Political attitudes vary with physiological traits

Is conservative opposition to climate change threat-based? Articulating an integrated threat model of climate change attitudes

Throughout the literature, there are assertions that those endorsing conservative ideologies reject the science and solutions of climate change due to perceived threat. That is, they fear that accepting climate change means accepting problems with a favoured socioeconomic system and supporting action on climate change threatens to disrupt these systems. We draw together lines of research and reasoning on this topic to outline three key predictions this perspective makes about the drivers of conservative denial of climate change and opposition to climate policy. The first is that an asymmetry exists in climate-related threat perceptions, whereby greater endorsement of conservative ideology predicts lower perceived threat from climate change and greater perceived threat from climate reform. Second, climate-related threat perceptions are multifaceted, such that threats to economic and cultural well-being can be experienced, at personal or collective levels. Third, the asymmetry in threat perceptions explains conservatives' lower support for pro-climate reforms. We then specify a new integrated threat model of climate change attitudes, review the current evidence for and against each prediction in this model and outline ways to interrogate these theoretical predictions with empirical research. Doing so will advance understanding of the underpinnings of ideological disagreement on climate change.

Donald Trump's contribution to the study of politics and the life sciences

If the life sciences are to have much to say about politics, there needs to be a universal element to political orientations. In this essay, I argue that the recent prominence of nativist, law-and-order, populist politicians reveals the nature of this universal element. All social units have to address bedrock dilemmas about how to deal with norm violators and how welcoming to be to outsiders as well as to proponents of new lifestyles. Might differences on these core dilemmas be the universal element of political life? Using the followers of one of the most prominent examples of a nativist political leader-Donald Trump-as an example, I present data showing that Trump's most earnest followers are different from others-even those who share their general ideological leanings-not on traditional economic or social issues, but rather on the group-based security issues that grow out of the bedrock dilemmas of social life.

Social Psychological Perspectives on Political Polarization: Insights and Implications for Climate Change

Political polarization is a barrier to enacting policy solutions to global issues. Social psychology has a rich history of studying polarization, and there is an important opportunity to define and refine its contributions to the present political realities. We do so in the context of one of the most pressing modern issues: climate change. We synthesize the literature on political polarization and its applications to climate change, and we propose lines of further research and intervention design. We focus on polarization in the United States, examining other countries when literature was available. The polarization literature emphasizes two types of mechanisms of political polarization: (1) individual-level psychological processes related to political ideology and (2) group-level psychological processes related to partisan identification. Interventions that address group-level processes can be more effective than those that address individual-level processes. Accordingly, we emphasize the promise of interventions leveraging superordinate identities, correcting misperceived norms, and having trusted leaders communicate about climate change. Behavioral interventions like these that are grounded in scientific research are one of our most promising tools to achieve the behavioral wedge that we need to address climate change and to make progress on other policy issues.

Emphasizing Similarities Between Politically Opposed Groups and Their Influence in Perceptions of the Political Opposition: Evidence From Five Experiments

Across five experiments (four pre-registered, N = 4,431), we investigate whether emphasizing similarities between Republicans and Democrats can improve intergroup relations between the two groups. Members of both groups who were presented with evidence emphasizing similarities rather than differences in the psychological attitudes of both parties reported greater inclusion of the political opposition in the self, greater belief that common ground can be reached for major social issues, and warmer feelings toward the opposition. Inclusion of the political outgroup in the self mediated the effect of the similarities condition on additional outcomes, relating to more positive and less threatening perceptions of political opposition members. These findings held even when compared with a baseline condition with no information presented to participants. We conclude that by emphasizing the study of group similarities and by disseminating research in a way that highlights similarities, researchers could reduce intergroup hostilities in the political domain.

Expectations about system justification predict the ideological gap in attitudes towards immigrants

In the U.S. political conservatives hold less favorable attitudes than liberals about immigration and immigrant groups. We hypothesized that one reason for this ideological gap is that conservatives are more likely to believe that immigrants are not as justifying of the American system as they should be. This hypothesis was tested in an online study (N = 404) with respect to four immigrant groups: Europeans, East Asians, Middle Easterners, and Latin Americans. Results revealed that conservatism was positively associated with (a) prescriptive beliefs that immigrants should engage in high levels of system justification, and (b) descriptive beliefs that immigrants-except for Middle Eastern immigrants-generally do endorse high levels of system justification. Importantly, conservatives perceived a bigger difference than liberals between prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about immigrants' system justification levels, and this difference mediated the association between conservatism and attitudes and feelings about non-European (but not European) immigrants. These findings support a new "Perceived System Justification Deficit Model of Prejudice" in which expectations about others' degree of ideological support for the societal status quo may contribute to out-group bias and perhaps even discrimination.

