Has Epizootic Become Enzootic? Evidence for a Fundamental Change in the Infection Dynamics of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Europe, 2021

Pigs are highly susceptible to but do not transmit mink-derived highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b

ABSTRACTRapid evolution of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) is driven by antigenic drift but also by reassortment, which might result in robust replication in and transmission to mammals. Recently, spillover of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV to mammals including humans, and their transmission between mammalian species has been reported. This study aimed to evaluate the pathogenicity and transmissibility of a mink-derived clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV isolate from Spain in pigs. Experimental infection caused interstitial pneumonia with necrotizing bronchiolitis with high titers of virus present in the lower respiratory tract and 100% seroconversion. Infected pigs shed limited amount of virus, and importantly, there was no transmission to contact pigs. Notably, critical mammalian-like adaptations such as PB2-E627 K and HA-Q222L emerged at low frequencies in principal-infected pigs. It is concluded that pigs are highly susceptible to infection with the mink-derived clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV and provide a favorable environment for HPAIV to acquire mammalian-like adaptations.

Reframing wildlife disease management problems with decision analysis

Contemporary wildlife disease management is complex because managers need to respond to a wide range of stakeholders, multiple uncertainties, and difficult trade-offs that characterize the interconnected challenges of today. Despite general acknowledgment of these complexities, managing wildlife disease tends to be framed as a scientific problem, in which the major challenge is lack of knowledge. The complex and multifactorial process of decision-making is collapsed into a scientific endeavor to reduce uncertainty. As a result, contemporary decision-making may be oversimplified, rely on simple heuristics, and fail to account for the broader legal, social, and economic context in which the decisions are made. Concurrently, scientific research on wildlife disease may be distant from this decision context, resulting in information that may not be directly relevant to the pertinent management questions. We propose reframing wildlife disease management challenges as decision problems and addressing them with decision analytical tools to divide the complex problems into more cognitively manageable elements. In particular, structured decision-making has the potential to improve the quality, rigor, and transparency of decisions about wildlife disease in a variety of systems. Examples of management of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, white-nose syndrome, avian influenza, and chytridiomycosis illustrate the most common impediments to decision-making, including competing objectives, risks, prediction uncertainty, and limited resources.

Avian influenza viruses in wild birds in Canada following incursions of highly pathogenic H5N1 virus from Eurasia in 2021-2022

Following the detection of novel highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in Newfoundland, Canada, in late 2021, avian influenza virus (AIV) surveillance in wild birds was scaled up across Canada. Herein, we present the results of Canada's Interagency Surveillance Program for Avian Influenza in Wild Birds during the first year (November 2021-November 2022) following the incursions of HPAIV from Eurasia. The key objectives of the surveillance program were to (i) identify the presence, distribution, and spread of HPAIV and other AIVs; (ii) identify wild bird morbidity and mortality associated with HPAIV; (iii) identify the range of wild bird species infected by HPAIV; and (iv) genetically characterize detected AIV. A total of 6,246 sick and dead wild birds were tested, of which 27.4% were HPAIV positive across 12 taxonomic orders and 80 species. Geographically, HPAIV detections occurred in all Canadian provinces and territories, with the highest numbers in the Atlantic and Central Flyways. Temporally, peak detections differed across flyways, though the national peak occurred in April 2022. In an additional 11,295 asymptomatic harvested or live-captured wild birds, 5.2% were HPAIV positive across 3 taxonomic orders and 19 species. Whole-genome sequencing identified HPAIV of Eurasian origin as most prevalent in the Atlantic Flyway, along with multiple reassortants of mixed Eurasian and North American origins distributed across Canada, with moderate structuring at the flyway scale. Wild birds were victims and reservoirs of HPAIV H5N1 2.3.4.4b, underscoring the importance of surveillance encompassing samples from sick and dead, as well as live and harvested birds, to provide insights into the dynamics and potential impacts of the HPAIV H5N1 outbreak. This dramatic shift in the presence and distribution of HPAIV in wild birds in Canada highlights a need for sustained investment in wild bird surveillance and collaboration across interagency partners.

IMPORTANCE

We present the results of Canada's Interagency Surveillance Program for Avian Influenza in Wild Birds in the year following the first detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 on the continent. The surveillance program tested over 17,000 wild birds, both sick and apparently healthy, which revealed spatiotemporal and taxonomic patterns in HPAIV prevalence and mortality across Canada. The significant shift in the presence and distribution of HPAIV in Canada's wild birds underscores the need for sustained investment in wild bird surveillance and collaboration across One Health partners.

Multiple transatlantic incursions of highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N5) virus into North America and spillover to mammals

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have spread at an unprecedented scale, leading to mass mortalities in birds and mammals. In 2023, a transatlantic incursion of HPAI A(H5N5) viruses into North America was detected, followed shortly thereafter by a mammalian detection. As these A(H5N5) viruses were similar to contemporary viruses described in Eurasia, the transatlantic spread of A(H5N5) viruses was most likely facilitated by pelagic seabirds. Some of the Canadian A(H5N5) viruses from birds and mammals possessed the PB2-E627K substitution known to facilitate adaptation to mammals. Ferrets inoculated with A(H5N5) viruses showed rapid, severe disease onset, with some evidence of direct contact transmission. However, these viruses have maintained receptor binding traits of avian influenza viruses and were susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir. Understanding the factors influencing the virulence and transmission of A(H5N5) in migratory birds and mammals is critical to minimize impacts on wildlife and public health.

Mapping the risk of introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza to Swedish poultry

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) have resulted in severe economic impact for national governments and poultry industries globally and in Sweden in recent years. Veterinary authorities can enforce prevention measures, e.g. mandatory indoor housing of poultry, in HPAI high-risk areas. The aim of this study was to conduct a spatiotemporal mapping of the risk of introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to Swedish poultry from wild birds, utilising existing data sources. A raster calculation method was used to assess the spatiotemporal risk of introduction of HPAIV to Swedish poultry. The environmental infectious pressure of HPAIV was first calculated in each 5 km by 5 km cell using four risk factors: density of selected species of wild birds, air temperature, presence of agriculture as land cover and presence of HPAI in wild birds based on data from October 2016-September 2021. The relative importance of each risk factor was weighted based on opinion of experts. The estimated environmental infectious pressure was then multiplied with poultry population density to obtain risk values for risk of introduction of HPAIV to poultry. The results showed a large variation in risk both on national and local level. The counties of Skåne and Östergötland particularly stood out regarding environmental infectious pressure, risk of introduction to poultry and detected outbreaks of HPAI. On the other hand, there were counties, identified as having higher risk of introduction to poultry which never experienced any outbreaks. A possible explanation is the variation in poultry production types present in different areas of Sweden. These results indicate that the national and local variation in risk for HPAIV introduction to poultry in Sweden is high, and this would support more targeted compulsory prevention measures than what has previously been employed in Sweden. With the current and evolving HPAI situation in Europe and on the global level, there is a need for continuous updates to the risk map as the virus evolves and circulates in different wild bird species. The study also identified areas of improvement, in relation to data use and data availability, e.g. improvements to poultry registers, inclusion of citizen reported mortality in wild birds, data from standardised wild bird surveys, wild bird migration data as well as results from ongoing risk-factor studies.

Using an adaptive modeling framework to identify avian influenza spillover risk at the wild-domestic interface

The wild to domestic bird interface is an important nexus for emergence and transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses. Although the recent incursion of HPAI H5N1 Clade 2.3.4.4b into North America calls for emergency response and planning given the unprecedented scale, readily available data-driven models are lacking. Here, we provide high resolution spatial and temporal transmission risk models for the contiguous United States. Considering virus host ecology, we included weekly species-level wild waterfowl (Anatidae) abundance and endemic low pathogenic avian influenza virus prevalence metrics in combination with number of poultry farms per commodity type and relative biosecurity risks at two spatial scales: 3 km and county-level. Spillover risk varied across the annual cycle of waterfowl migration and some locations exhibited persistent risk throughout the year given higher poultry production. Validation using wild bird introduction events identified by phylogenetic analysis from 2022 to 2023 HPAI poultry outbreaks indicate strong model performance. The modular nature of our approach lends itself to building upon updated datasets under evolving conditions, testing hypothetical scenarios, or customizing results with proprietary data. This research demonstrates an adaptive approach for developing models to inform preparedness and response as novel outbreaks occur, viruses evolve, and additional data become available.

