborhoods and their inhabitants. Furthermore, we offer insights into how these perceptions may influence intergroup attitudes toward foreigners living in Germany. The implications of our findings are highly relevant to ongoing discussions surrounding social norms within neighborhoods. By highlighting the significance of political graffiti as a representation of social norms, our research contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play in evaluating neighborhoods and their social fabric.

Overcome the fragmentation in online propaganda literature: the role of cultural and cognitive sociology

Evidence concerning the proliferation of propaganda on social media has renewed scientific interest in persuasive communication practices, resulting in a thriving yet quite disconnected scholarship. This fragmentation poses a significant challenge, as the absence of a structured and comprehensive organization of this extensive literature hampers the interpretation of findings, thus jeopardizing the understanding of online propaganda functioning. To address this fragmentation, I propose a systematization approach that involves utilizing Druckman's Generalizing Persuasion Framework as a unified interpretative tool to organize this scholarly work. By means of this approach, it is possible to systematically identify the various strands within the field, detect their respective shortcomings, and formulate new strategies to bridge these research strands and advance our knowledge of how online propaganda operates. I conclude by arguing that these strategies should involve the sociocultural perspectives offered by cognitive and cultural sociology, as these provide important insights and research tools to disentangle and evaluate the role played by supra-individual factors in the production, distribution, consumption, and evaluation of online propaganda.

Political orientation predicts the use of conventional and complementary/alternative medicine: A survey study of 19 European countries

BACKGROUND

People align their beliefs and behaviors, including those related to health, increasingly along politically ideological lines.

OBJECTIVE

We investigated whether individual political orientation (PO) predicts the use of conventional (CM) and complementary/alternative medicine (CAM) across Europe.

METHODS

We used cross-sectional samples representative of persons aged 15 and over from 19 European countries (ESS 2015; round 7; N = 35,572). We assessed PO based on participants' vote choice in the most recent national election, using expert ratings of party positioning along five political-ideological dimensions: left-right general; left-right economic; Green/alternative/libertarian vs. Traditional/authoritarian/nationalist; anti-elite; and anti-corruption. Use of CM was defined as having consulted a general practitioner or specialist, and use of CAM as having used acupuncture, acupressure, Chinese medicine, homeopathy, herbal treatment, hypnotherapy, or spiritual healing.

RESULTS

Participants with an anti-corruption PO were less likely to use CM and more likely to use CAM than other Europeans. Participants with a Green/alternative/libertarian PO were more likely to use CAM than others. Poorer health moderated the association between anti-corruption PO and CM, such that people in poor health tended to use CM regardless of their political leanings, but health status did not moderate the association between PO and CAM use.

CONCLUSIONS

The results show that political and socio-cultural views are associated with how the European lay public engages with healthcare and complementary/alternative services, but the relevant boundary lines do not lie along the left-right dimension. People who preferred parties favoring expanded freedoms were more likely to use complementary/alternative services, but likely for other reasons than to seek cures for diseases in a traditional biomedical sense. Concerns about corruption among the lay public may be more relevant for conventional healthcare than has been recognized.

Thinking outside the ballot box

A deeply heterogeneous set of ideological cohorts have shaped the course of history. From anarchists and authoritarians to Zionists and Zapatistas, the expansive alphabet of politics demands an equally expansive psychological vocabulary to describe political belief systems. We propose that constructing such a vocabulary is best facilitated by decentering familiar models that emphasize psychological differences between leftists and rightists. Synthesizing recent developments in the fields of personality, political science, and psychopathology, we characterize individual variation in politics as high-dimensional, heterarchical, intrapersonally eclectic, and contextually shaped and activated. Developing a data-driven taxonomic model of political-psychological phenomena will help create a foundational base of knowledge within political psychology that is more rigorous, more replicable, and certainly richer to investigate.

Distractions, analytical thinking and falling for fake news: A survey of psychological factors

Analytical thinking safeguards us against believing or spreading fake news. In various forms, this common assumption has been reported, investigated, or implemented in fake news education programs. Some have associated this assumption with the inverse claim, that distractions from analytical thinking may render us vulnerable to believing or spreading fake news. This paper surveys the research done between 2016 and 2022 on psychological factors influencing one's susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news, considers which of the psychological factors are plausible distractors to one's exercise of analytical thinking, and discusses some implications of considering them as distractors to analytical thinking. From these, the paper draws five conclusions: (1) It is not analytical thinking per se, but analytical thinking directed to evaluating the truth that safeguards us from believing or spreading fake news. (2) While psychological factors can distract us from exercising analytical thinking and they can also distract us in exercising analytical thinking. (3) Whether a psychological factor functions as a distractor from analytical thinking or in analytical thinking may depend on contextual factors. (4) Measurements of analytical thinking may not indicate vulnerability to believing or spreading fake news. (5) The relevance of motivated reasoning to our tendency to believe fake news should not yet be dismissed. These findings may be useful to guide future research in the intersection of analytical thinking and susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news.