Political Attitudes and Disease Threat: Regional Pathogen Stress Is Associated With Conservative Ideology Only for Older Individuals

What environmental factors are associated with individual differences in political ideology, and do such associations change over time? We examine whether reductions in pathogen prevalence in U.S. states over the past 60 years are associated with reduced associations between parasite stress and conservatism. We report a positive association between infection levels and conservative ideology in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. However, this correlation reduces from the 1980s onwards. These results suggest that the ecological influence of infectious diseases may be larger for older people who grew up (or whose parents grew up) during earlier time periods. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the political affiliation of 45,000 Facebook users, and find a positive association between self-reported political affiliation and regional pathogen stress for older (>40 years) but not younger individuals. It is concluded that the influence of environmental pathogen stress on ideology may have reduced over time.

Afraid of whom?: Threat sensitivity's influence changes with perceived source of threat

Taking insights from the fields of psychology and biology, a growing body of scholarship considers the psychophysiological foundations of political attitudes. Subconscious emotional reactions to threat, for example, have been shown to predict socially conservative attitudes toward out-groups. However, many of these studies fail to consider different sources of perceived threat. Using a combination of survey and physiological data, I distinguish between fear of others and fear of authority, finding that threat sensitivity predicts divergent political attitudes depending on the strength of each. Those who are more sensitive to threat from others tend to hold socially conservative attitudes, while those who fear authority generally take more libertarian positions. As sensitivity to threat is at least partially inherited, these findings highlight the genetic role of political predispositions.

It takes guts to be a rebel! A dynamic coordination account of the relationship between motivational reactivity, social morality, and political ideology

This study tests two sets of competing hypotheses about the relationship between trait reactivity to positive and negative stimuli (i.e., motivational reactivity), moral stances on social principles (i.e., social morality), and political ideology. The classic view contends that a specific political ideology or social morality results from a specific motivational reactivity pattern, whereas the dynamic coordination account suggests that trait motivational reactivity modulates an individual's political ideology and social morality as a result of the majority political beliefs in their immediate social context. A survey using subjects recruited from a liberal-leaning social context was conducted to test these hypotheses. Results support the dynamic coordination account. Reactivity to negativity (indexed by defensive system activation scores) is associated with the adoption of the dominant social morality and political ideology. Reactivity to positivity (indexed by appetitive system activation scores) is associated with the adoption of nondominant social moral and political stances.

Physiological threat sensitivity predicts anti-immigrant attitudes

Research finds that the perception that immigrants are culturally and economically threatening is associated with negative attitudes toward immigration. In a largely separate body of work, psychophysiological predispositions toward threat sensitivity are connected to a range of political attitudes, including immigration. This article draws together these two literatures, using a lab experiment to explore psychophysiological threat sensitivity and immigration attitudes in the United States. Respondents with higher threat sensitivity, as measured by skin conductance responses to threatening images, tend to be less supportive of immigration. This finding builds on our understanding of the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes.

Do liberals value emotion more than conservatives? Political partisanship and Lay beliefs about the functionality of emotion

Relying on feelings to guide thoughts and plans may be functional from the perspective of the individual but threaten the cohesion of social groups. Thus, liberals, who prioritize caring and fairness for individuals, may view emotion as more functional than do conservatives, who prioritize preserving social groups, hierarchies, and institutions. To test this, participants in three studies (total N = 1,355) rated political partisanship, beliefs about the functionality of emotion, and well-being. Study 3 also assessed how much participants prioritized “individualizing” versus “socially binding” values (Graham et al., 2011). Across all studies, the more liberal participants were, the more they viewed emotion as functional, despite reporting less emotional well-being. In Study 3, the link between liberalism and valuing emotion was mediated by more liberal participants’ greater endorsement of individualizing than socially binding values. These results suggest that emotion is viewed as more functional by those who prioritize the needs of individuals, but as less functional by those who prioritize the cohesion of social groups.

State anxiety by itself does not change political attitudes: A threat of shock experiment

Previous research suggests that state anxiety may sway political attitudes. However, previous experimental procedures induced anxiety using political contexts (e.g., social or economic threat). In a pre-registered laboratory experiment, we set out to examine if anxiety that is unrelated to political contexts can influence political attitudes. We induced anxiety with a threat of shock paradigm, void of any political connotation. All participants were instructed that they might receive an electric stimulus during specified threat periods and none during safety periods. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Political attitudes (implicit and explicit) were assessed under safety in one condition and under threat in the other. Psychometric, as well as physiological data (skin conductance, heart rate), confirmed that anxiety was induced successfully. However, this emotional state did not alter political attitudes. In a Bayesian analytical approach, we confirmed the absence of an effect. Our results suggest that state anxiety by itself does not sway political attitudes. Previously observed effects that were attributed to anxiety may be conditional on a political context of threat.