Assessing avian influenza surveillance intensity in wild birds using a One Health lens

Wildlife disease surveillance, particularly for pathogens with zoonotic potential such as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (HPAIV), is critical to facilitate situational awareness, inform risk, and guide communication and response efforts within a One Health framework. This study evaluates the intensity of avian influenza virus (AIV) surveillance in Ontario's wild bird population following the 2021 H5N1 incursion into Canada. Analyzing 2562 samples collected between November 1, 2021, and October 31, 2022, in Ontario, Canada, we identify spatial variations in surveillance intensity relative to human population density, poultry facility density, and wild mallard abundance. Using the spatial scan statistic, we pinpoint areas where public engagement, collaborations with Indigenous and non-Indigenous hunter/harvesters, and working with poultry producers, could augment Ontario's AIV wild bird surveillance program. Enhanced surveillance at these human-domestic animal-wildlife interfaces is a crucial element of a One Health approach to AIV surveillance. Ongoing assessment of our wild bird surveillance programs is essential for strategic planning and will allow us to refine approaches and generate results that continue to support the program's overarching objective of safeguarding the health of people, animals, and ecosystems.

Assessment of Survival Kinetics for Emergent Highly Pathogenic Clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx Avian Influenza Viruses

High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) cause high morbidity and mortality in poultry species. HPAIV prevalence means high numbers of infected wild birds could lead to spill over events for farmed poultry. How these pathogens survive in the environment is important for disease maintenance and potential dissemination. We evaluated the temperature-associated survival kinetics for five clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx HPAIVs (UK field strains between 2014 and 2021) incubated at up to three temperatures for up to ten weeks. The selected temperatures represented northern European winter (4 °C) and summer (20 °C); and a southern European summer temperature (30 °C). For each clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIV, the time in days to reduce the viral infectivity by 90% at temperature T was established (DT), showing that a lower incubation temperature prolonged virus survival (stability), where DT ranged from days to weeks. The fastest loss of viral infectivity was observed at 30 °C. Extrapolation of the graphical DT plots to the x-axis intercept provided the corresponding time to extinction for viral decay. Statistical tests of the difference between the DT values and extinction times of each clade 2.3.4.4 strain at each temperature indicated that the majority displayed different survival kinetics from the other strains at 4 °C and 20 °C.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5 Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Birds and Mammals

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are highly contagious respiratory viruses of birds, leading to significant morbidity and mortality globally and causing substantial economic losses to the poultry industry and agriculture. Since their first isolation in 2013-2014, the Asian-origin H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) of clade 2.3.4.4b have undergone unprecedented evolution and reassortment of internal gene segments. In just a few years, it supplanted other AIV clades, and now it is widespread in the wild migratory waterfowl, spreading to Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Wild waterfowl, the natural reservoir of LPAIVs and generally more resistant to the disease, also manifested high morbidity and mortality with HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4b. This clade also caused overt clinical signs and mass mortality in a variety of avian and mammalian species never reported before, such as raptors, seabirds, sealions, foxes, and others. Most notably, the recent outbreaks in dairy cattle were associated with the emergence of a few critical mutations related to mammalian adaptation, raising concerns about the possibility of jumping species and acquisition of sustained human-to-human transmission. The main clinical signs and anatomopathological findings associated with clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in birds and non-human mammals are hereby summarized.

Spatio-temporal dynamics and drivers of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in Chile

Introduction

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b (hereafter H5N1) is causing vast impacts on biodiversity and poultry around the globe. In Chile, lethal H5N1 cases have been reported in a wide range of wild bird species, marine mammals, backyard and industrial poultry, and humans. This study describes the spatio-temporal patterns of the current epizootic of H5N1 in Chile and test drivers that could be associated with outbreak occurrence.

Methods

We used H5N1 cases reported by the Chilean National Animal Health Authority from 5 December 2022 to 5 April 2023. These included wild bird cases confirmed through an avian influenza-specific real-time reverse transcription PCR assay (RT-qPCR), obtained from passive and active surveillance. Data were analyzed to detect the presence of H5N1 clusters under space-time permutation probability modeling, the association of H5N1 with distance and days since the first outbreak through linear regression, and the correlation of H5N1 presence with a number of ecological and anthropogenic variables using general linear modeling.

Results

From 445 H5N1 identified outbreaks involving 613 individual cases in wild birds, a consistent wave-like spread of H5N1 from north to south was identified, which may help predict hotspots of outbreak risk. For instance, seven statistically significant clusters were identified in central and northern Chile, where poultry production and wildlife mortality are concentrated. The presence of outbreaks was correlated with landscape-scale variables, notably temperature range, bird richness, and human footprint.

Discussion

In less than a year, H5N1 has been associated with the unusual mortality of >100,000 individuals of wild animals in Chile, mainly coastal birds and marine mammals. It is urgent that scientists, the poultry sector, local communities, and national health authorities co-design and implement science-based measures from a One Health perspective to avoid further H5N1 spillover from wildlife to domestic animals and humans, including rapid removal and proper disposal of wild dead animals and the closure of public areas (e.g., beaches) reporting high wildlife mortalities.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 infection in skua and gulls in the United Kingdom, 2022

The reemergence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtype H5N1 in the United Kingdom in 2021-2022 has caused unprecedented epizootic events in wild birds and poultry. During the summer of 2022, there was a shift in virus transmission dynamics resulting in increased HPAIV infection in seabirds, and consequently, a profound impact on seabird populations. To understand the pathological impact of HPAIV in seabirds, we evaluated the virus antigen distribution and associated pathological changes in the tissues of great skua (Stercorarius skua, n = 8), long-tailed skua (Stercorarius longicaudus, n = 1), European herring gull (Larus argentatus, n = 5), and black-headed gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus, n = 4), which succumbed to natural infection of HPAIV during the summer of 2022. Cases were collected from Shetland, including Scatness (mainland), No Ness (mainland), Clumlie (mainland), Hermaness (island), Fair Isle (island), Noss (island), and the West Midlands, South East, and South West of England. Grossly, gizzard ulceration was observed in one great skua and pancreatic necrosis was observed in 4 herring gulls, with intralesional viral antigen detected subsequently. Microscopical analysis revealed neuro-, pneumo-, lymphoid-, and cardiomyotropism of HPAIV H5N1, with the most common virus-associated pathological changes being pancreatic and splenic necrosis. Examination of the reproductive tract of the great skua revealed HPAIV-associated oophoritis and salpingitis, and virus replication within the oviductal epithelium. The emergence of HPAIV in seabirds Stercorariidae and Laridae, particularly during summer 2022, has challenged the dogma of HPAIV dynamics, posing a significant threat to wild bird life with potential implications for the reproductive performance of seabirds of conservation importance.

Iceland: an underestimated hub for the spread of high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in the North Atlantic

High-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the goose/Guangdong lineage are enzootically circulating in wild bird populations worldwide. This increases the risk of entry into poultry production and spill-over to mammalian species, including humans. Better understanding of the ecological and epizootiological networks of these viruses is essential to optimize mitigation measures. Based on full genome sequences of 26 HPAIV samples from Iceland, which were collected between spring and autumn 2022, as well as 1 sample from the 2023 summer period, we show that 3 different genotypes of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b were circulating within the wild bird population in Iceland in 2022. Furthermore, in 2023 we observed a novel introduction of HPAIV H5N5 of the same clade to Iceland. The data support the role of Iceland as an utmost northwestern distribution area in Europe that might act also as a potential bridging point for intercontinental spread of HPAIV across the North Atlantic.