Hashtags as signals of political identity: #BlackLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter

We investigate perceptions of tweets marked with the #BlackLivesMatter and #AllLivesMatter hashtags, as well as how the presence or absence of those hashtags changed the meaning and subsequent interpretation of tweets in U.S. participants. We found a strong effect of partisanship on perceptions of the tweets, such that participants on the political left were more likely to view #AllLivesMatter tweets as racist and offensive, while participants on the political right were more likely to view #BlackLivesMatter tweets as racist and offensive. Moreover, we found that political identity explained evaluation results far better than other measured demographics. Additionally, to assess the influence of hashtags themselves, we removed them from tweets in which they originally appeared and added them to selected neutral tweets. Our results have implications for our understanding of how social identity, and particularly political identity, shapes how individuals perceive and engage with the world.

The intentions of information sources can affect what information people think qualifies as true

The concept of truth is at the core of science, journalism, law, and many other pillars of modern society. Yet, given the imprecision of natural language, deciding what information should count as true is no easy task, even with access to the ground truth. How do people decide whether a given claim of fact qualifies as true or false? Across two studies (N = 1181; 16,248 observations), participants saw claims of fact alongside the ground truth about those claims. Participants classified each claim as true or false. Although participants knew precisely how accurate the claims were, participants classified claims as false more often when they judged the information source to be intending to deceive (versus inform) their audience, and classified claims as true more often when they judged the information source to be intending to provide an approximate (versus precise) account. These results suggest that, even if people have access to the same set of facts, they might disagree about the truth of claims if they attribute discrepant intentions to information sources. Such findings may shed light on the robust and persistent disagreements over claims of fact that have arisen in the "post-truth era".

Similarity to the self influences memory for social targets

The construct of the self is important in the domain of memory research. Recent work has shown that person memory is influenced by similarity of social targets to the self. The current experiments investigate self-similarity as defined by traits and political ideology to better understand how memory for social targets is organised. Across three experiments, participants formed positive or negative impressions based on each target's picture, a trait-implying behavior (Experiments 1 & 2), and/or political ideology (conservative/liberal label in Experiment 2; political-ideological belief statements in Experiment 3) followed by a memory test. Results showed a self-similarity effect dependent on valence in Experiment 1, but not in Experiments 2 or 3 when participants processed ideological information associated with targets. These results suggest that self-similarity has an effect on memory for social targets, but that ideological information disrupts self-focused processing of others, suggesting that ideological information also has a powerful influence on what people remember about others (i.e. social targets).

A belief systems analysis of fraud beliefs following the 2020 US election

Beliefs that the US 2020 Presidential election was fraudulent are prevalent despite substantial contradictory evidence. Why are such beliefs often resistant to counter-evidence? Is this resistance rational, and thus subject to evidence-based arguments, or fundamentally irrational? Here we surveyed 1,642 Americans during the 2020 vote count, testing fraud belief updates given hypothetical election outcomes. Participants' fraud beliefs increased when their preferred candidate lost and decreased when he won, and both effects scaled with partisan preferences, demonstrating partisan asymmetry (desirability effects). A Bayesian model of rational updating of a system of beliefs-beliefs in the true vote winner, fraud prevalence and beneficiary of fraud-accurately accounted for this partisan asymmetry, outperforming alternative models of irrational, motivated updating and models lacking the full belief system. Partisan asymmetries may not reflect motivated reasoning, but rather rational attributions over multiple potential causes of evidence. Changing such beliefs may require targeting multiple key beliefs simultaneously rather than direct debunking attempts.

Moralization and extremism robustly amplify myside sharing

We explored whether moralization and attitude extremity may amplify a preference to share politically congruent ("myside") partisan news and what types of targeted interventions may reduce this tendency. Across 12 online experiments (N = 6,989), we examined decisions to share news touching on the divisive issues of gun control, abortion, gender and racial equality, and immigration. Myside sharing was systematically observed and was consistently amplified when participants (i) moralized and (ii) were attitudinally extreme on the issue. The amplification of myside sharing by moralization also frequently occurred above and beyond that of attitude extremity. These effects generalized to both true and fake partisan news. We then examined a number of interventions meant to curb myside sharing by manipulating (i) the audience to which people imagined sharing partisan news (political friends vs. foes), (ii) the anonymity of the account used (anonymous vs. personal), (iii) a message warning against the myside bias, and (iv) a message warning against the reputational costs of sharing "mysided" fake news coupled with an interactive rating task. While some of those manipulations slightly decreased sharing in general and/or the size of myside sharing, the amplification of myside sharing by moral attitudes was consistently robust to these interventions. Our findings regarding the robust exaggeration of selective communication by morality and extremism offer important insights into belief polarization and the spread of partisan and false information online.