Yikes! The Effect of Incidental Disgust and Information on Public Attitudes During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Existing research has focused extensively on the role of emotions such as anger, fear, and enthusiasm in explaining public opinion, but less is known about the importance of disgust, an innate disease-related emotion. To study the independent and joint effects of disgust and information, I draw on the case of the COVID-19 pandemic. I demonstrate that experimentally induced incidental disgust and exposure to information about how to flatten the curve of the COVID-19 cases have distinctive effects on political, racial, and health attitudes. Independently, exposure to information affects preferences only for restrictive policies to fight the spread of the virus. In contrast, the stand-alone effect of incidental disgust, as well as its joint effect with exposure to information, are responsible for attitude change toward both pandemic-relevant and irrelevant policies, Asian minorities, and prevention measures. Importantly, the study finds that citizens respond symmetrically to disgusting stimuli and information across degrees of political awareness, ideology, partisan affiliation, and trait authoritarianism. The results draw attention to the far-reaching implications of disgust on public opinion under threatening conditions.

Belief in a Dangerous World Does Not Explain Substantial Variance in Political Attitudes, But Other World Beliefs Do

Decades of research suggest a correlation between belief in a dangerous world and political conservatism. However, research relied on a scale that may overemphasize certain types of dangers. Furthermore, few other world beliefs have been investigated, such that fundamental worldview differences between liberals and conservatives remain largely unknown. A preregistered study of nine samples ( N = 5,461; mostly US Americans) found a negligible association between a newly improved measure of generalized dangerous world belief and conservatism, and that the original scale emphasized certain dangers more salient to conservatives (e.g., societal decline) over others most salient for liberals (e.g., injustice). Across many measures of political attitudes, other world beliefs—such as beliefs that the world is Hierarchical, Intentional, Just, and Worth Exploring—each explained several times more variance than dangerous world belief. This suggests the relevance of dangerous world belief to political attitudes has been overstated, and examining other world beliefs may yield insights.

A Psychology of Ideology: Unpacking the Psychological Structure of Ideological Thinking

The psychological study of ideology has traditionally emphasized the content of ideological beliefs, guided by questions about what people believe, such as why people believe in omniscient gods or fascist worldviews. This theoretical focus has led to siloed subdisciplines separately dealing with political, religious, moral, and prejudiced attitudes. The fractionation has fostered a neglect of the cognitive structure of ideological worldviews and associated questions about why ideologies-in all their forms-are so compelling to the human mind. Here I argue that it is essential to consider the nature of ideological cognition across a multitude of ideologies. I offer a multidimensional, empirically tractable framework of ideological thinking, suggesting it can be conceptualized as a style of thinking that is rigid in its adherence to a doctrine and resistance to evidence-based belief-updating and favorably oriented toward an in-group and antagonistic to out-groups. The article identifies the subcomponents of ideological thinking and highlights that ideological thinking constitutes a meaningful psychological phenomenon that merits direct scholarly investigation and analysis. By emphasizing conceptual precision, methodological directions, and interdisciplinary integration across the political and cognitive sciences, the article illustrates the potential of this framework as a catalyst for developing a rigorous domain-general psychology of ideology.

Persuading republicans and democrats to comply with mask wearing: An intervention tournament

Many people practiced COVID-19-related safety measures in the first year of the pandemic, but Republicans were less likely to engage in behaviors such as wearing masks or face coverings than Democrats, suggesting radical disparities in health practices split along political fault lines. We developed an "intervention tournament" which aimed to identify the framings that would promote mask wearing among a representative sample of Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. from Oct 14, 2020, to Jan 14, 2021 (N = 4931). Seven different conditions reflecting different moral values and factors specific to COVID-19-including protection from harm (self), protection from harm (community), patriotic duty, purity, reviving the economy, threat, and scientific evidence-were implemented to identify which framings would "win" in terms of promoting mask wearing compared to a baseline condition. We found that Republicans had significantly more negative attitudes toward masks, lower intentions to wear them, and were less likely to sign or share pledges on social media than Democrats, which was partially mediated by Republicans, compared to Democrats, perceiving that the threat of COVID-19 was lower. None of our framing conditions significantly affected Republicans' or Democrats' attitudes, intentions, or behaviors compared to the baseline condition, illustrating the difficulty in overcoming the strength of political polarization during COVID-19.

Negativity bias, personality and political ideology

Research suggests that right-wing ideology is associated with negativity bias: a tendency to pay more attention and give more weight to negative versus positive stimuli. This work typically relies on either self-reported traits related to negativity bias in large, often-representative, samples or physiological and behavioural indicators of negativity bias in small convenience samples. We extend this literature and examine the relationship of negativity bias to political ideology using five distinct behavioural measures of negativity bias in four national samples of US residents with a total analytical sample size of about 4,000 respondents. We also examine the association of these behavioural measures to four of the most common self-report measures of personality in the literature on ideology. Across a wide range of tests, we find no consistent evidence for a relationship of negativity bias to either ideology or self-reported personality.