High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe-Why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict

Since 2016, A(H5Nx) high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of clade 2.3.4.4b has become one of the most serious global threats not only to wild and domestic birds, but also to public health. In recent years, important changes in the ecology, epidemiology, and evolution of this virus have been reported, with an unprecedented global diffusion and variety of affected birds and mammalian species. After the two consecutive and devastating epidemic waves in Europe in 2020-2021 and 2021-2022, with the second one recognized as one of the largest epidemics recorded so far, this clade has begun to circulate endemically in European wild bird populations. This study used the complete genomes of 1,956 European HPAI A(H5Nx) viruses to investigate the virus evolution during this varying epidemiological outline. We investigated the spatiotemporal patterns of A(H5Nx) virus diffusion to/from and within Europe during the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 epidemic waves, providing evidence of ongoing changes in transmission dynamics and disease epidemiology. We demonstrated the high genetic diversity of the circulating viruses, which have undergone frequent reassortment events, providing for the first time a complete overview and a proposed nomenclature of the multiple genotypes circulating in Europe in 2020-2022. We described the emergence of a new genotype with gull adapted genes, which offered the virus the opportunity to occupy new ecological niches, driving the disease endemicity in the European wild bird population. The high propensity of the virus for reassortment, its jumps to a progressively wider number of host species, including mammals, and the rapid acquisition of adaptive mutations make the trend of virus evolution and spread difficult to predict in this unfailing evolving scenario.

Divergent Pathogenesis and Transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in Swine

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have potential to cross species barriers and cause pandemics. Since 2022, HPAI A(H5N1) belonging to the goose/Guangdong 2.3.4.4b hemagglutinin phylogenetic clade have infected poultry, wild birds, and mammals across North America. Continued circulation in birds and infection of multiple mammalian species with strains possessing adaptation mutations increase the risk for infection and subsequent reassortment with influenza A viruses endemic in swine. We assessed the susceptibility of swine to avian and mammalian HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strains using a pathogenesis and transmission model. All strains replicated in the lung of pigs and caused lesions consistent with influenza A infection. However, viral replication in the nasal cavity and transmission was only observed with mammalian isolates. Mammalian adaptation and reassortment may increase the risk for incursion and transmission of HPAI viruses in feral, backyard, or commercial swine.

Genetic Diversity of Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Waterbirds in Northeast Italy Using Two Different Sampling Strategies

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs), which circulate endemically in wild aquatic birds, pose a significant threat to poultry and raise concerns for their zoonotic potential. From August 2021 to April 2022, a multi-site cross-sectional study involving active AIV epidemiological monitoring was conducted in wetlands of the Emilia-Romagna region, northern Italy, adjacent to densely populated poultry areas. A total of 129 cloacal swab samples (CSs) and 407 avian faecal droppings samples (FDs) were collected, with 7 CSs (5.4%) and 4 FDs (1%) testing positive for the AIV matrix gene through rRT-PCR. A COI-barcoding protocol was applied to recognize the species of origin of AIV-positive FDs. Multiple low-pathogenic AIV subtypes were identified, and five of these were isolated, including an H5N3, an H1N1, and three H9N2 in wild ducks. Following whole-genome sequencing, phylogenetic analyses of the hereby obtained strains showed close genetic relationships with AIVs detected in countries along the Black Sea/Mediterranean migratory flyway. Notably, none of the analyzed gene segments were genetically related to HPAI H5N1 viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b isolated from Italian poultry during the concurrent 2021-2022 epidemic. Overall, the detected AIV genetic diversity emphasizes the necessity for ongoing monitoring in wild hosts using diverse sampling strategies and whole-genome sequencing.

Incursion of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus, Brazil, 2023

We report 4 highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4.b viruses in samples collected during June 2023 from Royal terns and Cabot's terns in Brazil. Phylodynamic analysis revealed viral movement from Peru to Brazil, indicating a concerning spread of this clade along the Atlantic Americas migratory bird flyway.

Targeted genomic sequencing of avian influenza viruses in wetland sediment from wild bird habitats

Diverse influenza A viruses (IAVs) circulate in wild birds, including highly pathogenic strains that infect poultry and humans. Consequently, surveillance of IAVs in wild birds is a cornerstone of agricultural biosecurity and pandemic preparedness. Surveillance is traditionally done by testing wild birds directly, but obtaining these specimens is labor intensive, detection rates can be low, and sampling is often biased toward certain avian species. As a result, local incursions of dangerous IAVs are rarely detected before outbreaks begin. Testing environmental specimens from wild bird habitats has been proposed as an alternative surveillance strategy. These specimens are thought to contain diverse IAVs deposited by a broad range of avian hosts, including species that are not typically sampled by surveillance programs. To enable this surveillance strategy, we developed a targeted genomic sequencing method for characterizing IAVs in these challenging environmental specimens. It combines custom hybridization probes, unique molecular index-based library construction, and purpose-built bioinformatic tools, allowing IAV genomic material to be enriched and analyzed with single-fragment resolution. We demonstrated our method on 90 sediment specimens from wetlands around Vancouver, Canada. We recovered 2,312 IAV genome fragments originating from all eight IAV genome segments. Eleven hemagglutinin subtypes and nine neuraminidase subtypes were detected, including H5, the current global surveillance priority. Our results demonstrate that targeted genomic sequencing of environmental specimens from wild bird habitats could become a valuable complement to avian influenza surveillance programs.IMPORTANCEIn this study, we developed genome sequencing tools for characterizing avian influenza viruses in sediment from wild bird habitats. These tools enable an environment-based approach to avian influenza surveillance. This could improve early detection of dangerous strains in local wild birds, allowing poultry producers to better protect their flocks and prevent human exposures to potential pandemic threats. Furthermore, we purposefully developed these methods to contend with viral genomic material that is diluted, fragmented, incomplete, and derived from multiple strains and hosts. These challenges are common to many environmental specimens, making these methods broadly applicable for genomic pathogen surveillance in diverse contexts.

Enzootic Circulation, Massive Gull Mortality and Poultry Outbreaks during the 2022/2023 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 Season in the Czech Republic

In 2022/2023, Europe experienced its third consecutive season of high-pathogenicity avian influenza. During this period, the Czech Republic was again severely affected. For the first time, the number of culled birds approached one million, which was three times higher than in previous seasons. In parallel to the outbreaks in poultry, mass die-offs of gulls were also observed. In the present study, we performed whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of 137 H5N1 strains collected in the Czech Republic in 2022/2023 (94.6% of all outbreaks or locations). The analysis revealed four distinct genotypes: AB, CH, BB and AF. Phylogenetic analysis suggested that the AF genotype persisted from the previous H5N1 season without reassortment. In addition, the genotype BB, which was detected mainly in gulls, showed a noticeable strain diversity at the local level. This virus was also responsible for a single outbreak in commercially bred turkeys. Finally, an interesting spatio-temporal cluster with three co-circulating H5N1 genotypes, AB, CH and AF, was identified with no evidence of intrasubtype reassortment. Highly sensitive molecular surveillance and the timely sharing of genomic sequences and associated metadata could greatly assist in tracking the spread and detecting molecular changes associated with the increased virulence of this potentially zoonotic pathogen.

Genetic Analysis of H5N1 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus following a Mass Mortality Event in Wild Geese on the Solway Firth

The United Kingdom (UK) and Europe have seen successive outbreaks of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) since 2020 peaking in the autumn/winter periods. During the 2021/22 season, a mass die-off event of Svalbard Barnacle Geese (Branta leucopsis) was observed on the Solway Firth, a body of water on the west coast border between England and Scotland. This area is used annually by Barnacle Geese to over-winter, before returning to Svalbard to breed. Following initial identification of HPAIV in a Barnacle Goose on 8 November 2021, up to 32% of the total Barnacle Goose population may have succumbed to disease by the end of March 2022, along with other wild bird species in the area. Potential adaptation of the HPAIV to the Barnacle Goose population within this event was evaluated. Whole-genome sequencing of thirty-three HPAIV isolates from wild bird species demonstrated that there had been two distinct incursions of the virus, but the two viruses had remained genetically stable within the population, whilst viruses from infected wild birds were closely related to those from poultry cases occurring in the same region. Analysis of sera from the following year demonstrated that a high percentage (76%) of returning birds had developed antibodies to H5 AIV. This study demonstrates genetic stability of this strain of HPAIV in wild Anseriformes, and that, at the population scale, whilst there is a significant impact on survival, a high proportion of birds recover following infection.

Effect of 2020-21 and 2021-22 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Epidemics on Wild Birds, the Netherlands

The number of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5-related infections and deaths of wild birds in Europe was high during October 1, 2020-September 30, 2022. To quantify deaths among wild species groups with known susceptibility for HPAI H5 during those epidemics, we collected and recorded mortality data of wild birds in the Netherlands. HPAI virus infection was reported in 51 bird species. The species with the highest numbers of reported dead and infected birds varied per epidemic year; in 2020-21, they were within the Anatidae family, in particular barnacle geese (Branta leucopsis) and in 2021-22, they were within the sea bird group, particularly Sandwich terns (Thalasseus sandvicensis) and northern gannet (Morus bassanus). Because of the difficulty of anticipating and modeling the future trends of HPAI among wild birds, we recommend monitoring live and dead wild birds as a tool for surveillance of the changing dynamics of HPAI.

Transmission dynamics and pathogenesis differ between pheasants and partridges infected with clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 and H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses

During the UK 2020-2021 epizootic of H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs), high mortality occurred during incursions in commercially farmed common pheasants (Phasianus colchicus). Two pheasant farms, affected separately by H5N8 and H5N1 subtypes, included adjacently housed red-legged partridges (Alectoris rufa), which appeared to be unaffected. Despite extensive ongoing epizootics, H5Nx HPAIV partridge outbreaks were not reported during 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 in the UK, so it is postulated that partridges are more resistant to HPAIV infection than other gamebirds. To assess this, pathogenesis and both intra- and inter-species transmission of UK pheasant-origin H5N8-2021 and H5N1-2021 HPAIVs were investigated. Onward transmission to chickens was also assessed to better understand the risk of spread from gamebirds to other commercial poultry sectors. A lower infectious dose was required to infect pheasants with H5N8-2021 compared to H5N1-2021. However, HPAIV systemic dissemination to multiple organs within pheasants was more rapid following infection with H5N1-2021 than H5N8-2021, with the former attaining generally higher viral RNA levels in tissues. Intraspecies transmission to contact pheasants was successful for both viruses and associated with viral environmental contamination, while interspecies transmission to a first chicken-contact group was also efficient. However, further onward transmission to additional chicken contacts was only achieved with H5N1-2021. Intra-partridge transmission was only successful when high-dose H5N1-2021 was administered, while partridges inoculated with H5N8-2021 failed to shed and transmit, although extensive tissue tropism was observed for both viruses. Mortalities among infected partridges featured a longer incubation period compared to that in pheasants, for both viruses. Therefore, the susceptibility of different gamebird species and pathogenicity outcomes to the ongoing H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIVs varies, but pheasants represent a greater likelihood of H5Nx HPAIV introduction into galliforme poultry settings. Consequently, viral maintenance within gamebird populations and risks to poultry species warrant enhanced investigation.

Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Neuraminidase Inhibition Antibodies in Healthy Adults after Exposure to Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09

We detected high titers of cross-reactive neuraminidase inhibition antibodies to influenza A(H5N1) virus clade 2.3.4.4b in 96.8% (61/63) of serum samples from healthy adults in Hong Kong in 2020. In contrast, antibodies at low titers were detected in 42% (21/50) of serum samples collected in 2009. Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H5N1) titers were correlated.

High number of HPAI H5 virus infections and antibodies in wild carnivores in the Netherlands, 2020-2022

In October 2020, a new lineage of a clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI virus of the H5 subtype emerged in Europe, resulting in the largest global outbreak of HPAI to date, with unprecedented mortality in wild birds and poultry. The virus appears to have become enzootic in birds, continuously yielding novel HPAI virus variants. The recently increased abundance of infected birds worldwide increases the probability of bird-mammal contact, particularly in wild carnivores. Here, we performed molecular and serological screening of over 500 dead wild carnivores and sequencing of RNA positive materials. We show virological evidence for HPAI H5 virus infection in 0.8%, 1.4%, and 9.9% of animals tested in 2020, 2021, and 2022 respectively, with the highest proportion of positives in foxes, polecats and stone martens. We obtained near full genomes of 7 viruses and detected PB2 amino acid substitutions known to play a role in mammalian adaptation in three sequences. Infections were also found in without neurological signs or mortality. Serological evidence for infection was detected in 20% of the study population. These findings suggests that a high proportion of wild carnivores is infected but undetected in current surveillance programmes. We recommend increased surveillance in susceptible mammals, irrespective of neurological signs or encephalitis.

Annual report on surveillance for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds in Member States of the European Union in 2022

All European Union (EU) Member States (MSs) are required to implement surveillance for avian influenza (AI) in poultry and wild birds and (i) to notify the outbreaks, when relevant and (ii) to report the results to the responsible authority. In addition, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) also implement ongoing surveillance programmes to monitor occurrences of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in poultry and wild birds. EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to collate, validate, analyse and summarise the data resulting from these AI surveillance programmes in an annual report. The present report summarises the results of the surveillance activities carried out in MSs, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) in 2022. Overall, the 31 reporting countries (RCs) sampled 22,171 poultry establishments (PEs) during the 2022 surveillance activity: 18,490 PEs were sampled for serological testing and 3775 were sampled for virological testing. Some PEs were therefore sampled for both type of analytical methods. Out of the 18,490 PEs sampled for serological testing, 15 (0.08%) were seropositive for influenza A(H5) viruses. Out of the 3775 PEs sampled for virological testing, 74 PEs (1.96%) were positive to the virological assay for influenza A(H5) viruses. Seropositive PEs were found in four RCs (Belgium, Poland, Spain and Sweden) and as in previous years, the highest percentages of seropositive PEs were found in PEs raising breeding geese and waterfowl game birds. Out of these 15 seropositive PEs, 3 also tested positive by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for influenza A (H5) viruses - 2 for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) and 1 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) (H5N3). In relation to the virological surveys, 10 RCs (32%) out of the 31 reported the detection of A (H5) viruses in 74 PEs, covering 12 different poultry categories. More specifically, 54 reported HPAIV A(H5N1), 17 HPAIV (H5N8), 2 AIV (H5N1) with unknown virus pathogenicity and 1 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) (H5N3). Additionally, six PEs tested positive for undefined AIVs in three RCs. A total of 32,143 wild birds were sampled, with 4163 (12.95%) wild birds testing positive for HPAIVs by PCR, from 25 RCs. In contrast to previous years, out of the 4163 wild birds testing positive for HPAIv, subtype A(H5N1) virus was the main influenza A virus subtype identified among the wild bird testing positive for HPAIVs (3942; 95%). In addition, RCs also reported 984 wild birds testing positive for low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). Out of those, for 660 (67%) it was ascertained that the subtype was non-A(H5/H7); 260 (26%) wild birds tested positive for LPAIv of A(H5 or H7) subtypes and the remaining 64 (7%) LPAI viruses were belonging to other H-subtypes.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus-Induced Mass Death of Wild Birds, Caspian Sea, Russia, 2022

In May 2022, we observed a substantial die-off of wild migratory waterbirds on Maliy Zhemchuzhniy Island in the Caspian Sea, Russia. The deaths were caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4.b virus. Continued surveillance of influenza viruses in wild bird populations is needed to predict virus spread over long distances.