Whistling Through the COVID-19 Pandemic: Optimism Bias and Political Beliefs in the United States

Utilizing a nationally representative survey of Americans from December 2020, we consider the degree to which COVID-19 risk perceptions are related to political factors. We examine the likelihood that one believes they will be infected with COVID-19, the likelihood that a peer will be infected, and the difference between the individual and peer perceived risks, known as optimism bias, and compare these perceptions across partisan characteristics. Results show that Trump voting category is the most important contributor to perceived COVID-19 risks. We find similar partisan differences as prior research, note that these differences persisted through the end of 2020, despite the post-Thanksgiving surge with high and growing rates of COVID in all regions of the United States. Contrary to prior expectations, partisanship does not strongly predict the level of optimism bias, as both assessed personal and general health risks track closely with one another by both political party and ideology.

Is negativity bias intuitive for liberals and conservatives?

Previous research suggests that conservatives (right-wingers) tend to show more negativity bias than liberals (left-wingers) in several tasks. However, the majority of these studies are based on correlational findings and do not provide information on the cognitive underpinnings of this tendency. The current research investigated whether intuition promotes negativity bias and mitigates the ideological asymmetry in this domain in three underrepresented, non-western samples (Turkey). In line with the previous literature, we defined negativity bias as the tendency to interpret ambiguous faces as threatening. The results of the lab experiment revealed that negativity bias increases under high-cognitive load overall. In addition, this effect was moderated by the participants' political orientation (Experiment 1). In other words, when their cognitive resources were depleted, liberals became more like conservatives in terms of negativity bias. However, we failed to conceptually replicate this effect using time-limit manipulations in two online preregistered experiments during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the baseline negativity bias is thought to be already at peak. Thus, the findings provide no strong evidence for the idea that intuition promotes negativity bias and that liberals use cognitive effort to avoid this perceptual bias.

Analytic and Holistic Thinkers: Differences in the Dynamics of Heart Rate Complexity When Solving a Cognitive Task in Field-Dependent and Field-Independent Conditions

Analytic and holistic thinking styles are known to be associated with individual differences in various aspects of behavior and brain activity. In this study, we tested a hypothesis that differences in thinking styles may also be manifested at the level of neuro-visceral coordination. Heart rate variability (HRV) was compared between analytic and holistic thinkers at rest, during a simple motor choice reaction time task and when solving cognitive choice reaction time tasks in conditions with varying instructions contrasting the role of the field when evaluating objects. Participants (N = 52) with analytic and holistic thinking styles were equally successful at solving the cognitive tasks but response times were longer in the analytic group, compared to the holistic group. Heart rate complexity, as measured by sample entropy, was higher in the analytic group during the cognitive tasks but did not differ from the holistic group at rest or during the simple motor task. Analytic participants had longer response times and higher heart rate complexity when evaluating objects in relation to the field than when evaluating objects irrespective to the field. No difference in response times or heart rate complexity between tasks was observed in the holistic group. Our findings demonstrate that differences in individual behavior, including those related to holistic and analytic thinking styles, can be reflected not only in brain activity, as shown previously using fMRI and EEG methods, but also at the level of neuro-visceral coordination, as manifested in heart rate complexity.

A neurocognitive model of ideological thinking

Ideological behavior has traditionally been viewed as a product of social forces. Nonetheless, an emerging science suggests that ideological worldviews can also be understood in terms of neural and cognitive principles. The article proposes a neurocognitive model of ideological thinking, arguing that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of individuals' perceptual and cognitive systems. This model makes two claims. First, there are neurocognitive antecedents to ideological thinking: the brain's low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence its receptivity to ideological doctrines. Second, there are neurocognitive consequences to ideological engagement: strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can shape perceptual and cognitive systems. This article details the neurocognitive model of ideological thinking and synthesizes the empirical evidence in support of its claims. The model postulates that there are bidirectional processes between the brain and the ideological environment, and so it can address the roles of situational and motivational factors in ideologically motivated action. This endeavor highlights that an interdisciplinary neurocognitive approach to ideologies can facilitate biologically informed accounts of the ideological brain and thus reveal who is most susceptible to extreme and authoritarian ideologies. By investigating the relationships between low-level perceptual processes and high-level ideological attitudes, we can develop a better grasp of our collective history as well as the mechanisms that may structure our political futures.

Why do we pick similar mates, or do we?

Humans often mate with those resembling themselves, a phenomenon described as positive assortative mating (PAM). The causes of this attract broad interest, but there is little agreement on the topic. This may be because empirical studies and reviews sometimes focus on just a few explanations, often based on disciplinary conventions. This review presents an interdisciplinary conceptual framework on the causes of PAM in humans, drawing on human and non-human biology, the social sciences, and the humanities. Viewing causality holistically, we first discuss the proximate causes (i.e. the 'how') of PAM, considering three mechanisms: stratification, convergence and mate choice. We also outline methods to control for confounders when studying mate choice. We then discuss ultimate explanations (i.e. 'the why') for PAM, including adaptive and non-adaptive processes. We conclude by suggesting a focus on interdisciplinarity in future research.