Neurotropic Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Red Foxes, Northern Germany

In a 1-year survey of wild terrestrial predators in northern Germany, we found that 5 of 110 foxes were infected with contemporary avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses, forming a temporal cluster during January‒March 2023. Encephalitis and strong cerebral virus replication but only sporadic mammalian-adaptive viral polymerase basic 2 protein E627K mutations were seen.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (HPAIV) H5N1 infection in two European grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) with encephalitis

ABSTRACTRecent reports documenting sporadic infections in carnivorous mammals worldwide with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b have raised concerns about the potential risk of adaptation to sustained transmission in mammals, including humans. We report H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b infection of two grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) from coastal waters of The Netherlands and Germany in December 2022 and February 2023, respectively. Histological and immunohistochemical investigations showed in both animals a non-suppurative and necrotising encephalitis with viral antigen restricted to the neuroparenchyma. Whole genome sequencing showed the presence of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strains in brain tissue, which were closely related to sympatric avian influenza viruses. Viral RNA was also detected in the lung of the seal from Germany by real-time quantitative PCR. No other organs tested positive. The mammalian adaptation PB2-E627K mutation was identified in approximately 40% of the virus population present in the brain tissue of the German seal. Retrospective screening for nucleoprotein-specific antibodies, of sera collected from 251 seals sampled in this region from 2020 to 2023, did not show evidence of influenza A virus-specific antibodies. Similarly, screening by reverse transcription PCR of tissues of 101 seals that had died along the Dutch coast in the period 2020-2021, did not show evidence of influenza virus infection. Collectively, these results indicate that individual seals are sporadically infected with HPAIV-H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, resulting in an encephalitis in the absence of a systemic infection, and with no evidence thus far of onward spread between seals.

A systematic review of mechanistic models used to study avian influenza virus transmission and control

The global spread of avian influenza A viruses in domestic birds is causing increasing socioeconomic devastation. Various mechanistic models have been developed to better understand avian influenza transmission and evaluate the effectiveness of control measures in mitigating the socioeconomic losses caused by these viruses. However, the results of models of avian influenza transmission and control have not yet been subject to a comprehensive review. Such a review could help inform policy makers and guide future modeling work. To help fill this gap, we conducted a systematic review of the mechanistic models that have been applied to field outbreaks. Our three objectives were to: (1) describe the type of models and their epidemiological context, (2) list estimates of commonly used parameters of low pathogenicity and highly pathogenic avian influenza transmission, and (3) review the characteristics of avian influenza transmission and the efficacy of control strategies according to the mechanistic models. We reviewed a total of 46 articles. Of these, 26 articles estimated parameters by fitting the model to data, one evaluated the effectiveness of control strategies, and 19 did both. Values of the between-individual reproduction number ranged widely: from 2.18 to 86 for highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, and from 4.7 to 45.9 for low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses, depending on epidemiological settings, virus subtypes and host species. Other parameters, such as the durations of the latent and infectious periods, were often taken from the literature, limiting the models' potential insights. Concerning control strategies, many models evaluated culling (n = 15), while vaccination received less attention (n = 6). According to the articles reviewed, optimal control strategies varied between virus subtypes and local conditions, and depended on the overall objective of the intervention. For instance, vaccination was optimal when the objective was to limit the overall number of culled flocks. In contrast, pre-emptive culling was preferred for reducing the size and duration of an epidemic. Early implementation consistently improved the overall efficacy of interventions, highlighting the need for effective surveillance and epidemic preparedness.

What Have We Learned by Resurrecting the 1918 Influenza Virus?

The 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic was one of the deadliest infectious disease events in recorded history, resulting in approximately 50-100 million deaths worldwide. The origins of the 1918 virus and the molecular basis for its exceptional virulence remained a mystery for much of the 20th century because the pandemic predated virologic techniques to isolate, passage, and store influenza viruses. In the late 1990s, overlapping fragments of influenza viral RNA preserved in the tissues of several 1918 victims were amplified and sequenced. The use of influenza reverse genetics then permitted scientists to reconstruct the 1918 virus entirely from cloned complementary DNA, leading to new insights into the origin of the virus and its pathogenicity. Here, we discuss some of the advances made by resurrection of the 1918 virus, including the rise of innovative molecular research, which is a topic in the dual use debate.

Different Outcomes of Chicken Infection with UK-Origin H5N1-2020 and H5N8-2020 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses (Clade 2.3.4.4b)

Clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the "goose/Guangdong" lineage have caused a series of European epizootics since 2014. During autumn/winter 2020-2021, several H5Nx subtypes were detected in the UK, with H5N8 being the dominant subtype in wild birds and poultry. Despite the greater subtype diversity (due to viral neuraminidase gene reassortment) reported in wild birds, only H5N8 and H5N1 subtypes caused clade 2.3.4.4 UK HPAIV poultry outbreaks during this period. The direct inoculation of layer chickens showed that H5N8-2020 was more infectious than H5N1-2020, which supported the European H5N8 dominance during that season. However, the mean death time was longer for H5N8-2020 (3.42 days) than for H5N1-2020 (2.17 days). Transmission from directly infected to naive in-contact chickens was inefficient for both subtypes. Histological lesions, the tissue dissemination of viral antigen, and nucleic acid were more extensive and abundant and accumulated more rapidly for H5N1-2020 compared with H5N8-2020. Although inefficient, H5N1-2020 transmission was faster, with its greater virulence indicating that this subtype posed a major concern, as subsequently shown during H5N1 dominance of the clade 2.3.4.4 epizootic since autumn 2021. An evaluation of these in vivo viral characteristics is key to understanding the continuing poultry threats posed by clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx HPAIVs.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza affects vultures' movements and breeding output

An exceptional highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak due to H5N1 virus genotypes belonging to clade 2.3.4.4.b has been affecting birds worldwide since autumn 2021.1,2,3 Mortality caused by viral infection has been well documented in poultry and more recently in wild birds, especially in seabird-breeding colonies.4,5,6 However, there is a critical lack of knowledge about how terrestrial birds deal with HPAI virus infections in terms of behavior and space use, especially during the breeding season.7,8,9 Understanding how birds move when they are infected could help evaluate the risk of spreading the virus at a distance among other populations of wild or domestic birds, this latter risk being especially important for commensal bird species. Through long-term GPS tracking, we described the changes in daily movement patterns of 31 adult griffon vultures Gyps fulvus in two French sites in 2022 compared with 3 previous years. In spring 2022, 21 vultures at both sites showed periods of immobility at the nest, during 5.6 days on average. Positive serological status of 2 individuals confirmed that they had been infected by HPAI viruses. Death was recorded for 3 of the 31 tracked individuals, whereas all others recovered and returned quickly to their foraging routine, although at least 9 birds failed breeding. Such immobility patterns and death rates were never observed in previous years and were not related to weather conditions. The high immobility behavior of infected birds could reduce the risks of transmission. The observed vulnerability to HPAI viruses questions the resistance of endangered vulture species worldwide if infected.

North American wintering mallards infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza show few signs of altered local or migratory movements

Avian influenza viruses pose a threat to wildlife and livestock health. The emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in wild birds and poultry in North America in late 2021 was the first such outbreak since 2015 and the largest outbreak in North America to date. Despite its prominence and economic impacts, we know relatively little about how HPAI spreads in wild bird populations. In January 2022, we captured 43 mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) in Tennessee, USA, 11 of which were actively infected with HPAI. These were the first confirmed detections of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in the Mississippi Flyway. We compared movement patterns of infected and uninfected birds and found no clear differences; infected birds moved just as much during winter, migrated slightly earlier, and migrated similar distances as uninfected birds. Infected mallards also contacted and shared space with uninfected birds while on their wintering grounds, suggesting ongoing transmission of the virus. We found no differences in body condition or survival rates between infected and uninfected birds. Together, these results show that HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b infection was unrelated to body condition or movement behavior in mallards infected at this location during winter; if these results are confirmed in other seasons and as HPAI H5N1 continues to evolve, they suggest that these birds could contribute to the maintenance and dispersal of HPAI in North America. Further research on more species across larger geographic areas and multiple seasons would help clarify potential impacts of HPAI on waterfowl and how this emerging disease spreads at continental scales, across species, and potentially between wildlife and domestic animals.

Detection of H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses in Four Raptors and Two Geese in Japan in the Fall of 2022

In the fall of 2022, high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) were detected from raptors and geese in Japan, a month earlier than in past years, indicating a shift in detection patterns. In this study, we conducted a phylogenetic analysis on H5N1 HPAIVs detected from six wild birds during the 2022/2023 season to determine their genetic origins. Our findings revealed that these HPAIVs belong to the G2 group within clade 2.3.4.4b, with all isolates classified into three subgroups: G2b, G2d, and G2c. The genetic background of the G2b virus (a peregrine falcon-derived strain) and G2d viruses (two raptors and two geese-derived strains) were the same as those detected in Japan in the 2021/2022 season. Since no HPAI cases were reported in Japan during the summer of 2022, it is probable that migratory birds reintroduced the G2b and G2d viruses. Conversely, the G2c virus (a raptor-derived strain) was first recognized in Japan in the fall of 2022. This strain might share a common ancestor with HPAIVs from Asia and West Siberia observed in the 2021/2022 season. The early migration of waterfowl to Japan in the fall of 2022 could have facilitated the early invasion of HPAIVs.

Recurring Trans-Atlantic Incursion of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 Viruses by Long Distance Migratory Birds from Northern Europe to Canada in 2022/2023

In December 2022 and January 2023, we isolated clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses from six American crows (Corvus brachyrhynchos) from Prince Edward Island and a red fox (Vulpes vulpes) from Newfoundland, Canada. Using full-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis, these viruses were found to fall into two distinct phylogenetic clusters: one group containing H5N1 viruses that had been circulating in North and South America since late 2021, and the other one containing European H5N1 viruses reported in late 2022. The transatlantic re-introduction for the second time by pelagic/Icelandic bird migration via the same route used during the 2021 incursion of Eurasian origin H5N1 viruses into North America demonstrates that migratory birds continue to be the driving force for transcontinental dissemination of the virus. This new detection further demonstrates the continual long-term threat of H5N1 viruses for poultry and mammals and the subsequent impact on various wild bird populations wherever these viruses emerge. The continual emergence of clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx viruses requires vigilant surveillance in wild birds, particularly in areas of the Americas, which lie within the migratory corridors for long-distance migratory birds originating from Europe and Asia. Although H5Nx viruses have been detected at higher rates in North America since 2021, a bidirectional flow of H5Nx genes of American origin viruses to Europe has never been reported. In the future, coordinated and systematic surveillance programs for HPAI viruses need to be launched between European and North American agencies.

A Dutch highly pathogenic H5N6 avian influenza virus showed remarkable tropism for extra-respiratory organs and caused severe disease but was not transmissible via air in the ferret model

Continued circulation of A/H5N1 influenza viruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage in poultry has resulted in the diversification in multiple genetic and antigenic clades. Since 2009, clade 2.3.4.4 hemagglutinin (HA) containing viruses harboring the internal and neuraminidase (NA) genes of other avian influenza A viruses have been detected. As a result, various HA-NA combinations, such as A/H5N1, A/H5N2, A/H5N3, A/H5N5, A/H5N6, and A/H5N8 have been identified. As of January 2023, 83 humans have been infected with A/H5N6 viruses, thereby posing an apparent risk for public health. Here, as part of a risk assessment, the in vitro and in vivo characterization of A/H5N6 A/black-headed gull/Netherlands/29/2017 is described. This A/H5N6 virus was not transmitted between ferrets via the air but was of unexpectedly high pathogenicity compared to other described A/H5N6 viruses. The virus replicated and caused severe lesions not only in respiratory tissues but also in multiple extra-respiratory tissues, including brain, liver, pancreas, spleen, lymph nodes, and adrenal gland. Sequence analyses demonstrated that the well-known mammalian adaptation substitution D701N was positively selected in almost all ferrets. In the in vitro experiments, no other known viral phenotypic properties associated with mammalian adaptation or increased pathogenicity were identified. The lack of transmission via the air and the absence of mammalian adaptation markers suggest that the public health risk of this virus is low. The high pathogenicity of this virus in ferrets could not be explained by the known mammalian pathogenicity factors and should be further studied. IMPORTANCE Avian influenza A/H5 viruses can cross the species barrier and infect humans. These infections can have a fatal outcome, but fortunately these influenza A/H5 viruses do not spread between humans. However, the extensive circulation and reassortment of A/H5N6 viruses in poultry and wild birds warrant risk assessments of circulating strains. Here an in-depth characterization of the properties of an avian A/H5N6 influenza virus isolated from a black-headed gull in the Netherlands was performed in vitro and in vivo, in ferrets. The virus was not transmissible via the air but caused severe disease and spread to extra-respiratory organs. Apart from the detection in ferrets of a mutation that increased virus replication, no other mammalian adaptation phenotypes were identified. Our results suggest that the risk of this avian A/H5N6 virus for public health is low. The underlying reasons for the high pathogenicity of this virus are unexplained and should be further studied.

Investigating the Genetic Diversity of H5 Avian Influenza Viruses in the United Kingdom from 2020-2022

Since 2020, the United Kingdom and Europe have experienced annual epizootics of high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV). The first epizootic, during the autumn/winter of 2020-2021, involved six H5Nx subtypes, although H5N8 HPAIV dominated in the United Kingdom. While genetic assessments of the H5N8 HPAIVs within the United Kingdom demonstrated relative homogeneity, there was a background of other genotypes circulating at a lower degree with different neuraminidase and internal genes.  Following a small number of detections of H5N1 in wild birds over the summer of 2021, the autumn/winter of 2021-2022 saw another European H5 HPAIV epizootic that dwarfed the prior epizootic. This second epizootic was dominated almost exclusively by H5N1 HPAIV, although six distinct genotypes were defined. We have used genetic analysis to evaluate the emergence of different genotypes and proposed reassortment events that have been observed. The existing data suggest that the H5N1 viruses circulating in Europe during late 2020 continued to circulate in wild birds throughout 2021, with minimal adaptation, but then went on to reassort with AIVs in the wild bird population. We have undertaken an in-depth genetic assessment of H5 HPAIVs detected in the United Kingdom over two winter seasons and demonstrate the utility of in-depth genetic analyses in defining the diversity of H5 HPAIVs circulating in avian species, the potential for zoonotic risk, and whether incidents of lateral spread can be defined over independent incursions of infections from wild birds. This provides key supporting data for mitigation activities. IMPORTANCE High-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) outbreaks devastate avian species across all sectors, having both economic and ecological impacts through mortalities in poultry and wild birds, respectively. These viruses can also represent a significant zoonotic risk. Since 2020, the United Kingdom has experienced two successive outbreaks of H5 HPAIV. While H5N8 HPAIV was predominant during the 2020-2021 outbreak, other H5 subtypes were also detected. The following year, there was a shift in the subtype dominance to H5N1 HPAIV, but multiple H5N1 genotypes were detected. Through the thorough utilization of whole-genome sequencing, it was possible to track and characterize the genetic evolution of these H5 HPAIVs in United Kingdom poultry and wild birds. This enabled us to assess the risk posed by these viruses at the poultry-wild bird and the avian-human interfaces and to investigate the potential lateral spread between infected premises, a key factor in understanding the threat to the commercial sector.