Political Orientation as Psychological Defense or Basic Disposition? A Social Neuroscience Examination

Psychological views on political orientation generally agree that conservatism is associated with negativity bias but disagree on the form of that association. Some view conservatism as a psychological defense that insulates from negative stimuli and events. Others view conservatism as a consequence of increased dispositional sensitivity to negative stimuli and events. Further complicating matters, research shows that conservatives are sometimes more and sometimes less sensitive to negative stimuli and events. The current research integrates these opposing views and results. We reasoned that conservatives should typically be less sensitive to negative stimuli if conservative beliefs act as a psychological defense. However, when core components of conservative beliefs are threatened, the psychological defense may fall, and conservatives may show heightened sensitivity to negative stimuli. In two ERP studies, participants were randomly assigned to either an ostensibly real economic threat or a nonthreatening control condition. To measure reactivity to negative stimuli, we indexed the P3 component to aversive white noise bursts in an auditory oddball paradigm. In both studies, the relationship between increased conservatism and P3 mean amplitude was negative in the control condition but positive in threat condition (this relationship was stronger in Study 2). In Study 2, source localization of the P3 component revealed that, after threat, conservatism was associated with increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, regions associated with conflict-related processes. These results demonstrate that the link between conservatism and negativity bias is context-dependent, i.e., dependent on threat experiences.

Psychophysiology, cognition, and political differences: Guest editors' introduction to the special issue

We introduce the Politics and the Life Sciences special issue on Psychophysiology, Cognition, and Political Differences. This issue represents the second special issue funded by the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences that adheres to the Open Science Framework for registered reports (RR). Here pre-analysis plans (PAPs) are peer-reviewed and given in-principle acceptance (IPA) prior to data being collected and/or analyzed, and are published contingent upon the preregistration of the study being followed as proposed. Bound by a common theme of the importance of incorporating psychophysiological perspectives into the study of politics, broadly defined, the articles in this special issue feature a unique set of research questions and methodologies. In the following, we summarize the findings, discuss the innovations produced by this research, and highlight the importance of open science for the future of political science research.

The impact of COVID-19

BACKGROUND

Behavioral responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have become highly polarized, and public health initiatives often try to use different frames to influence behavior. If the polarization of behaviors is related to differences in responses to frames, then different health messages could be targeted to different groups to influence behavior.

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether risk preferences and susceptibility to gain/loss frames have been affected by COVID-19 and whether they differ along partisan lines.

METHODS

Using repeated cross-sectional data from a nationally representative dataset in the United States replicating the disease outbreak scenario collected before and after the onset of COVID-19, we test whether responsiveness to the gain/loss frames has changed over time and whether the responsiveness varies by political affiliation.

RESULTS

The experimental results show that the risk preferences of the U.S. population is very susceptible to the framing of choices, consistent with the literature finding risk loving preferences under the loss frame and risk aversion under the gain frame. However, the experience of COVID-19 does not appear to have changed the responsiveness, nor are there significant differences between conservatives/Republicans and liberals/Democrats.

CONCLUSION

Targeting different partisan groups with different risk-related message frames is unlikely to be effective at altering behaviors.

Examining the Left-Right Divide Through the Lens of a Global Crisis: Ideological Differences and Their Implications for Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 disease pandemic is one of the most pressing global health issues of our time. Nevertheless, responses to the pandemic exhibit a stark ideological divide, with political conservatives (versus liberals/progressives) expressing less concern about the virus and less behavioral compliance with efforts to combat it. Drawing from decades of research on the psychological underpinnings of ideology, in four studies (total N = 4441) we examine the factors that contribute to the ideological gap in pandemic response-across domains including personality (e.g., empathic concern), attitudes (e.g., trust in science), information (e.g., COVID-19 knowledge), vulnerability (e.g., preexisting medical conditions), demographics (e.g., education, income) and environment (e.g., local COVID-19 infection rates). This work provides insight into the most proximal drivers of this ideological divide and also helps fill a long-standing theoretical and empirical gap regarding how these various ideological differences shape responses to complex real-world sociopolitical events. Among our key findings are the central role of attitude- and belief-related factors (e.g., trust in science and trust in Trump)-and the relatively weaker influence of several domain-general personality factors (empathic concern, disgust sensitivity, conspiratorial ideation). We conclude by considering possible explanations for these findings and their broader implications for our understanding of political ideology.

Left- and Right-Leaning News Organizations Use Negative Emotional Content and Elicit User Engagement Similarly

Negativity has historically dominated news content; however, little research has examined how news organizations use affect on social media, where content is generally positive. In the current project we ask a few questions: Do news organizations on Twitter use negative or positive language and which type of affect garners more engagement on social media? Does the political orientation of news organizations impact the affect expressed and engagement tweets receive on social media? The goal of this project is to examine these questions by investigating tweets of 24 left- and 20 right-leaning news organizations (140,358 tweets). Results indicated that negative affect was expressed more than positive affect. Additionally, negativity predicted engagement with news organizations' tweets, but positivity did not. Finally, there were no differences in affect between left- and right-leaning political orientations. Overall, it appears that for news organizations, negativity is more frequent and more impactful than positivity.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-021-00046-w.