Genetic Characterization and Pathogenesis of H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Isolated in South Korea during 2021-2022

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx have been circulating in poultry and wild birds worldwide since 2014. In South Korea, after the first clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from wild birds in October 2021, additional HPAIV outbreaks occurred in poultry farms until April 2022. In this study, we genetically characterized clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV isolates in 2021-2022 and examined the pathogenicity and transmissibility of A/mandarin duck/Korea/WA585/2021 (H5N1) (WA585/21) in chickens and ducks. Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses caused 47 outbreaks in poultry farms and were also detected in multiple wild birds. Phylogenetic analysis of HA and NA genes indicated that Korean H5N1 HPAI isolates were closely related to Eurasian viruses isolated in 2021-2022. Four distinct genotypes of H5N1 HPAI viruses were identified in poultry, and the majority were also found in wild birds. WA585/21 inoculated chickens showed virulent pathogenicity with high mortality and transmission. Meanwhile, ducks infected with the virus showed no mortality but exhibited high rates of transmission and longer viral shedding than chickens, suggesting that they may play an important role as silent carriers. In conclusion, consideration of both genetic and pathogenic traits of H5N1 HPAI viruses is required for effective viral control.

The Molecular Epidemiology of Clade 2.3.4.4B H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Southern Africa, 2021-2022

In southern Africa, clade 2.3.4.4B H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) was first detected in South African (SA) poultry in April 2021, followed by outbreaks in poultry or wild birds in Lesotho and Botswana. In this study, the complete or partial genomes of 117 viruses from the SA outbreaks in 2021-2022 were analyzed to decipher the sub-regional spread of the disease. Our analysis showed that seven H5N1 sub-genotypes were associated with the initial outbreaks, but by late 2022 only two sub-genotypes still circulated. Furthermore, SA poultry was not the source of Lesotho's outbreaks, and the latter was most likely an introduction from wild birds. Similarly, SA and Botswana's outbreaks in 2021 were unrelated, but viruses of Botswana's unique sub-genotype were introduced into SA later in 2022 causing an outbreak in ostriches. At least 83% of SA's commercial poultry cases in 2021-2022 were point introductions from wild birds. Like H5N8 HPAI in 2017-2018, a coastal seabird-restricted sub-lineage of H5N1 viruses emerged in the Western Cape province in 2021 and spread to Namibia, causing mortalities in Cape Cormorants. In SA ~24,000 of this endangered species died, and the loss of >300 endangered African penguins further threatens biodiversity.

Efficient and Informative Laboratory Testing for Rapid Confirmation of H5N1 (Clade 2.3.4.4) High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Outbreaks in the United Kingdom

During the early stages of the UK 2021-2022 H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) epizootic in commercial poultry, 12 infected premises (IPs) were confirmed by four real-time reverse-transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RRT)-PCRs, which identified the viral subtype and pathotype. An assessment was undertaken to evaluate whether a large sample throughput would challenge laboratory capacity during an exceptionally large epizootic; hence, assay performance across our test portfolio was investigated. Statistical analysis of RRT-PCR swab testing supported it to be focused on a three-test approach, featuring the matrix (M)-gene, H5 HPAIV-specific (H5-HP) and N1 RRT-PCRs, which was successfully assessed at 29 subsequent commercial IPs. The absence of nucleotide mismatches in the primer/probe binding regions for the M-gene and limited mismatches for the H5-HP RRT-PCR underlined their high sensitivity. Although less sensitive, the N1 RRT-PCR remained effective at flock level. The analyses also guided successful surveillance testing of apparently healthy commercial ducks from at-risk premises, with pools of five oropharyngeal swabs tested by the H5-HP RRT-PCR to exclude evidence of infection. Serological testing at anseriform H5N1 HPAIV outbreaks, together with quantitative comparisons of oropharyngeal and cloacal shedding, provided epidemiological information concerning the chronology of initial H5N1 HPAIV incursion and onward spread within an IP.

Rapid evolution of A(H5N1) influenza viruses after intercontinental spread to North America

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b underwent an explosive geographic expansion in 2021 among wild birds and domestic poultry across Asia, Europe, and Africa. By the end of 2021, 2.3.4.4b viruses were detected in North America, signifying further intercontinental spread. Here we show that the western movement of clade 2.3.4.4b was quickly followed by reassortment with viruses circulating in wild birds in North America, resulting in the acquisition of different combinations of ribonucleoprotein genes. These reassortant A(H5N1) viruses are genotypically and phenotypically diverse, with many causing severe disease with dramatic neurologic involvement in mammals. The proclivity of the current A(H5N1) 2.3.4.4b virus lineage to reassort and target the central nervous system warrants concerted planning to combat the spread and evolution of the virus within the continent and to mitigate the impact of a potential influenza pandemic that could originate from similar A(H5N1) reassortants.

Avian influenza spread and seabird movements between colonies

Seabirds have recently been experiencing high rates of mortality across wide scales due to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). During breeding, seabird populations are highly spatially structured, while over their lifetimes they spend much time at sea. This makes them unique systems in which to document how movement and interspecies interactions affect eco-epidemiological dynamics.

Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) from the 2021/22 epizootic is highly duck adapted and poorly adapted to chickens

The 2021/2022 epizootic of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAIV) remains one of the largest ever in the UK, being caused by a clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV. This epizootic affected more than 145 poultry premises, most likely through independent incursion from infected wild birds, supported by more than 1700 individual detections of H5N1 from wild bird mortalities. Here an H5N1 HPAIV, representative of this epizootic (H5N1-21), was used to investigate its virulence, pathogenesis and transmission in layer chickens and Pekin ducks, two species of epidemiological importance. We inoculated both avian species with decreasing H5N1-21 doses. The virus was highly infectious in ducks, with high infection levels and accompanying shedding of viral RNA, even in ducks inoculated with the lowest dose, reflecting the strong waterfowl adaptation of the clade 2.3.4.4 HPAIVs. Duck-to-duck transmission was very efficient, coupled with high environmental contamination. H5N1-21 was frequently detected in water sources, serving as likely sources of infection for ducks, but inhalable dust and aerosols represented low transmission risks. In contrast, chickens inoculated with the highest dose exhibited lower rates of infection compared to ducks. There was no evidence for experimental H5N1-21 transmission to any naive chickens, in two stocking density scenarios, coupled with minimal and infrequent contamination being detected in the chicken environment. Systemic viral dissemination to multiple organs reflected the pathogenesis and high mortalities in both species. In summary, the H5N1-21 virus is highly infectious and transmissible in anseriformes, yet comparatively poorly adapted to galliformes, supporting strong host preferences for wild waterfowl. Key environmental matrices were also identified as being important in the epidemiological spread of this virus during the continuing epizootic.

Zoonotic Animal Influenza Virus and Potential Mixing Vessel Hosts

Influenza viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae with a negative-sense, single-stranded segmented RNA genome. They infect a wide range of animals, including humans. From 1918 to 2009, there were four influenza pandemics, which caused millions of casualties. Frequent spillover of animal influenza viruses to humans with or without intermediate hosts poses a serious zoonotic and pandemic threat. The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic overshadowed the high risk raised by animal influenza viruses, but highlighted the role of wildlife as a reservoir for pandemic viruses. In this review, we summarize the occurrence of animal influenza virus in humans and describe potential mixing vessel or intermediate hosts for zoonotic influenza viruses. While several animal influenza viruses possess a high zoonotic risk (e.g., avian and swine influenza viruses), others are of low to negligible zoonotic potential (e.g., equine, canine, bat and bovine influenza viruses). Transmission can occur directly from animals, particularly poultry and swine, to humans or through reassortant viruses in "mixing vessel" hosts. To date, there are less than 3000 confirmed human infections with avian-origin viruses and less than 7000 subclinical infections documented. Likewise, only a few hundreds of confirmed human cases caused by swine influenza viruses have been reported. Pigs are the historic mixing vessel host for the generation of zoonotic influenza viruses due to the expression of both avian-type and human-type receptors. Nevertheless, there are a number of hosts which carry both types of receptors and can act as a potential mixing vessel host. High vigilance is warranted to prevent the next pandemic caused by animal influenza viruses.