Factors Affecting the Perception of Disability: A Developmental Perspective

Perception of disability is an important construct affecting not only the well-being of individuals with disabilities, but also the moral compass of the society. Negative attitudes toward disability disempower individuals with disabilities and lead to their social exclusion and isolation. By contrast, a healthy society encourages positive attitudes toward individuals with disabilities and promotes social inclusion. The current review explored disability perception in the light of the in-group vs. out-group dichotomy, since individuals with disabilities may be perceived as a special case of out-group. We implemented a developmental approach to study perception of disability from early age into adolescence while exploring cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of children’s attitudes. Potential factors influencing perception of disability were considered at the level of society, family and school environment, and the individual. Better understanding of factors influencing the development of disability perception would allow the design of effective interventions to improve children’s attitudes toward peers with disabilities, reduce intergroup biases, and promote social inclusion. Based on previous research in social and developmental psychology, education, and anthropology, we proposed an integrative model that provides a conceptual framework for understanding the development of disability perception.

The Emotional Foundations of Political Support: How Fear and Anger Affect Trust in the Government in Times of the Covid-19 Pandemic

Crises like the current coronavirus pandemic evoke negative emotions in the general public. To date, however, little research has been conducted on the influence of these mental states on trust in the government - the uncontested key player in times of crises. Drawing on the appraisal and affective intelligence theories of emotions, we argue that fear and anger as the two crucial negative emotions in times of crises have divergent effects on trust in the government: Whereas fear leads to a rally-'round-the-flag effect increasing trust in the government, anger attributes blame for the adverse circumstances to the government. We present empirical evidence for our arguments with an original three-wave online panel survey of 1'600 Swiss residents during the unprecedented times of the coronavirus pandemic. Our analysis provides empirical support for our arguments and further shows that the relationship is strongest for right-wing respondents.

The cognitive and perceptual correlates of ideological attitudes: a data-driven approach

Although human existence is enveloped by ideologies, remarkably little is understood about the relationships between ideological attitudes and psychological traits. Even less is known about how cognitive dispositions-individual differences in how information is perceived and processed- sculpt individuals' ideological worldviews, proclivities for extremist beliefs and resistance (or receptivity) to evidence. Using an unprecedented number of cognitive tasks (n = 37) and personality surveys (n = 22), along with data-driven analyses including drift-diffusion and Bayesian modelling, we uncovered the specific psychological signatures of political, nationalistic, religious and dogmatic beliefs. Cognitive and personality assessments consistently outperformed demographic predictors in accounting for individual differences in ideological preferences by 4 to 15-fold. Furthermore, data-driven analyses revealed that individuals' ideological attitudes mirrored their cognitive decision-making strategies. Conservatism and nationalism were related to greater caution in perceptual decision-making tasks and to reduced strategic information processing, while dogmatism was associated with slower evidence accumulation and impulsive tendencies. Religiosity was implicated in heightened agreeableness and risk perception. Extreme pro-group attitudes, including violence endorsement against outgroups, were linked to poorer working memory, slower perceptual strategies, and tendencies towards impulsivity and sensation-seeking-reflecting overlaps with the psychological profiles of conservatism and dogmatism. Cognitive and personality signatures were also generated for ideologies such as authoritarianism, system justification, social dominance orientation, patriotism and receptivity to evidence or alternative viewpoints; elucidating their underpinnings and highlighting avenues for future research. Together these findings suggest that ideological worldviews may be reflective of low-level perceptual and cognitive functions. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

Psychodynamic and sociopolitical predictors of COVID Distress and Gravity

This study examined the relationship between attachment style and fear of contamination during the COVID-19 pandemic, hypothesizing that anxiously attached participants would be more distressed when their safe space was threatened by someone leaving and returning. During May 2020, n = 355 participants provided demographics, personality, health anxiety scores, attachment styles, political ideology, and attitudes towards the pandemic. In both social media and MTurk subsamples (but not in a subsample from a ListServ of professional psychologists), anxious attachment was a significant predictor of distress above and beyond personality and health anxiety. In addition, political ideology emerged as a consistent predictor of perceptions of the seriousness of COVID-19, even holding the other predictors constant. Understanding an individual's attachment style may be helpful in working with them in their trauma. This research also contributes to early empirical evidence for the impact of political ideology on self-reported attitudes and behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Visceral politics: a theoretical and empirical proof of concept

While the study of affect and emotion has a long history in psychological sciences and neuroscience, the very question of how visceral states have come to the forefront of politics remains poorly understood. The concept of visceral politics captures how the physiological nature of our engagement with the social world influences how we make decisions, just as socio-political forces recruit our physiology to influence our socio-political behaviour. This line of research attempts to bridge the psychophysiological mechanisms that are responsible for our affective states with the historical socio-cultural context in which such states are experienced. We review findings and hypotheses at the intersections of life sciences, social sciences and humanities to shed light on how and why people come to experience such emotions in politics and what if any are their behavioural consequences. To answer these questions, we provide insights from predictive coding accounts of interoception and emotion and a proof of concept experiment to highlight the role of visceral states in political behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

Dispositional Fear and Political Attitudes

Previous work proposes that dispositional fear exists predominantly among political conservatives, generating the appearance that fears align strictly along party lines. This view obscures evolutionary dynamics because fear evolved to protect against myriad threats, not merely those in the political realm. We suggest prior work in this area has been biased by selection on the dependent variable, resulting from an examination of exclusively politically oriented fears that privilege conservative values. Because the adaptation regulating fear should be based upon both universal and ancestral-specific selection pressures combined with developmental and individual differences, the elicitation of it should prove variable across the ideological continuum dependent upon specific combinations of fear and value domains. In a sample of ~ 1,600 Australians assessed with a subset of the Fear Survey Schedule II, we find fears not infused with political content are differentially influential across the political spectrum. Specifically, those who are more fearful of sharp objects, graveyards, and urinating in public are more socially conservative and less supportive of gay rights. Those who are more fearful of death are more supportive of gay rights. Those who are more fearful of suffocating and swimming alone are more concerned about emissions controls and immigration, while those who are more fearful of thunderstorms are also more anti-immigration. Contrary to existing research, both liberals and conservatives are more fearful of different circumstances, and the role of dispositional fears are attitude-specific.

Yikes! Are we disgusted by politicians?

In the political domain, disgust is primarily portrayed as an emotion that explains individual differences in pathogen avoidance. We hypothesized that political rhetoric accusing opponents of moral transgressions also elicits disgust responses. In this registered report, we present the results from a laboratory experiment. We find that participants self-report higher disgust and have stronger physiological (Levator labii) responses to pictures of out-party leaders compared with in-party leaders. Participants also report higher disgust in response to moral violations of in-party leaders. There is more suggestive evidence that in-party leaders evoke more labii activity when they commit moral violations than when out-party leaders do. The impact of individual differences in moral disgust and partisanship strength is very limited to absent. Intriguingly, on average, the physiological and self-reported disgust responses to the treatment are similar, but individuals differ in whether their response is physiological or cognitive. This motivates further theorizing regarding the concordance of emotional responses.

Fusiform Activity Distinguishes Between Subjects With Low and High Xenophobic Attitudes Toward Refugees

This study analyzes how people's attitudes to the European refugee crisis (ERC) correspond to selected psychological state and trait measures and impact the neural processing of media images of refugees. From a large pool of respondents, who filled in an online xenophobia questionnaire, we selected two groups (total N = 38) with the same socio-demographic background, but with opposite attitudes toward refugees. We found that a negative attitude toward refugees (high xenophobia - HX) was associated with a significantly higher conscientiousness score and with a higher trait aggression and hostility, but there was no group effect connected with empathy, fear, and anxiety measures. At the neural level we found that brain activity during the presentation of ERC stimuli is affected by xenophobic attitudes—with more xenophobic subjects exhibiting a higher BOLD response in the left fusiform gyrus. However, while the fMRI results demonstrate increased attention and vigilance toward ERC-related stimuli in the HX group, they do not show differentiated patterns of brain activity associated with perception of dehumanized outgroup.

Political attitudes vary with detection of androstenone

Building on a growing body of research suggesting that political attitudes are part of broader individual and biological orientations, we test whether the detection of the hormone androstenone is predictive of political attitudes. The particular social chemical analyzed in this study is androstenone, a nonandrogenic steroid found in the sweat and saliva of many mammals, including humans. A primary reason for scholarly interest in odor detection is that it varies so dramatically from person to person. Using participants' self-reported perceptions of androstenone intensity, together with a battery of survey items testing social and political preferences and orientations, this research supports the idea that perceptions of androstenone intensity relate to political orientations-most notably, preferences for social order-lending further support to theories positing the influence of underlying biological traits on sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors.

Political psychophysiology A primer for interested researchers and consumers

The past decade has seen a rapid increase in the number of studies employing psychophysiological methods to explain variation in political attitudes and behavior. However, the collection, analysis, and interpretation of physiological data present novel challenges for political scientists unfamiliar with the underlying biological concepts and technical skills necessary for utilizing this approach. Our objective in this article is to maximize the effectiveness of future work utilizing psychophysiological measurement by providing guidance on how the techniques can be employed most fruitfully as a complement to, not a replacement for, existing methods. We develop clear, step-by-step instructions for how physiological research should be conducted and provide a discussion of the issues commonly faced by scholars working with these measures. Our hope is that this article will be a useful resource for both neophytes and experienced scholars in lowering the start-up costs to doing this work and assessing it as part of the peer review process. More broadly, in the spirit of the open science framework, we aim to foster increased communication, collaboration, and replication of findings across political science labs utilizing psychophysiological methods.

Ideology and social cognition Are liberals and conservatives differentially affected by social cues about group inequality?