In Vitro and In Vivo Characterization of H5N8 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Neurotropism in Ducks and Chickens

H5N8 high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) of clade 2.3.4.4B, which circulated during the 2016 epizootics in Europe, was notable for causing different clinical signs in ducks and chickens. The clinical signs preceding death were predominantly neurological in ducks versus respiratory in chickens. To investigate the determinants for the predominant neurological signs observed in ducks, we infected duck and chicken primary cortical neurons. Viral replication was identical in neuronal cultures from both species. In addition, we did not detect any major difference in the immune and inflammatory responses. These results suggest that the predominant neurological involvement of H5N8 HPAIV infection in ducks could not be recapitulated in primary neuronal cultures. In vivo, H5N8 HPAIV replication in ducks peaked soon after infection and led to an early colonization of the central nervous system. In contrast, viral replication was delayed in chickens but ultimately burst in the lungs of chickens, and the chickens died of respiratory distress before brain damage became significant. Consequently, the immune and inflammatory responses in the brain were significantly higher in duck brains than those in chickens. Our study thus suggests that early colonization of the central nervous system associated with prolonged survival after the onset of virus replication is the likely primary cause of the sustained inflammatory response and subsequent neurological disorders observed in H5N8 HPAIV-infected ducks. IMPORTANCE The severity of high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) infection has been linked to its ability to replicate systemically and cause lesions in a variety of tissues. However, the symptomatology depends on the host species. The H5N8 virus of clade 2.3.4.4B had a pronounced neurotropism in ducks, leading to severe neurological disorders. In contrast, neurological signs were rarely observed in chickens, which suffered mostly from respiratory distress. Here, we investigated the determinants of H5N8 HPAIV neurotropism. We provide evidence that the difference in clinical signs was not due to a difference in neurotropism. Our results rather indicate that chickens died of respiratory distress due to intense viral replication in the lungs before viral replication in the brain could produce significant lesions. In contrast, ducks better controlled virus replication in the lungs, thus allowing the virus to replicate for a sufficient duration in the brain, to reach high levels, and to cause significant lesions.

The health of influenza surveillance and pandemic preparedness in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic is the first to have emerged when Next Generation Sequencing was readily available and it has played the major role in following evolution of the causative agent, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2. Response to the pandemic was greatly facilitated though use of existing influenza surveillance networks: World Health Organization (WHO) Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), focussing largely on human influenza, and the OFFLU network of expertise on avian influenza established by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH). Data collection/deposition platforms associated with these networks, notably WHO's FluNet and the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) were/are being used intensely. Measures introduced to combat COVID-19 resulted in greatly decreased circulation of human seasonal influenza viruses for approximately 2 years, but circulation continued in the animal sector with an upsurge in the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 with large numbers of wild bird deaths, culling of many poultry flocks and sporadic spill over into mammalian species, including humans, thereby increasing pandemic risk potential. While there are proposals/implementations to extend use of GISRS and GISAID to other infectious disease agents (e.g. Respiratory Syncytial Virus and Monkeypox), there is need to ensure that influenza surveillance is maintained and improved in both human and animal sectors in a sustainable manner to be truly prepared (early detection) for the next influenza pandemic.

Homo- and Heterosubtypic Immunity to Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Mitigates the Clinical Outcome of Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4.b in Captive Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos)

In this study, we investigated the clinical response, viral shedding, transmissibility, pathologic lesions, and tropism of HPAIV Gs/Gd H5N8 subtype (clade 2.3.4.4b), following experimental infection of three groups of captive mallards (Anas platyrhynchos): (i) fully susceptible, (ii) pre-exposed to low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) H5N1 subtype, and (iii) pre-exposed to LPAIV H3N8 subtype. Infection of naïve mallards with HPAIV H5N8 resulted in ~60% mortality, neurological signs, abundant shedding, and transmission to contact ducks, who also became sick and died. High amounts of viral RNA were found in all collected organs, with the highest RNA load recorded in the brain. The IHC examinations performed on tissues collected at 4 and 14 days post-infection (dpi) revealed tropism to nervous tissue, myocardium, respiratory epithelium, and hepatic and pancreatic cells. The mallards pre-exposed to LPAIV H5N1 and challenged with HPAIV H5N8 were asymptomatic and showed a significant reduction of viral RNA shedding, yet still sufficient to cause infection (but no disease) in the contact ducks. The AIV antigen was not detected in organs at 4 and 14 dpi, and microscopic lesions were mild and scarce. Similarly, mallards previously inoculated with LPAIV H3N8 remained healthy after challenge with HPAIV H5N8, but viral RNA was detected in large quantities in swabs and organs, particularly in the early phase of infection. However, in contrast to mallards from group I, the IHC staining yielded negative results at the selected timepoints. The virus was transmitted to contact birds, which remained symptomless but demonstrated low levels of viral RNA shedding and mild- to moderate tissue damage despite negative IHC staining. The results indicate that naïve mallards are highly susceptible to HPAIV H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b and that homo- and heterosubtypic immunity to LPAIV can mitigate the clinical outcomes of infection.

Genotype Diversity, Wild Bird-to-Poultry Transmissions, and Farm-to-Farm Carryover during the Spread of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in the Czech Republic in 2021/2022

In 2021/2022, the re-emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) occurred in Europe. The outbreak was seeded from two sources: resident and reintroduced viruses, which is unprecedented in the recorded history of avian influenza. The dominant subtype was H5N1, which replaced the H5N8 subtype that had predominated in previous seasons. In this study, we present a whole genome sequence and a phylogenetic analysis of 57 H5N1 HPAI and two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H5N1 strains collected in the Czech Republic during 2021/2022. Phylogenetic analysis revealed close relationships between H5N1 genomes from poultry and wild birds and secondary transmission in commercial geese. The genotyping showed considerable genetic heterogeneity among Czech H5N1 viruses, with six different HPAI genotypes, three of which were apparently unique. In addition, second-order reassortment relationships were observed with the direct involvement of co-circulating H5N1 LPAI strains. The genetic distance between Czech H5N1 HPAI and the closest LPAI segments available in the database illustrates the profound gaps in our knowledge of circulating LPAI strains. The changing dynamics of HPAI in the wild may increase the likelihood of future HPAI outbreaks and present new challenges in poultry management, biosecurity, and surveillance.

Reduced Seasonal Coronavirus Antibody Responses in Children Following COVID-19 Mitigation Measures, The Netherlands

SARS-CoV-2 prevention and control measures did not only impact SARS-CoV-2 circulation, but also the timing and prevalence of other seasonal respiratory viruses. Especially in children, information on exposure and infections to seasonal coronaviruses as well as SARS-CoV-2 in the first year of the pandemic is largely lacking. Therefore, we set up a one-year serological survey in a large tertiary hospital in the Netherlands. We show that seasonal coronavirus seroprevalence significantly decreased in 2021 in children less than one year, most likely due to COVID-19 control measures. The SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence in children and adolescents increased from 0.4% to 11.3%, the highest in adolescents. This implies higher exposure rates in adolescents as compared to the general population (>18 years old). It is clear that there have been significant changes in the circulation and subsequent immunity against most respiratory pathogens as a result of the mitigation measures. The implications on shorter as well as longer term are still largely unknown, but the impact of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and subsequent control measures will continue to affect the dynamics of other pathogens.

Iceland as Stepping Stone for Spread of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus between Europe and North America

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of hemagglutinin type H5 and clade 2.3.4.4b have widely spread within the northern hemisphere since 2020 and threaten wild bird populations, as well as poultry production. We present phylogeographic evidence that Iceland has been used as a stepping stone for HPAIV translocation from northern Europe to North America by infected but mobile wild birds. At least 2 independent incursions of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b assigned to 2 hemagglutinin clusters, B1 and B2, are documented for summer‒autumn 2021 and spring 2022. Spread of HPAIV H5N1 to and among colony-breeding pelagic avian species in Iceland is ongoing. Potentially devastating effects (i.e., local losses >25%) on these species caused by extended HPAIV circulation in space and time are being observed at several affected breeding sites throughout the North Atlantic.