Research links liberal and conservative ideological orientations with variation on psychological and cognitive characteristics that are important for perceptual processes and decision-making. This study investigates whether this variation can impact the social behaviors of liberals and conservatives. A sample of subjects (n = 1,245) participated in a modified public goods game in which an intragroup inequality was introduced to observe the effect on individuals' tendency toward self-interested versus prosocial behavior. Overall, the contributions of neither liberal- nor conservative-oriented individuals were affected by conditions of a general intragroup inequality. However, in response to the knowledge that group members voted to redress the inequality, levels of contribution among liberals significantly increased in comparison to the control. This was not true for conservatives. The results provide evidence that differences in ideological orientation are associated with individual differences in social cognition.

Conservatives and liberals have similar physiological responses to threats

About a decade ago, a study documented that conservatives have stronger physiological responses to threatening stimuli than liberals. This work launched an approach aimed at uncovering the biological roots of ideology. Despite wide-ranging scientific and popular impact, independent laboratories have not replicated the study. We conducted a pre-registered direct replication (n = 202) and conceptual replications in the United States (n = 352) and the Netherlands (n = 81). Our analyses do not support the conclusions of the original study, nor do we find evidence for broader claims regarding the effect of disgust and the existence of a physiological trait. Rather than studying unconscious responses as the real predispositions, alignment between conscious and unconscious responses promises deeper insights into the emotional roots of ideology.

Protective Gun Ownership as a Coping Mechanism

Firearms are one of the central flashpoints in American life, and yet the motivations underlying their ownership have been generally understudied by psychologists. In this article, I review work from across the social sciences to model the psychological utility that people get from gun ownership. I propose the coping model of protective gun ownership and argue that those who own their weapon for protection are using their gun symbolically as an aid to manage psychological threats-to their safety, control, and sense of belongingness-that come from their belief that the world is a dangerous place and that society will not keep them safe. I discuss the ramifications of this coping strategy and present a research agenda for exploring this framework.

The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology

Research over the last fifty years has suggested that political attitudes and values around the globe are shaped by two ideological dimensions, often referred to as economic and social conservatism. However, it remains unclear why this ideological structure exists. Here we highlight the striking concordance between these dual dimensions of ideology and independent convergent evidence for two key shifts in the evolution of human group living. First, humans began to cooperate more and across wider interdependent networks. Second, humans became more group-minded, conforming to social norms in culturally marked groups and punishing norm-violators. We propose that fitness trade-offs and behavioural plasticity have maintained functional variation in willingness to cooperate and conform within modern human groups, naturally giving rise to the two dimensions of political ideology. Supported by evidence from across the behavioural sciences, this evolutionary framework provides insight into the biological and cultural basis of political ideology.

Of deadly beans and risky stocks: Political ideology and attitude formation via exploration depend on the nature of the attitude stimuli

An attitude formation task examined how conservatives and liberals explore information about novel stimuli and form attitudes towards them. When framed as the BeanFest game, conservatives sampled fewer beans and exhibited a stronger learning asymmetry (i.e., better learning for negative than positive beans) than liberals. This has been taken as strong evidence that conservatives are more sensitive to negative stimuli than liberals. We argue that the learning asymmetry and sampling bias by conservatives is due to framing of the game. In addition to the BeanFest, we framed the game as StockFest (i.e., a stock market game) where participants learned about novel stocks. We replicated the pronounced learning asymmetry for conservatives in the BeanFest game, but found a pronounced learning asymmetry for liberals in the StockFest game. We suggest that conservatives and liberals are equally sensitive to negative stimuli but in different domains.

Cross-national evidence of a negativity bias in psychophysiological reactions to news

News coverage of current affairs is predominantly negative. American accounts of this tendency tend to focus on journalistic practices, but this cannot easily account for negative news content around the world. It is more likely that negativity in news is a product of a human tendency to be more attentive to negative news content. Just how widespread is this tendency? Our evidence suggest that, all around the world, the average human is more physiologically activated by negative than by positive news stories. Even so, there is a great deal of variation across individuals. The latter finding is of real significance for newsmakers: Especially in a diversified media environment, news producers should not underestimate the audience for positive news content.

What accounts for the prevalence of negative news content? One answer may lie in the tendency for humans to react more strongly to negative than positive information. “Negativity biases” in human cognition and behavior are well documented, but existing research is based on small Anglo-American samples and stimuli that are only tangentially related to our political world. This work accordingly reports results from a 17-country, 6-continent experimental study examining psychophysiological reactions to real video news content. Results offer the most comprehensive cross-national demonstration of negativity biases to date, but they also serve to highlight considerable individual-level variation in responsiveness to news content. Insofar as our results make clear the pervasiveness of negativity biases on average, they help account for the tendency for audience-seeking news around the world to be predominantly negative. Insofar as our results highlight individual-level variation, however, they highlight the potential for more positive content, and suggest that there may be reason to reconsider the conventional journalistic wisdom that “if it bleeds, it leads.”